| The following plan for fishery management is one that ORGALA
could lobby INGALA or the Ministry of the Environment of Ecuador to adopt,
either in its entirety or in any parts ORGALA lobbyists can convince them
to accept. The current common quota system promotes gold rush fishing in which fisherman compete with each other to catch fish the fastest. This results in much more destructive fishing, as fishermen have no time for environmentally friendly methods. Also, the fish they capture will get them less because huge quantities will be fished and sold at the start of the season, meaning the price will be much lower. ITQs would dissolve the need to rush for fish, as each fisherman would be allotted part of the stock, and they will be able to sell the fish at a greater profit. ITQs also have been found to promote a much greater sense of ownership of the fishery resource in the fishermen, which often results in an increased motivation to conserve and care for the well-being of the marine ecosystem. |
| The Plan |
Notes on the
plan |
| All fishery catches in the Galápagos will be
regulated by the distribution of individual quotas for each species by the
Galápagos National Park Service (GNPS) 1. Nature of the ITQ Each ITQ will specify a certain indivisible amount of total landing for a species. The ITQ represents the privilege of the owner to fish that certain amount in a season. The quotas may be bought and sold. 2. Allotment of the ITQs A total catch amount for a species will be determined based on environmental sustainability. Some fraction, perhaps ¾, of that total sustainable catch will be distributed to current fishing vessel operators, and the rest will be available to be bought from the government. No single operator should be allowed to hold more than some fraction of the total allowable catch in ITQs, perhaps no more than 10% (this would depend on the species in question). The initial distribution of ITQs will go as follows: As mentioned, 75% of the total ITQs will be allotted to current operators. 50% of the total ITQs will be divided according to each operator’s average annual catch over the past 5 years. Then 25% of the total ITQs will be given out by random drawing to current operators who agree to certain provisions, such as unlimited open access of their vessels to GNPS rangers, the use of environmentally friendly fishing methods, etc. In order for any operator to maintain his ITQs, he must, by the end of the second season of fishing his ITQs have completed at least 30 hours at an accredited university in a course related to the marine environment. 3. Restrictions and Revocation of ITQs The GNPS will reserve the right to revoke without compensation the ITQs held by any operator found to misrepresent of falsify his catch reporting, fish in restricted areas, engage in high-grading, or willfully violate any other regulation designed to protect the ecosystem. The operator in question must have a hearing before a panel produced by the GNPS with qualified representation present before revocation is possible. If the panel finds the operator acted out of ignorance rather than willful neglect, they may order him to take a class in a marine ecology and prove his understanding of the regulations coupled with a reasonable temporary suspension of ITQs. If the ITQs are indeed revoked, the operator may re-purchase ITQs if any remain at the start of the next season. Any operator or crewmember who provides direct evidence of the violation of one of the aforementioned regulations that results in the revocation of an operator’s ITQs will receive 50% of the violating operator’s ITQs, provided he does not exceed the maximum limit on percent share of the total sustainable catch. In the event of an ecological crisis involving the species in question, the GNPS reserves the right to suspend any ITQs after 30 days notice to all holders of ITQs. If the suspension continues for more than one season, the GNPS must upon request either refund the suspended operators’ ITQs for their original value or give them any available ITQs of equivalent value in another fishery. The GNPS is not responsible for buying operators’ ITQs except during an extended suspension, but they must exchange ITQs upon request for ITQs in different fisheries, of course without exceeding the determined total sustainable catch. 4. Annual reevaluation of total quota The total sustainable fishing quota out of which ITQs are divided must be reevaluated after each fishing season, and the quantity each ITQ represents can be altered to fit a larger or smaller quota allotment. In the case of an increased allotment, the GNPS may also opt to sell more ITQs rather then alter the value of each existing one. |
Please note that
the percentages specified here are merely ballpark estimates; the real figures
would depend on specific situations and species. It would be advisable for the GNPS to underestimate this total quota, as it is easy and good PR to be able to hand out extra quotas later, but it would be highly unpopular to have to downgrade the amount of each quota or confiscate quotas later. The eco-friendly ITQ bonus idea has proven successful in other situations as an effective incentive for eco-friendly operation The education of fishermen is essential, as many of them damage the environment solely out of ignorance of the consequences of their actions. High grading is a potentially disastrous practice of throwing back inferior specimens and bringing back and registering as part of one's individual quota the best of the catch, which would result in gross overfishing. This tattletale idea is my own, and it is likely to be controversial, but it carries the potential to break the back of illegal fishing practices from within. |