This committee report, labeled "intergovernmental cooperation" and consisting of Congressmen and -women from both major political parties takes a look at the entire Hurricane Katrina fiasco around six months after the disaster first struck. Although bland in both writing style and statements, it does come to the noteworthy conclusion that the confusion following the hurricane was a result of a "failure of initiative", more specifically the leadership of FEMA. In other words, this House report lends credence to the claims of the federal government's delayed response to the disaster. While not particularly revealing, the document's value lies in its being the Congressional response to the hurricane, assessing what went wrong.

Although the topic of this book is not Hurricane Katrina, it chronicles the political aftermath of a similar disaster in the region, the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927. The author's central thesis consists of the claim that the flood forever changed American history, through empowering various political groups in Louisiana and at the national stage. The book also contains interesting documents relating the opposition of some engineers to building stronger levees around New Orleans; they believed that New Orleans should be relocated in order to avoid a large-scale flood. In many ways, these issues were the predecessors to today's debates on what to do with New Orleans.

In this book, the RAND Corporation, a think tank associated mostly with national security issues, offers its outlook on the Hurricane Katrina disaster. The book resulted from a cooperation between the RAND Corporation and the (Louisiana) Governor's Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal. Consequently, the book concerns itself mostly with creating affordable housing, looking at precedents in the region and tried and true methods for bringing affordable real estate development. The authors are of the opinion that the city of New Orleans should assert itself against communities unwilling to accept affordable housing in their midst in order to provide affordable housing for residents who lost property. The book also contains useful data on income levels in New Orleans before Katrina hit.

This Wall Street Journal article describes the "bungling" of the federal response immediately following the disaster. It mentions a variety of bureacratic and interagency failures that prevented enough rescue materials to arrive at the scene on time, ranging from a failed internet server at FEMA to FEMA actually asking the wrong governmental agency for ambulances. According to the article, the long delay in declaring Hurricane Katrina an "Incident of National Significance", the underestimation of required resources, the lack of experience of high-level managers in FEMA, and the long duration of time taken to utilize even the simplest of resources all contributed to the suffering following the hurricane.

This USA Today article discusses the problem of government corruption in New Orleans. The article states that due to New Orleans' various dense regulations, businesses have traditionally used bribary, benefits, and political favors to persuade politicians to allow them to break the rules. The corrupt government employees can be found at all levels, local law enforcement officials to high-level public officials. FBI sources informed the author of this article that the corruptions cases they plan to file against officials in Louisiana, a number that has been steadily increasing in the past five years, will skyrocket this year (2005-2006). The author mentions that high corruption levels can ward off businesses not wanting to play ball, resulting in a lower tax base for the city of New Orleans.

This book abounds with documents tracing the alleged negligence of the Army Corps of Engineers in designing the levees that were supposed to protect New Orleans. The thesis of the authors comprises a belief that Hurricane Katrina was mostly a man-made disaster in that it had been foreseen and even fore-calculated, yet nobody took the political initiative to save New Orleans, leading to budget cuts for the flood protection system. The authors also claim that once FEMA entered the Department of Homeland Security umbrella, its ability to defend against natural disasters quickly faded in light of the national emphasis on combatting terrorism, leading to confusion of epic proportions following the hurricane. Both opinianated and documented, Disaster sheds light on the history of Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans.

Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, who represents California's 8th District and is the Minority Leader of the United States House of Representatives, issued this press release concerning what she considered failures of the Davis Committee in its report on Hurricane Katrina. The press release raises interesting questions regarding the behavior of the federal government following Hurricane Katrina's strike on New Orleans. The press release also charges that nobody knows who was in charge of public health right after Hurricane Katrina, with the two men who were supposed to be in charge both claiming that it was the other's responsibility.

As a libertarian think tank, the Cato Institute often makes unpopular arguments, and the one advanced in this article is no exception. Unlike the think tanks promoting direct government aid to the displaced residents of New Orleans, the Cato Institute argues for the exact opposite, saying that direct government aid to uninsured citizens discourages them from taking personal responsibility. This article claims that just because the uninsured residents did not "value" their insurance enough, other taxpayers should not have to pay to cover them. The central tenet of the article (and libertarianism) is promotion of self-reliance, and the article advances the argument that if the federal government does not take care of the displaced, private citizens will step in with charities, encouraging team work and self-reliance among the people of New Orleans. While probably controversial, the article's arguments cannot be discounted in our analysis.

This House report on the passing of House Resolution 437, which would establish a "select bipartisan committee" to report on what happened during the Huricane in terms of government response, gives researchers a window to look into the mechanisms of Congress after the Hurricane. As can be seen, the resolution was passed on the 14th of September, meaning that by that time there were already legitimate complains about the actions (and inactions) of the federal government with regards to Hurricane Katrina. The report also reveals that a motion to consider House Resolution 3764, which would have authorized "appropriations for the Securities and Exchange Commission", failed.

As the official online representative of the federal government's response, this website carries out the valuable task of breaking down the spending of the government over disaster relief. Although the figures are quite dated (the press release came out on February 16, 2006), they still shed light on the spending priorities of the White House. For example, the largest portion of the money ($9.4 billion) is going to direct relief, to be handed to FEMA. An additional $1.36 billion is being requested for "improved storm protection", while a much smaller portion ($70 million) is going to build an early warning system. Following the disaster in New Orleans, employees at all levels of the federal government, including President Bush, have faced criticism over a perceived delay and reluctance in assistance.

In this expose published on the left-leaning newsletter AlterNet, Mr. Flaherty claims that following the Hurricane, police abuse and brutality in New Orleans increased and the government turned a blind eye to the misery. Furthermore, Mr. Flaherty condemns FEMA for building itself a lavish compound (base of operations) inside New Orleans, while having little real work done. Moreover, according to Mr. Flaherty, the majority of the new contracts are going to out-of-state contracters, while the actual residents of New Orleans have low employment and thus little incentive to return to help rebuild. Mr. Flaherty sums up by implying that disasters such as the one in New Orleans remind the nation of how it views itself and the troubles bubbling under urban societies.

In this article, two free-market economists of the libertarian-leading Heritage Foundation present their take on House Resolution 3768, also known as the Katrina Tax Relief Act. While extolling the Act for its extending tax breaks over charity contributions to Hurricane Katrina and temporarily decreasing taxes on businesses in the region, the article argues that the government should make the tax cuts permanent and decrease spending in order to provide businesses with an incentive to move into the region. The report generally hints that the federal government should decrease direct aid to residents and instead try to boost employment through having businesses involved in the recovery effort. The paper also analyses the economic costs of Katrina in a variety of ways, and presents plans for remedying those costs.

This Washington Post column by Dan Froomkin discusses a dimension of the political process not hitherto covered, the benefits resulting from Katrina legislation. In this article, Mr. Froomkin discusses the election strategy of President Bush, as embodied by his chief political advisor, Karl Rove. The article points out the voting costs and benefits to the Republican and Democratic strategies concerning Hurricane Katrina, especially the consequences on upcoming elections. The columnist claims the Republican strategy has mostly consisted of rallying behind Bush, while the Democratic strategy has been to criticize the Bush's appointments to government agencies (such as FEMA). Obviously, both major political parties have much to gain, and lose, over this fiasco, and some of those effects may be seen in the November 2006 Congressional elections.

The author of the book, Jed Horne, is also the editor of the New Orleans Time-Picayune, giving him a somewhat more "closer-to-home" writing style. This book features heavy criticism of politicians on all levels of government for the delayed response to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. Although the book does not describe the hierarchy of government involved in the recovery efforts, nor does it mean to, it has the rare ability to give readers a glimpse into life in New Orleans in the first tragic days after the Hurricane. It is a must-read for anyone pondering the rebuilding and possible relocating of New Orleans.

After considering FEMA's efforts, the next natural place to look at is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FEMA's supervisor. Created from the merger of twenty-two federal emergency relief agencies by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, this cabinet-level department aims to protect the US from both natural and man-made catastrophes. For a while after Katrina struck, the Department of Homeland Security became heavily involved in the cleanup activities. The indicated DHS website proves itself to be useful in many ways: not only does it does it have a detailed list of policies passed by DHS concerning the recovery effort, but it also has links to other government agencies, on both the federal and state levels, involved in the cleanup. The site also hosts many of DHS's declarations and press releases, making it excellent for analyzing the post-Hurricane government strategy.

Although Rolling Stone Magazine is more used to writing about the music of New Orleans, in this article the magazine attempts to extricate the various government agencies in charge of cleaning up New Orleans from each other. The article claims that the Bush Administration, upon inauguration, replaced FEMA's staff with "political cronies" and placed many corporate CEOs on the advisory council of FEMA, resulting in waste on no-bid contracts. Also, it claims that some of the money of the Department of Homeland Security was diverted from legitimate FEMA expenses (before the Hurricane) to protecting landmarks of dubious susceptibility to terrorist attacks. While harsh in criticism, the article is detailed and well-documented, making it a useful read.

This testimony by Gregory D. Kutz, the managing director of forensic audits and special investigations, provides a look into the other side of the coin of federal assistance: fraud. In his printed testimony to Congress, Mr. Kutz explains how the government's rushed response (notice rushed, not timely) to the disaster resulted in fraud and abuse of the system. For example, the government provided $2,000 debit cards to those who claimed to have fled from New Orleans, but many of these cards (Kutz mentions 60 in Texas) went to fraudulent social security numbers or those of deceased people. Some of these cards paid for non-essential and luxury goods, which can not only result in wasted federal dollars but also undermine public support for the people of New Orleans. The testimony also makes recommendations for similar disasters in the future.

The Brookings Institute, a widely respected non-profit think tank, has a trove of documents concerning the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, including but not limited to reports, graphs, and recordings of panel discussions on policy. The particular document referenced above by Ms. Liu offers a concise look at the money behind the reconstruction effort. Even more importantly, it analyzes the income brackets within New Orleans and the role of affordable housing, which in its opinion should be provided by the government, in alleviating the situation at New Orleans. Most importantly, it describes a general plan to ensure that New Orleans recovers and prospers, and stresses that the city of New Orleans must write its own unified and detailed plan for progress.

This essay discusses the possibility of federalizing New Orleans. Federalizing is the process by which the National Guard and certain other institutions of a city are commandeered by the federal government, in order to override the local government or to more effectively carry out a certain operation. While we will most likely not decide to federalize New Orleans, this essay provides some insight into the events immediately following Hurricane Katrina, describing how President Bush asked the governor of Louisiana to federalize New Orleans but was rejected. Although he could have federalized New Orleans anyway, he chose not to, probably for the reasons listed in this article. The essay describes the constitutional process behind federalizing, and enumerates its advantages and disadvantages. A worthwhile read, if nothing else.

What better place to begin one's research of government involvement in the Hurricane Katrina disaster than the website of the federal government agency responsible for evacuating and assisting those caught in large-scale disasters, FEMA, or the Federal Emergency Management Agency. In the week following Hurricane Katrina's landfall at New Orleans, FEMA received intense criticism from politicians and figures across the political spectrum, for its perceived shortcomings in evacuating New Orleans, its apparent incomplete knowledge of the extent of the damage, and the alleged incompetence of its leadership. Currently, the website contains digital copies of many of FEMA's declarations, providing insight into the spending and scheduling arrangements of FEMA. It also references some of the laws and policies underpinning its actions.

This article in the New York Time does a good job of briefly exploring popular beliefs for why the federal government took longer than expected to aid New Orleans. Among the reasons listed are the low income levels of the areas afflicted by the storm, the negligence of the Army Corps of Engineers, and bureacracy surrounding the storm. The value of this article lies mostly in its timing; coming right after the storm, it captures fresh opinions from politicians and citizens, rather than vague ones. The article concludes that while the American people will eventually move on from this disaster, the government's bungling of the response has resulted in lost credibility both at home and abroad.

This article, by the business-oriented New Orleans City Business, discusses the Road Home program and its grievances, especially its very gradual implementation (as of the article's publishing, only thirteen households have been paid) and its relationship with other funds given immediately after Katrina. The article's usefulness lies in its presenting a wide range of views, from dissatisfied citizen to politician. Since the Road Home program will form the centerpiece of our rebuilding plan, we need to seriously take these concerns into consideration when implementing our management scheme on to New Orleans.