

Figure 20.1 Deadweight Loss of a Tax Gruber: Public Finance and Public Policy, First Edition Copyright © 2005 by Worth Publishers




Figure 20.3 Marginal Deadweight Loss Rises with Tax Rate Gruber: Public Finance and Public Policy, First Edition Copyright © 2005 by Worth Publishers

## **FORMULAS**

## FROM IMPLEMENTING A TAX:

$$DWL = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{\eta_d \eta_s}{\eta_s - \eta_d} \tau^2 \frac{Q}{P}$$

Change in consumer price (burden):  $\frac{\eta_s}{\eta_s - \eta_d} \tau$ 

Change in producer price (burden):  $\frac{\eta_d}{\eta_s - \eta_d} \tau$ 

## RAMSEY RULE:

If p=1 and supply is perfectly elastic:

$$\tau^{i} = -\frac{1}{\eta_{d}^{i}} \lambda \Rightarrow \tau^{i} \eta_{d}^{i} = \tau^{j} \eta_{d}^{j} \text{ for goods i and j}$$




Figure 20.4 Preexisting Distortions Matter Gruber: Public Finance and Public Policy, First Edition Copyright © 2005 by Worth Publishers

Table 1
Non-linear budget constraint models: summary of some empirical results for men

Study		W, wage; Y, income	Functional form of labor supply and budget set structure	specification <sup>a</sup>	Uncompensate wage elasticit	y elasticity
Blomquist (1983)		,	Linear labor supply,		0.08	-0.03
	Litting Date (b)	23.0	convex (piecewise		80.0	-0.04
	sample size 688, all	× average hours per	linear)	preferences		
		week)		(on income		
		W, directly observed	,	coefficient)		
		Y, spouse's net income				
		<ul> <li>family allowances</li> </ul>		•		
		+ net capital income		** 1.1 1		
Blomquist and		A A S COLUMN AND S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S	Linear and quadratic	Linear labor supply	0.00	ćoo o
Hansson-Brusewitz (1990)	Living Survey 1981:		labor supply	ML-convex	0.08	-0.002 $-0.008$
		Y, spouse's net income	Convex and non-	ML-non-convex	0.08	-0.008 $-0.01$
			convex (piecewise	ML-convex random	0.13	-0.01
	aged 25-55	+ net capital income	linear)	preferences		
				Quadratic labor supply	0.10	0.000
				ML-convex	0.12	-0.008 $-0.07$
Bourgiugnon and	French Labour Force	,	Linear labor supply	ML-convex, random	0.1	-0.07
Magnac (1990)	Survey 1985: sample	110 000	Convex (piecewise	preferences		
·		W, hourly net wage	linear)			
	employed, married,	(monthly earnings /				
		hours)				
4		Y, family allowances				
Blundell and	British Family	H, usual weekly hours	Gorman polar form/	ML-convex, random	0.024	-0.287
Walker (1986)		W, weekly earnings/	translog	preferences		
Walker (1900)		hours	Convex (piece-wise			
	1378, all employed,		linear)			
	married, aged 18-59	two-stage budgeting b				
Flood and MaCurdy (1992)	Swedish Household	H, annual hours	Linear and semi-	Linear labor supply		
1100d and Wacardy (1552)	Market and Non-		logarithmic	ML-piecewise linear,	0.16	-0.1
		(annual earnings/	Convex (piecewise	random preferences		
	1984: sample size 492 all employed, married, aged 25–65	y, asset income, UI, housing allowances etc.	linear and differentiable)	(on income coefficient additive measurement error ML-differentiable, random preferences	)	
					1	
				(on income coefficient		
				measurement error:	0.14	-0.09
				Additive	0.14	-0.07
				Multiplicative	0.04	-0.08
				None		,
				Semi-log labor supply		
				ML-differentiable,		•
				random preferences,		
•				measurement error:	0.21	-0.09
				Multiplicative	0.21 0.25	-0.09 $-0.1$
				None	$\{-0.25,$	{-0.11
				IV across 7 different		0.04}
		•		specifications	0.21}	{-0.95
Hausman (1981)	· US Panel Study of	H, annual hours	Linear labor supply	ML, random	{0.00,	-1.03
Hausman (1901)	Income Dynamics	W, directly reported		preferences (on incon	ne 0.03}	1.03
•	1975: sample size 1085, all employed, married, aged 25–55	hourly wage rates Y, other income assuming 8% return t	0	coefficient)		
		financial assets	Convex and non-	ML-convex	-0.004	-0.28
Kaiser et al. (1992)	German	H, annual hours	convex (piecewice-	Linear labor supply		
	SocioEconomic Pane	W, hourly wage		convex (piecewise		
	1983: sample size 238	32 (annual income/annual	ai micai)	linear)		
	employed, 939 non-	hours)		milcai)		
	employed, married,	Y, income from rents	S.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
	non-retired	capital income and	,			

From: Handbook of Labor Economics vol 3A, Blundell Macurdy

Table 2.26
Summary of labor supply estimates for women implied by results of selected studies of female labor supply.

		Wage	Total-income elasticity	
Study	Sample, procedure used	Uncompensated Compensated		
	Data for Unite	d States		
Heckman (1976b)	White wives age 30-44:			
, ,	Procedure IV	1.46	1.48	-0.02
	Procedure VI	4.31	4.35	-0.04
Cogan (1980a)	White wives age 30-44:			
	Procedure II	1.14	1.17	-0.03
	Procedure III	3.50	3.60	-0.10
	Procedure VI	2.83	2.91	-0.09
Schultz (1980)	White wives age 35-44 (lbc):			
	Procedure I	0.16	0.21	-0.05
	Procedure II	0.13	0.19	-0.05
	Procedure III	0.65	0.83	-0.18
	Black wives age 35-44 (lbc):			
	Procedure I	0.60	0.34	0.26
	Procedure II	0.42	0.41	0.01
	Procedure III	1.04	0.56	0.48
Trussell and	White wives age 25-45 (Procedure VI		n.a.	-0.41*
Abowd (1980)	Black wives age 25-45 (Procedure VI)		n.a.	≈ 0*
Heckman (1980)	White wives age 30-44:			
11001111111 (2700)	Procedure IV	2.26	2.26	<b>≃</b> 0
	Procedure VII	1.47	1.47	<b>≃</b> 0
	Procedure IV(a)	14.79	14.79	<b>≃</b> 0
	Procedure VII(a)	6.62	6.62	<b>≃</b> 0
	Procedure V(a)	4.47	4.47	≈ 0
Hanoch (1980)	White wives age 30–44 (fc):		,	Ü
Tanoen (1700)	weeks worked < 52			
	(no "corner" in weeks worked)	0.64	0.81	-0.17
	weeks worked = 52	0.01	0.01	0.17
	(with "corner" in weeks worked)	0.42	0.54	-0.13
Cogan (1980b)	White wives age 30–44:	0.12	0.5 .	0.15
Cogun (17000)	Procedure VI	2.45	2.64	-0.19
	fixed costs of labor market entry me		2.01	, 0.27
	OLS	0.89	0.93	-0.04
	conditional ML	1.14	1.19	-0.05
Cogan (1981)	White wives age 30–44:	*.* .	2.27	0.02
Cogan (1701)	Procedure VI	2.10	2.18	-0.08
	fixed costs of labor market entry			
	(conditional ML)	0.65	0.68	-0.03
Nakamura and	Wives – Procedure VIII (lbc):	0.00	0,00	0,02
Nakamura (1981)	age 30–34	-0.27	0.11	-0.36
(1701)	age 35–39	- 0.31	-0.12	-0.19
	age 40-44	-0.09	0.18	-0.27
Dooley (1982)	Wives – Procedure VII:	0.07	0.10	0.27
Dooley (1702)	Whites: age 30–34	3.66	4.14	-0.48
	age 35–39	15.24	15.35	-0.11
	age 40–44	4.28	4.73	-0.45
	Blacks: age 30-34	0.67	1.01	-0.35
	age 35–39	-0.34	-0.17	-0.17
	age 40–44	-0.89	-1.06	0.18
Ransom (1982)	Wives, husband age 30-50-ML,	0.07	1.00	0.10
(1702)	lbc (quadratic family duf)	0.40	0.46	-0.05
	ioc (quadratic failing duf)	to 0.42	to 0.50	to -0.03
		10 0.42	10 0.30	10 - 0.09

FROM! Handbook of Labor Economics vol 1, Killingsworth Meckman

Table 2
Non-linear budget constraint models: summary of some empirical results for married women


Study	Data source and sample selection	Variables: H, hours; W, wage <sup>a</sup> ; Y, income	Functional form of labor supply and budget set structure	Estimation method and stochastic specification <sup>b</sup>	Uncompensated wage elasticity	Income elasticity
Arellano and Meghir (1992)	British Family Expenditiure Survey (FES) 1983 and British Labor Force Survey (LFS) 1983: sample size 11,535 employed,	H, weekly hours W, hourly earnings <sup>c</sup> n (earnings/hours) Y, consumption based other income measure	Semi-log labor supply Convex (piecewise linear)	Instrumental variables/selection	{0.29, 0.71}	{-0.13, -0.40}
	13,200 non-employed, aged 20–59	•				
Arrufat and Zabalza (1986)	Bristish General Household Survey 1974: sample size 2002 employed, 1493 non- employed, aged < 60	Y, net weekly	CES utility based labor supply Convex (piecewise linear)	ML-convex, random preference (log norma on CES leisure coefficient) <sup>d</sup>	2.03 1	-0.2
Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz (1990)	Swedish Level of Living Survey 1981: sample size 795 full sample, 640 employed, aged 25–55	H, annual hours W, directly observed, SS° Y, spouse's net income + family allowances + net capital income		Linear labor supply ML-non-convex ML-non-convex, random preferences (on income coefficient Quadratic Labor Supply ML-convex	0.79 0.77	-0.24 -0.06
Blundell et al. (1988)	British Family Expenditure Survey 1980: sample size 1378 employed, aged 18–59		expenditure system Convex (piecewise	Truncated ML, random preferences		-0.26
Bourgiugnon and Magnac (1990)	French Labor Force Survey 1985: sample size 1175 employed, 817 non-employed, aged 18–60	H, normal weekly hours W, hourly net wage, SS, (earnings /hours) Y, spouse's net income + family allowances	Linear labor supply Convex (piecewise linear)	ML-convex, random preferences ML with fixed costs, random prefrences	0.05	-0.3 -0.2
Colombino and Del Boca (1990)	Couples 1979: sample size 338 employed, 494 non-employed		Linear labor supply Convex (piecewise linear)	ML-convex	{1.18, 0.66}	0.52
Hausman (1981)	US Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1975: sample size 575 participants, 510 non- participants	H, annual hours of work	Convex (piecewise-linear) and non-convex	ML-convex, random preferences ML-fixed costs random preferences (on income coefficient)		-0.121 -0.132
Kaiser et al. (1992)	SocioEconomic Panel 1983: sample size 1076 employed, 2284 non- employed, non-retired	H, yearly hours W, hourly wage, SS (annual earnings/ annual hours)	Linear labor supply Convex (piecewise linear)	ML-convex	1.04	-0.18

Table 1.21 Estimates of the behavioral responses for men from the NIT experiments.

		(E)	тре	E*
Ashenfelter (1978a) Ashenfelter (1978b)		0.21	0.02 - 0.01	0.19
Burtless and Greenberg (1982)	3 Year 5 Year	$0.08 \\ -0.12$	-0.04	0.12
Hausman and Wise (1977) Johnson and Pencavel (1982)	( 5 Teal	0.12 $0.10$ $-0.16$	-0.18 $-0.01$ $-0.29$	0.06 0.11 0.13
Johnson and Pencavel (1984) Keeley and Robins (1980)		$0.02 \\ -0.09$	-0.17 $-0.14$	0.19 0.05

Notes: Ashenfelter's estimates are from the North Carolina-Iowa rural experiment and Hausman and Wise's are from the New Jersey-Pennsylvania experiment. All the other estimates make use of data from the Seattle-Denver income maintenance experiment and all these estimates have been evaluated at the same number of hours of work (namely, 1880.97) and the same net wage rate (\$2.293). These are the mean values of working experimental husbands in the pre-experimental year whose incomes in that year would have placed them below the breakeven level and they are taken from the sample analyzed by Keeley and Robins (1980). The earlier work by Keeley, Robins, Spiegelman and West (1978a, 1978b) uses the same estimating procedure as in Keeley and Robins (1980), but in the later study the sample includes Chicanos, unlike the earlier work. The difference between Ashenfelter's (a) and (b) estimates is explained in footnote 100.

From: Handbook of Labor Garanics Vol 1, Percavel



From! E155A, "Taxatum + LS of married women!

He Tax Referm Act of 1986 as a

natural experiment"

Table III
Differences-in-Differences Estimates
CPS Married Women Before and After TRA86

## A: Labor Force Participation

Group	Before TRA86	After TRA86	Change	Difference-in- Difference
High	0.464 (.018) [756]	0.554 (.018) [718]	0.090 (.025) {19.5%}	
75 <sup>th</sup>	0.687 (.010)	0.740 (.010)	0.053 (.010)	0.037 (.028)
Percentile	[3799]	[3613]	{7.2%}	{12.3%}
90 <sup>th</sup>	0.611 (.010)	0.656 (.010)	0.045 (.010)	0.045 (.028)
Percentile	[3765]	[3584]	{6.5%}	{13%}

B: Hours Conditional on Employment

Group	Before TRA86	After TRA86	Change	Difference-in- Difference
High	1283.0 (46.3) [351]	1446.3 (41.1) [398]	163.3 (61.5) {12.7%}	· .
75 <sup>th</sup>	1504.1 (14.3)	1558.9 (13.9)	54.8 (20.0)	108.6 (65.1)
Percentile	[2610]	[2676]	{3.6%}	{9.4%}
90 <sup>th</sup>	1434.1 (16.4)	1530.1 (15.9)	96.0 (22.8)	67.3 (64.8)
Percentile	[2303]	[2348]	{6.8%}	{6.2%}

Each cell contains the mean for that group, along with standard errors in (), number of observations in [], and % increase in {}. Means are unweighted.