## The Overlapping Generations Model (OLG)

## Key Difference of OLG Model (relative to Ramsey Model)

- Agents have finite lives
- They live in two periods
- They are "Young", then "Old", then dead
- When one generation becomes "Old", another "Young" generation is born... hence, the "overlapping"
- This is different than Ramsey where agents lived for infinity


## Implications of OLG that Marios wants you to take away

- Can have multiple steady states
- It is possible to have dynamically inefficient outcomes
- In Solow Model with exogenous savings, this could happen
- In Ramsey with endogenous savings, this never happens
- In OLG, it can happen despite optimal saving at the individual level


## One Application of the OLG Model

- Can look at how taxing people when they are old and young can matter for economic growth, capital accumulation, and savings.
- Can use it to analyze social security proposals


## Further reading Marios wants you to do

- Blanchard, O. (1985), "D ebt, D eficits and Finite Horizons," JPE, pp. 223-47.


## Basic OLG Assumptions

- Agents only lives for 2 periods: Young and Old
- Generation $t$ is born and "Young" at time $t$
- Generation $t$ is "Old" at time $t+1$
- Population grows at rate n. i.e.

$$
N_{t+1}=(1+n) N_{t}
$$

- All agents born with zero assets. Leave nothing to children


## Description of OLG Agents

- Lifetime Utility of Agents:

$$
U\left(c_{t}^{\gamma}\right)+\beta U\left(c_{t+1}^{0}\right)
$$

Assume $U(c)=\frac{c^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}}}{1-1 / \theta}$

- Labor Supply of Agents Exogenous: Assume: $1^{\mathrm{Y}} \geq 0,1^{0} \geq 0$
- Per-period Budget Constraints:

$$
\begin{gather*}
a_{t+1}+c_{t}^{Y} \leq w_{l} l^{Y}  \tag{1}\\
c_{t+1}^{0} \leq w_{t+1} l^{0}+\left(1+r_{t+1}\right) a_{t+1} \tag{2}
\end{gather*}
$$

- Agents takes all prices as given
- Add (1) and (2) to get Intertemporal Budget Constraint:

$$
\begin{equation*}
c_{t}^{\mathrm{Y}}+\frac{c_{\mathrm{t}+1}^{0}}{1+\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{t}+1}} \leq \mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{t}} \mathrm{l}^{\mathrm{Y}}+\frac{\mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{t}+1} 1^{0}}{1+\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{t}+1}} \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

## Description of OLG Firms

- Production function: F ( $\mathrm{K}, \mathrm{L}$ ) with typical assumptions
- Per person output: $f(k)$
- Perfect competition among firms, i.e.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& w_{t}=f\left(k_{t}\right)-f^{\prime}\left(k_{t}\right) k_{t} \\
& 1+r_{t+1}=f^{\prime}\left(k_{t+1}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

## Market Clearing Conditions ------------------------

$$
\begin{gathered}
L_{t}=N_{t} 1^{Y}+N_{t-1} 1^{0}=N_{t}\left(1^{Y}+\frac{1^{0}}{1+n}\right) \\
K_{t+1}=N_{t} a_{t+1}
\end{gathered}
$$

## Agent's Optimization Problem

$$
\max U\left(c_{t}^{Y}\right)+\beta U\left(c_{t+1}^{0}\right) \text { s.t. } c_{t}^{Y}+\frac{c_{t+1}^{0}}{1+r_{t+1}} \leq w_{t} l^{Y}+\frac{w_{t+1} 1^{0}}{1+r_{t+1}}
$$

- FOCS for $c_{t}^{Y}$ and $c_{t+1}^{0}$ are as follows:

$$
\begin{gathered}
U^{\prime}\left(c_{t}^{r}\right)=\lambda_{t} \\
\beta\left(1+r_{t+1}\right) U^{\prime}\left(c_{t+1}^{0}\right)=\lambda_{t}
\end{gathered}
$$

- Combine to get typical Euler Condition:

$$
U^{\prime}\left(c_{t}^{Y}\right)=\beta\left(1+r_{t+1}\right) U^{\prime}\left(c_{t+1}^{0}\right)
$$

## Solve for Consumption Growth Rate of Economy

- $\quad$ Using $U(c)=\frac{c^{1-\frac{1}{\theta}}}{1-1 / \theta}$, we have $U^{\prime}(c)=c^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}$
- Using this in our Euler Condition, we have:

$$
\frac{c_{t+1}^{0}}{c_{t}^{Y}}=\left[\beta\left(1+r_{t+1}\right)\right]^{\theta}
$$

- Does this look familiar?


## Solve for the Optimal Consumption

- Using our growth rate equation, we have:

$$
c_{\mathrm{t}+1}^{0}=\left[\beta\left(1+\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{t}+1}\right)\right]^{\theta} c_{\mathrm{t}}^{\mathrm{y}}
$$

- Plugging this into the budget constraint, we have:

$$
c_{t}^{Y}+\frac{\left[\beta\left(1+r_{t+1}\right)\right]^{\theta} c_{t}^{Y}}{1+r_{t+1}}=w_{t} l^{Y}+\frac{w_{t+1} 1^{0}}{1+r_{t+1}}
$$

- Solving for $\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{t}}^{\mathrm{y}}$, we have:

$$
c_{t}^{\gamma}=\left(\frac{1}{1+\beta^{\theta}\left(1+r_{t+1}\right)^{\theta-1}}\right)\left[w_{l}{ }^{y}+\frac{w_{t+1} 1^{0}}{1+r_{t+1}}\right]
$$

- For simplicity, call $\mu\left(\beta, r_{t+1}, \theta\right)=\left(\frac{1}{1+\beta^{\theta}\left(1+r_{t+1}\right)^{\theta-1}}\right)$
- How can we interpret this expression?


## Solving for Optimal Savings -------------------------

- Using equation (1) we have:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& a_{t+1}=w_{t} l^{Y}-c_{t}^{Y} \\
& a_{t+1}=w_{t} l^{Y}-\mu\left(\beta, r_{t+1}, \theta\right)\left[w_{t} l^{Y}+\frac{w_{t+1} 1^{0}}{1+r_{t+1}}\right] \\
& a_{t+1}=\left[1-\mu\left(\beta, r_{t+1}, \theta\right)\right] w_{t} l^{Y}-\mu\left(\beta, r_{t+1}, \theta\right) \frac{w_{t+1} 1^{0}}{1+r_{t+1}}
\end{aligned}
$$

- What happens to total savings when future wages are higher?
- How does total savings, $a_{t+1}$, depend on $\beta$ ?
- How does total savings, $a_{t+1}$, depend on $r_{t+1}$ ?


## Solve for Growth Rate of Capital

- Recall that $\mathrm{K}_{\mathrm{t}+1}=\mathrm{N}_{\mathrm{t}} \mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{t}+1}$. So,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& k_{t+1}=\frac{N_{t} a_{t+1}}{L_{t+1}} \\
& k_{t+1}=\frac{a_{t+1}}{(1+n) l^{y}+l^{0}}
\end{aligned}
$$

- Plugging in for $a_{t+1}$ which we got from the agent's optimization problem above

$$
\begin{equation*}
k_{t+1}=\frac{1}{(1+n) l^{Y}+l^{0}}\left[\left[1-\mu\left(\beta, r_{t+1}, \theta\right)\right] w_{t} l^{Y}-\mu\left(\beta, r_{t+1}, \theta\right) \frac{w_{t+1} 1^{0}}{1+r_{t+1}}\right] \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

- Recall from our firm's problem that our prices are the following:

$$
\begin{gathered}
w_{t}\left(k_{t}\right)=f\left(k_{t}\right)-f^{\prime}\left(k_{t}\right) k_{t} \\
r_{t+1}\left(k_{t+1}\right)=f^{\prime}\left(k_{t+1}\right)-1
\end{gathered}
$$

N ote: I'm implicitly assuming full depreciation: $\delta=1$, otherwise, my ex pression would be $r_{t+1}\left(k_{t+1}\right)=f^{\prime}\left(k_{t+1}\right)-\delta$

- Therefore, it should hopefully be clear that (4) is simply a function of $k_{t}, k_{t+1}$ and other constants. In principle, we could rearrange (4) to get our law of motion: $k_{t+1}=G\left(k_{t}\right)$. And we could draw our typical phase diagram (in discrete time).


## Law of Motion in OLG Models

- It is not generally true that we have a unique solution.

But we can show that when $\theta \geq 1, \mathrm{G}^{\prime}>0$
And, when $\theta<1$, then shape of $G$ unknown

- Two examples of what we might find:

Example \#1

- How many steady states?
- Which one might we call a "poverty trap"?


## Example \#2 ------------

- What are the two opposing forces such that we could have three different possibilities for $k_{t+1}$ for a given $k_{t}$ ?
- How can anticipations be self-fulfilling in this situation?


## OLG with Log Preferences and Cobb-Douglas Production

- Let's now be explicit about our production function. Let,

$$
f(k)=k^{\alpha}
$$

Thus,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{t}+1}=\alpha \mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{t}+1}^{\alpha-1}-1 \\
& \mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{t}}=(1-\alpha) \mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{t}}^{\alpha}
\end{aligned}
$$

- Then, let's assume that $U(c)=\ln c$. [This is the same as saying $\theta=1$ ].
- We can now rewrite our capital accumulation equation (4), such that:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \qquad k_{t+1}=\left[\frac{1}{J\left[(1+n) 1^{Y}+l^{0}\right]}\right] \alpha \mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{t}}^{\alpha} \\
& \text { Where, } \mathrm{J} \equiv \frac{\left.(1+\beta) \alpha+\left(\frac{1-\alpha}{1+\mathrm{n}}\right)\right)^{0}}{(1-\alpha) \beta 1^{Y}}
\end{aligned}
$$

- What does the phase-diagram look like?
- Do we have a unique solution?


## OLG and Dynamic Inefficiency

- Continue to use Log preferences and Cobb-D ouglas production
- Now, we can use this to show that unlike Ramsey, it is possible to have steady states that are dynamically inefficient
- Rewrite the accumulation equation in the following way:

$$
\mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{t}+1}=\left[\frac{1}{\mathrm{~J}\left[(1+\mathrm{n}) \mathrm{l}^{\mathrm{Y}}+\mathrm{l}^{0}\right]}\right]\left(1+\mathrm{r}\left(\mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{t}}\right)\right) \mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{t}}
$$

- Then at steady state, it must be that $\mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{t}+1}=\mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{t}}=\mathrm{k}^{*}$, and hence,

$$
J\left[(1+n) 1^{Y}+1^{0}\right]=1+r^{*}
$$

Where $r^{*}=r\left(k^{*}\right)$.

- Recall, that in general, an economy is dynamically inefficient when $\mathrm{f}^{\prime}\left(\mathrm{k}^{*}\right)<\delta+\mathrm{n}$
- In our case, $\delta=1$ and $f^{\prime}\left(\mathrm{k}^{*}\right)=\mathrm{r}^{*}$.
- So, our economy will be dynamically inefficient when $1+\mathrm{r}^{*}<1+\mathrm{n}$

Thus, assuming the special case of $1^{Y}=1,1^{0}=0$

- J <1 implies dynamically inefficient
- $\mathrm{J}>1$ implies dynamically efficient
- Why is it possible to be dynamically inefficient in the OLG model?
- D oes more work in retirement make dynamic inefficiency more or less likely?
- Moreover, $\mathrm{J}=\frac{\alpha(1+\beta)}{\beta(1-\alpha)}$, and we have dynamic efficiency when $\beta<\frac{1}{1 / \alpha-2}$
- What is the intuition for this result?


## Analyzing Social Security in the OLG Model

Let's consider the two proposals for social security

1. Pay As You Go (current U.S. system)
2. Fully Funded (what President Bush wants)

## The Basic Model Setup

- Cobb-Douglas Production: $\mathrm{f}(\mathrm{k})=\mathrm{k}^{\alpha}$

$$
\circ \quad \text { Thus, } \begin{aligned}
& r_{t+1}=\alpha k_{t+1}^{\alpha-1}-1 \\
& w_{t}=(1-\alpha) k_{t}^{\alpha}
\end{aligned}
$$

- Log Preferences: U (c) $=\ln \mathrm{c}$
- Individuals only work when they are young: $1^{\mathrm{Y}}=1,1^{0}=0$
- Population growth rate of $n$


## The "Pay As You Go" System

- Government taxes each young individual lump-sum amount $T$
- Government uses proceeds to pay social security benefits to old individuals
- How much will each old person receive?
- What is an individual's budget constraint for each period of life?

$$
\begin{aligned}
& c_{t}^{Y}+a_{t+1}=w_{t}-T \\
& c_{t+1}^{0}=\left(1+r_{t+1}\right) a_{t+1}+(1+n) T
\end{aligned}
$$

- Thus, the intertemporal budget constraint is:

$$
c_{t}^{y}+\frac{c_{t+1}^{0}}{1+r_{t+1}}=w_{t}-T\left(\frac{r_{t+1}-n}{1+r_{t+1}}\right)
$$

- Maximizing $\ln c_{t}^{Y}+\beta \ln c_{t+1}^{0}$ s.t. the intertemporal budget constraint implies:

$$
c_{t}^{\mathrm{Y}}=\left(\frac{1}{1+\beta}\right)\left[\mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{t}}-\mathrm{T}\left(\frac{\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{t}+1}-\mathrm{n}}{1+\mathrm{r}_{\mathrm{t}+1}}\right)\right]
$$

- As we expected, we consume a constant fraction of lifetime income.
- Does "Pay As You Go" increase or decrease first period consumption?
- What is an individual's savings in this economy?

$$
\begin{gathered}
a_{t+1}=w_{t}-T-c_{t}^{Y} \\
a_{t+1}=w_{t}-T-\left(\frac{1}{1+\beta}\right)\left[w_{t}-T\left(\frac{r_{t+1}-n}{1+r_{t+1}}\right)\right] \\
a_{t+1}=\left(\frac{\beta}{1+\beta}\right) w_{t}-T\left(\frac{\beta\left(1+r_{t+1}\right)+(1+n)}{\left(1+r_{t+1}\right)(1+\beta)}\right) \\
a_{t+1}=\left(\frac{\beta}{1+\beta}\right) w_{t}-T Z
\end{gathered}
$$

Where $\mathrm{Z}>0$

- How does "Pay As You Go" affect savings? Why?
- What is the impact of "Pay As You Go" on the capital stock?
- $\quad K_{t+1}=a_{t+1} N_{t}$, so it is easily seen that $k_{t+1}=\frac{a_{t+1}}{1+n}$. And, plugging in for $a_{t+1}$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{t}+1}=\frac{1}{1+\mathrm{n}}\left[\left(\frac{\beta}{1+\beta}\right) \mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{t}}-\mathrm{TZ}\right] \\
& \mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{t}+1}=\frac{1}{1+\mathrm{n}}\left[\left(\frac{\beta}{1+\beta}\right)(1-\alpha) \mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{t}}^{\alpha}-\mathrm{TZ}\right]
\end{aligned}
$$

- What happens to the steady state capital stock when $T>0$ ?


## The "Fully Funded" System

- G overnment taxes each young individual lump-sum amount $T$
- Government uses revenue to purchase capital...
- Then, uses proceeds to finance social security for agents in their old age.
- How much do individuals receive in old age?
- What is the agent's budget constraint now?

$$
\begin{aligned}
& c_{t}^{Y}+a_{t+1}=w_{t}-T \\
& c_{t+1}^{0}=\left(1+r_{t+1}\right) a_{t+1}+\left(1+r_{t+1}\right) T
\end{aligned}
$$

- Hence, the intertemporal budget constraint is:

$$
c_{t}^{y}=\left(\frac{1}{1+\beta}\right) w_{t}
$$

- First period consumption no longer effect by system! Why?
- What is an individual's savings?

$$
\begin{gathered}
a_{t+1}=w_{t}-T-c_{t}^{Y} \\
a_{t+1}=w_{t}-T-\left(\frac{1}{1+\beta}\right) w_{t} \\
a_{t+1}=\left(\frac{\beta}{1+\beta}\right) w_{t}-T
\end{gathered}
$$

- Note: Individual saving is still lower
- What is the impact of "Fully Funded" on the capital stock? None!
- To see, this, we need to look at the accumulation of capital

$$
K_{t+1}=a_{t+1} N_{t}+T N_{t}
$$

- The key is that the government saves $T N_{t}$ now, whereas before, it simply gave it to the existing old people.
- Plugging in for individual savings, $a_{t+1}$, we find:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{K}_{\mathrm{t}+1}=\left[\left(\frac{\beta}{1+\beta}\right) \mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{t}}-\mathrm{T}\right] \mathrm{N}_{\mathrm{t}}+\mathrm{TN} \mathrm{~N}_{\mathrm{t}} \\
& \mathrm{~K}_{\mathrm{t}+1}=\left(\frac{\beta}{1+\beta}\right) \mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{t}} \mathrm{~N}_{\mathrm{t}} \\
& \mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{t}+1}=\left(\frac{\beta}{1+\beta}\right) \frac{\mathrm{w}_{\mathrm{t}}}{1+\mathrm{n}} \\
& \mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{t}+1}=\left(\frac{\beta}{1+\beta}\right) \frac{(1-\alpha) \mathrm{k}_{t}^{\alpha}}{1+\mathrm{n}}
\end{aligned}
$$

The accumulation of capital is unaffected by the "Fully Funded" system, and hence the steady state capital is higher than in the "Pay As You Go"

