

Table 2 – Effect of Political Connections on Changes in Share Price
 Separate Estimation for Each Event

	Jan. 30 - Feb. 1, 1995	April 27, 1995	April 29, 1996	July 4-9, 1996	July 26, 1996	April 1-3, 1997
POL	-0.58* (0.34)	-0.31 (0.18)	-0.24* (0.15)	-0.95*** (0.27)	-0.57*** (0.22)	-0.90** (0.35)
CONSTANT	1.29 (0.79)	0.21 (0.32)	0.12 (0.46)	0.83 (0.64)	-0.07 (0.41)	0.77 (0.97)
R-Squared	0.037	0.043	0.025	0.147	0.078	0.075
Obs.	70	70	78	79	79	79

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses

*Significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent level

** Significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level

*** Significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level

Table 3 - Effect of Political Connections on Changes in Share Price

	Industry Fixed-Effects							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
POL	-0.60** (0.11)	-0.19 (0.15)	-0.20 (0.15)	-0.22 (0.16)	-0.57 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.16)	-0.16 (0.16)	-0.18 (0.17)
NR(JCI)	0.25 (0.14)	-0.32 (0.28)	-0.30 (0.28)	-0.27 (0.30)	0.25 (0.14)	-0.32 (0.28)	-0.31 (0.28)	-0.28 (0.30)
NR(JCI)*POL		0.28* (0.11)	0.25* (0.11)	0.26* (0.12)		0.28* (0.11)	0.25* (0.11)	0.26* (0.12)
log(ASSETS)			-0.14 (0.08)	-0.20 (0.18)			-0.15 (0.08)	-0.23 (0.19)
log(DEBT)				0.05 (0.11)				0.07 (0.12)
CONSTANT	0.88 (0.27)	0.06 (0.35)	0.64 (0.52)	-0.06 (1.52)	0.92 (0.24)	0.11 (0.37)	0.47 (0.45)	-0.26 (1.49)
R-Squared	0.066	0.078	0.074	0.077	0.071	0.083	0.081	0.084
# of Observations	455	455	434	400	455	455	434	400

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses

* Significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent level

** Significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level

Table 2: Soft Money Contributions & Stock Market Response to Jeffords' Defection

	Dependent variable					
	Return	Abnormal return	Change in market cap	Return	Return	Return
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Soft money to Dems/\$100,000	0.0003 (0.0012)	0.0004 (0.0012)				0.0003 (0.0012)
Soft money to Reps/\$100,000	-0.0025*** (0.0009)	-0.0028*** (0.0010)				-0.0021** (0.0010)
Soft money to Dems			1174 [957]			
Soft money to Reps			-1731* [951]			
ln(Market cap)						-0.0021 (0.0022)
Total soft money > 0 (dummy)				-0.0149*** (0.0052)		
Total soft money				-0.0006 (0.0005)		
Fraction to Dems				0.0018 (0.0088)		
Soft money to Dems/Market cap					-204 (154)	
Soft money to Reps/Market cap					-202* (109)	
Constant	0.0009 (0.0023)	0.0055** (0.0024)	-6.10e7 (1.08e8)	0.0070** (0.0030)	0.0070 (0.0022)	0.0489 (0.0517)
Observations	498	498	498	498	498	498
R-squared	0.019	0.022	0.030	0.035	0.023	0.021

Notes:

Standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors in square brackets for column 3.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (for column 3, based on robust standard errors.)

Dependent variable is cumulative response from end-of-day 5/18/01 to 5/25/01; market model estimated from 5/00 through 4/01.

Soft money donations are for 1999-2000.


Table 4: Own versus Industry Donations & Within-Industry Results

	No fixed effects -- Own vs. industry's giving			4-digit SIC code fixed effects				
				Dependent variable				
	Return	Abnormal Return	Mkt Cap Change	Return	Abnormal Return	Mkt Cap Change	Return	Return
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Soft money to Dems/\$100,000	0.0004 (0.0012)	0.0003 (0.0012)		0.0002 (0.0011)	0.0002 (0.0011)		0.0002 (0.0011)	0.0002 (0.0011)
Soft money to Reps/\$100,000	-0.0028*** (0.0010)	-0.0024** (0.0010)		-0.0019* (0.0010)	-0.0017* (0.0010)		-0.0026* (0.0015)	-0.0028* (0.0014)
Industry's soft money to Dems/\$100,000	-0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.0004)						
Industry's soft money to Reps/\$100,000	0.0003 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0003)						
Soft money to Dems			922 [921]			956 [1173]		
Soft money to Reps			-1,424 [884]			-1,401 [1595]		
Industry's soft money to Dems			264* [157]					
Industry's soft money to Reps			-252* [155]					
Herfindahl index * soft money to Reps							0.0044 (0.0072)	
Market share								-0.0647*** (0.0238)
Market share * soft money to Reps								0.0088 (0.0030)
Constant	-0.0003 (0.0026)	-0.0085*** (0.0025)	7.0.E+06 (1.2E+08)	0.0002 (0.0021)	-0.0074*** (0.0021)	-8.9.E+07 (9.8E+07)	-0.0003 (0.0023)	0.0129*** (0.0052)
4-digit SIC code fixed effects?	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	486	498	498	498	498	498	498	498
R-squared	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.55	0.54	0.56	0.55	0.56

Notes:


Standard errors in parentheses. Robust standard errors in square brackets in columns 3 and 6. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 Dependent variable is cumulative response from end-of-day 5/18/01 to 5/25/01; market model estimated from 5/00 to 4/01. Soft money is for 1999-2000.
 Market share is (firm revenues/industry revenues) for 2000. An industry is a 4-digit SIC code. SIC codes and revenue data are from CRSP/Compustat.
 Herfindahl index = sum of squares of firm market share for an industry (4-digit SIC code).

Figure 1: Aggregate Philippine import capture ratios by origin-country group 1983-1995




NOTE-- See Table 5 for list of countries in each Round and exact dates of program expansion. See Table 6 for data sources. Aggregate import capture ratio is total Philippine-reported imports from a country group in a year divided by total exports reported by that country group to Philippines in same year.

Figure 2: Log of total Philippine imports by origin-country group 1983-1995




NOTE-- See Table 5 for list of countries in each Round and exact dates of program expansion. See Table 6 for data sources. Imports are actually exports to Philippines reported by trade partners (thousands of 1995 US\$ before taking logs).

Figure 4: Impact of minimum value threshold reduction on shipments valued between \$2,500 and \$5,000 (November 1989 – February 1992)




NOTES-- Chart plots fraction of total imports by value entering in shipments valued between \$2,500 and \$5,000 in the given month, from PSI countries and from non-PSI countries. PSI countries during the period depicted are Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. All other countries are non-PSI countries. Shipments falling into more than one of the shipment types in Figures 4 to 10 (2.8% of total shipments by value) are allocated to just one of the overlapping types (see section 5.1 for allocation rule). Data source: individual shipment database of the National Statistics Office of the Philippines.

Figure 5: Impact of minimum value threshold reduction on shipments valued between \$500 and \$2,500 (November 1989 – February 1992)




NOTES-- Chart plots fraction of total imports entering in shipments valued between \$500 and \$2,500 in the given month, from PSI countries and from non-PSI countries. For all other notes, see Figure 4.

Figure 6: Impact of minimum value threshold reduction on shipments valued below \$500 (November 1989 – February 1992)




NOTES-- Chart plots fraction of total imports entering in shipments valued below \$500 in the given month, from PSI countries and from non-PSI countries. For all other notes, see Figure 4.

Figure 7: Impact of minimum value threshold reduction on transshipments (November 1989 – February 1992)




NOTES-- Chart plots fraction of total imports transhipped in the given month, from PSI countries and from non-PSI countries. Each data point is a 3-month centered moving average. For all other notes, see Figure 4.

Figure 8: Impact of minimum value threshold reduction on shipments to export processing zones (November 1989 – February 1992)




NOTES-- Chart plots fraction of total imports destined for export processing zones in the given month, from PSI countries and from non-PSI countries. Each data point is a 3-month centered moving average. For all other notes, see Figure 4.

Figure 9: Impact of minimum value threshold reduction on shipments to bonded warehouses (November 1989 – February 1992)



NOTES-- Chart plots fraction of total imports destined for bonded warehouses in the given month, from PSI countries and from non-PSI countries. Each data point is a 3-month centered moving average. For all other notes, see Figure 4.

Figure 10: Impact of minimum value threshold reduction on shipments of products exempt from PSI (November 1989 – February 1992)



NOTES-- Chart plots fraction of total imports of products exempt from PSI in the given month, from PSI countries and from non-PSI countries. Each data point is a 3-month centered moving average. For all other notes, see Figure 4.

Table 1: The Effect of the Corruption Crackdown on Prices

	A	B
Quantity	-0.05297*** (6.196)	-0.04792*** (5.534)
Policy	-0.13076*** (4.945)	
Period 2		-0.15869*** (5.686)
Period 3		-0.10153*** (3.619)
Fixed Effects F-stat. †	Yes	Yes 8.69***
Observations	544	544
R ²	0.79	0.80

Notes: Dependent variable: log of unit price. *Policy*, *Period 2*, and *Period 3* are dummy variables that take the value of 1 for September 1996-December 1997, September 1996-May 1997, and June 1997-December 1997, respectively. Fixed effects models (with hospital dummies). T-statistics are in parentheses (absolute values). Regressions include product dummies. † Null hypothesis: *Period 2* = *Period 3*. *** Significant at the 1% level.