

17.261/262
Congressional Politics II
Fall 2005
Tuesday, 11-1
E56-249

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Purpose

This class will prepare you for professional research into congressional politics in particular and legislatures more generally. During the first half of the semester we will meet weekly in seminar and pore through (most of the) important books that have set the agenda in contemporary congressional scholarship. During the second half, we will meet to discuss your own research in progress and the current literatures it addresses. When the semester is finished, you should be well enough acquainted with the current congressional literature that you could do well on a general exam question about Congress. You will also have a paper that with a little work (perhaps) could be submitted to a journal.

Requirements

1. Weekly attendance and participation.
2. Weekly literature memos. By 5:00 on the Monday before class, you will have e-mailed to other class participants a series of questions you'd like to see addressed in the discussion.
3. Research paper (25–30 pages). Due at the end of the semester.

Special words about the last half of the class

I have specified a fixed reading list through the first week of November. After that, the direction of the class will be guided by seminar participants. The exact details depend on how many participants we have and their interests. The idea is that during November, each participant will be responsible for a week. The week's leader will generate a reading list of contemporary scholarship that his or her seminar paper responds to. The reading should amount to approximately 100 pages of material. At the designated seminar meeting, the leader will first lead us in a discussion of his/her chosen readings. Once that is finished, the leader will discuss his or her own research plans. Finally, once these sessions are through, we will hear again from participants as the research progresses.

Reading schedule

NB: The numbers in [square brackets] indicate the rank-ordering in a citation count conducted using all articles from the AJPS, APSR, and LSQ since 2000 that addressed a topic in congressional politics. (For instance, the first assigned reading, by Miller and Stokes, was the 31st most-cited article among all articles about congressional politics in these journal since 2000.) There are many ties.

September 20. Congressional elections and representation

- Warren Miller and Donald Stokes. 1963. Constituency influence in Congress. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 57, pp. 45–56. (JSTOR) [31]
- Edward R. Tufte. 1973. The relationship between seats and votes in two-party systems. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 67, pp. 540–54. (JSTOR)
- Morris P. Fiorina. 1974. *Representatives, roll calls, and constituencies*. (photocopyable copy will be provided to the class.) [15]
- Richard F. Fenno. 1977. U.S. House members and their constituencies: An exploration. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 71, pp. 883–917. (JSTOR) The book-length treatment is *Home Style*, which you should be familiar with eventually. [8]
- Eric J. Engstrom and Samuel Kernell. 2005. Manufactured responsiveness: The impact of state electoral laws on unified party control of the presidency and House of Representatives, 1840–1940. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 49, pp. 531–549.

Additional readings

- Morris P. Fiorina. 1981. *Retrospective voting in American national elections*. [38.5]
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1983. *The politics of congressional elections*. [15]
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1990. *The electoral origins of divided government: Competition in U.S. House elections, 1946–1988*. [24]
- John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1995. *Congress as public enemy: Public attitudes toward American political institutions* [38.5]

September 27. Congressional candidates

- Anthony Downs. 1957. *The economic theory of democracy*, chap. 8 (Library reserve) [15]
- Gary C. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell. 1981. *Strategy and choice in congressional elections*. (Library reserve) [38.5]
- Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2000. Old voters, new voters, and the personal vote: Using redistricting to measure the incumbency advantage, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 44, pp. 17–34. (JSTOR)
- Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2001. Candidate positioning in U.S. House elections, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 45, pp. 136–59. (JSTOR)
- Jamie L. Carson and Jason M. Roberts. 2005. Strategic politicians and U.S. House Elections, 1874–1914, *Journal of Politics*, vol. 67, pp. 474–496. (MIT Libraries online)

October 4. Committees

- Richard F. Fenno. 1973. *Congressmen in committees*, chaps. 1–4. (Library reserve) [15]
- Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1979. Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 23, pp. 27–59. [38.5]

- Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. The institutional foundations of committee power. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 81, pp. 85–127. (JSTOR) [24]
- Barry R. Weingast, and William J. Marshall. 1988. The industrial organization of Congress: Or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets. *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 96, pp. 132–163. (JSTOR) [48.5]
- Keith Krehbiel. 1991. *Information and legislative organization* (Coop) [8]
- John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde. 2000. The Republican revolution and the House Appropriations Committee. *Journal of Politics*, vol. 62, pp. 1–33.

Additional readings

- Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. Collective decisionmaking and standing committees: An informational rationale for restrictive amendment procedures. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, vol. 3, pp. 287–335. [31]
- Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. Buying time: Moneyed interests and the mobilization of bias in congressional committees. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 84, pp. 797–820. [24]

October 11. Institute student holiday

October 18. Parties and leadership I

- Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and Randall B. Ripley. 1965. Conditions for party leadership: The case of the House Democrats. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 59, pp. 52–63. (JSTOR) [38.5]
- Garrison Nelson. 1977. Partisan patterns of House leadership change, 1789–1977. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 71, pp. 918–939. (JSTOR)
- David W. Brady, Joseph Cooper, and Patricia A. Hurley. 1979. The decline of party in the United States House of Representatives, 1887–1968. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 4, pp. 381–407. (JSTOR)
- Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady. 1981. Institutional context and leadership style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 75, pp. 411–425. (JSTOR) [15]
- David W. Brady. 1985. A reevaluation of realignment in American politics: Evidence from the House of Representatives. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 79, pp. 28–49. (JSTOR)
- David W. Rohde. 1991. *Parties and leaders in the post-reform House of Representatives*. (Coop) [2]
- John Aldrich, *Why Parties?* (Coop) [5.5]

Additional readings

- Barbara Sinclair. 1995. *Legislators, leaders, and lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the postreform era*. [8]

October 25. Parties and leadership II

- Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative leviathan* (Coop) [1]
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. Where's the party? *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 23, pp. 235–266. (JSTOR) [11]
- Eric Schickler and Andrew Rich. 1997. Controlling the floor: Parties as procedural coalitions in the House, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 41, pp. 1340–1375. (JSTOR) [15]
- Sarah A. Binder, Eric D. Lawrence, and Forrest Maltzman. 1999. Uncovering the hidden effect of party. *Journal of Politics*, vol. 61, pp. 815–831. (JSTOR) [48.5]
- James M. Snyder, Jr. and Timothy Groseclose. 2000. Estimating party influence in congressional roll call voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 44, pp. 193–211. (JSTOR) [38.5]
- Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III. 2001. The effects of party and preferences on congressional roll-call voting, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 26, pp. 533–72. (JSTOR)

November 1. Decisionmaking and rules

- Aage Clausen. 1973. *How congressmen decide* (chaps. 1–3) (Library reserve) [24]
- John Kingdon. 1973. *Congressmen's voting decisions* (chaps. 1–8). (Library reserve) [48.5]
- Herbert B. Asher and Herbert F. Weisberg. 1978. Voting change in Congress: Some dynamic perspectives on an evolutionary process, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 22, pp. 395–425. (JSTOR)
- John R. Wright. 1985. PACS, contributions, and roll calls: An organizational perspective, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 79, pp. 400–414 (JSTOR)
- John E. Jackson. 1992. Ideology, interest group scores, and legislative votes, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 36, pp. 805–823. (JSTOR)
- Keith Krehbiel. 1998. *Pivotal politics* (Coop) [5.5]
- Krehbiel, Keith. 1997. Restrictive rules reconsidered, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 62, pp. 144–168 (JSTOR) [15]

Additional readings

- Duncan Black. 1958. *The theory of committees and elections* [38.5]
- Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. Ideology, party, and voting in the United States Congress, 1959–1980, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 79, pp. 373–399. [24]
- Steven S. Smith. 1989. *Call to order: Floor politics in the House and Senate* [24]
- Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher. 1990. *The president and the legislative arena* [48.5]
- Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. Patterns of congressional voting, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 35, pp. 228–278. [24]
- James M. Snyder, Jr. 1992. Artificial extremism in interest group ratings, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, vol. 17, pp. 319–342. [38.5]

- John E. Jackson and John W. Kingdon. 1993. Ideology, interest group scores, and legislative votes, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 36, pp. 805–823. [48.5]
- Sarah A. Binder and Steven S. Smith. 1997. *Politics or principle? Filibustering in the United States Senate* [31]
- James J. Heckman and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1997. Linear probability models of the demand for attributes with an empirical application to estimating the preferences of legislators. *Rand Journal of Economics*, vol. 28 (sp. iss.), pp. S142–S189. [31]
- Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1997. Toward a theory of legislative rules changes: Assessing Schickler and Rich's evidence, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 41, pp. 1376–1386. [48.5]
- Douglas Dion and John D. Huber. 1997. Sense and Sensibility: The role of rules, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 41, pp. 945–957. [48.5]
- Timothy Groseclose, Steven Levitt, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1999. Comparing interest group scores across time and chambers: Adjusted ADA scores for the US Congress, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 93, pp. 33–50. [10]

November 8. History

- Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 1997. *Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting*. (Coop) [3]
- Nelson W. Polsby. 1968. The institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 62, pp. 144–168. (JSTOR) [48.5]
- Charles Stewart III and Barry R. Weingast. 1992. Stacking the Senate, changing the nation: Republican rotten boroughs, statehood politics, and American Political Development, *Studies in American Political Development*, pp. 223–71. (Photocopy from library)
- Eric Schickler. 2001. *Disjointed pluralism: Institutional innovation and development of the U.S. Congress* (Coop)
- Eric Schickler, Gregory Wawro. 2004. "Where's the Pivot?: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the Pre-cloture Senate." *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 48, pp. 758–774. (Photocopy from library)

Additional readings

- David W. Brady. 1988. *Critical elections and congressional policymaking* [48.5]
- Sarah A. Binder. 1997. *Minority rights, majority rule: Partisanship and the development of Congress* [24]
- G. Douglas Dion. 1997. *Turning the legislative thumbscrew: Minority rights and procedural change in legislative politics*. [24]

Nov 15, 22, 29, Dec. 6
Paper workshop

December 13. Some classic general works

- David Mayhew, *Congress: The electoral connection* (Coop) [4]
 Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional government* (Coop)
 R. Douglas Arnold, *The logic of congressional action* (Coop) [19]

Additional readings

- David R. Mayhew. 1991. *Divided we govern*. [38.5]

The 20 most important books about Congress to have read to understand contemporary scholarship.

- John H. Aldrich, *Why parties? The origin and transformation of political parties* (1995)
 R. Douglas Arnold, *The logic of congressional action* (1990)
 Sarah Binder, *Minority rights, majority rule* (1997)
 Aage Clausen, *How congressmen decide* (1973)
 Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, *Legislative leviathan* (1993)
 Douglas Dion, *Turning the legislative thumbscrew: Minority rights and procedural change in legislative politics* (1997)
 Lawrence Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, *Congress reconsidered* (many editions—keep current with the most recent)
 Anthony Downs, *The economic theory of democracy* (1957)
 Richard F. Fenno. *Congressmen in committees* (1973)
 Richard F. Fenno. *Home style* (1978)
 Morris P. Fiorina, *Representatives, roll calls, and constituencies* (1974)
 Gary C. Jacobson, *Politics of congressional elections* (2001)
 Gary C. Jacobson, *The electoral origins of divided government: Competition in U.S. House elections, 1946–1988i* (1990)
 Keith Krehbiel. *Information and legislative organization* (1991)
 Keith Krehbiel, *Pivotal politics* (1998)
 David R. Mayhew. *Congress: The electoral connection*. (1974)
 Keith T. Pool and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting* (1997)
 David W. Rohde, *Parties and leaders in the post-reform House of Representatives* (1991)
 Barbara Sinclair, *Legislators, leaders, and lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era*, 1995
 Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional government* (1885)

The 10 most important articles that are not associated with these books:

- Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady, Institutional context and leadership style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn, *American Political Science Review* vol 75 (1981), pp. 411–425.
 Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and Randall B. Ripley, Conditions for party leadership: The case of the House Democrats, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 59 (1965), pp. 52–63.

- Timothy Groseclose, Stephen D. Levitt, and James M. Snyder, Jr., Comparing interest group scores across time and chambers: Adjusted ADA scores for the US Congress, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 93 (1999), pp. 33–50.
- Hall, Richard L. and Frank W. Wayman, Buying time: Moneyed interested and the mobilization of bias in congressional committees, vol. 84 (1990), pp. 797–820.
- James J. Heckman and James M. Snyder, Jr., Linear probability model of the demand for attributes with an empirical application to estimating the preferences of legislators, vol. 28 (special issue, 1997), pp. S142–S189.
- Keith Krehbiel, Where's the party? *British Journal of Political Science* vol. 23 (1993), pp. 235–266.
- Keith Krehbiel, Restrictive rules reconsidered, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 41 (1997), pp. 919–944.
- Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, Constituency influence in Congress. *American Political Science Review*, vol. 57 (1963), pp. 45–56.
- Eric Schickler and A. Rich, Controlling the floor: Parties as procedural coalitions in the House, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 41 (1997), pp. 1340–1375.
- Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, The institutional foundations of committee power, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 81 (1987), pp. 85–104.

Winners of the Richard F. Fenno, Jr. Prize from the Legislative Studies Section of the APSA (and some of the competition that didn't win):

2004. Sarah A. Binder, *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock* (Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
2003. John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, *Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
2002. Eric Schickler, *Disjointed pluralism: Institutional innovation and development of the U.S. Congress* (Princeton University Press, 2001)
2001. Charles M. Cameron, *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power* (Cambridge University Press, 2000)
2000. David Canon, *Race Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts* (University of Chicago Press, 1999)
1999. Keith Krehbiel, *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking* (University of Chicago Press, 1998)
1998. No selection
- Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting* (Oxford University Press, 1997)

1997. Richard Hall, *Participation in Congress* (Yale University Press, 1996)
1996. No selection.
- John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, *Congress as public enemy* (Cambridge University Press, 1995)
- Barbara Sinclair, *Legislators, leaders, and lawmakers* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995)
1995. Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman, *Quiet Revolution in the South* (Princeton University Press)
1994. Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House* (University of California Press)
- Carol Swain, *Black faces, black interests* (Harvard University Press, 1992)
1993. Frank Sorauf, *Inside Campaign Finance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992)
1992. Keith Krehbiel, *Information and Legislative Organization* (University of Michigan Press, 1991)
- D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins, *The logic of delegation* (University of California Press)
- David R. Mayhew, *Divided we govern* (Yale University press, 1991)
- David W. Rohde, *Parties and leaders in the postreform House* (University of Chicago Press, 1991)
1991. R. Douglas Arnold, *The Logic of Congressional Action* (Yale University Press, 1990)
- Jon R. Bond, *The president in the legislative arena* (Chicago University Press, 1990)
- David T. Canon, *Actors, athletes, and astronauts* (University of Chicago Press, 1990)
- Gary C. Jacobson, *The electoral origins of divided government* (Westview Press, 1990)
1990. Barbara Sinclair, *The Transformation of the U.S. Senate* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989)
- Steven S. Smith, *Call to Order* (Brookings Institution Press, 1989)

1989. No award

David W. Brady, *Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making* (Stanford University Press, 1988)

1988. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence* (Harvard University Press, 1987).

Gary C. Jacobson, *The Politics of Congressional Elections* (Little, Brown).

The 25 most-cited articles (on a per-year basis) in *Legislative Studies Quarterly* since 1985

Peverel Squire, 1992, Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures, pp. 69-79.

Terry M. Moe, 1987, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congressional Dominance, pp. 475-520.

Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, 1994, Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, pp. 149-179.

Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 2001, D-NOMINATE after 10 Years: A Comparative Update to *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting*, pp. 5-29

John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, 2000, The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs, pp. 25-52.

Beth Reingold, 1992, Concepts of Representation among Female and Male State Legislators, pp. 509-537.

James M. Snyder, 1992, Artificial Extremism in Interest Group Ratings, pp. 319-345.

Christophe Crombez, 1997, The Co-Decision Procedure in the European Union, pp. 97-119.

Peverel Squire, 1988, Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures, pp. 65-82.

Peverel Squire, 1989, Challengers in United States Senate Elections, pp. 531-547.

Malcolm E. Jewell and David Breaux, 1988, The Effect of Incumbency on State Legislative Elections, pp. 495-514.

Arturo Vega and Juanita M. Firestone, 1995, The Effects of Gender on Congressional Behavior and the Substantive Representation of Women, pp. 213-222.

Michele Swers, 1998, Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women's Issue Bills than Their Male Colleagues?, pp. 435-448.

Gregory L. Hager and Jeffery C. Talbert, 2000, Look for the Party Label: Party Influences on Voting in the US House, pp. 75-99.

Peverel Squire, 2000, Uncontested Seats in State Legislative Elections, pp. 131-146.

Thomas F. Remington and Steven S. Smith, 1995, The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia, pp. 457-489.

John Londregan and James M. Snyder, 1994, Comparing Committee and Floor Preferences, pp. 233-266.

Keith Krehbiel, 1988, Spatial Models of Legislative Choice, pp. 259-319.

Barry C. Burden, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Timothy Groseclose, 2000, Measuring the Ideologies of US Senators: The Song Remains the Same, pp. 237-258.

- Richard E. Matland, 1998, Women's Representation in National Legislatures: Developed and Developing Countries, pp. 109-125.
- Timothy P. Nokken, 2000, Dynamics of Congressional Loyalty: Party Defection and Roll Call Behavior, 1947-97, pp. 417-444.
- Keith T. Poole, 1988, Recent Developments in Analytical Models of Voting in the United States Congress, pp. 117-133.
- David W. Rohde, 1994, Parties and Committees in the House: Member Motivations, Issues, and Institutional Arrangements, pp. 341-359.
- Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, 1994, Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House, pp. 215-231.
- Keith Krehbiel, 1999, Paradoxes of Parties in Congress, pp. 31-64.

The 25 most-cited articles (on a per-year basis) in the *American Journal of Political Science* on the topic of legislatures, since 1985.

- Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, 1991, Patterns of Congressional Voting, pp. 228-278.
- Donald P. Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, 1988, Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections, pp. 884-907
- James M. Snyder and Timothy Groseclose, 2000, Estimating Party Influence in Congressional Roll Call Voting, pp. 193-211.
- Leonine Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, 1993, Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male and Female Candidates, pp. 119-147.
- Gary C. Jacobson, 1990, The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments, pp. 334-362.
- Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III, 2001, Candidate Positioning in US House Elections, pp. 136-159.
- John E. Jackson and John W. Kingdon, 1992, Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes, pp. 805-823.
- Richard D. McKelvey, 1986, Covering, Dominance, and Institution-Free Properties of Social Choice, pp. 283-314.
- Randal L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast, 1989, A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, pp. 588-611.
- Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, 1989, Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee, pp. 459-490.
- Gary C. Jacobson, 1987, The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the United States House of Representatives, 1952-82, pp. 126-141.
- Keith T. Poole, 1998, Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales, pp. 954-993.
- Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, 1990, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, pp. 531-564.
- Christopher Z. Mooney and Mei-Shien Lee, 1995, Legislating Morality in the American States: The Case of Pre-Roe Abortion Regulation Reform, pp. 599-627.
- Barry Ames, 1995, Electoral Strategy Under Open-List Proportional Representation, pp. 406-433.
- Elizabeth R. Gerber, 1996, Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, pp. 99-128.

- Timothy Groseclose, 2001, A Model of Candidate Location when One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage, pp. 862-886.
- Janet M. Grenzke, 1989, PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency Is Complex, pp. 1-29.
- David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright, 1994, Counteractive Lobbying, pp. 25-44.
- Robert S. Erikson, 1990, Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote: A Review of the Macrolevel Evidence, pp. 373-399.
- Robert H. Durr, John B. Gilmour, and Christina Wolbrecht, 1997, Explaining Congressional Approval, pp. 175-207.
- Mathew D. McCubbins, 1985, The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, pp. 721-748.
- Gary King, James E. Alt, Nancy E. Burns, and Michael Laver, 1990, A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies, pp. 846-871.
- Jeffrey A. Segal, Charles M. Cameron, and Albert D. Cover, 1992, A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations, pp. 96-121.
- John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler, 2001, Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy, pp. 330-345.

The 25 most-cited articles (on a per-year basis) in the *American Political Science Review* on the topic of legislatures, since 1985.

- Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, 1987, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, pp. 85-104.
- David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn, 1989, Bargaining in Legislatures, pp. 1181-1206.
- Timothy Groseclose, Stephen D. Levitt, and James M. Snyder, Jr., 1999, Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the Us Congress, pp. 33-50.
- James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson, 1995, Dynamic Representation, pp. 543-565.
- George Tsebelis, 1994, The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter, pp. 128-142.
- Arthur T. Denzau and Michael C. Munger, 1986, Legislators and Interest-Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, pp. 89-106.
- Kathleen Bawn, 1995, Political Control *versus* Expertise: Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures, pp. 62-73.
- Terry M. Moe, 1985, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, pp. 1094-1116.
- Charles Cameron, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran, 1996, Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, pp. 794-812.
- Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman, 1990, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, pp. 797-820.
- David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, 1988, Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes, pp. 405-422.

- Jeffrey A. Segal, 1997, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, pp. 28-44.
- B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, 1991, the Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, pp. 801-828
- James E. Alt and Robert C. Lowry, 1994, Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States, pp. 811-828.
- Keith Krehbiel, 1990, Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers, pp. 149-163.
- Lyn Kathlene, 1994, Power and Influence in State Legislative Policy-Making: The Interaction of Gender and Position in Committee Hearing Debates, pp. 560-576.
- Daniel Diermeier and Timothy J. Feddersen, 1998, Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure, pp. 611-621.
- Alan I. Abramowitz, 1988, Explaining Senate Election Outcomes, pp. 385-403.
- Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, 1989, Partisan Cycles in Congressional Elections and the Macroeconomy, pp. 373-398.
- Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, 1998, A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting, pp. 533-544.
- Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, 1990, Coalitions and Cabinet Government, pp. 873-890.
- John R. Wright, 1990, Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the United States House of Representatives, pp. 417-438.
- Nolan McCarthy, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, 2001, The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress, pp. 673-687.
- John D. Huber, 1996, The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies, pp. 269-282.
- Richard L. Hall and Bernard Grofman, 1990, The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias, pp. 1149-1166.