When are threats of punishment ("sticks") the best way to gain other states' compliance, and when do positive inducements (promise of rewards, appeasement, "carrots") work best? Both policies sometimes succeed, but both can also make things worse: "sticks" can provoke a hostile response, while "carrots" can lead the target to sense weakness, make more demands, and dismiss final warnings not to move further.
Sometimes either sticks or carrots will work, and sometimes neither will work. However, it often happens that one will work while the other will make things worse.2 In these situations the choice between carrots and sticks is crucial, since that choice determines if policy will succeed or prove counter-productive.
B. The Deterrence Model posits that conflicts arise from acts of appeasement made in the false expectation that appeasement will elicit better behavior from the other side, when in fact it elicits worse behavior. The other, believing that it coerced or frightened the appeaser to offer its concessions, assumes that more threats will elicit more concessions. Hence it makes additional demands, backed by threats. It also may dismiss the appeaser's threats after the appeaser changes course and adopts deterrence; as a result it may move too far and trigger war.
Prescription: Threat of punishment works better than appeasement. Sticks are safer than carrots. Peace is best preserved by unyielding policies.
Note: the spiral model incorporates one misperception (the punishing state falsely expects that punishment will elicit better behavior from the other, when it elicits worse behavior). The deterrence model incorporates two misperceptions (the appeasing state falsely expects that appeasement will elicit better behavior, when in fact it elicits worse behavior; and the appeased state then falsely expects the appeaser won't carry out its later threats when in fact it will.)
B. A nationalism explanation: states and societies paint rose-colored self-images in their schoolbooks and public discourse, largely to build patriotism and a spirit of civic self-sacrifice in the population. As a result they are unaware that they injured other societies in the past; hence they are unaware that others might have legitimate grievances against them, or might have legitimate fears of their future conduct based on their past behavior. Hence they view others complaints against them as unprovoked malice; the other side is in the wrong, knows it, is just testing to see if its bluff will be called, and will back down if its bluff is called.
These conditions can be important:
But note: some aggressors don't know they are aggressors--neurotic Wilhelmine states, who forget each past act of aggression as soon as they are done committing it. With these states appeasement may be safer.
So there are two issues:
Note: some states making illegitimate claims don't think their claims are illegitimate. With these states appeasement may be safer, and standing firm more dangerous.
So there are two issues:
The key issues here are: