April 30, 1998
Causes & Prevention of War Van Evera & Mendeloff
THE COLD WAR AND KOREA
I. HOW THE COLD WAR ERUPTED: EVENTS
A. Poland and Eastern Europe:
1. Warsaw uprising, 1944: Stalin watches inertly while Hitler slaughters the
Polish non-communists. Americans wonder what else Stalin intends.
2. Stalin (kind of) promises at Yalta (Feb. 1945) to allow democracy in
Poland; then he imposes communism instead.
B. Iran 1946: Stalin won't leave northern Iran until he is pressured.
C. Turkey 1946: Stalin wants some Turkish territory; instead Truman sends the
Missouri to the Mediterranean, a threatening show of force.
D. Greece 1947: the West thought Stalin was instigating the Communist revolution
in Greece (he wasn't--aid and inspiration were coming from communists outside
Greece, but YugoslaviaÕs communist Tito government was the source)..)
E. Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949--an outgrowth of the struggle for Germany.
F. Military aspects:
1. The illusion of Soviet military superiority. American intelligence and
the Western press depicted a vast Soviet conventional superiority in
Europe, and downplayed the implications of the American atomic monopoly.
Hence a Soviet threat that was largely political--the Soviets had some
capacity to disrupt or subvert Western Europe--was also perceived as
military.)
2. The Soviet atomic bomb explodes, September 1949. Now the West is really
scared. What if Stalin isn't deterrable?
Western responses: the Marshall Plan (1947); the Berlin airlift (1948-49); the
formation of NATO (1949); and a vast American military buildup (1950-53)--
triggering a Soviet counter-buildup. And away we go.
II. WHAT CAUSED THE COLD WAR? WHO CAUSED THE COLD WAR? FIVE EXPLANATIONS
A. Communist totalitarian expansionism? "The totalitarian Soviets were the
aggressor, the democratic West the defender. Soviet aggression sprang from
the aggressiveness of Communist political systems. Communist governments are
aggressive either because they are (a) inherently messianic--Communist
ideology preaches the necessity for global conquest; and/or because they are
(b) frail, hence aggressive for Orwellian reasons--they needed enemies to
legitimate their totalitarian rule."
Variant #1: Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe, driven by these motives,
threatened Western (American) security, causing the Cold War.
Variant #2: Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe aroused Western
opposition less for security reasons than for domestic political (cultural)
reasons--the Polish-American lobby, etc. The Soviets had seized the homelands
of powerful American ethnic groups.
Variant #3: Western softness early in the Cold War made things worse--the
West led the Soviets forward by appeasement. (The problem wasn't Western
aggression, but insufficient Western toughness.) Question: what if the U.S.
had given Stalin an ultimatum in 1946: "get out of Eastern Europe or we'll
throw you out! By atomic war if necessary!"? (For this view see Adam Ulam,
The Rivals.)
B. Communist totalitarian cruelty and barbarism? "The West opposed the USSR less
because the USSR was aggressive than because it was tyrannical--i.e. the Cold
War was a Western human rights crusade." (But if true, why didn't the Cold
War blossom fully in 1919?)
C. Capitalist expansionism? "The U.S.-led capitalist west was the aggressor, the
socialist Soviet Union was the defender. The U.S. feared a new depression.
It hoped to avoid such a depression by finding market outlets for surplus
goods. It sought to control Eastern Europe to compel it to be such a market.
U.S. imperialism in Eastern Europe collided with a legitimate Soviet desires
to maintain a neutral buffer to its west." This is the (now largely
discredited) left-revisionist view. See e.g. writings of Gabriel Kolko, Lloyd
Gardner.
D. Revolutionary v. Oligarchic states? "Both sides were aggressors, for reasons
Stephen Walt describes; revolutionary states are messianic and frightened;
their neighbors are defensively aggressive, and polluted by emigres." (But if
true why didn't the Cold War blossom fully in 1919?)
E. The Unshaped Postwar European Order/Collapse of German Empire? "The lack of a
clear Soviet-American wartime agreement on the postwar partition of the German
empire caused a collision of the two major allied powers in a zone of
uncertainty. Had each side's sphere of influence been more clearly delineated
earlier, the Cold War might have been milder."
F. International System: Bipolarity and the Security Dilemma? "The world's two
strongest states never get along well, as each is the main threat to the
other. They will always compete for security. The Cold War was an inevitable
result of the rise of the U.S. and USSR to the pinnacle of world power."
Variant #1 (realism variant): The two superpowers were in fact insecure,
and contested for resources of real value (buffer room in Eastern Europe.)
Variant #2 (realism + misperception variant): The superpowers were secure
(due to the nuclear revolution, their vast size, and their distance from each
other), but didn't know it; and they contended for assets (Eastern Europe) of
no real value. (Controlling Eastern Europe made USSR less, not more, secure,
by scaring the rest of the world.)
Variant #3 (spiral model variant): The two superpowers felt insecure, and
contended for security, but both thought the other pursued unprovoked
aggression for non-security reasons, and overreacted accordingly.
Question: what does this explanation predict for the future of U.S.-Japan
and/or U.S.-China relations?
III. KOREAN WAR, 1950: WHAT HAPPENED
A. The partition of Korea, 1945--an American blunder.
B. The U.S. pulls all U.S. troops out of Korea, 1949. Another blunder.
C. Communist victory in China---->"who lost China?" debate in the USA.
D. Dean Acheson's January 1950 speech delineating the "American defense perimeter
in Asia." He omitted South Korea! (Another American blunder).
E. North Korea attacks South Korea, June 25, 1950. Why? Kim Il Sung and Stalin
expect the U.S. will not intervene; or that the North can crush the South
before the U.S. can intervene effectively. A huge miscalculation.
F. Truman decides to intervene. Reasons:
1. To preserve American credibility (but was it engaged in Korea?)
2. Domestic politics--1950 was a bad year to lose another Asian country to
Communism.
G. U.S. landing at Inchon, Sept. 15, 1950: U.S. routs North Korean army from
South Korea; Truman decides to cross 38th parallel & conquer North Korea, late
September. (An American mega-blunder).
H. Oct. 3 1950 (& again on Oct. 9): China warns the Truman administration: "don't
cross 38th parallel or it's war with us!" Truman & Acheson don't listen; UN
troops cross the 38th parallel Oct. 7. Why?
1. The warning came via an Indian diplomat, not trusted by Truman.
2. The Chinese didn't explain the reasoning behind their warning, or include
Congressional Republicans among those who received it.
3. The Administration had already decided to cross the parallel;
backtracking is painful.
4. Truman feared attacks from Republican hawks if he stayed South.
5. American contempt for Chinese military capability.
I. U.S. encounters small Chinese forces in Korea, 26 Oct. 1950: MacArthur
thinks: "if this is all they can do, they'll be a pushover," and orders an
advance to the Yalu (another mega-blunder).
J. Massive Chinese surprise attack on U.S. forces in North Korea, Nov. 26, 1950,
routing U.S. army & driving it from North Korea. The worst defeat in U.S.
army history!
K. A long and bloody war ensues, Dec. 1950-summer 1953, ending in a tie. China
tries and fails to drive the U.S. from Korea. (Note: this war included a
long-hidden Soviet-American air war!)
IV. KOREAN WAR, U.S.-CHINA WAR: WHAT CAUSED THEM?
A. Background misperceptions:
1. American self-sugar-coating: "We've always been nice to China (so China
has nothing to fear from us!")
2. Chinese myths about U.S.: "America helped Japanese aggressors in the
1930s! America is plotting to rebuild and unleash Japan in Asia again!"
Marxist-Leninist dogma shapes Chinese thought.
B. Non-strategy: By the USA? No--the problem was that Acheson did state US
strategy, but misstated it. A misstated strategy is worse than none. By
China? Yes. China told the US in late September that it wouldn't intervene,
then changed its mind, but too late.
C. Absence of Sino-American diplomatic relations (another mega-blunder by both
sides.)
D. McCarthyism in the U.S.? A powerful force--what caused it?
E. First-strike advantage. This is the likely reason why China never issued an
ultimatum, and sought to convince the U.S. of China's weakness.
F. U.S. window after Inchon ----> too-hasty diplomacy, Sept. 15-Oct. 7.
G. Optimistic miscalculation--by everyone.
H. Security Dilemma: security was the basic goal pursued by both the U.S. and
China.
I. War ----> War
1. U.S. aims widen due to the war itself:
a. "We must conquer the North to punish the aggressor."
b. "We should hold POWs to scare future communist aggressors into
thinking we'll do it again."
2. Chinese aims also widen: Mao inferred malign U.S. intent from the
interposition of the U.S. fleet off Taiwan, and the U.S. invasion of
North Korea; he responded by expanding China's aims, to include expelling
the U.S. from South Korea.
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