March 10, 1998 // Causes & Prevention of War // Van Evera & Mendeloff


                                 THE CRIMEAN WAR, 1854-1856

I.  BACKGROUND TO WAR: MISPERCEPTIONS IN RUSSIA, BRITAIN & FRANCE
   A.   "The Russians Are Coming!"--Ill-founded British & French fears of Russia.
        1.   The Illusion of Russian Power: "Russia is the strongest state in Europe!"
        2.   The Illusion of Russian Expansionism: "Russia plans to carve up Turkey!"
   B.   "The French are coming!"--Ill-founded Russian fears of a "revolutionary" France, and 
        false Russian faith that Britain and Austria share these Russian fears.
   C.   "The Turks Are Collapsing"--False Russian expectations of Turkey's impending demise.
   D.   Strategic background: Turkey's role as Russia's southern strategic buffer.

II.  PROXIMATE CAUSES OF WAR: 13 EVENTS
   A.   "The Quarrel of the Monks," 1690-1852: Catholics and Orthodox Christians struggle for 
        control of Palestine's Holy Places.  France favors Catholics, Russia backs Orthodox.
   B.   Napoleon III Plays Demagogue:  France intimidates Turkey into favoring the Catholics in 
        the Holy Places dispute, 1850-52.  Turkey concedes to France over Russian opposition.
   C.   Russia Counter-intimidates, Feb. 1853--Menshikov demands that Turkey grant Russia wide 
        rights to protect Orthodox believers in Turkey.  (He demands more than the restoration       
        of the Holy Places status quo.)  His demands arise from these facts and concerns:
        1.   Turkey controls naval access to Russian Black Sea region--hence is a key buffer.
        2.   Russia infers from French action that France has wide imperial designs on Turkey.
        3.   Russia fears "revolutionary" France; and also falsely assumes that the rest of 
             Europe also sees "revolutionary" France as the main danger to the European order.
        4.   Russia thinks Turkey generally "bandwagons" when threatened.
        5.   Russia exaggerates its rights under the 1774 Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, hence 
             it falsely believes Menshikov's demands are legitimate under existing treaty 
             rights.
   D.   Britain & Russia bungle their negotiations of Feb. 1853, and Britain misperceives the 
        Russian-Austrian talks of Sept. 1853; hence Britain falsely infers that Russia seeks a 
        wider empire in Turkey; and Russia is oblivious of this British misperception.
   E.   Britain and France send fleets to Besika Bay, June 1853, to scare Russia into 
        withdrawing Menshikov demands (a result they confidently expect).
   F.   Russia doesn't fold--isn't even scared--& instead invades Moldavia & Wallachia (now 
        Rumania), July 1853, in false belief that the Besika Bay deployment reflects British 
        bureaucratic politics, not a firm British attitude; and because Russian diplomats 
        won't tell the Czar that his moves are provoking Europe.
   G.   The Anglo-French "Blank Check" to Turkey.  An offensive Franco-British-Turkish 
        alliance develops, fall 1853.  Symbolizing this blank check, the Anglo-French fleet is 
        sent forward from Besika Bay to Constantinople, Sept./Oct. 1853 (in violation of 
        existing treaties); it arrives in Constantinople Oct. 22, 1853.  Why the deployment?  
        Partly because the Turkish Sultan (dishonestly) tells GB & Fr: "my government might 
        fall unless you back me with a show of force!"
   H.   The Turks, blank check in hand, attack both Moldavia & Wallachia and the Caucasus, 
        Oct. 23, 1853.
   I.   The "Sinope Massacre," Nov. 1853 ---> anti-Russian uproar in GB, France; they commit 
        more deeply to Turkey (why?); they declare war on Russia, March 1854.
   J.   Russia withdraws from Moldavia & Wallachia, August 1854, under Austrian pressure.  
        This satisfies the British & French war aims, but: 
   K.   Britain and France nevertheless open ground war in Crimea, Sept. 1854 (!!)
   L.   The rise of the hawks (Palmerston) in Britain; the growth of hawkish public opinion; 
        and the growth of British war aims--"We must destroy Russian power in the Black Sea 
        region" ("and we'll win in a jiffy!")
   M.   The harsh peace: Russian power in the Crimea is destroyed (but not for long...)

III.  PERSISTING MYSTERIES ABOUT THESE EVENTS
   A.   Why didn't Russia assure Britain and France that only limited aims underlay the 
        Menshikov demands?
   B.   Why did France & Britain come to feel so completely committed to Turkey's defense 
        (e.g. the defense of Moldavia & Wallachia)?  More important, why did they later 
        back Turkish aggression against Russia in the Caucasus?
   C.   Specifically, why did the Sinope massacre cause such outrage in Britain?
   D.   Why did Britain and France launch the ground war in 1854, even after Russia withdraws 
        from Moldavia/Wallachia?

IV.  CAUSES OF THE WAR
   A.   Ten (10) Misperceptions & Diplomatic Blunders:
        1.   French leaders were unaware that by humiliating Turkey over the Holy Places issue 
             they would injure an interest that Russia held dear--i.e. Turkey's attitude of 
             fearing Russia more than other states.
        2.   France failed to tell Russia: "our objectives in Turkey are limited"; hence 
             Russia feared that France had wide ambitions.
        3.   Russia failed to tell Britain, France, and Turkey: "our objectives in Turkey are 
             limited"; hence Britain and France feared that Russia had wide ambitions.
        4.   Britain and Russia differed on the odds that the Ottoman empire would soon 
             collapse, but didn't realize that they differed, hence they talked past each 
             other; hence British wrongly inferred that Russia sought Turkey's partition.
        5.   The Russian Czar exaggerated Russian rights under the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji.
        6.   British & French expected their Besika Bay deployment would induce Russia to 
             back down; instead Russia got tougher, occupying Moldavia & Wallachia.
        7.   Russian leaders wrongly assumed the Franco-British Besika Bay deployment arose 
             from British bureaucratic politics, and did not reflect real British opposition 
             to Russian demands on Turkey.
        8.   Russia occupied Moldavia and Wallachia without realizing that Austria would 
             threaten to counter-intervene.
        9.   Russia failed to realize that the Menshikov demands and the occupation of 
             Moldavia and Wallachia appeared aggressive to others, because Russian leaders 
             focused on false analogies--similar moves in the past by Russia (in M&W) and 
             Austria (in Montenegro) that had evoked no alarmed reaction.
       10.   Britain and France failed to bound their commitment to Turkey, instead giving 
             Turkey a blank check to attack Russia.
   B.   Spiral Dynamics?
        1.  Spiral ingredients:
             a.   Russia:
                  i.   misperceives the status quo, by exaggerating Russian rights under 1774 
                       Kutchuck Kainardji Treaty.
                 ii.   underestimates British & French interests, hence inadvertently damages 
                       them.  Specifically, Russia was unaware of British & French security-
                       related fears of Russian power & intentions, hence Russia was slow to see 
                       the need to assuage their fears by curbing its demands on Turkey.
             b.   France: underestimates Russia's interests, hence inadvertently damages them.  
                  Specifically, France was unaware of the injury Russia thought it would 
                  suffer if it allowed France to intimidate Turkey successfully.
             c.   Britain: exaggerates Russian aggressiveness, because Britain misconstrues 
                  Feb. 1853 Anglo-Russian discussions & later Austro-Russian talks; and Russia 
                  is unaware of this British misperception.
             d.   GB, France, Russia all exaggerate the shared character of information, & 
                  underestimate the others' misperceptions: hence they do too little to 
                  explain their actions & intentions; hence misperceptions persist that 
                  otherwise might be detected & cured.
        2.   Later stages of the Spiral:
             a.   As a result of #1a and #1b, France and Russia injure each others' interests 
                  without knowing they did so.
             b.   France therefore overestimates Russian hostility, since it misconstrues the 
                  Russian hostility that it provokes to be unprovoked.
             c.   Russia, at first unaware of the hostility its behavior has provoked, 
                  underestimates British and French hostility (re: ignoring the warning 
                  conveyed by the Besika Bay deployment); hence it fails to heed their 
                  warnings, and continues to do them injury, unaware that they mean business.
             d.   As a result Britain and France exaggerate Russian hostility, leading them to 
                  adopt more aggressive aims themselves. 
             e.   Russia, finally aware of Franco-British hostility, is now unaware that it 
                  provoked this hostility, and hence overestimates it.  
             Note: the 7 Years War spiral arose largely from misperceptions about others' 
             actions.  The Crimean spiral arose largely from misperceptions of others' ideas}, 
             intentions, and interests.
   C.   Unsettled Disputes (but did Russia try to settle something too early?)
   D.   Preventive War (by Turkey).
   E.   Optimistic Miscalculation: Britain and France expect easy victory at Sebastopol.
   F.   Offense/defense & Security Aspects.
        1.   Security is a goal of all major parties: Britain, France, Russia, & Turkey.
        2.   Offensive opportunity tempts Turkey.
   G.   Non-evaluation (of Russian policy by Russian diplomats).
   H.   Non-strategy (Britain never frames its own aims.  Is this why they expand?)
   I.   Crisis Mismanagement:
        1.   The Sinope Massacre--a loss of command control by the Czar.
        2.   The Besika Bay deployment--a move whose self-entrapping effects were not 
             foreseen, hence an instance of crisis mismanagement.
   J.   Manipulation of Perceptions (Britain and France are manipulated by Turks.)
   K.   War ---> War.  See British war aims grow like topsy!

V.  OUTCOME
   A.   Russia, seeking to secure Black Sea region, loses control of Black sea until 1871.
   B.   Britain and France prevent a Russian expansion into Turkey that Russia never planned         
        anyway.
   C.   Russian power, which Britain fought to destroy, is restored in only 14 years.