March 17, 1998 // 17.423 // Van Evera & Mendeloff

                               THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1866

I.  BISMARCK'S PLAN TO UNIFY GERMANY: "LET'S BAIT AUSTRIA INTO STARTING A WAR!"
    Bismarck sought to unify Germany by force.  He had two requirements: (1) France, Britain 
    and Russia must remain neutral; and (2) the Prussian king must be induced to declare war 
    on his brother-German Austrians.  Solution: sweet-talk the other European powers into not 
    fearing Prussia, and get the Austrians to start the war.  Then Austria will stand alone, 
    hence will be easy pickings, and the Prussian king will be outraged at Austria, hence will 
    declare war.

II.  BACKGROUND TO WAR: EVENTS & CONDITIONS
    A.  Bismarck's deceptions:
        1.   Regarding Prussian capability ("we're weak!")
        2.   Regarding Prussian intentions ("we're benign!")  The Schweinitz 
             mission to Russia proclaiming Prussia's limited aims.
    B.  British, French, and Russian isolationism:
        1.   Britain: feared France more than Prussia, was generally isolationist.
        2.   France: saw advantage in a (long) Prussian-Austrian war.  "We can demand the 
             Rhineland as our fee for breaking the stalemate for the victor."
        3.   Russian-Prussian anti-Polish solidarity; Russian focus on revising the 
             convention that demilitarized the Black Sea in 1856.
    C.  The Prussian-Italian offensive alliance, April 8, 1866.
    D.  Austria mobilizes its army, April 21, 1866--a fateful step.  Why did Austria take it?
        1.   Austria received false reports that Italy was mobilizing.  Where did these false 
             reports come from?  (Maybe the Austrian military deceived its civilians; perhaps 
             Bismarck deceived Austria.)
        2.   Why did Austria mobilize against Prussia as well as Italy?
             a.   Austrian leaders assumed Prussia had already decided for war.  They didn't 
                  realize that Prussia couldn't start a war if Austria didn't move first.
             b.   Austria had only one mobilization plan--positing a 2-front mobilization.

III.  WARTIME EVENTS:
    A.  Bitter civil-military conflict in Prussia over war aims.  (The Prussian army: "Let's 
        smash Austria completely!  And perhaps France!"  Bismarck: "Why not go all the way to 
        Constantinople?")  The military doesn't get its way--fortunately for Prussia.
    B.  Prussian war aims nevertheless do modestly widen: Prussia excludes Austria from 
        Germany instead of dividing it with her at the Main.

IV.  CAUSES OF THE WAR?  PERHAPS AMONG THEM:
    A.  Austria's optimistic miscalculation.
    B.  Prussia's search for security; and Prussia's offensive opportunity.
    C.  Bismarck's baiting, & Austria's blundering (Austria took the bait).

V.  CAUSES OF THE PEACE?  (AN EMERGING DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE AGAINST PRUSSIA.)

VI.  WAS A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS POSSIBLE?  (PROBABLY NO--SCARY THOUGHT.)


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                               THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1870

I.  BACKGROUND
    A.  Bismarck's continuing deceptions:  "We're weak and we're benign!"
    B.  Bismarck's provocations to France: he authored the Hohenzollern candidacy for the 
        Spanish throne & the Ems telegram; they provoke France to mobilize, triggering war.

II.  THE WAR: EVENTS
    A.  The wartime widening of German aims (to include Alsace-Lorraine).
    B.  Bitter civil-military conflict in Prussia over war aims and military operations.

III.  RELEVANT HYPOTHESES
    A.  The Prussian and French militaries both (!) saw windows of opportunity.
    B.  Prussia saw an offensive opportunity (arising from Britain, Russia & Austria's 
        unusual failure to counterbalance Prussia.)
    C.  France was falsely optimistic about the military outcome of the war.

IV.   THE FALSE LESSONS GERMANS LEARNED FROM THE WAR OF 1870:  "BISMARCK USED BLOOD AND IRON TO     
      MAKE FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE.  YOU CAN TOO!"  (WHY WAS THIS FALSE LESSON 
      LEARNED?)

V.  LESSONS OF BOTH WARS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY?