May 5, 1998 // Causes & Prevention of War // Van Evera & Mendeloff

                           THE INDOCHINA WAR, 1945-1975

I.  U.S. DECISIONS IN INDOCHINA
    A.  1945-6: the U.S. decides to allow the French to return to Indochina.
    B.  1950: the U.S. starts giving large $$$ and arms backing to France.
    C.  1954-56:  the U.S. decides to let the North fall to communism, but to sustain a non-
        communist Southern state.  The U.S. blocks elections in the South.  342 U.S. military 
        advisers are sent to aid Saigon's army (in 1956). 
    D.  1961-1962: more U.S. military advisers go to Vietnam (total = over 9,000, late 1962.) 
    E.  1965: Vietcong victory in the South is imminent; the U.S. intervenes massively to avert 
        it.  Thus large direct U.S. involvement begins. US starts bombing, February 1965 
        (Operation "Rolling Thunder"): sends large ground forces, July 1965.  U.S. forces in 
        Vietnam peak at 545,000 troops in 1968.
    F.  1969: the U.S. begins to withdraw and launches "Vietnamization."
    G.  1970: the U.S. widens the war into Cambodia and Laos.
    H.  1973: a peace is agreed.  The agreement allows North Vietnamese forces to remain in 
        the South.  The U.S. Congress forbids bombing throughout Indochina.
    I.  1973-75: both sides break the peace; the U.S. then stands aside as communist forces 
        seize the South and unify Vietnam under Hanoi's rule, April 1975.

II.  WHAT FACTUAL & THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS MOTIVATED U.S. INVOLVEMENT? 
    A.  Containment, Version #1:  "The U.S. must save France and NATO."  Influential during 
        1945-48.
        1.  "France's colonies make her stronger, hence a better contributor to NATO."
        2.  "We must placate France on Indochina to gain her cooperation in NATO."
    B.  Containment, Version #2:  "The U.S. must contain Soviet (Chinese) expansion."
        1.  Proxy assumption, 1949-75: Ho Chi Minh as Moscow's (or Beijing's) puppet. 
        2.  Domino theory, in 4 versions, 1953-1965.
            a.  "A communist-controlled Vietnam will send cadres across borders and subvert 
                neighbors."
            b.  "A communist-controlled Vietnam will send armies across borders and conquer 
                neighbors."
            c.  "A communist victory in Vietnam will inspire revolutions elsewhere in 
                Southeast Asia, by showing that they can succeed, and that the U.S. will let 
                them succeed."
            d.  "A communist victory in Vietnam will position Vietnam to cow other Southeast 
                Asian states into submission and alliance."
        3.  Strategic Region assumption, 1950-1965
            a.  Southeast Asian bases matter in the global balance of power.
            b.  The West depends on Southeast Asian raw materials.
    C.  The Credibility theory
        >>  Version #1 ("The Soviets are testing us"), 1945-1965
        >>  Version #2 ("We have promised to defend South Vietnam"), 1961-75
        >>  Version #3 ("We have paid costs, hence our reputation is engaged"), 1969-75
        Cures: Kissinger ("We must win") v. McNaughton ("We must suffer, but needn't win")
    D.  Domestic Backlash
        1.  Electoral Backlash version ("We'll be tossed out of office"), 1949-53, 1969-75
        2.  Weimar Analogy version ("America will suffer a nightmare of recrimination"), 
            1969-75
    E.  Philanthropy
        1.  Bloodbath theory ("Hanoi will slaughter Vietnamese non-communists"), 1969-75
        2.  Vietcong Unpopularity assumption ("The VC are unpopular, hence their victory 
            would be an undemocratic outcome"), 1964-75
    F.  American POWs--"we must fight until we get them back," 1970ff.
    G.  "We can win," 1961-64--optimism about the military outcome.

III.  THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT: DID IT FAIL? IF SO, WHY?

IV.  THE CASE FOR THE WAR IN RETROSPECT
    A.  N. Viet did take over the South, suppressing all local institutions after 1975.
    B.  There was a bloodbath in Cambodia, and millions fled the South in boats.
    C.  Hanoi in fact became a loyal Soviet ally, 1979ff.  Vietnam gave the Soviets a large naval 
        base a Cam Ranh Bay; this confirms the proxy theory.
    D.  Cambodia and Laos did fall to Communism; this confirms the domino theory.
    E.  More Southeast Asian states might have fallen had the US not given them a 10-year 
        breathing space to get their act together.  Hanoi revealed its aggressiveness by invading 
        Cambodia in 1979; had its other SE Asian targets been weaker it might have moved 
        further.
    F.  U.S. bases in the Philippines were useful in the 1970s and 1980s, e.g. in staging forces 
        into the Persian Gulf; hence it's fortunate the U.S. didn't lose them.
    G.  US defeat was followed by an upsurge of Soviet activity in the Third World during 1975-
        1980--in Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia.  This confirms the credibility theory.
    H.  Victory was possible--in fact was in our grasp in 1968.  The Viet Cong were annihilated 
        in the 1968 Tet offensive.

V.  THE CASE AGAINST THE WAR IN RETROSPECT
    A.  The premises of Containment Version #1 are false.  France's empire was a drain, not an 
        asset; and France needed US cooperation in NATO far more than the US needed France.  
        The US could have compelled French cooperation without appeasing her on Indochina.
    B.  The premises of Containment #2 are false.
        1.  The Proxy Assumption was false in the 1940s: see Ho's request to get the US into 
            the Pacific war in 1941, and his request to be made an American protectorate.  It 
            remained false later; see Hanoi's hostility toward China, 1975-91, and aloofness 
            toward USSR, 1975-79.  Hanoi did ally with the USSR after 1979, but U.S. and 
            Chinese hostility toward Hanoi explains this alliance. Perhaps the "Proxy" 
            assumption became valid after 1975, but American behavior made it true.
        2.  Domino theory: deduction flunks itat least the cadre version and the conquest 
            version.  Moreover, it was tested and flunked by events after 1975.
        3.  Strategic Region.  Events don't test this proposition, but its proponents have the 
            burden of proof.
    C.  Credibility:
        1.  Version #1 is flunked by the failure of the proxy theory, since this version depends 
            on a proxy assumption.
        2.  Version #2 was false because: 
            a.  The US had no obligation under the SEATO treaty, since that treaty was aimed 
                at international aggression, and the war in South Vietnam was mainly civil.
            b.  The South Vietnamese voided US any obligations by their political corruption 
                and military incompetence.
        3.  Versions #1-#3 are falsified by history:
            a.  After 1975 NATO remained strong, and nuclear proliferation didn't happen. 
                And most scholars think that the Soviets didn't infer much from the defeat.
            b.  The war itself drained American willpower--see e.g. the "Vietnam syndrome," 
                much lamented by the American right.  This syndrome, if real, was a 
                consequence of U.S. involvement in Indochina.
    D.  Domestic Backlash:
        1.  Version #1 is not tested by events for the year 1965, but seems wrong for 1969.
        2.  Version #2 is falsified by history.  When the war ended, it quickly vanished from 
            the consciousness of an American public more interested in Star Trek and disco.
    E.  Philanthropy:
        1.  Bloodbath: there was a bloodbath in Cambodia, but none in Vietnam.  Had the 
            U.S. left Indochina before 1970 there would have been none in Cambodia either.
        2.  VC unpopularity: clearly true after 1975, but false in 1950s and 1960s (cf. Ike's 
            admission that the Communists would have won a free election in 1956.)
    F.  "We Can Win"--the U.S. didn't.

VI. CAUSES OF THE WAR
    A.  Security dilemma--US security concerns.  Cold War ----> Indochina war.  US 
        security required Vietnam's continued division.
    B.  Misperceived security dilemma--misplaced US security concerns.  The US falsely 
        believed its security required Vietnam's continued division.  (But why?)
    C.  US false optimism, fuelled by optimistic reporting by the South Vietnamese and by the 
        first US officials sent to Vietnam.
    D.  Non-evaluation?  The U.S. "China hands" were purged from government service during 
        1950s, leaving few East Asian experts.  John Paton Davies is making furniture in Peru 
        when Vietnam brews up.  McNamara later: "I had no experts to consult!" (although this 
        can be overblown).
    E.  Imperial collapse--the US thinks it is in a contest with the USSR (and later China) for 
        control of the carcass of the French empire.
    F.  War ----> war: overselling of Cold War to US public creates pressure for 
        confrontation in Indochina.
    G.  Vietnamese nationalism.  The US collided with the huge power of a divided nationalism.  
        (Does the US face this again today in the Taiwan straits?)
    H.  North Vietnamese revolutionary/communist expansion.  (But this explanation seems 
        dubious: Hanoi displayed little post-war messianism.)