April 7, 1998 // 17.423 // Van Evera & Mendeloff


                         THE CAUSES OF LIMITED OR INTENSE WAR


I.  THE MYSTERY OF LIMITED WAR
    Some wars are total from the outset (1914).  Some start quietly but end with a  
    bang (1939-1945 in Europe, which opened with the "Sitzkrieg").  Some remain 
    limited (Korea, Vietnam).  Why?


II.  SEVEN COMMON HYPOTHESES ON LIMITED WAR

    A.  "Destructive Weapons Cause Destructive War"--and its less-popular opposite: 
        "Mutual Deterrence Prevents Destructive War."  

        Consider four hypotheses on arms and the intensity of war:

        1.  States destroy what they can.  The violence of war corresponds to the 
            destructive power of states.
        2.  States destroy what they cannot avoid destroying.  The violence of war 
            depends on whether weapons are discriminating, e.g. accurate or not.
        3.  States destroy what they must to accomplish their war goals.  The         
            violence of war corresponds to the scope of those goals, and hence to 
            the scope of political conflict between the belligerents.
        4.  States destroy in inverse proportion to the punishment they will receive 
            in return.  The violence of war corresponds inversely to the ability of 
            both belligerents to punish the other.  

        Note: Propositions #A1 and #A4 are mirror opposites.  What to make of this?

        Solutions implied by Proposition #A1:

        1.  Disarmament.
        2.  Deploy forces that can disarm the other side--e.g., strategic nuclear 
            counterforce forces (accurate silo-busting ICBMs and strategic defenses             
            for cities).

        Solutions implied by Proposition #A2:

        1.  Deploy discriminating weapons that can be used without collateral 
            damage--e.g. laser-guided bombs.  Ban land mines, especially hard-to-
            clear anti-personnel mines.

        Solution implied by Proposition #A3:

        1.  All states should adopt defensive force postures, so that their             
            neighbors will not be insecure, hence will not feel the need to adopt 
            desperate measures in a search for security.

        Solution implied by Proposition #A4:

        1.  States should arm themselves abundantly with well-protected weapons of 
            mass destruction.  "Nuclear weapons are your friend..."

    B.  "Total War Doctrine Causes Total War, Limited War Doctrines Allow Limited 
        War."

    C.  "Defining and Observing Thresholds Helps Keep War Limited"--e.g. "I won't 
        use gas if you won't."

    D.  "Don't destroy your opponent's command, control, communications, and 
        intelligence (C3I)"--otherwise they can't observe your restraint, or make 
        peace with you.


III.  CAUSES OF WAR AS CAUSES OF ESCALATION
    A.  First-strike advantages: when these exist, wars
        1.  Start at an intense level--cf. 1941 Pearl Harbor, 1941 Barbarossa, 1967 
            Arab-Israeli war; compare with 1939 in Europe, U.S. in Vietnam.
        2.  Are fought intensely, as each attacks before it is attacked.
        3.  Widen as belligerents preempt neutrals--cf. German invasion of Norway 
            1940.
        4.  Are harder to stop due to the treachery displayed by a surprise attack--
            why should the attacker now be trusted to keep peace?

    B.  Large windows--fluctuations in relative power: when these exist, wars
        1.  Start at an intense level--cf. World War I, 1941 Pacific War.
        2.  Escalate as states "jump through" windows of opportunity in wartime--cf. 
            Hitler's 1940 attack on France, Germany's 1918 offensive.
        3.  Widen as neutrals jump in to exploit war-caused "windows."
        4.  Become harder to stop, since peace agreements require more trust.
        Note: windows also make war more barbaric.  Belligerents often massacre POWs 
        and populations for "preventive" reasons, i.e. otherwise they will escape 
        and rejoin the fight.  See e.g. the 1976 massacre of Tal Zataar in Lebanon.  
        Moreover, such horrors make losers fight to the end.

    C.  False optimism: this makes war
        1.  Persist--see e.g. World War I, World War II, Vietnam, etc.
        2.  Escalate--see e.g. German 1917 submarine campaign, U.S. in Vietnam, the 
            Athenians' Syracusan expedition, etc.
        3.  Widen.

    D.  Cumulative resources: when resources are cumulative states struggle to 
        control them for themselves, and to destroy them, in order to deny them to 
        their opponent.  These two motives drive much wartime destruction.

    E.  Offense v. Defense: Does a strong offense make war more or less intense?  
        1914-1918 v. 1792, 1939.


IV.   WARFIGHTING STRATEGY AND ESCALATION
    A.  Do offensive operations cause or dampen escalation?  The Altmark incident; 
        the rush to the Yalu, 1950; the Posen-Navy debate over Murmansk.
    B.  Also: remember Admiral Boscawen and the danger of self-opened windows.


V.  DOES WAR BEGET WAR?  IF SO, WHY?
    A.  The expansion of war aims, as each side adopts a darker image of the other's 
        intentions.
    B.  The blackmail problem.
    C.  False wartime optimism.
    D.  Wartime hyper-nationalism and chauvinist mythmaking.
    E.  Wartime non-evaluation:
        1.  Critical assessment of official policy becomes "aid and comfort to the 
            enemy"--and in fact it is!
        2.  Wartime breakdown of communication between adversaries ---> no external 
            evaluation of each side's domestic debate ---> lopsided debates on war 
            aims.  Hawks can lie unanswered about the enemy.
    F.  Sunk-cost dynamics and ego-investment by elites, who can't admit they were 
        wrong.
    G.  The popular desire for vengeance.
    H.  Do "Cleon's" (the military, other hawks) wield more political power in 
        wartime?
    A missing concept in wartime: The "Treason of the Hawks."  Collaborating with 
    enemies is reviled, but ruining one's country in avoidable warfare is a crime 
    with no name and no punishment. 


VI.  WHAT WILL WORLD WAR III BE LIKE?  THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION AND THE INTENSITY OF     
     WAR