February 12, 1998 / MIT / 17.423 / Causes & Prevention of War
Van Evera & Mendeloff
MILITARY POLICY AND THE CAUSES OF WAR: EIGHT HYPOTHESES
I. FIRST MOVE ADVANTAGE (or "crisis instability"). "The greater the
advantage that accrues to the side mobilizing or striking first, the
greater the risk of war." See Schelling, Arms and Influence, chapter 6
(in the course notes.)
A. When does it pay / not pay / to move (mobilize or strike) first?
1. The problem is two-sided--their first-move advantage is also yours.
2. First-strike v. first-mobilization advantages: both are dangerous.
B. Dangers Raised by a First-Move Advantage (FMA):
1. Opportunistic war. ("If we strike first we win, so let's strike and
capture the benefits of winning?") Not a profound point, but many
analysts don't get beyond it.
2. Preemptive war. "We fear they will strike, so we must strike."
Examples: Israel's 1967 attack on Egypt; Russia's 1914 mobilization.
And two extensions:
-- "Accidental War." Example: 1890 Battle of Wounded Knee.
-- "The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack"--Schelling. ("We fear
they fear we fear they will strike; so they may strike; so we
must.") This is the most famous formulation of the problem--but
the least realistic. History shows that reciprocal fear almost
never happens. (Does Robert Jervis explain why?)
3. The "Dangers of Candor"--the most serious of these 3 risks. States
conceal their grievances and their capabilities ("we must lull them
into believing we are weak and benign; otherwise we can't gain
surprise.") This makes inadvertent war and wars of false optimism
more likely.
a. States conceal their grievances: China 1950 vs. US, Sadat
(Egypt) 1973, Prussia 1740.
b. States conceal their capabilities, leaving others under-
deterred: China 1950, Sadat 1973.
c. States conceal their misperceptions, leaving others unable to
correct these misperceptions: China 1950.
d. States conceal their military and diplomatic miscalculations:
Britain and France 1956, Prussia 1740, North Korea 1950, Japan
1941.
C. Types of war caused by FMA: first mobilization v. first strike;
preemption of opponents v. preemption of neutral states.
D. How can a First Move Advantage Be Prevented? The ingredients and
antidotes to an FMA.
1. Is a secret military move possible? This is a function of two
factors: (a) the degree of secrecy with which an attack can be
enshrouded; (b) the speed of the attack.
2. Can a secret move change force ratios in the attacker's favor?
3. Is the offense powerful relative to the defensive in warfare? If
the offense is very weak there is little first-move advantage even
if states can change force ratios by stealthy first moves.
E. How common are first-move advantages? (Very rare.) How often have
they been perceived? (Often!) Actual first-move advantages, being
scarce, cause little trouble; the illusion of first-move advantage,
being common, causes lots of trouble.
F. How could the first-move advantage hypothesis be tested?
II. "WINDOWS" OF OPPORTUNITY & VULNERABILITY (causing "preventive war"): "The
greater the fluctuations in the relative power of states, the greater the
risk of war."
A. Varieties of preventive war:
1. Internally-caused "windows": Hitler 1940, Germany 1914, Germany &
Japan 1941, Israel 1956, Athens 440 BCE, Gulf War 1991 CE.
2. Externally (diplomatically)-caused windows: Germany 1914, Japan
1941, USA 1812, indeed all wide wars...
3. Tactical v. Strategic "windows."
B. Dangers raised by "Windows":
1. Attack pays for the declining state ("war is better now than later,
and since war later is likely let's start a war now!"); and
belligerent diplomacy makes more sense for the decliner ("a war now
would not be such a bad thing, let's risk it...) (USA 1950s.)
2. The rising state has less credibility, hence others won't settle
disputes with it. ("They will break promises made in weakness after
they gain strength, so agreements with them are worthless.") Arabs
& Israelis 1930s.
3. Haste, truncated diplomacy ("we must resolve any disputes before our
power wanes..."):
a. Shortened negotiation ---> No agreement. Examples: USSR v.
Finland 1939, 1755 (7 Years War), US-China 1950, 1914.
b. No time to warn ---> one side underestimates another's will.
Examples: German misreading of Britain, 1914; Finnish
misreading of USSR, 1940; Egyptian misreading of American
intentions, 1967...
C. How common are windows? (Common in perception, rare in reality. As
Bismarck said, preventive war is usually to "commit suicide from fear
of death." Why are illusory windows so often imagined?)
D. Applications to today: would disarmament create dangerous windows?
Would nuclear proliferation?
III. FALSE OPTIMISM: "If losers could foresee their defeat they would not
fight; hence false optimism on the outcome of war raises the risk of
war." (See Blainey, Causes of War, in course notes.)
A. Three types of false optimism:
1. Optimism about relative power: Hitler 1941, Arabs 1948 & 1967,
Israel 1973, France 1870, Saddam Hussein 1990-1991.
2. Optimism about relative will: Japan 1941, Confederacy 1861, USA
1965.
3. Optimism about relative access to allies: Germany 1939, North Korea
1950, Germany 1914.
B. Causes of false optimism: First-strike advantages? Arms races?
Will-based forms of war (e.g. guerilla war)? Multipolarity? The
"line in the dust" dilemma (if you draw one, the other side can safely
advance to it)?
IV. CUMULATIVE RESOURCES: "The greater the cumulativity of resources (i.e.
the more that control of one resource enables control of another) the
greater the risk of war."
-- Buffer Room: "we need to control our lifelines/backyard etc."
-- Convertible resources, e.g. industry
-- Credibility
(How does the nuclear revolution change things?)
V. CHEAP WAR: "War is least common when its costs are greatest."
VI. OFFENSE-DOMINANCE/EASY CONQUEST: "The greater the power of
attackers/conquerors relative to defenders, the greater the risk of war."
See Hugh Gibson 1932, Robert Jervis 1978; & see assigned reading by SVE,
"Primed for Peace." A related idea: the "security dilemma."
A. What is the "Security Dilemma"? ("States' efforts to secure
themselves leave other states insecure.")
B. Are offensive forces and force postures distinguishable from defensive
forces and force postures? (Sometimes.) Does the offense-defense
balance vary across time and space? (Yes; cf. the battles of France,
1914 and 1940.)
C. Ten (10) Dangers that Arise When Conquest Is Easy:
1. Opportunistic aggression. When conquest is easy cheap gains can
be had by war, so states go to war.
2. Defensive aggression. States are less secure, because their
borders are harder to defend and their neighbors are more
aggressive. Hence they are more desirous of more territory to
make themselves more secure. Hence they are more expansionist.
3. Because states are less secure, they resist others' expansion more
fiercely. This intensifies the collision between expansionist
states and others.
4. First-move advantages are larger, because states can make greater
territorial gains with any military advantages gained by
mobilizing first or striking first.
5. Windows are larger, for the same reason. Small force-ratio
advantages can be converted into large territorial gains, small
force-ratio disadvantages may translate into large losses, so
states are anxious to strike while they have the upper hand, if
they see themselves in decline.
6. Fait Accompli tactics:
a. Are more tempting to adopt ("we must gain our aims, since our
safety is threatened if we fail; hence we should adopt even
reckless diplomatic tactics if they will work.")
b. Have more dangerous effects if adopted.
7. Alliances are tighter, hence wars have a greater propensity to
spread (e.g. 1914). ("We can't let our allies go under or we'll
be next; so we must join every war they get into, even wars they
start.")
8. Secrecy is tighter, hence miscalculation and misperception are
more common; and errors flowing therefrom have more catastrophic
and less reversible consequences. ("If they knew our plans and
forces our enemies could conquer us; hence we must observe dark
secrecy.")
9. Arms racing is more intense, giving rise to windows of opportunity
and vulnerability, and to false optimism.
10. Offense-dominance is self-feeding: offense breeds offense.
("Offense is the stronger form of war; we should buy what works so
let's buy offensive forces.")
D. How can these hypotheses be tested? What are their observable
implications? Tests & what they show:
1. In the past states were often driven to war by the search for
security. In a world of very strong defenses this search would
not be necessary, and the wars caused by this search could be
avoided.
2. War has been more common when & where security was believed scarce.
E. Causes of Offensive and Defensive Advantage:
1. Military factors: arms, geography, the character of societies &
economies.
2. Diplomatic factors: are alliances defensive or
defensive/offensive? Do "balancers" exist and do they balance?
Can "collective security" be made to work?
3. The conflict between arms and diplomacy: can defending your allies
require offensive forces?
F. Are Offensive Military Strategies Always Bad? Despite the dangers
listed under "A", is offense sometimes the best strategy anyway?
1. When the offense already dominates?
2. When windows are large?
3. For "extended deterrence" (i.e. protecting allies)?
4. For scaring aggressor-states into better behavior?
5. For limiting one's own damage in wars, & ending wars?
6. For reforming otherwise-unreformable aggressor states?
G. How Easy Is Conquest in the Real World? Does the Nuclear Revolution
Make Conquest Easier or Harder?
VII. ARMS RACING AND WAR
A. Causes of Arms Racing:
1. Secrecy.
2. Offense-dominance, offensive doctrines and force postures.
a. Direct effects (offensive forces spur more counter-building by
the other side.)
b. Indirect effects: secrecy, less arms control.
B. Does Arms Racing Cause War? (Is it more a cause or a symptom of
international conflict?)
1. It causes windows.
2. It causes false optimism.
3. Why the importance of arms racing is exaggerated: war and arms
racing are correlated, but is the correlation spurious? (Does
mutual hostility cause them both, creating an illusion of
causation?)
VIII. WHAT ABOUT DISARMAMENT? IS IT POSSIBLE? WOULD IT CAUSE OR PREVENT
WAR?
A. Is it possible?
-- Could the human race ever really be disarmed? (Consider the
slaughter of ancient wars, waged with swords & shields; e.g.,
76,000 of the 126,000 participants in the battle of Cannae [216
BCE] perished in an afternoon.)
-- What quality of verification would be required before states would
disarm? What arrangements to equalize both side's possible rate of
"breakout" from the arms control regime would be required?
B. Is it desirable? The problem of preventive war.
C. If it's possible, is it necessary? (If states already get along so
well that they can agree to disarm, why is it needed?)
Note: These eight hypotheses represent the universe of major hypotheses on
arms and war. If you can think of more you've found something new.
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