17.423 // Causes & Prevention of War // April 8, 1998
Van Evera & Mendeloff
THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION AND WORLD POLITICS
I. THE TECHNICAL EFFECTS OF THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION
Technologies rarely have decisive effects on war or politics; more often
technology is bent to serve politics or military doctrine. Nuclear weapons are
an exception. They overwhelm politics and doctrine.
Five cascading technical effects flow from the nuclear revolution. These
cascade further into political effects listed below in Section IV. The
technical effects are:
A. Effect #1: hydrogen bombs offer an increase of six (6, count them six)
orders of magnitude over the power of the TNT explosives used in World War
II. The atomic bomb = x 1,000 increase on TNT; the hydrogen bomb = x
1,000 increase on atomic bombs.
B. Effect #2: due to 'A' (the destructiveness of nuclear weapons), the "cost
exchange ratio" vastly favors defenders (better termed "retaliators") over
attackers seeking to disarm them. Nuclear weapons pack tremendous
explosive power in devices that are cheap, light, easily hidden,
protected, and delivered. Hence destroying nuclear weapons is very hard,
protecting and delivering them very easy.
C. Effect #3: due to 'B' (the cost-exchange ratio), a relationship of MAD
("Mutual Assured Destruction") develops between major powers. Both can
destroy the other's society even after absorbing an all-out counterforce
attack by the other. In short, both have a "second strike countervalue
capability."
In the Cold War, both the US and USSR sought to avert MAD, preferring
instead to deny the other a second-strike countervalue capability, but
they could not escape it. Technology overrode their desires.
D. Effect #4: "flat of the curve" dynamics. One of MAD's special
characteristics is the "flat of the curve": beyond a certain point, the
capacity to inflict damage on the other society, or to prevent damage to
one's own, is inelastic to the size and capability of one's own force or
one's opponent's force. Capabilities are absolute.
E. Effect #5: the "multiplier effect." The efficiency with which one side
must strike the other's forces in order to leave the other unable to
inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation increases sharply as the
arsenals on both sides grow. Even an inefficient strike (a substantial
percentage of the attacked weapons survive) can reduce the retaliation to
acceptable levels if both arsenals are very small; even a very efficient
strike (e.g., 99 percent effective) can fail to reduce retaliation to
acceptable levels if both arsenals are very large. Hence first strikes
are least thinkable when arsenals are large, suggesting the argument that
"the more weapons both sides have, the less the risk of their use."
II. ALTERNATE NUCLEAR DOCTRINES: COUNTERVALUE vs. COUNTERFORCE STRATEGIES
Nuclear weapons present states with two basic nuclear doctrines: counterforce
and countervalue.
>> Countervalue: the enemy society is targeted. Political aims are achieved
by threatening to punish the adversary by destroying its population and
industry.
>> Counterforce: the enemy nuclear forces are targeted. Political aims are
achieved by threatening to disarm the adversary--to remove its capacity to
inflict punishment on oneself.
Since forces can be used first or second, we have a crude universe of four
possible nuclear capabilities:
A. Second-strike countervalue capability: the capacity to absorb an all-out
counterforce first strike and inflict unacceptable damage on the
adversary's society in retaliation.
This capability is normally easy to build, for reasons noted above in
Section I.
B. First-strike counterforce: the capacity to launch a first strike that
removes the adversary's capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on oneself
in retaliation.
This capability is normally very hard or impossible to build, for reasons
noted above in Section I.
C. Second-strike counterforce capability: the capacity to absorb an all-out
counterforce first strike and mount a counterforce counterattack that
leaves the attacker's forces unable to inflict unacceptable further damage
on one's own society.
This capability is even harder to build than a first-strike counterforce
capability.
D. First-strike countervalue capability: the capacity to launch a first
strike that inflicts unacceptable damage on the adversary's society.
This capability is normally very easy to build, for reasons noted above in
Section I, but is quite useless.
These four capabilities can be displayed in a 2x2 table:
Striking what?
Values (cities) Forces
____________________________________
|#1 First |#3 First |
| Strike | Strike |
First | Countervalue | Counterforce |
Striking | Capability | Capability |
When? ____________________________________
|#2 Second |#4 Second |
Second | Strike | Strike |
| Countervalue | Counterforce |
| Capability | Capability |
____________________________________
Past debates over US nuclear doctrine have focused on whether the US should be
content with capability #2 (second strike countervalue capability) or should
also strive for #3 (first strike counterforce capability).
III. FOUR NUCLEAR ORDERS: MAD AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
MAD may be a technical inevitability. However, hypothetical alternates to MAD
include: BAD ("both are defended", a world of symmetrical city defenses); WORSE
("winning only requires striking early," a world of mutual first strike
capabilities); and MARNE ("mankind absolutely rejects nuclear explosives," a non-
nuclear world); and USA ("Unilateral Superiority--American"), a world where the
U.S. is top dog--it has second-strike countervalue and first-strike
counterforce capabilities against all other nuclear powers.
IV. THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION IF STATES ARE CASUALTY-
SENSITIVE, CLEAR-PERCEIVING, NOT HYPER-AGGRESSIVE, CANNOT TRANSFER NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ANONYMOUSLY, CAN BUILD SECURE ARSENALS
Assume states have five attributes: (1) they are casualty-sensitive; (2) they
do not value conquest unduly, e.g. they do not value it more than others value
freedom; (3) their perceptions of their surroundings are fairly accurate--they
have some capacity to assess their neighbors' capabilities, and to correctly
anticipate how these neighbors will respond to their conduct; (4) they are
unable to use or transfer nuclear weapons anonymously; (5) they have the
industrial capacity to build large, secure arsenals. If so, the nuclear
revolution has seven positive consequences:
A. First-strike advantages disappear, hence "crisis instability" and
preemptive war also disappear. Flat-of-the-curve dynamics (see 'I D')
erase first-strike payoffs. Even if a country can shift the force ratio
in its favor by striking first, it merely moves itself and its enemy
laterally on the flat of the curve. The relative ability to bounce rubble
changes, but nothing else.
B. "Windows" of opportunity and vulnerability disappear, hence temptation to
preventive war also disappears. See 'IV A': windows disappear for similar
flat-of-the curve reasons.
C. Resources are less cumulative. Flat-of-the-curve dynamics diminish the
additivity of resources; even large shifts in the control of industrial
resources, or in control of advantageous geographic positions, won't move
either power off the flat of the curve. Also, nuclear forces can be
delivered over great distances, hence don't require proximity to function
(so bases matter little.) (Though this was less true earlier, e.g. in
1962.)
D. Less false optimism. Nuclear weapons create very certain physical
results, eliminating miscalculations of relative capability. They still
leave room for miscalculations of relative will, however.
E. Defense-dominance, hence fewer wars for security and wars of opportunity.
The nuclear revolution strengthens defender-states and weakens aggressor-
states, since conflicts in a MAD world become to contests of will, and
defenders nearly always win contests of will. Under MAD each side can
harm the other without limit. Disputes are then settled in favor of the
side that cares more about the issue, and hence is willing to run a
greater risk or pay a higher price to prevail. Contests of will are
nearly always won by defenders, since defenders value freedom more than
aggressors value conquests. If so, conquest among great powers is
impossible unless one power acquires a first-strike counterforce
capability against the other. A first-strike counterforce capability is
essentially unreachable between powers of remotely comparable resources,
hence conquest is also impossible among them.
F. Limited war. Logic suggests that causes of war and intense war are
similar; and if so, logic suggests that the nuclear revolution can
(counter-intuitively) promote limited war, as well as less war.
G. Slower arms racing.
V. THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION ON THE INTENSITY OF WAR IF
STATES ARE NOT CASUALTY-SENSITIVE OR CLEAR-PERCEIVING, ARE HYPER-AGGRESSIVE, CAN
TRANSFER NUCLEAR WEAPONS ANONYMOUSLY, & CANNOT BUILD SECURE ARSENALS
If we relax the five assumptions outlined at the front of in Section IV then
the benefits of MAD evaporate and the dark face of MAD appears.
A. If the first four assumptions are relaxed, the benefits of the nuclear
revolution are lost, even reversed. Defenders no longer have the clear
upper hand. Moreover a new danger appears: states now must face the
possibility of being physically destroyed (by a crazed, non-deterrable
adversary) even if they cannot be conquered. This may impel them to take
drastic steps if a nuclear-armed neighbor seems to be taking leave of its
senses. If the crazed neighbor seems certain to attack eventually,
killing hundreds of millions, a preemptive strike against it becomes
sensible, even though the neighbor's retaliation will kill tens of
millions. (In short, a "survival dilemma" arises, parallel to the
"security dilemma." "The measures each state must take to ensure its
physical survival threaten the physical survival of other states.")
States also face the risk of anonymous use by rogue states or movements.
Such rogues are less deterred because they can hope that their
responsibility will not be discovered.
B. If the fifth assumption is relaxed, MAD itself may be frail, or may never
develop. A first strike may be feasible by one or both sides. Hence MAD
between superpowers can be good, but nuclear proliferation to small states
can be bad.
Bottom line: nuclear weapons are Janus-faced. They cause peace or war,
security or insecurity, depending on ... us! They pacify a world of states
that are casualty-sensitive, fairly clear-perceiving, not hyper-aggressive,
unable to use or transfer nuclear weapons anonymously, and able to build secure
arsenals. If these conditions are relaxed the benefits of the nuclear
revolution evaporate and a dark side appears; nuclear weapons themselves become
a cause of war.
VI. NUCLEAR TRANSITIONS
MAD may be pacifying, but the road to MAD is dangerous. The transition to MAD
opens windows; other states are tempted to strike emerging nuclear powers before
they develop their forces, and newly-emerged nuclear powers are tempted to strike
neighbors who are lagging in the race. (See, e.g., Israel's attack on Iraq's
Osiraq nuclear reactor, 1981.)
Note: this suggests that nuclear disarmament would raise the danger of
preventive war if that disarmament proved impermanent, and the disarmed states
began a race back to nuclear capabilities.
VII. THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Many who like the nuclear revolution, believing it has pacified relations among
great powers, also fear the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more states.
Two reasons are given:
A. New nuclear states may not meet the five conditions outlined above. Hence
relations among them, and between them and the established nuclear powers,
will be worsened by their acquisition of nuclear weapons. Examples
offered: Saddam Hussein's crazed Iraqi regime; Iran under the Ayatollah
and the Shia mullahs; North Korea under the Great Leader and Dear Leader.
B. As the number of nuclear states grows, so does the feasibility of
anonymous use or transfer. Nuclear users can lose themselves in the
crowd, erasing their victims' capacity to hold them accountable.
VIII. COMPARE FOUR WORLDS: WHICH IS BEST?
1. Few (5-10) nuclear powers.
2. Many (80-100) nuclear powers.
3. No nuclear powers, in a world of nuclear knowledge. (We would achieve
this if today's nuclear powers disarmed.)
4. No nuclear powers, nuclear weapons are never invented and remain unknown.
A now-impossible world still worth evaluating.
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