March 10, 1998 // Causes & Prevention of War // Van Evera & Mendeloff


                  THE ANGLO-FRENCH SEVEN YEARS WAR, 1756-1763

I.  BACKGROUND TO WAR
   A.  Mercantilism: the scramble for specie (gold) to pay 
       mercenaries, hence for trade surpluses, hence for empire.
   B.  The Anglo-French contest for empire in the Caribbean, South 
       Asia, West Africa, and North America.
   C.  The incomplete partition of the world.  Who owned the Ohio valley 
       region in North America?  It hadn't been decided.
   D.  Military facts: Britain had the stronger navy (the Royal navy was 
       twice the strength of the French navy), France had the stronger army.
   E.  Chronology: the Ohio Valley encounters of 1752-54--France builds forts 
       in the Ohio Valley, Britain tried three times to eject them and 
       failed; Britain sent Braddock's 2 battalions to America, early 1755; 
       France sent 6 battalions, May 1755; Admiral Boscawen attempted to 
       intercept these battalions off Newfoundland, June 1755; Britain & 
       France halted negotiations; war, May 18, 1756.
   F.  Three key misperceptions to look for:
       1.   Of one's own and the other's conduct and intentions.
       2.   Of the other's likely response to one's own acts.  Compliance with 
            threats and submission to punishment is expected, defiance is 
            elicited.
       3.   Of the value of the stakes in dispute--which is greatly 
            exaggerated.

II.  CAUSES OF THE SEVEN YEARS WAR
   A.  Misperceptions (do these constitute a Jervisian spiral?)
     1.  Britain misperceived:
       a.  The nature of the status quo -- "Ohio belongs to us!"
           --  Dinwiddie described the Ohio Valley as "British property" in 
                communiques to London (making the French "invaders of British 
                property.")  But Ohio wasn't British--its ownership was 
                undetermined.
       b.  French conduct--Britain exaggerated the aggressiveness of French 
           behavior.
           --  Dinwiddie told London "the French have invaded East of the 
                Alleghanies!" (but they hadn't.)
           --  Shirley told London "the French have invaded Massachusetts!" 
                (but they hadn't.)
           --  Dinwiddie told London "the French are planning a general 
                invasion of British North America!" (but they weren't.)
           --  Dinwiddie wrote London that the French were attacking "the 
                forces of this Dominion" in the Ohio Valley (but these forces 
                were Ohio Company mercenaries, not British govt. troops.)  In 
                his dispatches the Ohio Company fort-builders became "our 
                people" and the fort was "our fort."
       c.  British conduct--GB underestimated the aggressiveness of its own 
           behavior.
           --  Dinwiddie failed to report his own fort-building in the Ohio 
               Valley.
           --  Dinwiddie failed to report his collaboration with Indians 
               fighting against the French in the Ohio Valley.
     2.  France suffered similar misperceptions, though we know fewer 
         details.
     3.  Additional misperceptions (which ones grew from those above?):
       a.  Both sides saw the other as very expansionist.
       b.  Both sides thought a tough policy would persuade the other side 
           to back down; in fact the other counter-escalated.
           i.   Britain thought France would not counter Braddock's 2-
                battalion deployment.  But France did (with 6 battalions.)
           ii.  France thought Britain would not counter its 6-battalion               
                deployment.  But Britain did (with Boscawen's naval attack 
                on that deployment.)
       c.  Both sides were reluctant to negotiate, because:
           i.    They thought the other would take their willingness to 
                 talk as a sign of weakness.
           ii.   They thought concessions would injure their credibility.
           iii.  They thought negotiations were pointless, wouldn't 
                 succeed.
           However, without talks misperceptions on both sides went 
           undiscovered.
       d.  Britain exaggerated the value of the stakes at issue.  Britain 
           thought by beating France it could consolidate control over 
           North America.  In fact Britain's victory cost it North America.
   B.  Non-settlement of disputes: the gaps in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle 
       (1748).
   C.  4 "windows": 
       a.   Britain saw a waning British worldwide military advantage over 
            France.  British leaders thought Britain was better prepared for 
            war than France but also saw France building up its fleet.
       b.   France saw British power growing.  The French saw Britain making 
            alliances on the European continent (e.g., with Spain) and 
            expanding into the Ohio Valley.
       c.   The British deployment of Braddock's 2 battalions to North 
            America in winter 1755 caused France to perceive a tactical 
            "window": "we must deploy offsetting forces to North America 
            before a war starts and Britain closes the seas; we can't do it 
            later."
       d.   The subsequent French 6-battalion deployment to North America on 
            disarmed French warships created dual British windows of 
            opportunity and vulnerability: "we have a fleeting opportunity 
            to destroy a third of the French fleet," and "if we don't strike 
            the French will gain military superiority in North America!"
       Note: windows 'c' and 'd' were unwitting products of government 
       decisions.
   E.  Competition for control of cumulative resources & Competition 
       for security.
   F.  Expectation of a cheap, limited war.

III.  OUTCOME: BRITAIN WINS WAR ---> BRITAIN LOSES ITS AMERICAN COLONIES 
      (HMMMM ... DON'T YOU HATE IT WHEN THAT HAPPENS?)

IV.  ESCALATION OF THE SEVEN YEARS WAR