FINAL EXAM STUDY QUESTIONS

Please bring this list to the exam.

You **may** outline your answers on these study-question sheets, but will not be permitted to consult other materials.

You will be asked to answer two from a choice of three questions, drawn for the list below, plus some short identifications. Total exam time: 2.5 hours (1 hour each for the essays, .5 hour for the short IDs).

You are encouraged to study together as you prepare your answers.

1. If you were designing a peaceful world of states best able to co-exist without war, what would your states be like? You may comment on the nature of their political systems, their economic systems, their administrative and educational institutions, their foreign and defense policies, or any other national attributes you believe are relevant. However, confine your remarks to 3-5 attributes, and explain why you think they matter most. Also, please indicate how much you think war would diminish if all the world's states followed your design.

Use historical examples and evidence drawn from course readings and lectures.

2. Which previous wars covered in this course should the leaders of the powers engaged in the Korean War have studied most closely to avoid the mistakes they made? Why?

3. Could World War I have been prevented, localized or limited? If so, when and how? By whom? ("Whom" = any individual, group, or institution, including governments, institutions or individuals within governments, and private institutions or individuals.)

4. Some scholars believe that war results largely from the environment states face. There is no superior authority to protect states, so they must protect themselves; but the measures that each takes to secure itself injures others' security, causing conflict and war. Others argue that real-world conditions give states little reason to fight, that most wars arise from misperception of the real world, and that warfare is best explained by theories of national misperception. What do you think?

   a. How common are wars arising from the security dilemma? How much warfare could be prevented if states could somehow achieve absolute security from conquest?

   b. How common are wars arising from national misperception? How much warfare could be prevented if national perceptions were always accurate?

Base your answer on historical cases covered in this course. Discuss exceptions to any generalizations you offer. If you argue that misperceptions are important, specify what types of misperceptions matter most: (a) those arising from human cognitive shortcomings (that is, psychological causes); (b) those deliberately purveyed by mendacious individuals or institutions; (c) those arising from the

opacity of the international environment (that is, from the inherent difficulty of perceiving international politics correctly).

5.   In Perception and Misperception in International Politics (chapter 3) Robert Jervis notes that sometimes unyielding policies cause war by provoking a conflict-spiral, while sometimes concessions cause war by encouraging aggressors to make more demands, and to falsely expect that others will grant these demands.

     a.   Which problem occurs more often in international history? Comment on the cases covered in this course.

     b.   What policy prescriptions follow from your answer? How could past policy makers have avoided the spirals or deterrence failures that you discuss?

6.   What has been the single most **potent and preventable** cause of war in the 20th century? Explain why your war-cause is both potent and preventable; also identify the second and third most potent and preventable war-causes, and explain why they are less potent and/or less preventable than the prime cause you identify.

7.   What foreign policy should the United States adopt to keep itself and the world at peace? Some people argue an activist U.S. foreign policy only leads to U.S. entanglement in wars like World War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Others argue that an isolationist policy permits wars among other states; then the U.S. is eventually drawn in, as in 1917, 1941, and 1950. They suggest a paradox: "To preserve peace, we must threaten war."

Still others argue that both an active or isolationist policy can cause war or peace, depending on specific policies and circumstances.

Discuss these views with reference to relevant history. This history could include past American policies or the policies of other powers covered in this course.

8.   You are an adviser to the President of the United States. Write a memo to the President on the future of U.S.-China relations. Address specifically these questions: (1) How great is the danger of military conflict between China and the United States in the next 20 years? (2) What would be the causes of any conflict that occurs? (3) What policies do you recommend to avoid conflict while also protecting American interests? Feel free to mention specific attributes of China and/or the United States, or aspects of the military, technological, and economic environment of today and the future. Support your argument with reference to relevant theories and evidence, including historical evidence.

9.   Many later observers have seen their own times reflected in the work of Thucydides and drawn similarities between the Peloponnesian War and conflicts they observed first hand. Of the wars studied in this course, which one in your view is most similar to the Peloponnesian War in its causes and conduct? What were the most important common features of the outbreak and conduct of the Peloponnesian War and the one you have chosen? What are the common lessons that can be drawn from them for the conduct of policy? Feel free to note differences as well as similarities between the wars you discuss.

10.   What is the future of war? Will warfare be more or less common in the future than it was before 1945? Will it be more or less violent than pre-1945 warfare? In developing your answer, clearly state your factual and theoretical assumptions. (Note: you may wish to offer different answers for different regions of the globe.)