Handout // Feb. 17

 

NATIONAL MISPERCEPTIONS AND THE CAUSES OF WAR

I. How Common are Misperceptions? How Dangerous?

A. Scholars agree: Misperceptions are VERY COMMON in international relations.

B. Dangerous?

1. Sometimes misperceptions can prevent war, e.g., if states are insecure but don’t know it they may refrain from wars they might start if they knew the truth. However, it is OFTEN true that misperceptions on either side of the reality baseline raise the risk of war: a. Exaggerating or underestimating others’ hostility can cause war.

b. False optimism and false pessimism can cause war.

 C. Is it more common for states to exaggerate threats or to underestimate them? (An interesting question . . . hotly debated!) II. Three Paradigms of National Misperception: A. Opacity (the world is opaque) = uncertainty of capabilities and intentions of others leads to misperceptions

B. Psychology = psychologists have shown that humans misperceive their reality because they use cognitive shortcuts in reasoning, and/or because of their emotional needs (motivational).

C. Cozenology (cozen = "to mislead by means of a petty trick or fraud . . ." or "to act deceitfully") = political actors mislead nations into believing wrong ideas /hold false images of international situations

 III. Opacity A. Capabilities are difficult to know 1. technology

2. doctrine

3. readiness

4. will

 B. Intentions are nearly impossible to know with certainty. 1. Secrecy and deception always possible, even likely.

2. States often do not know their own intentions.

3. States cannot know their future intentions.

 C. Worst-case analysis is necessary often = more security dilemma.

D. What can be done?

 IV. Psychology (Jervis) A. Examples of Hypotheses from Jervis: 1. "Attribution theory" — states tend to attribute their own aggressive behavior to their situation, while attributing others’ aggressive behavior to their innate disposition. (Hence states see their own nasty conduct as excused by necessity, while others’ nasty conduct is unprovoked and unjustified.)

2. A related syndrome: states tend to ascribe others’ good behavior to their own efforts to make others behave well, and to blame others’ bad conduct on the others’ innate disposition.

3. Belief perseverance — states are slow to absorb new facts & realities that clash with their elites’ existing beliefs.

4. States tend to exaggerate the shared character of information, hence to exaggerate the effectiveness of communication.

5. States tend to exaggerate the centralized/disciplined/coordinated character of others’ behavior.

 B. Appeal of Psychological theories: regular patterns, demonstrated in the lab, that explain misperceptions beyond insufficient information.

C. Problems with Psychological Theories:
 

1. Individual problems do not often explain National Perceptions a. Group perception formation should cancel individual problems

b. Perceptions across time should be corrected for psychological quirks.

c. Applies mostly to dictators in crisis!!!!

 D. Mostly: Bad Social Science -- borrowing half a theory . . . V. Cozenology: Organization Theory #1­Gov’t Bureaucracies and Private Organizations as the sources of Elite and Public Misperceptions (MIC­Military Industrial Complex) A. "Militarism" -- "Professional military organizations’ desire to preserve/protect their organizational interests causes them to infuse civilian society with organizationally self-serving, war-causing ideas." The professional military and associated agencies and industries as causes of misperceptions -- (MIC). 1. What organizations want: size & wealth, conservation of "essence," autonomy, control of "task environment," prestige.

2. Why militaries are willfull and powerful actors­why they want to shape national misperceptions and why they can.

a. Professional militaries are willfull because:

-- military officers have only one potential employer, hence they are especially concerned about its welfare.

-- military careers are very competitive, have enforced early retirement.

-- militaries demand a lot from society­lots of money, plus draftees’ time­and must constantly justify these demands.

--militaries have natural political enemies, e.g. peace groups, pacific religious organizations, etc., who dislike the militaries task and must be countered.

-- militaries have turbulent "task environments."

b. Professional militaries have considerable domestic political capability because they possess:
-- a monopoly of information­control of "secrecy"

-- a monopoly of expertise — outside "experts" often do not have access to all of the relevant information because of secrecy.

-- a monolithic internal character & hierarchic internal structure.

-- a vast workforce (including public relations specialists).

-- great prestige.

 3. What perceptions do militaries (sometimes) purvey? a. "Others are hostile" — others’ hostility is exaggerated

b. "Bandwagoning is common, threats make others more compliant"

c. "Conquest is easy"

d. "Striking first pays off"

e. "Windows are common and large"

f. "Empires are valuable, resources are cumulative."

g. "War is cheap, healthy, beneficial."

h. Optimism in wartime.

i. "Escalation is the answer" in wartime.

 4. What states are prone to "militarism?" (Big states; insecure states; states whose militaries form a separate society.)

5. Full-blown "militarism" v. low-level "militarism"; what makes "militarism" more or less across time?

6. What forces counter militarist misperceptions? How powerful?

a. knowledge of "militarism"

b. outside experts, academe, peace groups

 VI. Cozenology: Organization Theory #2: States and Societies as Organizations A. National Mythmaking: self-glorifying, self-whitewashing & other maligning myths. 1. Nationalism and nationalist mythmaking in education —"value infusion" and the "non-guilt complex" --(Philip Selznik, Carleton Hayes). "Elites’ desire to persuade publics to support the regime, pay taxes & join the army causes them to purvey myths that glorify the state & national institutions." a. Three types of myth: i. Self-glorifying myths —"we’re brilliant, ingenious, chosen by god. We invented all the world’s better mousetraps."

ii. self-whitewashing myths­"we’ve started no wars, committed no crimes!"

iii. Other-maligning myths — "our neighbors are culturally inferior/aggressive/dangerous."

 b. Why are myths purveyed? They make citizens contribute more to the nation­pay taxes, join the army, etc. They also bolster political power of illegitimate elites.

c. A short history of mythmaking: Chauvinist mythmaking peaked in Europe during 1870-1945; it then diminished. WHY?

 2. Can nationalist myths be cured? If so, how? (Start: Amnesia International)
  B. "Non self-evaluation" by states and societies can lead to misperceptions. "the wish of the powerful to stifle criticism leads societies to punish those who evaluate dominant policies and ideas; hence evaluation is scarce and inferior." 1. Non-evaluation in government bureaucracy. a. Punishment of "whistle blowers"   b. Motives for expunging evaluators: the clash between requirements of sound policy formulation and implementation. Dissenters make implementation difficult, so they are purged in advance­which injures formulation. 2. Non-evaluation in the press and academe: critics are marginalized by the "establishment,"­much easier to advance if you don’t rock the boat. C. "Non-strategy": "States tend to leave national grand strategy & basic foreign policy vague, or fail to frame it at all." 1. WHY? Politically easier by a lot!!!!!   2. Results: --Less learning­no clear continuing evaluation of policies.   --Less storing of knowledge­Countries forget why they did things, because no clear records of "changing their minds"   --Explaining is more difficult­often impossible to make intentions clear because intentions have not been clarified, even if everyone "knows" what the country would do­outsiders often can’t know! VII. Cozenology: Other Political Theories of Misperceptions (in the US) A. Oversell: The nature of the "division of power" in the US is such that sometimes, the Executive Branch may feel that it needs to pass a new demanding foreign policy but it anticipates resistance in Congress, or it fears the government bureaucracy will fail to implement its policies, then it is likely that the executive Branch will "oversell’ or exaggerate the threat to create an atmosphere of crisis in order to unify the public and the elite.

B. Electoral Politics: at times, elites outside of power find it advantageous to accuse the elites inside power of not being tough enough against the external threat­political rhetoric and "one-upsmanship" can combine to escalate the threat and create national misperceptions.

C. Can you think of other scenarios of misperception creation?

D. Does the press help control or exacerbate these problems of threat inflation?

 VIII. The Two-sided Problem of Misperceptions-- No "playing it safe": The "Spiral Model" Versus "Deterrence" (or the "Deterrence Model"): Choosing between hard-line policies and appeasement, and the dangers that follow from wrong choices A. "Sticks" are safer than "carrots;" Threat of punishment works better than appeasement -- Worst-case analysis and "if you want peace, prepare for war," is the safest strategy = DETER, DETER, DETER

B. Appeasement works better than punishment; international relations is more often "tragedy" than a "zero-sum" game--The security dilemma; If one threatens others one is likely to provoke trouble rather than solve it-- "Carrots are Safer than "Sticks" = APPEASE, APPEASE, APPEASE (or you will end up in a spiral of conflict nobody really wants).

C. What could explain spirals? Opacity, psychology, cozenology.

D. What conditions determine whether carrots or sticks work better?

1. Is the other an aggressor state or a status quo power? 9 And does it see itself as the aggressor or not?)

2. Are the others’ claims legitimate or illegitimate? (And does it see its claims as legitimate or not?)

3. Is the other weak or strong?

4. Will the concessions demanded by the other strengthen its ability to commit further aggression?

-- military careers are very competitive, have enforced early retirement. IX. The Art of Diplomacy: Preventive measures… A. The dangers of unsettled disputes.

B. Framing claims: blackmail v. back-scratching.