Handout // Feb. 15
 
 

The International System

    A.  Definitions:
              a.  Anarchy, Power and the System
              b.  Realpolitik, Balance of Power
              c.  Alliances and "Balance of Threat" theory
    B.  Polarity: unipolar, bipolar, multipolar: what system is the most stable?
              a. Wars happen when balance is disrupted?peace is maintained through equal balances.
       
    C.  Power transition theories: wars happen when states change "position"?when a state becomes powerful enough to "challenge the leader"
     
      a. Hegemon: the leader of the system, with a preponderence of power
      b. Wars happen when power becomes equal! Peace maintained through hierarchy of power, with a leader and status quo allies?not through balances.

    D.  Cycle theories: war is fate (almost)?no "exact fit" predictions.

II. Realism/Neo-Realism: Powerful Ideas often Attacked!

          A. Realism: States seek power/security

B. The Security Dilemma: "States’ efforts to secure themselves leave other states less secure." Thus, the central theme of international relations is not evil but tragedy. No innate "power instinct," but the instinct of self-preservation which, in the vicious circle [the security dilemma], leads to competition for ever more power." (p. 66, Jervis) "States often share a common interest, but the structure of the situation prevents them from bringing about the mutually desired situation."
C. Liberalism’s Critique: States can sometimes achieve cooperative relations!   D. Fine-grained structure of Power Critique: Different types of power/ relative power of attackers matters?not number of poles!   E. Perceptions matter most! III. Military Factors, Military Policy and War
 
A. First Move Advantage (or "crisis instability"): "The greater the advantage that accrues to the side mobilizing or striking first, the greater the risk of war." (see Schelling)
 1. When does it pay/ not pay to strike or mobilize first?
        a. Problem: often a two-sided situation
        b. first-strike v. first-mobilization: both are dangerous

2. Dangers Raised by a First Move Advantage (FMA):
        a. Opportunistic War: "If we strike first we win, so let’s strike and capture the benefits."
        b. Preemptive War. "We fear they will strike, so we must strike."
        c. Accidental War: war that arises out of inadvertence or panic or misunderstanding or false alarm--
                the real deterrence problem.  (Schelling, p. 229-232)
        d. The "Dangers of Candor"--when a state fears a first strike advantage, or hopes to gain one, it must
             begin to conceal its grievances and its capabilities--cutting short the possibilities for diplomacy!

3. How can a FMA be prevented?

a. Is a secret military move possible? (Create Openness!)
           i. degree of secrecy possible x speed of attack                               b. Can a secret move change force ratios in attackers favor? (Build survivable, robust forces.)
                              c. Is the offense powerful relative to the defense?
4. How common are FMAs? (Very rare) How often have they been perceived? (Very often.  Why?) The illusion of FMAs has caused lots of TROUBLE!
B. "Windows" of Opportunity and Vulnerability (causing "preventive war"): "The greater the fluctuations in the relative power of states, the greater the risk of war."
1.  Dangers of "Windows": a. Attack pays for the declining state ("war is better now than later, and since war later is likely, let’s start war now!); often with haste, truncated diplomacy.
b. Belligerent diplomacy makes more sense for the decliner ("a war now would not be such a bad thing, let’s risk it….").
c. The rising state has less credibility, hence others won’t settle disputes with it. ("They will break promises made in weakness after they gain strength, so agreements with them are worthless.’)
  2. How common are "Windows"? (Common in perception, rare in reality. As Bismark said, preventive war is usually to "commit suicide from fear of death.")

3. Application to today: Would nuclear disarmament create dangerous windows? Will nuclear proliferation create these windows?
 

 C. False Optimism: "If losers could forsee their defeat they would not fight; hence false optimism on the outcome of war raises the risk of war." (See Blainey.) 1. Three types of false optimism: a. Optimism about relative power.
b. Optimism bout relative will.
c. Optimism about relative access to allies. 2. How common? What causes false optimism? First-strike advantages? Arms races? Multipolarity? The "line in the dust" dilemma (if you draw one, the other side can safely advance to it)? Will-based forms of war (e.g. guerilla war, bombing)?
  D. Cumulative resources: "The greater the cumulativity of resources (i.e. the more that control of one resource enables control of another) the greater the risk of war." 1. Buffer room: "We need to control our lifelines/backyard etc."
2. Convertible resources, e.g. industry
3. Credibility
4. How does the nuclear revolution change things????
  E. Cheap War: "War is least common when its costs are greatest." 1. Antidote: Make war expensive--punish aggressors!!!!
  F. Offense-dominance/ Easy Conquest: "The greater the power of the attackers/conquerors relative to the defenders, the greater the risk of war." 1. Are offensive forces and force postures distinguishable from defensive forces and force postures? (Sometimes.)
2. Does the offense-defense balance vary across time and space? (Yes. Think of Schelling’s example of all island nations with 19th century weaponry . . . )

3. Ten Dangers Arise when Conquest is easy:
 

1. Opportunistic aggression: when conquest is easy, cheap gains can be had by war, so states go to war.

2. Defensive aggression: States are less secure, because their borders are harder to defend and their neighbors are more aggressive. Hence they are more desirous of more territory to make themselves more secure. Hence they are more expansionist.

  3. Because states are less secure, they resist others’ expansion more fiercly. This intensifies the collision between expansionist states and others--widens wars more quickly.   4. First-move advantages are larger, because states can make greater territorial gains with any military advantages gained by mobilizing first or striking first.   5. Windows are larger, for thee same reason. Small force-ratio advantages can be converted into large territorial gains, small force-ratio disadvantages may translate into large losses, so states are anxious to strike while they have the upper hand, if they see themselves in decline.   6. Fait accompli tactics are more tempting to adopt and have more dangerous effects if adopted. ("We must gain our aims, since our safety is threatened if we fail; hence we should adopt even reckless tactics if they will work.")   7. Alliances are tighter, hance wars have a greater propensity to spread. ("We can’t allow our allies to go under or we’ll be next; so we must join every war they get into, even wars they start.")   8. Secrecy is tighter, hence miscalculation and misperception are more common; and errors flowing therefrom have more catastrophic and less reversible consequences. ("If they knew our plans and forces, they could conquer us; we must observe dark secrecy.")   9. Arms racing is more intense, giving rise to windows of opportunity and vulnerability, and to false optimism.   10. Offense-dominance is self-feeding: offense breeds offense. ("Offense is the stronger form of war; we should buy what works so let’s buy offense.")
  2. Causes of Offensive and Defensive Advantage: a. Military factors: arms, geography, the character of societies and economies.
b. Diplomatic factors: are alliances defensive or defensive/offensive? Do "balancers" exist and do they balance? Can "collective security" be made to work?
c. The conflict between arms and diplomacy: can defending your allies require offensive forces?   3. Critics argue no distinction can be made between offense and defense dominance. Are there observables? a. In the past states were often driven to war by a search for security. In a world of very strong defenses this search would not be necessary, and the wars caused by this search can be avoided.
b. War has been more common when and where security was believed scarce.

4. Are Offensive Military strategies Always Bad? Despite the dangers--is offense sometimes the best strategy anyhow?

a. When offense already dominates?
b. When windows are large?
c. For "extended deterrence" (i.e. protecting allies)
d. For scaring aggressors into better behavior?
e. For limiting one’s own damage in wars and ending wars?
f. For reforming otherwise-unreformable aggressor states?   5. How easy is conquest in the real world? Does the nuclear revolution Make Conquest easier or harder?
 
  G. Arms Racing and War 1. Causes of Arms racing: a. Secrecy.
b. Offense dominance, offensive doctrines and force postures. --directly spurs arms racing
--indirectly spurs arms racing through secrecy, hence less arms control 2. Does Arms Racing Cause WAR??? (More of a symptom of conflict, only an indirect cause of war.) a. Causes windows.
b. Causes false optimism.
  H. What about Disarmament? Is it Possible? Would it cause or prevent war? 1. Is it possible? --Consider ancient wars, and Ruwanda 1994?plenty of killing without modern weapons…. 2. Is it desirable? Or does it open windows?the possibility for preventive war?
3. If it is possible, is it necessary? (if states get along so well that they can agree to disarm--why is it needed?)