I. Cautionary Note: Dangers of Metaphors and "Rorschach" Readings

II. Underlying/Structural Causes

A. Security Dilemma in Ancient Greece: severe and symmetrical

1. Spartan empire: an oppressive "human volcano" (Austria 1914/USSR 1941?)
2. Athenian empire: dependent on fleet/economic zone (UK 1914, US CW?)

B. Power Transition: destabilizing and seemingly unstoppable

1. fading Spartan status as premier military power (Germany 1914, USSR CW?)
2. Athenian hubris from rise to power in wake of previous major war (US Vietnam?)

C. Windows & Preventive War: large and tempting

1. Spartan window of vulnerability, 431 BCE, preventive war (WWI, WWII)
2. Escalation by Sparta, 414 BCE: window of opportunity in Sicilian Expedition

D. Alliance System: polarized, internally unsteady, and intertwined

1. Extremely tight alliance systems, no "balancer" (pre-WWI Europe, CW)
2. Intra-alliance dynamics quite unhealthy:

a. "chain-ganging" effects (Corinth, Egestaeans) [Austria/Serbia 1914, China lobby, CW Asia]
b. revolts/rebellions repressed, creating persistent "rollback" fears

3. Spheres of influence intertwined, but without clear "rules of the road"

a. "pan-nationalism" problems (Dorians vs. Ionians), mother-colony city relations (Potidaea) [pan-Slavism, monolithic Communism]
b. alliances internally fissured and externally linked through ideology: ready "fifth columns" and "defecting volunteers" (CW, somewhat WWII)

E. Cumulativity of Resources: high, destabilizing

1. Seized resources/economic blocs generate military power (Athenian tribute system, Sicilian expedition, Corcyra) [WWI, WWII, CW concern over Europe]
2. Necessity of empire/zones of control/blocking enemy gains, creating built-in crisis- and war-escalation mechanism (Corcyra, Megara, Athenian/Spartan empire) [WWII Germany/Japan, Soviet EEuro empire in CW]

III. Intermediate Causes
 

A. Strategic Deterrence Breakdown: difficult, easily misestimated, and strategically novel

1. Wide-spread belief in offense-dominance (WWI, German side in WWII)
2. Persistent false optimism created by possibility of outside intervention (Syracuse, Persia) [WWI&WWII US intervention; Chinese intervention in Korea]
3. Athenian deterrent strategy based on "MAD" approach, but sea power could not inflict immediate, overwhelming pain on land power (UK 1914/39, Vietnam)

B. "Cult of Credibility" and Bandwagoning Beliefs: pernicious and escalatory

1. "Credibility is vital, hard-won and easily lost" (WWI, CW)
2. "Other states bandwagon with threats and force" (Melians/Mytelians) [WWI Germany, Munich, CW, "domino theory"]

C. Domestic Politics and Political Actors: selection, dysfunction, and opportunism

1. Athenian politics selected for military ambition (Alcibiades/Cleon); Spartan politics militaristic, closed, highly distrustful [WWI Germany, totalitarian regimes]
2. Wartime atmosphere of hysteria/non-evaluation, with rise of super-hawks, further escalation (Sicilian Expedition) [U-boats, Barbarossa, McCarthyism/China]
3. Leaders with personal interest in risky policies (Alcibiades) [1914 Austrian chief-of-staff, WWI German officer corps, Hitler]

D. Mythmaking and Hypernationalist Chauvinism: conflict spirals and recklessness

1. national character mythmaking and self-glorification (Pericles’ funeral oration), with conflict spirals [pre-WWI, CW US/PRC/Sovs, pre-WWII Japan/Germany]
2. hypernationalist chauvinism helped support non-evaluation and recklessness (Sicilian Expedition) [Barbarossa, U-boat, MacArthur on Chinese intervention]

A. Potidaea: intertwined alliance system--Corinthian colony, Athenian client (see above)

B. Epidamnus: Corcyra vs. Corinth--cumulative resources and security dilemma (see above)

C. Megarian Decree: Economic Interdependence as immediate cause? (WWII Japan & oil)