Handout // March 9

 

The Origins of World War I: Part 1
Background and Remote Causes

I. World War I in Perspective:

A. In 1890 Europe was a nice, quiet place. Experiencing a "Long Peace." Many believed war was impossible because the economic losses would be too great, the killing too horrific. How could such a great war emerge from such an untroubled world?

B. WWI unleashed an avalanche of violence that pervaded the 20th Century. What if it had been avoided?

 II. Three Images of WWI: A. The July Crisis was inadvertent, the war was inadvertent — nobody wanted either (the Sidney Fay view).

B. The July Crisis was engineered (by Germany), but the war was inadvertent — Germany sought only a diplomatic crisis victory, or the military smashing of Serbia by Austria, but no war with the other great powers.

C. Both the July Crisis and the War were engineered — Germany sought and desired both (The Fischer School View)

1. Some in this view argue Germany wanted a continental war, but preferred the prewar status quo to a world war (e.g., a war against Britain).

2. Some argue that Germany preferred even a world war to the prewar status quo.

 To choose between ‘B’, ‘C1’, and ‘C2’ (the dominant contending views) we must know:

A. German expectations: where would the July Crisis lead?

B. German desires: what were German priorities among 4 possible outcomes:

1. Status quo ante crisis.

2. Austria crushes Serbia, with no wider war.

3. Continental war (Germany & Austria fight Russia & France.)

4 World war (German & Austria fight Russia, France, and Britain.)
 

 III. Background to War: Europe 1890-1914: A. The Powers’ Relative Strength: they ranked as follows: (1) Germany; (2) Britain; (3) Russia; (4) France; (5) Austria-Hungary; (6) Serbia. (See Kennedy tables.)

B. Social Structure and Domestic Politics in Europe, 1890-1914

1. Oligarchy and fears of upheaval in Europe, e.g. in Austria-Hungary and Germany.

2. Militarism (see assigned Martin Kitchen readings.)

a. The military’s influence was large, especially in Germany

b. The military’s ideas were dangerous. These included:

i. Offense is easy // windows are common and large //surprise is essential

ii. waving big sticks makes others nice

iii. Others are hostile

iv. Empires are valuable

v. War is short, glorious, even fun

 3. Self-glorifying nationalist myths in schools — history as fiction (see assigned Langsam reading)

4. Lack of independent scholarship. Professors were propagandists for the state who repeated fatuous ideas instead of evaluating them, especially in Germany
 

 C. The Changing Nature of War 1. The rise of mass armies and the mobilization system: a. Premobilization v. full mobilization

b. Why mobilization meant war

c. Was secret mobilization possible? (No, but some thought so.)
 

 2. The rise of the power of the defensive on the battlefield: machine guns, barbed wire, railroad, and mass armies.

3. The growth of the "cult of the offensive": the Schlieffen Plan, Plan XVII, and offensive war plans in Russia and Austria-Hungary; the cult of the offensive at sea.
 

 Question: What war plans would have made the most sense for each power? Once at war, what was the best way for each side to fight?

D. Perceptions in Europe (see Geiss assigned readings)
 

1. The rise of international Social Darwinism and the cult of the offensive.   2. Big stick ideas in Germany: Admiral Tirpitz’s Risk Theory and Kurt Riezler’s theory of "bluff diplomacy."   3. The self-encirclement of Germany, and the German myth that others had conspired to bring it about.   4. The need for empire — Pan-Gemanism and Pan-Slavism, expansionism in Germany, Russia, Serbia (!), and France.   5. "War is good for you" — a remarkable idea.
  E. German expansion and the Fischer controversy (see Geiss reading): How expansionist was Germany? The "War Council" of December 8, 1912: how to interpret it?
F. The decline of British Power & the Anglo-German Détente of 1912-1914.

G. The appearance of a tight (offensive) network of alliances in Europe (the transformation of alliances from "epimachies" to "symmachies.")

H. The crises of 1905, 1908, 1911 (causes of trouble, or mere symptoms of other causes?)

I. The naval and land arms races (causes of trouble, or mere symptoms of other causes?)

J. The rise of economic interdependence.

K. The (alleged) appearance of dumb national leaders in Russia, Germany, Britain, and Austria-Hungary.

L. The rise of (incompetent?) peace movements: "let’s arbitrate disputes!"; "let’s have arms control."