Handout // April 20, 2000

17.423

The Indochina War, 1945-1975

I. U.S. Decisions in Indochina:

A. 1945-6: The US decides to allow the French to return to Indochina.

B. 1950: The US starts giving large money and arms backing to France.

C. 1954-56: The US decides to let the North fall to communism, but to sustain a non-communist Southern state. The US blocks elections in the South. 342 US military advisers are sent to aid Saigon’s army in 1956.

D. 1961-1962: More US military advisers go to Vietnam, (total = over 9,000 by late 1962.)

E. 1965: Vietcong victory in the South is imminent; the US intervenes massively to avert it. Thus large US direct involvement begins. US starts bombing, February 1965 (Operation "Rolling Thunder"); US sends large ground forces, July 1965. US forces in Vietnam peak at 545,000 troops in 1968.

F. 1969: The US begins to withdraw and launches "Vietnamization."

G. 1970: The US widens the war into Cambodia and Laos.

H. 1973: A peace is agreed. The agreement allows North Vietnamese forces to remain in the South. The US Congress forbids bombing throughout Indochina.

I. 1973-1975: Both sides break the peace; the US stands aside as communist forces seize the South and unify Vietnam under Hanoi’s rule, April 1975.

 II. What Factual and Theoretical Assumptions Motivated US Involvement? A. Containment, Version #1: "The US must save France and NATO." Influential 1945-48.
  1. "France’s colonies make her stronger, hence a better contributor to NATO."

2. "We must placate France on Indochina to gain her cooperation in NATO." (And placate Britain!)
 

 B. Containment, Version #2: "The US must contain Soviet (Chinese) expansion."
  1. Proxy assumption, 1949-1975: Ho Chi Minh as Moscow’s (or Beijing’s) puppet.

2. Domino theory, in 4 versions, 1953-1965:
 

a. "A communist-controlled Vietnam will send cadres across borders and subvert neighbors."

b. "A communist-controlled Vietnam will send armies across borders and conquer neighbors."

c. "A communist victory in Vietnam will inspire revolutions elsewhere in Southeast Asia, by showing that they can succeed, and that the US will let them succeed."

d. "A communist victory in Vietnam will position Vietnam to cow other Southeast Asian states into submission and alliance."
 

 3. Strategic Region assumption, 1950-1965:
  a. Southeast Asian bases matter in the global balance of power.

b. The West depends on Southeast Asian raw materials.
 

 C. The Credibility Theory:
  Version #1: "The Soviets are testing us!"­1945-1965.

Version #2: "We have promised to defend South Vietnam!"­1961-1975.

Version #3: "We have paid costs, hence our reputation is engaged."­1969-1975.
 

 Cures: Kissinger, "We must win!" v. McNaughton, "We must suffer, but we needn’t win."

D. Domestic Backlash:
 

1. Electoral Backlash: "We’ll be tossed out of office!" 1949-1953, 1969-1975.

2. Weimar Analogy: "America will suffer a nightmare of recrimination!" 1969-1975. (Kissinger Analysis.)
 

 E. Philanthropy:
  1. Bloodbath theory: "Hanoi will slaughter Vietnamese non-communists." 1969-1975.

2. Vietcong Unpopularity assumption: "The VC are unpopular, hence their victory would be an undemocratic outcome." 1964-1975.
 

 F. American POWs: "We must fight until we get them back!" 1970ff.

G. Military Optimism: "We can Win!" (without too much trouble) 1961-1964.

 III. The Anti-War Movement: Did it Fail? If so, why?

IV. The Case for the War in Retrospect:

A. N. Vietnam did take the South, suppressing all local institutions after 1975.

B. There was a bloodbath in Cambodia. Millions fled S. Vietnam in boats.

C. Hanoi became a loyal Soviet ally, 1979ff. Vietnam gave the Soviets a large naval base in Cam Ranh Bay; this confirms the proxy theory.

D. Cambodia and Laos did fall to Communism; this confirms the domino theory.

E. More Southeast Asian states might have fallen if they had not ben given a 10-year breathing space to get their act together. Hanoi revealed its aggressiveness by invading Cambodia in 1979; had its other SE Asian targets been weaker it might have moved further.

F. US bases in the Philippines were useful in the 1970s and 1980s, e.g. in staging forces into the Persian Gulf, hence it’s fortunate we didn’t lose them.

G. US defeat was followed by an upsurge of Soviet activity in the Third World during 1975-1980­in Angola, Afghanistan, Ethiopia. This confirms the credibility theory.

H. Victory was possible­in fact it was in our grasp in 1968. The Viet Cong were annihilated in the 1968 Tet offensive.

 V. The Case Against the War in Retrospect: A. The premises of Containment Version #1 are false. France’s empire was a drain, not an asset for France; and France needed US cooperation in NATO far more than the US needed France.

B. The premises of Containment Version #2 are false (all three need to be true for Cont. argument):
 

1. The proxy assumption was false in the 1940s: see Ho's request to get the US into the Pacific war in 1941, and his request to be made an American protectorate. It remained false later; see Hanoi’s hostility toward China, 1975-1991, and aloofness toward USSR, 1975-1979. Hanoi did ally with the USSR after 1979, but US and Chinese hostility toward Hanoi explains this alliance. Perhaps the "Proxy" assumption became true after 1975, but American behavior made it happen.

2. Domino theory: deduction flunks it­nationalism and balancing rather than bandwagoning make it unlikely (at least the cadre and conquest versions.) Moreover, it was tested after 1975, and flunked test.

3. Strategic region: Events don’t test this, but proponents have burden of proof.
 

 C. Credibility:
  1. Version #1 is flunked by the failure of the proxy theory. If Vietnam is not a proxy, then Soviets are not testing US.

2. Version #2 was false because:
 

a. The US had no obligation under the SEATO Treaty, since the Treaty was aimed at international aggression, and the war in South Vietnam was mainly civil.

b. The South Vietnamese voided any US obligation by their political corruption and military incompetence.
 

 3. Versions #1-#3 are falsified by history:
  a. After 1975 NATO remained strong, and nuclear proliferation did not happen.

B The war itself drained American willpower­see e.g "The Vietnam syndrome," much lamented by the American right. This syndrome, if real, was a consequence of US involvement in Indochina.
 

 D. Domestic Backlash:
  1. Electoral politics: Unclear earlier, but seems wrong in 1969-1975.

2. Version #2­is falsified by history. Losing the war did not lead to a nightmare of recriminations that ripped the country apart­getting out seemed to help the country begin to heal.
 

 E. Philanthropy:
  1. Bloodbath: there was a bloodbath in Cambodia, but none in Vietnam. Had the US left Vietnam before 1970, there may have been no bloodbath in Cambodia either.

2. VC unpopularity: clearly true after 1975, but false in 1950s and 1960s (see Ike’s admission that the Communists would have won free elections in 1956.)
 

 F. "We can Win!"­the US didn’t.
  VI. Causes of the War: A. Bipolarity: Cold War
  1. Security Dilemma--> US security concerns, which requires Vietnam’s continued division.

2. Misperceived Security dilemma--> Misplaced US security concerns. The US falsely believed it required Vietnam’s continued division. (But why?)
 

 B. Imperial Collapse­the US thinks it is in a contest with USSR (and later China) for control of the carcass of the French empire.

C. Domestic Politics.

D. Non-evaluation? The US "China Hands" were purged during the 1950s. McNamara in retrospect: "I had no experts to consult!" (sort-of.)

E. US false Optimism­fuelled by optimistic reporting from South Vietnam and by first officials sent to Vietnam.

F. Vietnamese Nationalism: Misunderstood, underestimated.

G. War --> War: Overselling during the Cold War caused pressure for confrontation in Indochina­war aims expand.