unity of Slavs is important. But even apart from this, if the unity of the Slavs exists, no one will dare move a finger.'

At one point he got up, hitched up his trousers as though he was about to wrestle or to box, and cried out emotionally, 'The war will soon be over. We shall recover in fifteen or twenty years, and then we'll have another go at it.'

There was something terrible in his words: a horrible war was still going on. Yet there was something impressive, too, about his realisation of the paths he had to take, the inevitability that faced the world in which he lived and the movement that he headed.

Source: Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin *(Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1969), pp. 90–1, 103.*

Document 7.2 Stalin's 'Two Camps' Speech, 9 February 1946

In his speech during the Supreme Soviet elections in February 1946 Stalin advanced the argument that later became the orthodoxy: the sacrifices of the 1930s – collectivisation, frenetic industrialisation and purges – had provided the essential foundations for victory. Stalin addressed two key issues: the first insisted that the world remained divided into 'two camps', despite the shared victory over fascism; and the second was that the new five-year plan was to restore pre-war levels of output and then to achieve new levels. The two themes were intimately linked: the danger from abroad required yet more efforts and sacrifices to build up heavy industry in case of a new war, this time with the Western democracies. The speech in tone and substance signalled continuity with pre-war policies and bitterly disappointed those who had anticipated that victory would allow the Soviet regime to relax and adapt to new circumstances.

Comrades!
Eight years have passed since the last elections to the Supreme Soviet. This was a period full of events of a decisive character. The first four years passed in intensive effort on the part of Soviet men and women to fulfil the Third Five-Year Plan. The second four years cover the events of the war against the German and Japanese aggressors, the events of the Second World War. Undoubtedly, the war was the principal event of the past period.

It would be wrong to think that the Second World War was a chance occurrence or the result of mistakes of any particular statesmen, although mistakes undoubtedly were made. The war was the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism. Marxists have always argued that the capitalist system of world economy harbours elements of general crisis and armed conflicts and that, therefore, the development of world capitalism in our time proceeds not in the form of smooth and even progress but through crises and military catastrophes.

The unevenness of development of the capitalist countries in time provokes violent disturbances of equilibrium in the world system of capitalism; a group of capitalist countries which considers itself worse provided than others with raw materials and markets attempts to alter the situation and repartition the 'spheres of influence' in its favour by armed force. The result is a splitting of the capitalist world into two hostile camps and war between them . . .

Thus the First World War was the result of the first crisis of the capitalist system of world economy, and the Second World War was the result of a second crisis.

That does not mean of course that the Second World War is a copy of the first. On the contrary, the Second World War differs materially from the first in nature. It must be borne in mind that before attacking the Allied countries the principal fascist states – Germany, Japan and Italy – destroyed the last vestiges of bourgeois democratic liberties at home, established a brutal terrorist regime in their own countries, rode roughshod over the principles of sovereignty and free development of small countries, proclaimed a policy of seizure of alien territories as their own policy and declared for all to hear that they were out for world domination and the establishment of a fascist regime throughout the world. Moreover, by the seizure of Czechoslovakia and of the central areas of China, the Axis states showed that they were prepared to carry out their threat of enslaving all freedom-loving nations. In view of this, unlike the First World War, the Second World War against the Axis states from the very outset assumed the character of an anti-fascist war, a war of liberation, one the aim of which was also the restoration of democratic liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis states could only enhance, and indeed did enhance, the anti-fascist and liberatory character of the Second World War.

It was on this basis that the anti-fascist coalition of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and other freedom-loving states came into being – a coalition which subsequently played a decisive part in defeating the armed forces of the Axis states.

That is how matters stand as regards the origin and character of the Second World War.

By now I should think everyone admits that the war really was not and could not have been an accident in the life of nations, that actually this war became the war of nations for their existence, and that for this reason it could not be a quick lightning affair.

As for our country, this war was the most bitter and arduous of all wars in the history of our Motherland.

But the war was not only a curse. It was at the same time a great school in which all the forces of the people were tried and tested. The war laid bare all facts and events in the rear and at the front, it tore off relentlessly all veils and coverings which had concealed the true faces of the states, governments and

parties and exposed them to view without a mask or embellishment, with all their shortcomings and merits.

The war was something like an examination for our Soviet system, for our state, for our government, for our Communist Party, and it summed up the results of their work, saying to us as it were: 'Here they are, your people and organisations, their deeds and their lives. Look at them well and reward them according to their deeds.'

This was one of the positive aspects of war . . .

Our victory means, first of all, that our Soviet social order has triumphed, that the Soviet *social order* successfully passed the ordeal in the fire of war and proved its unquestionable vitality . . . The point now is that the Soviet social order has shown itself more stable and capable of enduring than a non-Soviet social order, that the Soviet social order is a form of organisation, a society superior to any non-Soviet social order . . . Our victory means, second, that our Soviet *governmental* system triumphed, that our multinational Soviet state withstood the trials of war and proved its viability . . .

Can it be claimed that before entering the Second World War our country already commanded the necessary minimum material potential for satisfying all these requirements in the main? I think it can. In order to prepare for this tremendous job we had to carry out three Five-Year Plans of national economic development. It was precisely these three Five-Year Plans that helped us to create this material potential. Our country's position in this respect before the Second World War, in 1940, was several times better than it was before the First World War, in 1913 . . .

The main task of the new five-year plan is to rebuild the country's regions that have suffered, to restore pre-war levels of industry and agriculture and then to exceed those levels more or less substantially. Not to mention that very soon the rationing system will be abolished (*stormy, prolonged applause*), special attention will be paid to increasing the output of mass consumer goods, to raise the standard of living of toilers by the consistent lowering of the prices of goods (*stormy, prolonged applause*), and to the extensive building of all types of research institutes (*applause*) that will allow science to develop its potential (*stormy applause*).

I have no doubt that if we give the necessary support to our scientists, they will not only be able to catch up but also to soon overtake the achievements of science abroad (*prolonged applause*).

As for the more long-term plans, then the Party intends to organise a new powerful development of the economy which will allow us to raise the level of our industry, for example, three times in comparison with the pre-war level. We must ensure that our industry can produce annually up to 50 million tonnes of pig iron (*prolonged applause*), up to 60 million tonnes of steel (*prolonged applause*), up to 500 million tonnes of coal (*prolonged applause*), and up to 60 million tonnes of oil (*prolonged applause*). Only if this is achieved can we consider that our Motherland is guaranteed against any eventuality (*stormy applause*). For this no doubt three five-year plans, if not more, will be required. But this can be achieved and we must achieve it (*stormy applause*).

Source: Stalin, 'Pre-Election Speech of 9 February 1946', in R. H. McNeal (ed.), I. V. Stalin, Works, *vol. 3 (16) (Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1967), pp. 1–5, 6, 7, 11, 19–20.*

Document 7.3 Kennan's 'Long Telegram' of 22 February 1946

Posted to the American Embassy in Moscow, George Kennan analysed the context of Soviet policy in a document that exerted a powerful influence on Washington's view of Soviet behaviour.

At the bottom of the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison for contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot

dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced their country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security for their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate the importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven by necessities of their own past and present position to put forward a dogma which pictures the outside world as evil, hostile, and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final coup de grace by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power in Russia state, for that isolation of Russian population from the outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries-old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and wartorn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

Sources: George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1950–63 *(New York, Bantam, 1969), pp. 549–51; McCauley,* The Origins of the Cold War, *pp. 113–14.*

Document 7.4 Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech

It was only after Stalin's speech (7.2) that Churchill, now in opposition, delivered his 'Iron Curtain' speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946 in the presence of President Harry Truman. He called for a partnership between Great Britain and the United States as the guarantors of peace. With powerful communist parties in France and Italy sharing power, it appeared that the days of capitalist democracy on the continent were numbered. The tone of the speech was not overtly hostile to the Soviet Union, and even less a call to war, but pointed the way to what later would be called 'containment'.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone, with its immortal glories, is free to decide its future at an election under British, American, and French observation . . .

However, in a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist centre. Except in the British Commonwealth, and in the United States, where communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization . . .

On the other hand, I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable, still more that it is imminent. It is because I am so sure that our fortunes are in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have an occasion to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines . . .

From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength. If the western democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering these principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If, however, they become divided or falter in their duty, and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away, then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all.

Sources: Pravda, *11 March 1946; McCauley,* The Origins of the Cold War, *pp. 114–15.*

Document 7.5 Stalin's Response to Churchill's Speech

Stalin wilfully misrepresented Churchill's speech, accusing the West of preparing for war against the Soviet Union. His figure of 7 million Soviet deaths was revised upwards by Khrushchev to 20 million, and then under Gorbachev 27 million became the accepted figure.

A few days ago a *Pravda* correspondent asked Stalin to clarify a number of questions concerning Mr Churchill's speech. Comrade Stalin provided these clarifications, which are presented below in the form of answers to the correspondent's questions.

Question: What is your opinion of Mr Churchill's latest speech in the United States of America?

Answer: I regard it as a dangerous act, calculated to sow the seeds of discord among the Allied states and impede their collaboration.

Q. Can it be considered that Mr Churchill's speech is prejudicial to the cause of peace and security?

A. Yes, unquestionably. Essentially, Mr Churchill now adopts the position of the warmongers, and in this Mr Churchill is not alone. He has friends not only in Britain but in the United States of America as well.

A point to be noted is that in this respect Mr Churchill and his friends bear a striking resemblance to Hitler and his friends. Hitler began his work of unleashing war by proclaiming a race theory, declaring that only German-speaking people constitute a superior nation. Mr Churchill sets out to unleash war with a race theory, asserting that only English-speaking nations are superior nations, who are called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world. The German race theory led Hitler and his friends to the conclusion that the Germans, as the only superior nation, should rule over other nations. The English race theory leads Mr Churchill and his friends to the conclusion that the English-speaking nations, as the only superior nations, should rule over the rest of the nations of the world . . .

There is no doubt that the plan of Mr Churchill is a plan for war, a call to war with the Soviet Union. It is also clear that such a plan as that of Mr Churchill is incompatible with the existing treaty of alliance between Britain and the USSR . . .

Q. How do you assess that part of Mr Churchill's speech in which he attacks the democratic regime of our neighbouring European countries and in which he criticises the good neighbourly relations established between these countries and the Soviet Union?

A. This part of Mr Churchill's speech is a mix of libel with rudeness and lack of tact. Mr Churchill asserts that 'Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia – all these famous cities and the populations of these areas, are within the Soviet sphere and are all subjected to Soviet influence and to the increasing control of Moscow'. Mr Churchill describes this as the 'limitless expansionist' tendency of the Soviet Union. It is not hard to demonstrate that Mr Churchill crudely and shamelessly libels not only Moscow but also the above-mentioned states neighbouring the USSR.

First, it is quite absurd to speak of the exclusive control of the USSR in Vienna and Berlin, where there are Allied Control Commissions with representatives of four states, where the USSR has only a quarter of the votes. It sometimes happens that people cannot stop themselves from making libellous statements, but they should at least know the limits.

Second, the following fact should not be forgotten. The Germans made their invasion of the USSR through Finland, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The Germans were able to make their invasion through these countries because, at the time, governments hostile to the Soviet Union ruled in these countries. As a result of the German invasion the Soviet Union irretrievably lost in fighting against the Germans, and also through the German occupation and the deportation of Soviet citizens to German servitude, a total of about seven million people. In other words, the Soviet

Union's loss of life was several times greater than that of Britain and the United States of America taken together. It may be that some quarters want to forget these colossal sacrifices of the Soviet people, which secured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget about them. And so what can there be surprising about the fact that the Soviet Union, anxious for its future safety, is trying to ensure that governments loyal in their attitude to the Soviet Union should exist in these countries? How can anyone, who has not taken leave of his senses, describe these peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as expansionist tendencies by our state? . . .

Mr Churchill further maintains that 'the communist parties were very insignificant in all these Eastern European countries but became very strong, far exceeding their earlier numbers, and are attempting to establish totalitarian states everywhere' . . . In Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary there are governing blocs composed of several parties – from four to six parties – in which the opposition, if it is more or less loyal, has the right to participate in government. Mr Churchill calls this totalitarianism, tyranny, a police state. Why, on what basis – don't expect an answer from Mr Churchill . . .

The growth of the influence of communism cannot be considered accidental. It is a normal pattern. The influence of the communists grew because during the hard years of the dominance of fascism in Europe, communists showed themselves to be reliable, daring and self-sacrificing fighters against fascist regimes for the liberty of peoples . . . Such is the law of historical development.

Of course, Mr Churchill does not like such a turn of events. He raised the alarm, appealing to force. But neither did he like the appearance of the Soviet regime in Russia after the First World War. Then, too, he raised the alarm and organised an armed expedition of fourteen states against Russia with the aim of turning back the wheel of history. History turned out to be stronger than Churchill's intervention and the quixotic antics of Mr Churchill resulted in his complete defeat. I do not know whether Mr Churchill and his friends will succeed in organising after the Second World War a new military expedition against 'Eastern Europe'. But if they succeed in this, which is unlikely since millions of 'common people' stand to defend the peace, then one can confidently assert that they will be beaten, just as they were beaten twenty-six years ago.

Sources: Pravda, *14 March 1946; Stalin,* Works, *vol. 3, pp. 35–9, 41–2, 43.*

Reimposing Orthodoxy

Any lingering hopes that the war would be followed by a thaw were dashed by a number of campaigns launched to reverse the relative openness of the war years.

whom are still alive. These documents should be thoroughly studied by both our and German historians. Thank God that we have lived to cooperation other than that between MGB–KGB and Stasi.

Source: Irina Shcherbakova, 'How Buchenwald Became NKVD's Torture Chamber', Moscow News, *no. 23, 4 June 1993, p. 14.*

Document 7.12 Djilas on the Soviet–Yugoslav Split

The Yugoslav communists under the leadership of Josef Broz Tito had come to power by their own efforts in 1945, and had thereafter pursued an independent policy although remaining loyal to a Stalinist definition of socialism. Despite their orthodoxy, the independence of the Yugoslav communists irked Stalin to such an extent that in 1948 he sought to bring them to heel, leading to a break. Only after the split did ideological differences emerge as the Yugoslavs developed an original form of 'self-managing socialism'. In Djilas's account of his conversations with Stalin (Document 7.1) special attention was paid to Stalin's views on revolution and the new socialist camp. Here Djilas comments on the break.

Except for Albania, Yugoslavia had been the only East European country to free itself from the Nazi invasion and at the same time carry out a domestic revolution without the decisive help of the Red Army . . . [T]he decision that Belgrade should be the seat of the Cominform was, on the surface, a form of recognition of the Yugoslav revolution. Behind it lay the secret Soviet intention to lull the Yugoslav leaders into a state of self-satisfaction at their own revolution and to subordinate Yugoslavia to some supposed international Communist solidarity – in fact, to the hegemony of the Soviet state, or, rather, to the insatiable demands of the Soviet political bureaucracy.

It is time something was said about Stalin's attitude to revolutions, and thus to the Yugoslav revolution. Because Moscow had always refrained at the crucial moment from supporting the Chinese, Spanish, and in many ways even the Yugoslav revolutions, the view prevailed, not without reason, that Stalin was generally against revolutions. This is, however, not entirely correct. His opposition was only conditional, and arose only when the revolution went beyond the interests of the Soviet state. He felt instinctively that the creation of revolutionary centres outside Moscow could endanger its supremacy in world Communism, and of course that is what actually happened. That is why he helped revolutions only up to a certain point – as long as he could control them – but he was always ready to leave them in the lurch whenever they slipped out of his grasp. I maintain that not even today is there any essential change in this respect in the policy of the Soviet Government.

In his own country Stalin had subjected all activities to his views and to his personality, so he could not behave differently outside. Having identified

domestic progress and freedom with the interests and privileges of a political party, he could not act in foreign affairs other than as a dictator. And like everyone else he must be judged by his actual deeds. He became himself the slave of the despotism, the bureaucracy, the narrowness, and the servility that he imposed on his country.

It is indeed true that no one can destroy another's freedom without losing his own.

Source: Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, *pp. 102–3.*

Stalin moved quickly to crush any other possible outbreaks of 'national communism'. In Poland Władisław Gomułka was purged as head of the party, but survived in gaol from 1951 to 1956 when he re-emerged to defuse the crisis in Polish–Soviet relations. Elsewhere show trials were held on the Soviet model; in Hungary and Bulgaria in 1949, and in Czechoslovakia in 1952. In Yugoslavia meanwhile a new model of socialism was being developed focused on the concept of workers' self-management through workers' councils. A more decentralised economy emerged allowing private farming, foreign travel and some intellectual freedom. The Marxist critique of Soviet-type socialism generated in Yugoslavia and other communist countries in the long-run proved as devastating as any number of liberal critiques.

Containment and Beyond

The full-blown Cold War is usually reckoned to have started in 1947–8. The United States adopted the Truman Doctrine (based on a speech delivered to Congress by Truman on 12 March 1947) that sought to 'contain' Soviet expansionism in response, in part, to Kennan's arguments in his 'Mr X' article, even though he later explained that he had intended a *political* response to a *political* threat, whereas the Truman Doctrine gave it a military form. To the end Stalin was preaching the ideology of irreconcilable hostility between the capitalist world and the Soviet Union.

Document 7.13 Kennan's 'Mr X' Article

Kennan published the article anonymously, but his authorship did not remain a secret for long. In this acute analysis of the Soviet system he accurately pointed out its strengths while noting the brittle character of Soviet power.

The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia . . . tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist

worlds . . . Of the original ideology, nothing has been officially junked. Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power in its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it . . .

It is always possible that another transfer of preeminent power may take place quietly and inauspiciously, with no repercussions anywhere. But again, it is possible that the questions involved may unleash, to use some of Lenin's words, one of those 'incredibly swift transitions' from 'delicate deceit' to 'wild violence' which characterize Russian history, and may shake Soviet power to its foundations . . . And if disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian society would be revealed in forms beyond description. For we have seen that Soviet power is only a crust concealing an amorphous mass of human beings among whom no independent organizational structure is tolerated. In Russia there is not even such a thing as local government. The present generation of Russians have never known spontaneity of collective action. If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies . . . the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced . . .

It is clear that the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a longterm, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies . . . It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet Regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure towards the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

Source: George Kennan (Mr X), 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', Foreign Affairs, *vol. 25, no. 4 (July 1947), pp. 566, 570, 571–2, 578–9, 580–1.*

Document 7.14 Stalin's Final Bequest – War

In his last theoretical exposition Stalin noted that war was still likely between capitalist countries, but that the Soviet Union did not necessarily need to be involved.

Some comrades affirm that, as a result of new international conditions after the Second World War, war between capitalist countries is no longer inevitable. They consider that the contradictions between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp are stronger than the contradictions between capitalist states, that the United States has subordinated the other capitalist countries to itself to such an extent that it would not permit them to go to war or weaken each other, that the leading capitalist peoples have learned enough from the experience of two world wars, damaging the whole capitalist world, to allow the capitalist world once again to be drawn into war, that in view of all this war between capitalist countries is no longer inevitable.

These comrades are mistaken. They only see the superficial phenomena, but do not see those more profound forces which, even though they are at present hardly noticeable, will nevertheless determine the course of events . . .

It is said that the contradictions between capitalism and socialism are stronger than the contradictions among the capitalist countries. Theoretically, of course, that is true. It is not only true now, today; it was equally true before the Second World War. And it was more or less understood by the leaders of the capitalist countries. Yet the Second World War began not as a war with the USSR, but as a war between capitalist countries. Why? First, because war with the USSR, as a socialist land, is more dangerous to capitalism than war between capitalist countries; for whereas war between capitalist countries puts in question only the supremacy of certain capitalist countries over others, war with the USSR must certainly put in question the existence of capitalism itself. Second, because the capitalists, although they make a big fuss, for 'propaganda' purposes, about the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, do not themselves believe that it is aggressive, because they understand the Soviet Union's peaceful policy and know that it will not itself attack capitalist countries . . .

When the United States and Britain assisted Germany's economic recovery [after the First World War], they did so with a view to setting a recovered Germany against the Soviet Union, to use her against the land of socialism. But Germany directed her forces in the first place against the Anglo-French–American bloc. And when Hitler's Germany declared war on the Soviet Union, the Anglo-French–American bloc, far from joining with Hitler's Germany, was compelled to enter into a coalition with the USSR against Hitler's Germany.

Consequently, the struggle of the capitalist countries for markets and their desire to crush their competitors proved in practice to be stronger than the contradictions between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp.

What guarantee is there, then, that Germany and Japan will not rise to their feet again, will not attempt to break out of American bondage and live their own independent lives? I think there is no such guarantee.