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LIVING WITH TELEVISION: THE VIOLENCE PROFILE

Does TV entertainment incite or pacify (or both)? A new approach to research uses Cultural Indicators as a framework for a progress report on a long-range study of trends in television content and effects. The environment that sustains the most distinctive aspects of human existence is the environment of symbols. We learn, share, and act upon meanings derived from that environment. The first and longest lasting organization of the symbolic world was what we now call religion. Within its sacred scope, in earlier times, were the most essential processes of culture: art, science, technology, statecraft, and public storytelling.

Common rituals and mythologies are agencies of symbolic socialization and control. They demonstrate how society works by dramatizing its norms and values. They are essential parts of the general system of messages that cultivates prevailing outlooks (which is why we call it culture) and regulates social relationships.

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This system of messages, with its storytelling functions, makes people perceive as real and normal and right that which fits the established social order.

The institutional processes producing these message systems have become increasingly professionalized, industrialized, centralized, and specialized. Their principal locus shifted from handicraft to mass production and from traditional religion and formal education to the mass media of communications—particularly television. New technologies on the horizon may enrich the choices of the choosy but cannot replace the simultaneous public experience of a common symbolic environment that now binds diverse communities, including large groups of young and old and isolated people who have never before joined any mass public. Television is likely to remain for a long time the chief source of repetitive and ritualized symbol systems cultivating the common consciousness of the most far-flung and heterogenous mass publics in history.

Our long-range study of this new symbolic environment developed from, and still includes, the annual Violence Index and Profile of TV content and its correlates in viewers' conceptions of relevant aspects of social reality. The research began with the investigation of violence in network television drama in 1967–68 for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (4) and continued through 1972 under the sponsorship of the Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior (5). The study was broadly conceived from the beginning and both reports showed the role and symbolic functions, as well as the extent, of violence in the world of television drama. A conference of research consultants to the National Institute of Mental Health in the spring of 1972 recommended that the Violence Index developed for the report to the Surgeon General be further broadened to take into account social relationships and viewer conceptions. Implementing that recommendation, we issued the Violence Profile (fifth in our series of reports), including violence-victim ratios and eventually viewer responses. The then Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Caspar W. Weinberger reported to Senator John O. Pastore in the fall of 1973 that our research was "broadened to encompass a number of additional dimensions and

linked with viewers' perceptions of violence and its effects, as recommended by NIMH consultants and as incorporated by Dr. Gerbner in his renewal research" (16).

The "renewal research" to which Secretary Weinberger referred is our present project, Cultural Indicators. Conducted under a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health, it consists of periodic study of television programming and of the conceptions of social reality that viewing cultivates in child and adult audiences. Although the study of violence is a continuing aspect of the research,[1] the project is also developing indicators of other themes, roles, and relationships significant for social science and policy.

The pattern of findings that is beginning to emerge confirms our belief that television is essentially different from other media and that research on television requires a new approach. In this article we shall sketch the outlines of a critique of modes of research derived from experience with other media and advance an approach we find more appropriate to the special characteristics, features, and functions of television. We shall illustrate the design and some contributions of the approach taken in the Cultural Indicators project by presenting the latest Violence Profile (No. 7 in the series), including indicators of some conceptions television cultivates in its viewers.[2]

The confusing state of television research is largely due to inappropriate conceptions of the problem. The automobile that burst upon the dusty highways of the turn of the century was seen by most people as just a horseless carriage rather than as a prime mover of a new way of life. Similarly, those who grew up before

[1] Several additional events influenced the further fate and development of the Violence Profile. Senator Pastore and Chairman Torbert Macdonald of the House Communications Subcommittee continued to take an active interest in it. The research director of the studies for the Surgeon General, Eli A. Rubinstein, continued to press for follow-up research (14). Douglass Cater and Stephen Strickland wrote a book on the report and argued for "ongoing research capable of undergirding large public policy investigations" (1, p. 133). And, finally, a committee of the Social Science Research Council especially formed and funded by NIMH to study the Voilence Profile recommended continued use and further development (15).

[2] A summary of the cultivation studies also appears in our article in the April, 1976 *Psychology Today* (10).

television tended to think of it as just another in the long series of technological innovations in mass communications. Consequently, modes of thinking and research rooted in experience with other media have been applied to television. These earlier modes of study were based on selectively used media and focused on attitude or behavior change. Both assumptions are largely inadequate to the task of conceptualizing and investigating the effects of television.

We begin with the assertion that television is the central cultural arm of American society. It is an agency of the established order and as such serves primarily to extend and maintain rather than to alter, threaten, or weaken conventional conceptions, beliefs, and behaviors. Its chief cultural function is to spread and stabilize social patterns, to cultivate not change but resistance to change. Television is a medium of the socialization of most people into standardized roles and behaviors. Its function is, in a word, enculturation.

The substance of the consciousness cultivated by TV is not so much specific attitudes and opinions as more basic assumptions about the "facts" of life and standards of judgment on which conclusions are based. The purpose of the Cultural Indicators project is to identify and track these premises and the conclusions they might cultivate across TV's diverse publics.

We shall make a case for studying television as a force for enculturation rather than as a selectively used medium of separate "entertainment" and information functions. First, we shall suggest that the essential differences between television and other media are more crucial than the similarities. Second, we will show why traditional research designs are inadequate for the study of television effects and we will suggest more appropriate methods. Third, we will sketch the pattern of evidence emerging from our studies indicating that "living" in the world of television cultivates conceptions of its own conventionalized "reality."

The reach, scope, ritualization, organic connectedness, and nonselective use of mainstream television makes it different from other media of mass communications. TV penetrates every home in the land. Its seasonal, cyclical, and perpetual patterns of organically related fact and ficion (all woven into an entertainment fabric producing publics of consumers for sale to advertisers) again encom-

pass essential elements of art, science, technology, statecraft, and public (as well as most family) story-telling. The information-poor (children and less educated adults) are again the entertainment-rich held in thrall by the myths and legends of a new electronic priesthood.

If you were born before, say, 1950, television came into your life after the formative years as just another medium. Even if you are now an "addict," it will be difficult for you to comprehend the transformations it has wrought. Could you, as a twelve-year old, have contemplated spending an average of six hours *a day* at the local movie house? Not only would most parents not have permitted such behavior, but most children would not have imagined the possibility. Yet, in our sample of children, nearly half the twelve-year-olds watch at least six hours of television every day.

Unlike print, television does not require literacy. Unlike the movies, television is "free" (supported by a privately imposed tax on all goods), and it is always running. Unlike radio, television can show as well as tell. Unlike the theater, concerts, movies, and even churches, television does not require mobility. It comes into the home and reaches individuals directly. With its virtually unlimited access from cradle to grave, television both precedes reading and, increasingly, preempts it.

Television is the first centralized cultural influence to permeate both the initial and the final years of life—as well as the years between. Most infants are exposed to television long before reading. By the time a child reaches school, television will have occupied more time than would be spent in a college classroom. At the other end of the lifelong curriculum, television is there to keep the elderly company when all else fails.

All societies have evolved ways of explaining the world to themselves and to their children. Socially constructed "reality" gives a coherent picture of what exists, what is important, what is related to what, and what is right. The constant cultivation of such "realities" is the task of mainstream rituals and mythologies. They legitimize action along socially functional and conventionally acceptable lines.

The social, political, and economic integration of modern industrial society has created a system in which few communities, if any, can maintain an independent integrity. We are parts of a Leviathan

and its nervous system is telecommunications. Publicly shared knowledge of the "wide world" is what this nervous system transmits to us.

Television is the chief common ground among the different groups that make up a large and heterogeneous national community. No national achievement, celebration, or mourning seems real until it is confirmed and shared on television.

Never before have all classes and groups (as well as ages) shared so much of the same culture and the same perspectives while having so little to do with their creation. Representation in the world of television gives an idea, a cause, a group its sense of public identity, importance, and relevance. No movement can get going without some visibility in that world or long withstand television's power to discredit, insulate, or undercut. Other media, used selectively and by special interests or cultural elites, cultivate partial and parochial outlooks. Television spreads the same images and messages to all from penthouse to tenement. TV is the new (and only) culture of those who expose themselves to information only when it comes as "entertainment." Entertainment is the most broadly effective educational fare in any culture.

All major networks serving the same social system depend on the same markets and programming formulas. That may be one reason why, unlike other media, television is used non-selectively: it just doesn't matter that much. With the exception of national events and some "specials," the total viewing audience is fairly stable regardless of what is on. Individual tastes and program preferences are less important in determining viewing patterns than is the time a program is on. The nearly universal, non-selective, and habitual use of television fits the ritualistic pattern of its programming. You watch television as you might attend a church service, except that most people watch television more religiously.

Constitutional guarantees shield the prerogatives of ownership. Technological imperatives of electronics have changed modern governance more than Constitutional amendments and court decisions. Television, the flagship of industrial mass culture, now rivals ancient religions as a purveyor of organic patterns of symbols—news and other entertainment—that animate national and even global communities' senses of reality and value.

These considerations led us to question many of the more common arguments raised in discussions of television's effects. An important example is the concern over the consequences of violence on television. The invention and development of technologies which permit the production and dissemination of mass mediated fictional images across class lines seems invariably to raise in the minds of the established classes the specter of subversion, corruption and unrest being encouraged among the various lower orders—poor people, ethnic and racial minorities, children and women. The specter arises when it seems that the lower orders may presume to imitate—if not to replace—their betters. Whether the suspect and controversial media are newspapers, novels, and theater, as in the nineteenth century, or movies, radio, comic books, and television as in the twentieth, concern tends to focus on the possibilities of disruption that threaten the established norms of belief, behavior, and morality.

In our view, however, that concern has become anachronistic. Once the industrial order has legitimized its rule, the primary function of its cultural arm becomes the reiteration of that legitimacy and the maintenance of established power and authority. The rules of the games and the morality of its goals can best be demonstrated by dramatic stories of their symbolic violations. The intended lessons are generally effective and the social order is only rarely and peripherally threatened. The *system* is the message and, as our politicians like to say, the system works. Our question is, in fact, whether it may not work too well in cultivating uniform assumptions, exploitable fears, acquiescence to power, and resistance to meaningful change.

Therefore, in contrast to the more usual statement of the problem, we do not believe that the only critical correlate of television violence is to be found in the stimulation of occasional individual aggression. The consequences of living in a symbolic world ruled largely by violence may be much more far-reaching. Preparation for large-scale organized violence requires the cultivation of fear and acquiescence to power. TV violence is a dramatic demonstration of power which communicates much about social norms and relationships, about goals and means, about winners and losers, about the risks of life and the price for transgressions of society's

rules. Violence-laden drama shows who gets away with what, when, why, how and against whom. "Real world" *victims* as well as violents may have to learn their roles. Fear—that historic instrument of social control—may be an even more critical residue of a show of violence than aggression. Expectation of violence or passivity in the face of injustice may be consequences of even greater social concern. We shall return to this theme with data from our studies.

The realism of TV fiction hides its synthetic and functionally selective nature. The dominant stylistic convention of Western narrative art—novels, plays, films, TV dramas—is that of representational realism. However contrived television plots are, viewers assume that they take place against a backdrop of the real world. Nothing impeaches the basic "reality" of the world of television drama. It is also highly informative. That is, it offers to the unsuspecting viewer a continuous stream of "facts" and impressions about the way of the world, about the constancies and vagaries of human nature, and about the consequences of actions. The premise of realism is a Trojan horse which carries within it a highly selective, synthetic, and purposeful image of the facts of life.

A normal adult viewer is not unaware of the fictiveness of television drama. No one calls the police or an ambulance when a character in a television program is shot. "War of the Worlds"-type scares are rare, if they occur at all. Granting this basic awareness on the part of the viewers, one may still wonder how often and to what degree all viewers suspend their disbelief in the reality of the symbolic world.

Surely we all know that Robert Young is not a doctor and that Marcus Welby is an M.D. by only poetic license. Yet according to the Philadelphia Bulletin (July 10, 1974), in the first five years of the program "Dr. Welby" received over a quarter of a million letters from viewers, most containing requests for medical advice.

Doctor shows are not the only targets of such claims. A former New York City police official has complained that jury members have formed images and expectations of trial procedures and outcomes from television which often prejudice them in actual trials. In a courtroom incident related to us by a lawyer, the counsel for the defense leapt to his feet, objecting, "Your Honor, the Prosecutor is badgering the witness!" The judge replied that he, too, had seen that objection raised on the Perry Mason show but, unfortunately, it was not included in the California code.

Anecdotes and examples should not trivialize the real point, which is that even the most sophisticated can find many important components of their knowledge of the real world derived wholly or in part from fictional representation. How often do we make a sharp distinction between the action which we know is not "real" and the accumulation of background information (which is, after all, "realistic")? Are we keenly aware that in the total population of the television world men outnumber women four to one? Or that, with all the violence, the leading causes of real life injury and death—industrial and traffic accidents—are hardly ever depicted?

How many of us have ever been in an operating room, a criminal courtroom, a police station or jail, a corporate board room, or a movie studio? How much of what we know about such diverse spheres of activity, about how various kinds of people work and what they do—how much of our real world has been learned from fictional worlds? To the extent that viewers see television drama—the foreground of plot or the background of the television world—as naturalistic, they may derive a wealth of incidental "knowledge." This incidental learning may be effected by bald "facts" and by the subtle interplay of occurrence, co-occurrence, and non-occurrence of actors and actions.

In addition to the subtle patterns against whose influence we may all be somewhat defenseless, television provides another seductively persuasive sort of imagery. In real life much is hidden from our eyes. Often, motives are obscure, outcomes ambiguous, personalities complex, people unpredictable. The truth is never pure and rarely simple. The world of television, in contrast, offers us cogency, clarity, and resolution. Unlike life, television is an open book. Problems are never left hanging, rewards and punishments are present and accounted for. The rules of the game are known and rarely change. Not only does television "show" us the normally hidden workings of many important and fascinating institutions—medicine, law enforcement and justice, big business, the glamorous world of entertainment, etc.—but we "see" the people who fill important and exciting roles. We see who they are in

terms of sex, age, race, and class and we also see them as personalities—dedicated and selfless, ruthless and ambitious, good-hearted but ineffectual, lazy and shiftless, corrupt and corrupting. Television provides the broadest common background of assumptions not only about what things are but also about how they work, or should work, and why.

The world of television drama is a mixture of truth and falsehood, of accuracy and distortion. It is not the true world, but an extension of the standardized images which we have been taught since childhood. The audience for which the message of television is primarily intended (recall that an audience of about 20 million viewers is necessary for a program's survival) is the great majority of middle-class citizens for whom America is a democracy (our leaders act in accordance with the desires of the people), for whom our economy is free, and for whom God is alive, white, and male.

The implications for research are far-reaching and call into question essential aspects of the research paradigm stemming from historic pressures for behavior manipulation and marketing efficacy. They suggest a model based on the concept of broad enculturation rather than of narrow changes in opinion or behavior. Instead of asking what communication "variables" might propagate what kinds of individual behavior changes, we want to know what types of common consciousness whole systems of messages might cultivate. This is less like asking about preconceived fears and hopes and more like asking about the "effects" of Christianity on one's view of the world or—as the Chinese *had* asked—of Confucianism on public morality. To answer such questions, we must review and revise some conventional articles of faith about research strategy.

First, we cannot presume consequences without the prior investigation of content, as the conventional research paradigm tends to do. Nor can the content be limited to isolated elements (e.g., news, commercials, specific programs), taken out of the total context, or to individual viewer selections. The "world" of television is an organic system of stories and images. Only system-wide analysis of messages can reveal the symbolic world which structures common assumptions and definitions for the generations born into it and provides bases for interaction (though not necessarily of

agreement) among large and heterogeneous communities. The system *as a whole* plays a major role in setting the agenda of issues to agree or disagree about; it shapes the most pervasive norms and cultivates the dominant perspectives of society.

Another conventional research assumption is that the experiment is the most powerful method, and that change (in attitudes, opinions, likes-dislikes, etc., toward or conveyed by "variable X") is the most significant outcome to measure. In the ideal experiment, you expose a group to X and assess salient aspects of the state of the receivers before and after exposure, comparing the change, if any, to data obtained from a control group (identical in all relevant ways to the experimental group) who have not received X. No change or no difference means no effect.

When X is television, however, we must turn this paradigm around: stability may be *the* significant outcome of the sum total of the play of many variables. If nearly everyone "lives" to some extent in the world of television, clearly we cannot find unexposed groups who would be identical in all important respects to the viewers. We cannot isolate television from the mainstream of modern culture because it *is* the mainstream. We cannot look for change as the most significant accomplishment of the chief arm of established culture if its main social function is to maintain, reinforce, and exploit rather than to undermine or alter conventional conceptions, beliefs, and behaviors. On the contrary, the relative ineffectiveness of isolated campaigns may itself be testimony to the power of mainstream communications.

Neither can we assume that TV cultivates conceptions easily distinguishable from those of other major entertainment media. (But we cannot emphasize too strongly the historically novel role of television in standardizing and sharing with all as the common norm what had before been more parochial, local, and selective cultural patterns.) We assume, therefore, that TV's standardizing and legitimizing influence comes largely from its ability to streamline, amplify, ritualize, and spread into hitherto isolated or protected subcultures, homes, nooks, and crannies of the land the conventional capsules of mass produced information and entertainment.

Another popular research technique which is inappropriate is the

experimental or quasi-experimental test of the consequences of exposure to one particular type of television programming. Much of the research on media violence, for example, has focused on the observation and measurement of behavior which occurs after a viewer has seen a particular program or even isolated scenes from programs. All such studies, no matter how clean the design and clear the results, are of limited value because they ignore a fundamental fact: the world of TV drama consists of a complex and integrated system of characters, events, actions, and relationships whose effects cannot be measured with regard to any single element or program seen in isolation.

How should, then, the effects of television be conceptualized and studied? We believe that the key to the answer rests in a search for those assumptions about the "facts" of life and society that television cultivates in its more faithful viewers. That search requires two different methods of research. The relationship between the two is one of the special characteristics of the Cultural Indicators approach.[3]

The first method of research is the periodic analysis of large and representative aggregates of television output (rather than individual segments) as the system of messages to which total communities are exposed. The purpose of message system analysis is to establish the composition and structure of the symbolic world. We have begun that analysis with the most ubiquitous, translucent, and instructive part of television (or any cultural) fare, the dramatic programs (series, cartoons, movies on television) that populate and animate for most viewers the heartland of the symbolic world. Instead of guessing or assuming the contours and dynamics of that world, message system analysis maps its geography, demography, thematic and action structure, time and space dimensions, personality profiles, occupations, and fates. Message system analysis yields the gross but clear terms of location, action, and characterization discharged into the mainstream of community consciousness. Aggregate viewer interpretation and response starts with these common terms of basic exposure.

[3] For a more detailed description of the conceptual framework for this research see "Cultural Indicators: The Third Voice" (*8*).

The second step of the research is to determine what, if anything, viewers absorb from living in the world of television. Cultivation analysis, as we call that method, inquires into the assumptions television cultivates about the facts, norms, and values of society. Here we turn the findings of message system analysis about the fantasy land of television into questions about social reality. To each of these questions there is a "television answer," which is like the way things appear in the world of television, and another and different answer which is biased in the opposite direction, closer to the way things are in the observable world. We ask these questions of samples of adults and children. All responses are related to television exposure, other media habits, and demographic characteristics. We then compare the response of light and heavy viewers controlling for sex, age, education, and other characteristics. The margin of heavy viewers over light viewers giving the "television answers" within and across groups is the "cultivation differential" indicating conceptions about social reality that viewing tends to cultivate.

Our analysis looks at the contribution of TV drama to viewer conceptions in conjunction with such other sources of knowledge as education and news. The analysis is intended to illuminate the complementary as well as the divergent roles of these sources of facts, images, beliefs, and values in the cultivation of assumptions about reality.

We shall now sketch some general features of the world of network television drama, and then report the latest findings about violence in that world. As any mythical world, television presents a selective and functional system of messages. Its time, space, and motion—even its "accidents"—follow laws of dramatic convention and social utility. Its people are not born but are created to depict social types, causes, powers, and fates. The economics of the assembly line and the requirement of wide acceptability assure general adherence to common notions of justice and fair play, clear-cut characterizations, tested plot lines, and proven formulas for resolving all issues.

Representation in the fictional world signifies social existence; absence means symbolic annihilation. Being buffeted by events and victimized by people denotes social impotence; ability to wrest

events about, to act freely, boldly, and effectively is a mark of dramatic importance and social power. Values and forces come into play through characterizations; good is a certain type of attractiveness, evil is a personality defect, and right is the might that wins. Plots weave a thread of causality into the fabric of dramatic ritual, as stock characters act out familiar parts and confirm preferred notions of what's what, who's who, and who counts for what. The issue is rarely in doubt; the action is typically a game of social typing, group identification, skill, and power.

Many times a day, seven days a week, the dramatic pattern defines situations and cultivates premises about society, people, and issues. Casting the symbolic world thus has a meaning of its own: the lion's share of representation goes to the types that dominate the social order. About three-quarters of all leading characters are male, American, middle- and upper-class, and in the prime of life. Symbolic independence requires freedom relatively uninhibited by real-life constraints. Less fully represented are those lower in the domestic and global power hierarchy and characters involved in familiar social contexts, human dependencies, and other situations that impose the real-life burdens of human relationships and obligations upon freewheeling activity.

Women typically represent romantic or family interest, close human contact, love. Males can act in nearly any role, but rare is the female part that does not involve at least the suggestion of sex. While only one in three male leads is shown as intending to or ever having been married, two of every three females are married or expect to marry in the story. Female "specialties" limit the proportion of TV's women to about one-fourth of the total population.

Nearly half of all females are concentrated in the most sexually eligible young adult population, to which only one-fifth of males are assigned; women are also disproportionately represented among the very young and old. Children, adolescents, and old people together account for less than 15 percent of the total fictional population.

Approximately five in ten characters can be unambiguously identified as gainfully employed. Of these, three are proprietors, managers, and professionals. The fourth comes from the ranks of labor—including all those employed in factories, farms, offices, shops, stores, mining, transportation, service stations, restaurants, and households, and working in unskilled, skilled, clerical, sales, and domestic service capacities. The fifth serves to enforce the law or preserve the peace on behalf of public or private clients.

Types of activity—paid and unpaid—also reflect dramatic and social purposes. Six in ten characters are engaged in discernible occupational activity and can be roughly divided into three groups of two each. The first group represents the world of legitimate private business, industry, agriculture, finance, etc. The second group is engaged in activity related to art, science, religion, health, education, and welfare, as professionals, amateurs, patients, students, or clients. The third makes up the forces of official or semi-official authority and the army of criminals, outlaws, spies, and other enemies arrayed against them. One in every four leading characters acts out a drama of some sort of transgression and its suppression at home and abroad.

Violence plays a key role in such a world. It is the simplest and cheapest dramatic means available to demonstrate the rules of the game of power. In real life much violence is subtle, slow, circumstantial, invisible, even impersonal. Encounters with physical violence in real life are rare, more sickening than thrilling. But in the symbolic world, overt physical motion makes dramatically visible that which in the real world is usually hidden. Symbolic violence, as any show of force, typically does the job of real violence more cheaply and, of course, entertainingly.

Geared for independent action in loosely-knit and often remote social contexts, half of all characters are free to engage in violence. One-fifth "specialize" in violence as law breakers or law enforcers. Violence on television, unlike in real-life, rarely stems from close personal relationships. Most of it is between strangers, set up to drive home lessons of social typing. Violence is often just a specialty—a skill, a craft, an efficient means to test the norms of and settle any challenge to the existing structure of power.

The Violence Profile is a set of indicators tracing aspects of the television world and of conceptions of social reality they tend to cultivate in the minds of viewers. Four specific types of indicators have been developed. Three come from message system analysis: (1) the context of programming trends against which any aspect of the world of television can be seen; (2) several specific measures of

violence given separately and also combined in the Violence Index; and (3) structural characteristics of the dramatic world indicating social relationships depicted in it (in the present report, "risk ratios"). The fourth type of indicator comes from cultivation analysis and will be shown in this report as the "cultivation differential." Although the Violence Profile is the most developed, the Cultural Indicators project is constructing similar profiles of other aspects and relationships of the media world.

Before we present the indicators, let us briefly note the definitions, terms, and some procedures employed in generating the TV violence measures.

Message system analysis has been performed on annual sample-weeks of prime time and weekend daytime network dramatic programming since 1967 by trained analysts who observe and code many aspects of TV content. The definition of violence employed in this analysis is "the overt expression of physical force against self or other, compelling action against one's will on pain of being hurt or killed, or actually hurting or killing." The research focuses on a clear-cut and commonly understood definition of violence, and yields indicators of trends in the programming context in which violence occurs; in the prevalence, rate, and characterizations involved in violence; and in the power relationships expressed by the differential risks found in the world of television drama.

All observations are recorded in three types of units: the program (play) as a whole, each specific violent action (if any) in the program, and each dramatic character appearing in the program.

Program means a single fictional story presented in dramatic form. This may be a play produced for television, a feature film telecast during the period of the study, or a cartoon story (of which there may be one or more in a single program).

Violent action means a scene of some violence confined to the same parties. If a scene is interrupted (by flashback or shift to another scene) but continues in "real time," it is still the same act. However, if a new agent of violence enters the scene, that begins another act. These units are also called violent episodes.

Characters analyzed in all programs (whether violent or not) are of two types. Major characters are the principal roles essential to the story. Minor characters (subjected to a less detailed analysis) are all other speaking roles. (The findings summarized in this report include the analysis of major characters only.)

Samples of programming. Network dramatic programs transmitted in evening prime time (8 to 11 P.M. each day), and network children's dramatic programs transmitted weekend mornings (Saturday and Sunday between 8 A.M. and 2 P.M.) comprise the analytical source material.[4] With respect to four basic sample dimensions (network, program format, type and tone), the solid week sample is at least as generalizable to a year's programming as larger randomly drawn samples (2).

Coder training and reliability. For the analysis of each program sample, a staff of 12 to 18 coders is recruited. After about three weeks of training and testing, coders analyze the season's videotaped program sample.

During both the training and data-collection phases, coders work in independent pairs and monitor their assigned videotaped programs as often as necessary. All programs in the sample are coded by two separate coder-pairs to provide double-coded data for reliability comparisons. Final measures, computed on the study's entire corpus of double-coded data, determine the acceptability of information for analysis and provide guidelines to its interpretation (11, 12).

Three sets of violence measures have been computed from the direct observational data of the message system analysis. They show the percent of programs with any violence at all, the frequency and rate of violent episodes, and the number of roles calling for characterizations as violents, victims, or both. These measures are called *prevalence, rate,* and *role,* respectively. Each is given separately in all the tabulations that follow.

For ease of illustration and comparison, the three types of measures are also combined to form the Violence Index. The Index itself is not a statistical finding but serves as a convenient illustrator of trends and facilitates gross comparisons. The Index is obtained by adding measures of prevalence, rates (doubled ro raise

[4] In 1967 and 1968, the hours included were 7:30 to 10 P.M. Monday through Saturday, 7 to 10 P.M. Sunday, and children's programs 8 A.M. to noon Saturday. Beginning in 1969, these hours were expanded until 11 P.M. each evening and from 7 A.M. to 2:30 P.M. Saturday and Sunday. As of 1971 however, network evening programming has been reduced by the FCC's prime-time access rule. The effective evening parameters since 1971 are therefore 8 to 11 P.M. Monday through Saturday and 7:30 to 10:30 P.M. Sunday.



Figure 1: "Action" (crime, western, adventure) programs as percent of cartoon and of other (general) programs analyzed

their relatively low numerical value) and roles. The formula can be seen on Tables 1 through 4 (found at the end of this article).

Before presenting the trends indicated by the measures just discussed, let us glance at the first indicator, that of program mix. "Action" programs contribute most violence to the world of television drama. Figure 1 shows that such programs comprise more than half of all prime-time and weekend daytime programming, and their proportion of the total has not changed much in recent years. In fact, while general (non-cartoon) crime and adventure plays dropped from their 1974 high of 62 percent to 54 percent in 1975, cartoon crime and adventure rose in the same period from 47 percent to 66 percent of all cartoons.

These programming trends foreshadow the violence findings that follow. We can summarize them by noting that there has been *no significant reduction in the overall Violence Index despite some fluctuations in the specific measures and a definite drop in "family hour" violence, especially on CBS, in the current season.* The "family hour" decline has been matched by a sharp increase in

violence during children's (weekend daytime) programming in the current season and by an even larger two-year rise in violence after 9 P.M. EST.

Figure 2 shows these trends in greater detail. Figure 3 provides similar information for each network separately, showing that late evening violence shot up on all three networks in the past two or three years (with minor dips on CBS and ABC in 1975), and that children's (weekend daytime) programs became more violent on ABC and NBC in the past season. Figure 4 is a direct comparison of the Violence Index for each network, showing remarkable long-term stability and similarity among them. Figure 5 is a direct comparison of the "family hour" Violence Index for each network, showing little change over a two-year period for ABC and NBC, substantial reduction for the second year in a row for CBS.

Figure 2: Violence Index for different hours of dramatic programming





Figure 3.
Violence Index for different hours by network



Figure 4: Violence Index for each network, all programs in sample

Tables 1 through 4 (at the end of the essay) present all measures for the different hours of programming. They show how the specific measures of prevalence, rate, and role fluctuate and combine each year to make up the composite Violence Index. More complete tabulations, including network and format breakdowns, can be found in the Technical Report (3).

The indicators reflected in the Violence Index are clear manifestations of what network programmers actually do as compared to what they say or intend to do. Network executives and their censorship ("Standards and Practices") offices maintain close control over the assembly line production process that results in the particular program mix of a season (6). While our data permit many specific qualifications to any generalization that might be made, it is safe to say that network policy seems to have responded in narrow terms, when at all, to very specific pressure, and only while the heat was on. After nine years of investigations, hearings, and commissions (or since we have been tracking violence on television), eight out of every ten programs (nine out of every ten weekend children's hour programs) still contain some violence. The

overall rate of violent episodes, eight per hour, is, if anything, higher than at any time since 1969. (The violence saturation of weekend children's programs declined from the 1969 high but increased from its 1974 low to sixteen per hour, double that of overall programming, as can be seen on Table 4.) Between six and seven out of every ten leading characters (eight and nine for children) are still involved in some violence. Between one and two out of every ten are still involved in killing. Reductions have been achieved in the portrayal of on-screen killers (especially during weekend children's hours) and in "family hour" violence (especially by CBS), but, as we have noted, a sharp rise in late evening and general children's violence has canceled out any overall gains from the latter.

Figure 5: Violence Index for each network, family hour only



It is clear, at least to us, that deeply rooted sociocultural forces, rather than just obstinacy or profit-seeking, are at work. We have suggested earlier in this article, and have also developed elsewhere (9, 10), that symbolic violence is a demonstration of power and an instrument of social control serving, on the whole, to reinforce and preserve the existing social order, even if at an ever increasing price in terms of pervasive fear and mistrust and of selective aggressiveness. That maintenance mechanism seems to work through cultivating a sense of danger, a differential calculus of the risks of life in different groups in the population. The Violence Profile is beginning to yield indicators of such a mechanism, and thereby also of basic structural and cultivation characteristics of television programming.

The structural characteristics of television drama are not easily controlled. They reflect basic cultural assumptions that make a show "entertaining"—i.e., smoothly and pleasingly fitting dominant notions (and prejudices) about social relations and thus demonstrating conventional notions of morality and power.

The most elementary—and telling—relationship involved in violent action is that of violent and victim. The pattern of those who inflict and those who suffer violence (or both) provides a differential calculus of hazards and opportunities for different groups of people in the "world" of television drama. Table 5 presents a summary of the scores of involvement and what we call risk ratios. The character score is the roles component (CS) of the Violence Index; it is the percent of all characters involved in any violence plus the percent involved in any killing. The violent-victim and killer-killed (risk) ratio are obtained by dividing violents and victims, or killers and killed within each group. The plus sign means more violents or killers in the group; the minus sign means more victims (hurt) or killed.

We see that the 1967—75 totals show 1.19 male and 1.32 female victims for every violent male and female. Even more striking are the differential risks or fatal victimization. There were nearly two male killers for every male killed; however, for every female killer one woman was killed.

Table 5 also shows the differential risks of involvement and victimization attributed to other groups, projecting assumptions about

social and power relations. Old men, married men, lower class, foreign, and nonwhite males were most likely to get killed rather than to inflict lethal injury. "Good guys" were of course most likely to be the killers.

Among females, more vulnerable than men in most categories, both young and old women as well as unmarried, lower class, foreign, and nonwhite women bore especially heavy burdens of relative victimization. Old, poor, and black women were shown *only* as killed and never as killers. Interestingly, "good" women, unlike "good" men, had no lethal power, but "bad" women were even more lethal than "bad" men. The victimization of the "good" woman is often the curtain-raiser that provokes the hero to righteous "action."

The pattern of relative victimization is remarkably stable from year to year. It demonstrates an invidious (but socially functional) sense of risk and power. We do not yet know whether it also cultivates a corresponding hierarchy of fear and aggression. But we do have evidence to suggest that television viewing cultivates a general sense of danger and mistrust. That evidence comes from the fourth and final element of the Violence Profile, the component we call the cultivation differential.

The cultivation differential comes, of course, from the cultivation analysis part of the Cultural Indicators research approach. It highlights differences in conception of relevant aspects of social reality that television viewing tends to cultivate in heavy viewers compared to light viewers. The strategy is obviously most appropriate to those propositions in which television might cultivate conceptions that measurably deviate from those coming from other sources. Furthermore, the independent contributions of television are likely to be most powerful in cultivating assumptions about which there is little opportunity to learn first-hand, and which are not strongly anchored in other established beliefs and ideologies.

The obvious objection arises that light and heavy viewers are different prior to—and aside from—television. Factors other than television may account for the difference.

The point is well taken. We have found, as have others, that heavy viewing is part and parcel of a complex syndrome which also includes lower education, lower mobility, lower aspirations, higher

anxieties, and other class, age, and sex related characteristics. We assume, indeed, that viewing helps to hold together and cultivate elements of that syndrome. But it does more than that. Television viewing also makes a separate and independent contribution to the "biasing" of conceptions of social reality within most age, sex, educational, and other groupings, including those presumably most "immune" to its effects.

Our study of TV's contribution to notions of social reality proceeds by various methods, each comparing responses of heavy and light viewers, with other characteristics held constant. Of the different methods used in cultivation analysis, only adult survey results are included in this report; the others are still in the process of development and summarization. These surveys were executed by commercial survey research organizations. For details of sampling, etc., the reader is referred to the Technical Report (3).

To probe in the direction of the pattern suggested by our message analysis, we obtained responses to questions about facts of life that relate to law enforcement, trust, and a sense of danger. Figure 6 presents the results of the first question asking what proportion of people are employed in law enforcement. The "television answer" (slanted in the direction of the world of television) was five percent. The alternative answer (more in the direction of reality) was one percent.

As Figure 6 shows, the heavy viewers (those viewing an average of four hours a day or more) were always more likely to give the television answer than the light viewers (those viewing an average of two hours a day or less). Figure 7 shows similar results for the question "Can most people be trusted?" and Figure 8 for the question "During any given week, what are your chances of being involved in some type of violence?" One in ten (the "television answer") or one in a hundred?"

Let us take education as probably the best index of a complex of social circumstances that provide alternative informational and cultural opportunities. Those of our respondents who have had some college education are less likely to choose the "television answer" than those who have had none. But *within* each group, television viewing "biases" conceptions in the direction of the "facts" it presents. When we compared light and heavy viewers within the "college" and the "no college" groups, we got a typical



Figure 6: Percent giving the "television answer" to a question about the proportion of people employed in law enforcement

step-wise pattern of the percentage of "television answers." Regular reading of newspapers makes a similar difference.

Both college education and regular newspaper reading seem to reduce the percentage of "television answers," but heavy viewing boosts it within both groups. This appears to be the general pattern of TV's ability to cultivate its own "reality."

An exaggerated impression of the actual number of law enforce-



Figure 7: Percent responding "Can't be too careful" to the question "Can most people be trusted?"

ment workers seems to be a consequence of viewing television. Of greater concern, however, would be the cultivation of a concomitantly exaggerated demand for their services. The world of television drama is, above all, a violent one in which more than half of all characters are involved in some violence, at least one-tenth in some killing, and in which over three-fourths of prime-time hours con-

tain some violence. As we have suggested, the cultivation of fear and a sense of danger may well be a prime residue of the show of violence.

Questions about feelings of trust and safety may be used to test that suggestion. The National Opinion Research Corporation's 1975 General Social Survey asked "Can most people be trusted?" Living in the world of television seems to strengthen the conclusion that they cannot. Heavy viewers chose the answer "Can't be too careful" in significantly greater proportions than did light viewers in the same groups, as shown in Figure 7. Those who do not read newspapers regularly have a high level of mistrust regardless of TV viewing. But, not surprisingly, women are the most likely to absorb the message of distrust.

Focusing directly on violence, we asked a national sample of adults about people's chances of being involved in violence in any given week. Figure 8 shows the patterns of overestimations in line with television's view of the world. It may explain why in recent surveys, such as the Detroit study conducted by the Institute of Social Research (13), respondents' estimates of danger in their neighborhoods had little to do with crime statistics or even with their own personal experience. The pattern of our findings suggests that television and other media exposure may be as important as demographic and other experiential factors in explaining why people view the world as they do.

Television certainly appears to condition the view of the generation that knew no world without it. All the figures show that the "under 30" respondents exhibit consistently higher levels of "television responses," despite the fact that they tend to be better educated than the "over 30" respondents. We may all live in a dangerous world, but young people (including children tested but not reported on here), the less educated, women, and heavy viewers within all these groups sense greater danger than light viewers in the same groups. College education (and its social correlates) may counter the television view, but heavy exposure to TV will counteract that too.

Fear is a universal emotion and easy to exploit. Symbolic violence may be the cheapest way to cultivate it effectively. Raw violence is, in comparison, risky and costly, resorted to when symbolic means



Figure 8: Percent giving the "television answer" (exaggerating) their own chances of being involved in violence

fail. Ritualized displays of any violence (such as in crime and disaster news, as well as in mass-produced drama) may cultivate exaggerated assumptions about the extent of threat and danger in the world and lead to demands for protection.

What is the net result? A heightened sense of risk and insecurity (different for groups of varying power) is more likely to increase acquiescence to and dependence upon established authority, and to legitimize its use of force, than it is to threaten the social order through occasional non-legitimized imitations. Risky for their perpetrators and costly for their victims, media-incited criminal violence may be a price industrial cultures extract from some citizens for the general pacification of most others.

As with violence, so with other aspects of social reality we are investigating, TV appears to cultivate assumptions that fit its socially functional myths. Our chief instrument of enculturation and social control, television may function as the established religion of the industrial order, relating to governance as the church did to the state in earlier times.

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Table 1. VIOLENCE MEASURES FOR ALL PROGRAMS IN SAMPLE

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	TOTAL
SAMPLES (100%)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Programs (plays) analyzed	96	87	121	111	103	100	99	96	111	924
Program Hours Analyzed	62.0	58.5	71.8	67.2	70.3	72.0	75.2	76.0	77.3	630.2
Leading characters analyzed	240	215	377	196	252	300	359	346	364	2649
PREVALENCE	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
(%P) Programs containing violence	81.3	81.6	83.5	77.5	80.6	79.0	72.7	83.3	78.4	79.8
Program hours containing violence	83.2	87.0	83.2	78.3	87.2	84.2	79.7	86.8	83.0	83.6
RATE	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Number of violent episodes	478	394	630	498	483	539	524	522	626	4694
(R/P) Rate per all programs (plays)	5.0	4.5	5.2	4.5	4.7	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.6	5.1
(R/H) Rate per all hours	7.7	6.7	8.8	7.4	6.9	7.5	7.0	6.9	8.1	7.4
Duration of Violent Episodes (hrs)	—	—	—	—	—	—	3.2	3.8	3.6	10.6
ROLES (% OF LEADING CHARACTERS)	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Violents (committing violence)	55.8	49.3	46.5	52.0	46.0	39.3	34.5	40.8	43.1	44.6
Victims (subjected to violence)	64.6	55.8	56.9	56.6	50.8	49.7	48.2	51.2	53.8	54.0
(%V) Any involvement in violence	73.3	65.1	66.3	62.8	61.5	58.3	55.7	60.7	64.8	62.9
Killers (committing fatal violence)	12.5	10.7	3.7	6.6	8.7	7.7	5.8	9.8	6.3	7.7
Killed (victims of lethal violence)	7.1	3.7	2.1	4.6	3.2	4.7	3.3	5.8	3.8	4.2
(%K) Any involvement in killing	18.7	11.6	5.6	8.7	9.9	9.7	7.5	13.6	9.1	10.2
INDICATORS OF VIOLENCE										
Program Score: PS = (%P) + 2 (R/P) + 2 (R/H)	106.6	104.1	111.4	101.3	103.7	104.8	97.3	107.9	105.8	104.8
Character V-Score: CS = (%V) + (%K)	92.1	76.7	71.9	71.4	71.4	68.0	63.2	74.3	73.9	73.0
Violence Index: VI = PS + CS	198.7	180.9	183.3	172.7	175.1	172.8	160.5	182.2	179.7	177.8

Table 2. VIOLENCE MEASURES FOR FAMILY HOUR ONLY

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	TOTAL
SAMPLES (100%)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Programs (plays) analyzed	38	36	38	35	28	27	32	29	31	294
Program Hours Analyzed	30.0	27.0	27.3	26.0	25.0	23.5	29.0	27.0	21.5	236.3
Leading characters analyzed	103	102	130	76	78	98	110	109	105	911
PREVALENCE	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
(%P) Programs containing violence	78.9	75.0	63.2	57.1	75.0	74.1	56.3	69.0	51.6	66.7
Program hours containing violence	86.7	83.3	74.3	67.3	86.0	85.1	70.7	77.8	60.5	77.1
RATE	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Number of violent episodes	240	123	122	86	110	122	147	108	77	1135
(R/P) Rate per all programs (plays)	6.3	3.4	3.2	2.5	3.9	4.5	4.6	3.7	2.5	3.9
(R/H) Rate per all hours	8.0	4.6	4.5	3.3	4.4	5.2	5.1	4.0	3.6	4.8
Duration of Violent Episodes (hrs)	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.9	1.0	0.5	2.4
ROLES (% OF LEADING CHARACTERS)	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Violents (committing violence)	58.3	39.2	36.2	32.9	37.2	37.8	29.1	29.4	16.2	35.0
Victims (subjected to violence)	68.9	46.1	40.8	39.5	38.5	40.8	33.6	36.7	27.6	41.4
(%V) Any involvement in violence	75.7	56.9	49.2	40.8	50.0	50.0	40.9	45.0	36.2	49.5
Killers (committing fatal violence)	22.3	10.8	6.2	3.9	9.0	4.1	6.4	12.8	1.0	8.6
Killed (victims of lethal violence)	7.8	4.9	3.1	1.3	2.6	3.1	4.5	7.3	0.0	4.0
(%K) Any involvement in killing	28.2	12.7	9.2	3.9	10.3	5.1	10.0	16.5	1.0	11.0
INDICATORS OF VIOLENCE										
Program Score: PS = (%P) + 2 (R/P) + 2 (R/H)	107.6	90.9	78.5	68.7	91.7	93.5	75.6	84.4	63.7	84.0
Character V-Score: CS = (%V) + (%K)	103.9	69.6	58.5	44.7	60.3	55.1	50.9	61.5	37.1	60.5
Violence Index: VI = PS + CS	211.5	160.6	137.0	113.4	151.9	148.6	126.5	145.9	100.9	144.5

Table 3. VIOLENCE MEASURES FOR LATE EVENING (9–11 P.M. EST)

	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	TOTAL
SAMPLES (100%)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Programs (plays) analyzed	26	21	26	26	34	33	30	29	35	260
Program Hours Analyzed	25.0	24.0	30.5	28.0	30.3	33.0	27.5	33.0	39.5	270.7
Leading characters analyzed	75	60	88	56	91	119	104	115	133	841
PREVALENCE	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
(%P) Programs containing violence	69.2	76.2	80.8	69.2	76.5	69.7	63.3	86.2	85.7	75.4
Program hours containing violence	76.0	89.6	84.4	80.4	87.6	79.8	79.1	92.4	92.4	85.1
RATE	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Number of violent episodes	87	99	110	116	129	172	130	220	284	1347
(R/P) Rate per all programs (plays)	3.3	4.7	4.2	4.5	3.8	5.2	4.3	7.6	8.1	5.2
(R/H) Rate per all hours	3.5	4.1	3.6	4.1	4.3	5.2	4.7	6.7	7.2	5.0
Duration of Violent Episodes (hrs)	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.3	1.8	1.9	5.0
ROLES (% OF LEADING CHARACTERS)	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Violents (committing violence)	38.7	55.0	34.1	46.4	44.0	37.8	32.7	56.5	51.1	44.0
Victims (subjected to violence)	42.7	55.0	44.3	50.0	48.4	45.4	36.5	61.7	59.4	49.7
(%V) Any involvement in violence	56.0	68.3	52.3	57.1	59.3	55.5	41.3	71.3	68.4	59.1
Killers (committing fatal violence)	5.3	16.7	5.7	14.3	15.4	16.0	12.5	16.5	16.5	13.6
Killed (victims of lethal violence)	4.0	5.0	2.3	12.5	5.5	8.4	6.7	10.4	9.8	7.4
(%K) Any involvement in killing	9.3	16.7	6.8	21.4	17.6	19.3	14.4	24.3	23.3	17.6
INDICATORS OF VIOLENCE										
Program Score: PS = (%P) + 2 (R/P) 2 (R/H)	82.9	93.9	96.4	86.4	92.6	90.5	81.5	114.7	116.3	95.7
Character V-Score: CS = (%V) + (%K)	65.3	85.0	59.1	78.6	76.9	74.8	55.8	95.7	91.7	76.7
Violence Index: VI = PS + CS	148.2	178.9	155.5	165.0	169.5	165.3	137.2	210.4	208.1	172.4

Table 4. VIOLENCE MEASURES FOR WEEKEND DAYTIME (CHILDREN'S) HOURS

	1967	*1968*	*1969*	*1970*	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*	*TOTAL*
SAMPLES (100%)	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	
Programs (plays) analyzed	32	30	57	50	41	40	37	38	45	370
Program Hours Analyzed	7.0	7.5	14.0	13.2	15.0	15.5	18.7	16.0	16.3	123.2
Leading characters analyzed	62	53	159	64	83	83	145	122	126	897
PREVALENCE	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
(%P)Programs containing violence	93.8	93.3	98.2	96.0	87.8	90.0	94.6	92.1	91.1	93.2
Program hours containing violence	94.0	92.2	97.6	95.6	88.5	92.3	94.6	90.6	89.8	92.7
RATE	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Number of violent episodes	151	172	398	296	244	245	247	194	265	2212
(R/P)Rate per all programs (plays)	4.7	5.7	7.0	5.9	6.0	6.1	6.7	5.1	5.9	6.0
(R/H)Rate per all hours	21.6	22.9	28.4	22.5	16.2	15.8	13.2	12.1	16.2	18.0
Duration of Violent Episodes (hrs)	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.0	0.9	1.2	3.2
ROLES (% OF LEADING CHARACTERS)	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Violents (committing violence)	72.6	62.3	66.7	79.7	56.6	43.4	40.0	36.1	57.1	54.8
Victims (subjected to violence)	83.9	75.5	81.8	82.8	65.1	66.3	67.6	54.1	69.8	70.9
(%V)Any involvement in violence	90.3	77.4	88.1	93.8	74.7	72.3	77.2	64.8	84.9	79.9
Killers (committing fatal violence)	4.8	3.8	0.6	3.1	1.2	0.0	0.7	0.8	0.0	1.2
Killed (victims of lethal violence)	9.7	0.0	1.3	1.6	1.2	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.3
(%K) Any involvement in killing	14.5	3.8	1.9	3.1	1.2	1.2	0.7	0.8	0.8	2.3
INDICATORS OF VIOLENCE										
Program Score: PS = (%P) + 2 (R/P) + 2 (R/H)	146.3	150.7	169.1	152.8	132.2	133.9	134.4	126.6	135.3	141.1
Character V-Score: CS = (%V) + (%K)	104.8	81.1	89.9	96.9	75.9	73.5	77.9	65.6	85.7	82.3
Violence Index: VI = PS + CS	251.2	231.8	259.0	249.7	208.1	207.4	212.3	192.1	221.1	223.4

Table 5. RISK RATIOS FOR ALL PROGRAMS STUDIED 1967-75

Groups	Male Characters N	Character score	Violent-victim ratio	Killer-killed ratio	Female Characters N	Character score	Violent-victim ratio	Killer-killed ratio
ALL CHARACTERS	2010	80.0	1.19	+1.97	605	48.9	−1.32	1.00
SOCIAL AGE								
Children-adolescents	188	64.9	−1.83	+0.00	77	46.8	−1.39	0.00*
Young adults	431	81.2	−1.21	+3.07	209	59.8	−1.67	+1.29
Settled adults	1068	80.0	−1.15	+1.98	267	37.8	1.00	1.00
Old	81	58.0	+1.03	−2.00	22	50.0	−2.25	−0.00*
MARITAL STATUS								
Not married	1133	83.6	−1.16	+2.24	306	57.2	−1.51	−1.43
Married	462	66.9	−1.33	+1.57	252	39.3	−1.11	+1.40
CLASS								
Clearly upper	196	87.2	−1.28	+1.15	70	52.9	−1.64	+1.33
Mixed; indeterminante	1744	78.7	−1.19	+2.36	517	48.2	−1.26	1.00
Clearly lower	70	9.14	−1.11	−1.33	18	55.6	−2.67	−0.00**
NATIONALITY								
U.S.	1505	75.0	−1.19	+2.39	503	46.1	−1.39	−1.08
Other	276	96.7	−1.22	+1.13	66	60.6	−1.55	+3.00
RACE								
White	1533	77.6	−1.20	+2.12	541	49.9	−1.29	1.07
Other	264	83.3	−1.27	+1.33	50	38.0	−2.43	0.00*
CHARACTER TYPE†								
"Good" (heroes)	928	69.3	−1.26	+3.47	314	43.3	−1.56	−6.00
Mixed type	432	71.1	−1.31	+1.09	156	43.6	−1.37	1.00
"Bad" (villains)	291	114.1	−1.03	+1.80	41	82.9	+1.14	+2.00

*Group has neither violents nor victims. If 0.00 is preceded by a sign, group has either no violents or no victims; +00.0 means only violent(s) but no victims(s); −0.00 means only victim(s) but no violent(s).

†This classification was introduced in 1969.

NOTE: Character score is the percent of characters involved in any violence plus the percent involved in any killing. V-v ration is of violents (+) and victims (−) K-k ration is of killers (+) and killed (−).