



General Design Principles

Robustness principle

be tolerant of inputs, strict on outputs

End-to-end argument

the application knows best

Open design principle

you need all the help you can get

Incommensurate scaling rule

changing a parameter by a factor of ten usually requires a new design

Design for iteration

you won't get it right the first time

Principle of diminishing returns

to increase utilization requires effort that is out of proportion

Escalating complexity principle

adding function adds complexity that is out of proportion

Adopt sweeping simplifications

pair-and-compare
separate authentication from confidentiality
best-effort network
stateless protocols
each variable has only one author
optimize just the common case
don't overwrite, create a new version instead

Stay back from the edge of the cliff

and monitor how far away it is

Beware of excessive generality

if it is good for everything it is good for nothing (Hammer's law)

Complexity Revisited

6.033 Lecture 26

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Coping with Complexity

- Sources
- Learning from failure (and success)
- Fighting back
- Admonition

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Too many objectives



Not enough systematic methods

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Many objectives

+


Few methods

+

High $d(\text{technology})/dt$

=


Very high risk



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No hard-edged barrier—

it just gets worse...



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Learn from failure


Pharaoh Sneferu's first try

Meidum pyramid
The outer layers collapsed

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Learn from failure

Pharaoh Sneferu's second try



Dashum (bent) pyramid
The plan changed midway, but interior chambers still collapsed.

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Learn from failure

Pharaoh Sneferu's third try

Red pyramid
Success

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Learn from failure

Complex systems fail for complex reasons

- Find the cause
- Find a second cause
- Keep looking
- Find the mind-set

(see Petroski, *Design Paradigms*)

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NYC: 2,963 traffic lights

Univac, based on experience in Baltimore and Toronto with 100 lights

started: 1965
scrapped: 1968
spent: \$5.4M

- two years behind schedule
- changing specifications
- second-system effect:
 - new, untried sensors
 - new, untried software
 - new, untried algorithms
- incommensurate scaling at 30X

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California Department of Motor Vehicles

Vehicle registration, driver's licenses

started: 1987
scrapped: 1994
spent: \$44M

- Underestimated cost by factor of 3
- Slower than 1965 system
- Governor fired the whistleblower
- DMV blames Tandem
- Tandem blames DMV

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United Airlines/Univac

Automated reservations, ticketing, flight scheduling, fuel delivery, kitchens, and general administration

started: 1966, target 1968
scrapped: 1970
spent: \$50M

- Second system: tried to automate everything, including the kitchen
- "Enhancement" concurrent with "stabilization"

(repeat: Burroughs/TWA)

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CONFIRM

Hilton, Marriott, Budget, American Airlines

Hotel reservations with links to Wizard and Sabre

started: 1988
scrapped: 1992
spent: \$125M

- Second system
- Very dull tools (machine language)
- Bad-news diode
- See CACM October 1994, for details

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Advanced Logistics System

U.S. Air Force materiel and transport tracking

started: 1968
scrapped: 1975
spent: \$250M

- Second system effect
- Estimated \$480M more needed to complete the system

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SACSS(California) Statewide Automated Child-Support System

Started: 1991 (\$99M)
"on hold": Sept. 1997
cost: \$300M

- "Lockheed and HWDC disagree on what the system contains and which part of it isn't working."
- "Departments should not deploy a system to additional users if it is not working."
- "...should be broken into smaller, more easily managed projects..."

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Taurus

British Stock Exchange share settlement system

started: 1990
scrapped: 1993
spent: £400M = \$600M

- "Massive complexity of the back-end systems..."
- All-or-nothing approach, nothing to show until everything works
- Shifting requirements
- Responsibility disconnected from control
- Bad-news diode in action
- Thorough report in Drummond, *Escalation in Decision-Making* (1996)

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IBM Workplace OS for PPC

Mach 3.0 + binary compatibility with AIX, DOS, MacOS, OS/400 + new clock mgt + new RPC + new I/O + new CPU

started: 1991
scrapped: 1996
spent: \$2B (est.)

- 400 staff on kernel, 1500 elsewhere
- "Sheer complexity of the class structure proved to be overwhelming"
- Big-endian/little-endian not solved
- Inflexibility of frozen class structure
- report in Fleisch, HOT-OS 1997

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Tax systems modernization plan

U.S. Internal Revenue Service, to replace 27 aging systems

started: 1989 (est.: \$7B)
scrapped: 1997
spent: \$4B

- All-or-nothing massive upgrade
- Systems "do not work in real world"
- Government procurement regulations

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Advanced Automation System

U.S. Federal Aviation Administration

Replaces 1972 Air Route Traffic Control System

started: 1982
scrapped: 1994
spent: \$6B

- Changing specifications
- Grandiose expectations
- Congressional meddling

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London Ambulance Service


Ambulance dispatching

started: 1991
scrapped: 1992
cost: 20 lives lost in 2 days of operation, \$2.5M

- Unrealistic schedule (5 months)
- Overambitious objectives
- Unidentifiable project manager
- Low bidder had no experience
- Backup system not checked out
- No testing/overlap with old system
- Users not consulted during design

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1995 Standish Group study



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Recurring problems

- Incommensurate scaling
- Second-system effect
- Mythical man-month
- Bad ideas get included
- Wrong modularity
- Bad-news diode

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Why aren't abstraction, modularity, hierarchy, and layers enough?

- First, you must understand what you are doing.
- It is easy to create abstractions; it is hard to discover the *right* abstraction.
- It is hard to change the abstractions later.

(ditto for modularity, hierarchy, and layers)

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Fighting back: Use sweeping simplifications

Some modular boundaries work better than others

By chapter...

- 1: Processors, memory, communication links
- 2: Dedicated servers
- 3: N -level memories, $N = 2$
- 4: Best-effort network
- 5: Delegate administration
- 6: Signing *and* sealing
- 7: Fail-fast, pair-and-compare
- 8: Avoid overwriting data

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Fighting Back: Control Novelty

Sources of excessive novelty...

- Second-system effect
- Technology is better
- Idea worked in isolation
- Marketing pressure

Some novelty is necessary; the hard part is figuring out when to say **No**.

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
Fighting back: Feedback

Design for Iteration, Iterate the Design

- Something simple working soon
- One new problem at a time
- Find ways to find flaws early
- Use iteration-friendly design
- Bypass the bad-news diode
- General: Learn from failure

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Brooks's version:



(stolen from Brooks, 1993)


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Fighting back: Find bad ideas fast

- Examine the requirements
"and ferry itself across the Atlantic"
(LHX light attack helicopter)
- Try ideas out—but don't
hesitate to scrap them
- Understand the design loop

*Requires strong, knowledgeable
management*

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Fighting back: Find flaws fast

- Plan, plan, plan
- Simulate, simulate, simulate
- Design reviews, coding
reviews, regression tests,
performance measurements
- Design the feedback system
e.g., alpha test + beta test,
no-penalty reports,
incentives &
reinforcement

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Use iteration-friendly design methods

- Authentication logic (Ch 6)
- Alibis (space shuttle)
- Failure tolerance models
(Ch 7)

General method:

- document all assumptions
- provide feedback paths
- when feedback arrives,
review assumptions

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Fighting back: Conceptual integrity

- One mind controls the
design
 - *Reims cathedral*
 - *Macintosh*
 - *Visicalc*
 - *Linux*
 - *X Window System*
- Good esthetics yields
more successful systems
 - *Parsimony*
 - *Orthogonality*
 - *Elegance*

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Obstacles


- Hard to find the right
modularity
- Tension: need the best
designers—but they are the
hardest to manage
- The Mythical Man-Month

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
Fighting back: Summary

- Use sweeping simplifications
- Control novelty
- Install feedback
- Find bad ideas fast
- Use iteration-friendly design
methods
- Conceptual integrity

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