# Computer security: certification

6.033 Spring 2007



# How confidential is traffic in this lecture room?


- sudo tcpdump -s 0 -Ai en1
  - Complete trace of all packets on wirelessc3d4
    - c3d4 a1b2 0002 0004 0000 0000
  - You shouldn't do this
- Example:

13:57:53.794429 IP 18.188.69.36.mdns > 224.0.0.251.mdns: 0 [4a] [4q] SRV? Ben's music.\_daap.\_tcp.local. TXT? Ben's music.\_daap.\_tcp.local. A? ben-powerbook-g4-15.local. AAAA? ben-powerbook-g4-15.local. (367)


## Example Data inside packet

- GET /tracking/tracking.cgi?tracknum=1Z1836810375022812 HTTP/1.1
- Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shock wave-flash, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application /msword, \*/\*
- Accept-Language: en-us
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
- User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows
- NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; InfoPath.1)
- Host: wwwapps.ups.com Connection: Keep-Alive


# URLs are visible in Referer and in the GET command



# Auxiliary Material for Lecture



#### Research into Video Streaming for DP2?



#### GMail is not encrypted by default

- Passed in the clear:
  - Contacts lists
  - GCalendar events

- GZipped text
  - Inbox entries
  - Mail messages

["112677a23fed4887",0,0,"12:58 pm","\u003cspan id\u003d\"\_upro\_rms@ gnu.org\"\>Richard Stallman\u003c/span\>"," ","[csailrelated] Thwart big brother--trade charlie cards. 13:45 Tuesday at rm 381","I have a charlie card with zero value currently stored on on it which I used for a couple of …",[],"","112677a23fed4887",0,"Mon May 7 2007\_12:58 PM",0,"",0,0,1]

Hint: Change the GMail URL to https:// !

#### IChat is Plaintext

• strings log.dump | grep ichatballoon | cut -d> -f 4-

A: it's just better not to reveal personal information B: why?

- A: I dunno, identity theft and stuff
- B: oh, okay
- A: maybe I just won't worry about it

QuickTime<sup>™</sup> and a TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor are needed to see this picture.

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## Authentication logic (p 11-83)

- Delegation of authority:
  If A says (B speaks for A) ⇒ B speaks for A
- Use of delegated authority:
  If B speaks for A and B says (A says X) ⇒ A says X
- 3. Chaining of delegation
  - If B speaks for A and A speaks for C  $\Rightarrow$  B speaks for C

## Example

0. {A: M}<sub>KApriv</sub> if verify( ..., K<sub>Apub</sub>) accepts then: 1. K<sub>Apriv</sub> says A says M if K<sub>Apriv</sub> speaks for K<sub>Apub</sub>, apply rule 3: 2. K<sub>Apub</sub> says A says M if K<sub>Apub</sub> speaks for A, apply rule 2: 3. A says M does K<sub>Apub</sub> speak for A?

1. {K<sub>Apub</sub> speaks for A}<sub>KMITpriv</sub> if verifies with K<sub>MITpub</sub> 2. K<sub>MITpriv</sub> says K<sub>Apub</sub> speaks for A if K<sub>MITpriv</sub> speaks for K<sub>MITpub</sub> 3. K<sub>MITpub</sub> says K<sub>Apub</sub> speaks for A if  $K_{MITpub}$  speaks for MIT 4. MIT says K<sub>Apub</sub> speaks for A if MIT speaks for A 5. K<sub>Apub</sub> speaks for A