Preparation for Recitation 22
Read Why cryptosystems
fail. You may wish to skim the abstract, introduction, and
conclusion first, because they will help you to focus on the parts
of the paper that support the author's main claims. As always, you
should read critically and be on the lookout for additional gems,
and for arguments that are missing or whose framing de-emphasizes
This paper is about a philosophy of cryptosystem design, with a
focus on their use in financial institutions, and particularly in
ATM (Automated Teller Machine, not Asynchronus Transfer Mode)
networks. Although it may not be immediately obvious, this paper
is closely related to other papers we have read, such as the Therac-25 paper. Think about these
connections as you read.
Over half of the paper is devoted to examples of ways in which ATM
networks could fail or have failed. This part of the paper is very
entertaining, but it can be difficult to keep the big picture in
mind while reading about the individual exploits and problems. Pay
attention to the section headings (which you may wish to skim
before diving into the text) in order to keep your bearings. For
each incident, before moving on, spend a few moments thinking
about the lessons that it teaches, and how the problem could have
Answer one of the following questions, by submitting an answer via
the submission web site before start of recitation:
- What is a cryptosystem? What elements (machine, communication,
and human) does it encompass? How do its components make the
concerns of this paper similar to those of the Therac-25 paper,
and dissimilar to certain other papers we have read?
- What are the end-to-end requirements of a cryptosystem? (Be
specific; don't just say "security", because then that term
itself requires a definition.) Can those requirements be achieved
by composing modules with certain characteristics? Where and how
is the end-to-end check performed, if one is required?
- Suppose you have built a cryptosystem from a set of components
plus a way of composing them. How could you compute a
quantitative measure for the security of the system or of some
component? Isn't this what standards organizations have to do
when certifying a component? Are Anderson's suggestions
applicable to this issue?
- How can an organization test the security of a system? Isn't this
an important part of the process that Anderson omits?