L21: Security intro

Nickolai Zeldovich 6.033 Spring 2012

Private data routinely leaked



Utah Department of Technology Services (DTS) reveals 780,000 individuals have been affected by the theft of sensitive Medicaid information. That's far worse than initial estimates.

By **Nicole Lewis** ■ InformationWeek April 11, 2012 11:38 AM

W Utah's Medicaid Data Brea ×

A new tally of files stored on a server that contained Medicaid information at the Utah Department of Technology Services (DTS) reveals that 780,000 individuals have been affected by the theft of sensitive information. That's far worse than initial estimates.

C www.informationweek.com/news/healthcare/security-privacy/232900128

The data breach occurred on March 30, when a configuration error occurred at the password authentication level, allowing the hacker, located in Eastern Europe, to circumvent DTS's security system.

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"The server was a test server and when it was put into production there was a misconfiguration. Processes were not followed and the password was very weak," Stephanie Weiss, spokesperson for DTS, told InformationWeek Healthcare.




Master's Degree
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Users tricked by impersonators



Botnets control millions of PCs



Computer worm used to sabotage



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- ... when should we stop thinking of more ways?

paymaxx.com (2005)

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 - Gets a PDF of W2 tax form for ID 1234
- get-w2.cgi forgot to check authorization
 - Attacker manually constructs URLs to fetch all data

Layer interactions: naming

```
athena% cd /mit/bob/project
athena% cat ideas.txt
Hello world.
...
athena%
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athena% cd /mit/bob/project
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athena%</pre>
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Layer interactions: naming

athena% cd /mit/bob/project athena% cat ideas.txt Hello world. Bob changes ideas.txt into a symbolic link to 6.033's grades.txt

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Summary

- Security is a negative goal hard to achieve
 - Policy: desired goal
 - Threat model: assumptions about what can go wrong

- Guard model
 - Authentication
 - Authorization