Importance of Open Discussion on Adversarial Analyses for Mobile Security Technologies --- A Case Study for User Identification ---

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Security Architecture **Operating Systems Security** Software Tamper Resistance Mobile Code Security Physical Tamper Resistance Communications Security Cryptographic Protocol User Identification

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Security assessment of biometric user identification systems should be conducted not only for the accuracy of authentication, but also for security against fraud.


> In this presentation we focus on Fingerprint Systems which may become widespread for Mobile Terminals.

Examine Adversarial Analysis as A Third Party

- Can we make artificial fingers that fool fingerprint systems?
- What are acceptance rates?

Fingerprint Systems

Typical structure of a fingerprint system



A Risk Analysis for Fingerprint Systems

- Attackers may present
- 1) the registered finger, by an armed criminal, under duress, or with a sleeping drug,
- 2) an unregistered finger (an imposter's finger), i.e., non-effort forgery,
- 3) a severed fingertip from the registered finger,
- 4) a genetic clone of the registered finger,
- 5) an artificial clone of the registered finger, and
- 6) the others,


such as a well-known method as a "fault based attack."

Part of patterns of dishonest acts with artificial fingers against a fingerprint system.


	Verification / Identification						
Enrollment	L(X)	A(X)	L(Y)	A(Y)	A(Z)		
L(X)	(1)	(2)	- *	Ι	—		
A(Y)	-	Ι	(3)	(4)	-		
A(Z)	Ι		Ι	Ι	(5)		

L(X): A Live Finger corresponding to Person X A(Y): An Artificial Finger corresponding to Person Y A(Z): An Artificial Finger corresponding to Nobody


Fraud with Artificial Fingers I




Fraud with Artificial Fingers II



Fraud with Artificial Fingers III



Mapping a Fingerprint onto Artificial Fingers






Process 0

(1) Finger (2) Mold

(3) Silicone Rubber Finger

Fact



Capacitive Sensor Finger

Array of Electrodes



Often Accepts Silicone Rubber Fingers Usually Rejects Silicone Rubber Fingers

Our Result

Process 1 (1) Finger (2) Plastic Mold

(3) Gummy Finger



Materials

Free molding plastic "FREEPLASTIC"

by Daicel FineChem Ltd.

Solid gelatin sheet "GELATINE LEAF" by MARUHA CORP

板せらき

200JPY/30grams



350JPY/35grams



How to make a mold



Put the plastic into hot water to soften it.



Press a live finger against it.



It takes around 10 minutes.

The mold



Preparation of material

A liquid in which immersed gelatin at 50 wt.%.







Add boiling water (30cc) to solid gelatin (30g) in a bottle and mix up them.


It takes around 20 minutes.



How to make a gummy finger



Pour the liquid into the mold.






It takes around 10 minutes.

The gummy finger

Similarity with Live Fingers

The photomicrographs of fingers



(a) Live Finger

(b) Silicone Finger

(c) Gummy Finger

Captured Images

Captured images with the device C (an optical sensor).



(a) Live Finger (b) Silicone Finger (c) Gummy Finger

Captured images with the device H (a capacitive sensor).



(a) Live Finger (b) Gummy Finger

Subjects: five persons whose ages are from 20's to 40's Fingerprint systems: 11 types

We attempted one-to-one verification 100 times counting the number of times that it accepts a finger presented.

Types of experiments


Experiment	Enrollment	Verification		
Type 1	Live Finger	Live Finger		
Type 2	Live Finger	Gummy Finger		
Туре 3	Gummy Finger	Live Finger		
Type 4	Gummy Finger	Gummy Finger		

The List of Fingerprint Devices

	H ard ware Specifications					Software Specifications			Methods	
	Manufacturer / Selling Agency	Product Name	Туре	Product Number	Sensor	Live and Well Detection	Manufacturer / Selling Agency	Product Name (Application)	Comparison Levels	for Verification
Device A	Compaq Computer Corporation	Compaq Stand-Alone Fingerprint Identification Unit	DFR3-200	E03811US001	Optical Sensor	unknown	Compaq Computer Corporation	Fingerprint Identification Technology Software version 1.1	1 through 3	M inu tiae M atc hing
Device B	M IT SUB ISH I ELECTRIC CORPORATION	Fingerprint Recognizer	FPR-DT mkII	003136	Optical Sensor	unknown	Sumikin Izumi Computer Service co. Ltd.	SecFP V1.11		M inu tiae M atc hing
Device C	NEC Corporation	Fingerprint Identification Unit (Prism)	N7950-41	9 Y 00 00 3	Optical Sensor	unknown	NEC Corporation	Basic Utilities for Fingerprint Identification	Fixed	Minutiae Matching (Minutia and Relation)
Device D	OMRON Corporation	Fingerprint Recognition Sensor	FPS-1000	90500854	Optical Sensor	unknown	OMRON Corporation	" <i>YUBI PASS</i> " U.are.U∃ Fingerprint Verification Software	Fixed	M inu tiae M atc hing
Device E	Sony Corporation	Sony Fingerprint Identification Unit	FIU-002-F11	- 00709	Optical Sensor	Live Finger detection	TSUBASA SYSTEM CO.,LTD.	Fingerprint Identification Unit Windows3 95 Interactive Demo Version 1.0 Build 13	1 through 5	Pattern matching
Device F	FUJITSU LIMITED	Fingsensor	FS-200U	00AA000257	Capacitive Sensor	unknown	FUJITSU LIMITED	Logon for Fingsensor V1.0 for Windows3 95/98	Fixed	M inu tiae M atching (C orrelation)
Device G	NEC Corporation	Fingerprint Identification Unit (Serial)	PK-FP002	03005298	Capacitive Sensor	unknown	NEC Corporation	Basic Utilities for Fingerprint Identification	Fixed	Minutiae Matching (Minutia and Relation)
Device H	Siemens AG (Infineon Technologies AG)	FingerTIP3 EVALUATION KIT	E VALUATION - KIT	C 98 451 - D 6 100 - A 900 - 4	Capacitive Sensor	unknown	Siemens AG(Infineon Technologies AG)	FingerTIP3 Software Development Kit (SDK) Version: V0.90, Beta 3 "Demo Program"	Fixed	M inu tia match ing
Device I	Sony Corporation	Sony Fingerprint Identification Unit	FIU-710	3000398	Capacitive Sensor	Live Finger detection	Systemneeds Inc.	Good-bye " <i>PASSWORD"</i> s	1 through 5	P attern m a tch ing
Device J	Secugen	EyeD mouse II	SM B -800	9650172004	Optical Sensor	unknown	Secugen	SecuDesktop 1.55 日 本語版	1 through 9	Minutia matching
Device K	Ethentica	ethenticatior MS 3000 PC Card	MS 3000	M 3 0 0 F 2 0 0 9 9 1	Optical Sensor	unknown	Ethentica	Secure Suite Release1.0		Minutia matching

Experimental Results

Making an Artificial Finger directly from a Live Finger



Our Result Process 2 (1) Residual Fingerprint (2) Digital Image Data (3) Printed Circuit Board (4) Gummy Finger



Making an Artificial Finger from a Residual Fingerprint

Materials

A photosensitive coated Printed Circuit Board (PCB) "10K" by Sanhayato Co., Ltd.




320JPY/sheet


Solid gelatin sheet "GELATINE LEAF" by MARUHA CORP














Gelatin Liquid





Drip the liquid onto the mold.

Put this mold into a refrigerator to cool, and then peel carefully.



The Mold and the Gummy Finger





Mold: 70JPY/piece (Ten molds can be obtained in the PCB.)

Gummy Finger: 50JPY/piece

Resolution of Fingerprint Images

Pores can be observed.




Enhanced Fingerprint



Captured Fingerprint Image of the Gummy Finger with the device H (a capacitive sensor)


Experimental Results

from Residual Fingerprints (for 1 subject)



Characteristics of Gummy Fingers

	Moisture	Electric Resistance
Live Finger	16%	16 Mohms/cm
Gummy Finger	23%	20 Mohms/cm
Silicone Finger	impossible to measure	impossible to measure



- There can be various dishonest acts using artificial fingers against the fingerprint systems.
- Gummy fingers, which are easy to make with cheep, easily obtainable tools and materials, can be accepted by 11 types of fingerprint systems.
- The experimental study on the gummy fingers will have considerable impact on security assessment of fingerprint systems.
- Manufacturers, vendors, and users of biometric systems should carefully examine security of their system against artificial clones.
- How to treat such information should be an important issue.



• Paper: T. Matsumoto, H. Matsumoto, K. Yamada, S. Hoshino, "Impact of Artificial "Gummy" Fingers on Fingerprint Systems" Proceedings of SPIE Vol. #4677, Optical Security and Counterfeit Deterrence Techniques IV.

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