Five Myths about the Iraq Jihad

by Stephanie Kaplan

Iraq had never been a major front in the so-called War on Terror before the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003 made it so. Now, five years later, a critical question weighs heavily on the minds of scholars and policymakers alike: Has the Iraq War increased or decreased the jihadist terrorist threat?

The 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on transnational terrorism identified the war in Iraq as one of the main drivers of the global jihadist movement. Yet the debate over the conflict’s legacy continues. One week, the U.S. military reports that foreign fighters are leaving the theater—a development sure to strike fear in the heart of Western counterterrorism officials. Days later, a handful of European officials suggest that talk of blowback from Iraq is overstated. With reliable data in short supply, the parties to this debate must fill empirical gaps with assumptions, many of which do not hold up on closer scrutiny. Five myths dominate the conventional discourse regarding the war and its impact on the global jihad, a phenomenon that Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank label the “Iraq effect.” Dispelling these myths will not only contribute to a greater understanding of the jihadist terrorist threat in the post-Iraq era, but also inform a strategy to contain it.

Myth No. 1: Iraq is Afghanistan redux.

The first myth draws parallels between the Iraq and anti-Soviet jihads. This simple historical comparison—what I call the Afghanistan analogy—reads like a question from a high school S.A.T. exam: the Soviet-Afghan War was to Al-Qaeda in the 1980s as the Iraq War is to the global jihadist movement today. The former conflict gave rise

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Toward a Membership Theory of Apologies

Melissa Nobles

Governments are not in the habit of apologizing for their own injustices, let alone those perpetrated by former governments in distant and not-so-distant pasts. Yet they sometimes do, most often in response to the demands of organized citizen groups or former adversaries, but not always. In widely known instances, former belligerents have apologized for crimes committed during World War II. Similarly, in democratizing nations, former perpetrators of state crimes have apologized for their past actions. For both, the desired outcomes are clear, if not always achieved. Former belligerents may apologize, thereby easing relations between the two, as in the case of France and Germany. In contrast, Japan’s repeated failures to apologize unambiguously for its war crimes have made reconciliation with neighboring countries difficult. For new democracies, proponents assert that apologies will advance societal reconciliation and strengthen democratic consolidation.

But neither the latest wave of democratization nor World War II crimes account for all present-day apologies or demands for them. Groups have demanded and governments have offered apologies for historical injustices. Australian Aboriginal peoples have urged Prime Minister John Howard to apologize for the state policy, begun in the early twentieth century, of removing “half-caste” Aboriginal children from their parents’ care, usually forcibly. Aboriginal Canadians and New Zealand Maori continue to press for greater political and economic autonomy, after receiving official apologies from the Canadian government and the British Crown, respectively. African Americans call for apology and reparations for two hundred years of slavery. Existing scholarship on World War II war crimes and democratization says little about these cases, if mostly because they fall outside of its established topical parameters.

In the cases of indigenous peoples and African Americans, the motivations for either asking for or offering an apology and the desired outcomes are less clear. The passage of time makes the rectification of most claimed injustices difficult, if not impossible. Without the possibility of direct remedy, might an apology be regarded as empty rhetorical gesture, without much impact? Moreover, in established democracies such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, neither the survival nor the consolidation of a new democratic regime is at stake. Indeed, in these democracies, grievances may be addressed through several channels, without an apology, thus raising the question of why and how “apology politics” emerge at all. What do such politics accomplish?

I argue that in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, organized groups and state actors demand and provide apologies in order to help change the terms and meanings of national membership. The power of apologies, and what distinguishes them from other types of symbolic gestures, such as monuments and pronouncements, is that they not only publicly ratify certain reinterpretations of history, but they also morally judge, assign responsibility, and introduce expectations about what acknowledgment of that history requires. Thus, although apologies focus our attention on the past, they also have implications for the future. This is not surprising. In everyday life and politics, we routinely use the past to inform our judgments and justify our decisions about present and future conduct. We reevaluate our past, in light of new information or simply for new reasons, and come up with revised understandings that guide our actions as we move forward.

Yet, because our views of the past change and are governed, in part, by our evaluations of present and future needs, apologies for that past are bound to be contentious. With
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official apologies, political elites, groups, intellectuals, and the public at large disagree about historical facts, about how they should be interpreted, and about what bearing such facts should have on present-day and future policy making. There is disagreement also over whether the moral culpability that an apology implies is warranted. One might expect state officials and aggrieved groups to be willing to endure such contention because of the anticipated benefits—electoral or monetary—of receiving or offering an apology (or not). Yet, as we shall see, these motivations are weak in practice and are largely overridden by ideological commitments and moral concerns. All parties recognize the symbolic power of apology, which they treat not as a form of political evasion, “cheap talk,” or mere means to an end, but as a political act, with intrinsic significance. Apologies help to shape politics, by publicly acknowledging injustice and by registering support of certain views of national membership and history while displacing others.

This book proposes a membership theory of official apologies, which explains apologies by focusing on their ideological and moral stakes and not only on anticipated material gains or losses. Political actors provide and seek apologies to register their ideological support of minority group claims and to advance the political, economic, and social objectives that flow from group demands. Apologies are the likely outcomes when political elites and aggrieved groups favor them, but of the two, political elite support is absolutely essential to obtaining an apology. Apologies, in turn, are most effective indirectly and diffusely, strengthening historical justifications for present-day recognition and government support of indigenous claims and contributing to greater public acceptance of, if not deep agreement with, indigenous demands.

My explanation focuses on government apologies, which are part of a larger universe of apologies. Although I do not analyze these other apologies, it is important to locate within this larger set those cases that are the focus of this book (those of indigenous peoples in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, and of African Americans) in order to specify further their frequency and characteristics.

A Sorry World
Journalists have taken notice of the swell of apologies, asking in often skeptical tones, “Who’s sorry now?” Their observations about the increase of apologies are borne out by existing data, even if their skepticism is not. Public apologies and gestures of regret became more frequent over the second half of the twentieth century and continue to be offered in the early years of the twenty-first. Heads of state, governments, religious institutions, individuals, and nongovernmental organizations have offered them. Drawing from the few studies and compilations of apologies, I divide them into six separate categories organized according to who offers the apology: (1) heads of state and government officials; (2) governments; (3) religious institutions; (4) organized groups or individual citizens; (5) nongovernmental organizations and institutions; and (6) private institutions. My compilation is undoubtedly incomplete, relying as it does on public English-language sources (newspaper and magazine articles, books, and Internet searches). These shortcomings notwithstanding, it does provide a fairly full view of apologies in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Of the seventy-two apologies I list, over half of them (thirty-nine) have been offered by heads of state. Moreover, nearly half (nineteen) of their apologies are related to World War II, thus explaining their appearance in the postwar period. Most (thirteen) of these World War II apologies were offered in the 1990s, in conjunction with fifty-year

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Farewell to Magdalena Rieb

Magdalena Rieb, beloved Security Studies Program assistant director, left the program in March to become the administrative officer for MIT’s Program in Writing and Humanistic Studies. Rieb joined SSP in 2001 as an assistant to the director, and was promoted to program coordinator and assistant director in 2003, positions she held until her departure earlier this year. During her time at CIS, Rieb helped coordinate nearly all of SSP’s major events and helped spearhead the launch of the recent SSP alumni initiative, whose purpose is to build a vibrant alumni organization to serve past and present students alike. In recognition of her impressive service to SSP and the MIT community, Magdalena won the MIT School of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences Infinite Mile Innovator award for 2007. She is happy in her new position, just down Amherst Street in Building 14, and hopes to remain a part of MIT for the foreseeable future. All students, faculty, and staff who have had the pleasure of knowing Magdalena over the past seven years thank her for her hard work and reliably good humor, and we wish her all the best in her future endeavors, both personal and professional.

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to Al-Qaeda, an outcome recognized by many as one of the most egregious examples of blowback in the history of U.S. foreign policy. Today, the Iraq War provides jihadists with another formative opportunity to fight against a superpower. And so, according to the analogy, we should expect the current conflict to likewise exacerbate the threat posed by global jihad.

At best, this analogy teaches us that the Iraq War will produce blowback, without specifying what that blowback might be. The analogy prevents us from drawing conclusions about Iraq that may differ from those appropriate to the Soviet-Afghan experience. For example, the quality and quantity of combat experience for the average mujahid in Iraq is far superior to that of his Arab-Afghan counterpart. As Bergen, Bruce Hoffman, and Mohammed Hafez have noted, the tactics employed in Iraq—suicide bombings, remote-detonations, and assassinations, to name a few—are much more relevant to the conduct of terrorist operations off the battlefield. Moreover, in comparison to the Soviet-Afghan War, the war in Iraq affords deeper training in those skills against a much stronger adversary. If wars truly are conveyor belts for terrorists, then we should want to know the make and model of the terrorist in production. Rather than focusing our attention on these relevant differences, the Afghanistan analogy glosses over them.

Myth No. 2: The fallout from the Soviet-Afghan War was worse.

Efforts to spell out the differences between these two cases can lead analysts astray as well. Using the Afghanistan analogy as a straw man, the second myth asserts that because the Soviet-Afghan and Iraq wars are not the same, the consequences of the
latter conflict will be much less severe. The American Enterprise Institute’s Reuel Marc Gerecht leads this particular charge: “Among Democrats and even many Republicans, it is by now accepted wisdom that the war in Iraq brought huge numbers of holy warriors to the anti-American cause. But is it true? I don’t think so... [If] we make a comparison with the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-89, which was the baptismal font for Al-Qaeda, what’s most striking is how few foreign holy warriors have gone to Mesopotamia since the U.S. invasion in 2003.”

To be sure, after ten years and the financial and operational support of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, the number of foreign fighters who made their way to the Afghan battlefield (around ten thousand) will almost certainly outnumber the cadre of foreign fighters drawn to Iraq (in the thousands). The reason for the discrepancy is patently obvious. But using the Soviet-Afghan case as the standard against which we should judge all developments in Iraq is misleading. If we let the Soviet-Afghan war define the universe of relevant criteria, then we will likely miss the entire picture. In fact, one could just as easily select alternative criteria to establish why the Iraq War is worse, including, as mentioned above, the superior military training it affords. Assertions like Gerecht’s demonstrate the need to develop an objective set of criteria with which we can judge the legacy of jihadist armed conflicts. Such criteria would focus on the underlying components of the jihadist terrorist threat and the manner in which war influences each of them.

Myth No. 3: Other centers of jihadist activity pose a greater threat.

In order to demonstrate that the threat from Iraq is overblown, still others compare it to contemporary hotbeds of Islamist extremism. Referring to the Iraq War, one EU official recently told the New York Times: “[T]he major threat to Europe is coming from elsewhere—Pakistan, Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.”

But Iraq need not rival Pakistan in order to be a cause for concern. Indeed, the problem with this argument is that it dismisses the relationship between Iraq and other centers of jihadist activity within the movement. The Iraq War poses an indirect threat by generating and transferring capabilities to these alternative locations. The alleged flow of funds from Iraq to the Al-Qaeda vanguard in Pakistan, the migration of suicide tactics from Iraq to Afghanistan, and the trail of Algerians to and from the Iraqi theater collectively are all examples of the war’s second-order effects. Moreover, those who are mobilized by the Iraq War need not take up arms between the two rivers; the movement offers myriad outlets for contention, as the attacks in London and Madrid demonstrate. Thus, if we only look for transnational terrorist plots hatched in Baghdad, we may misinterpret the repercussions of the Iraq War.

Myth No. 4: Just crunch the numbers.

The fourth myth is methodological in nature and refers to the use of incident data as a means to determine the war’s impact on the global jihad. Both sides of the debate deploy statistics to support their respective positions. Pro-war advocates observe that the United States has not been attacked since 9/11. Others, like Bergen and Cruickshank, argue that jihadist terrorist attacks have increased substantially since the 2003 invasion.

But the event data, as depicted by both sides, does not reliably capture the trends associated with the war’s legacy. On the one hand, the absence of attacks against the American homeland during the past seven years dissimulates the concurrent increase in attacks in other regions such as Europe and the broader Middle East. On the other hand, once the incidents from Iraq and Afghanistan are excluded, there does not appear to be a demonstrable increase in overall jihadist terrorist attacks since 2003. The remaining post-inva-

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sion sample size (in Bergen and Cruickshank’s study, an average of 9 attacks per year) is much too small to infer anything, leaving observers to wait for a lag effect to kick in, or to look for other qualitative measures of the Iraq effect. Understanding incident data is an important part of terrorism analysis, but a purely quantitative approach has its limitations.

Myth No. 5: Defeating Al-Qaeda in Iraq will void the blowback.

The fifth and final myth about the Iraq jihad ties the fate of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to the war’s overall legacy. Setting aside the feasibility of defeating AQI, this argument confuses the jihadist experience in Iraq with the war’s ultimate outcome. Iraq does not exist in a vacuum; even the total destruction of AQI will not erase the years of damage caused by the war. That damage will take the form of additional jihadist capabilities generated on and off the battlefield. As an episode of organized violence, wars simulate the terrorist experience and prepare the surviving mujahideen for a lifetime of post-war terrorist activity. Many of the capabilities acquired on the battlefield are the same as those necessary to sustain a terrorist movement. Wars train a new cadre of battle-hardened fighters and leaders who return from the frontlines armed with a rolodex full of the most violent contacts on the planet. And wars serve as a magnet for money and weapons that can be deployed in the warzone and beyond. If the Iraq conflict creates more jihadist resources than it destroys, then the defeat of AQI will be tantamount to winning one of many battles but losing ground in the war against Islamist extremism.

We should not, furthermore, underestimate the ability of jihadist propagandists to spin their way out of defeat. Even without the aid of the Internet, after the anti-Soviet jihad the Al-Qaeda vanguard fabricated an elaborate tale about their decisive role in defeating the Soviet Union. If there is one thing that the Al-Qaeda vanguard knows, it is post-war propaganda, the likes of which will minimize the gains achieved by AQI’s tactical defeat.

From Mythmaking to Policymaking

Our political-military strategies must be geared not only toward achieving victory on the battlefield, but with an eye toward anticipating, acknowledging, and mitigating the consequences of setting foot on that battlefield in the first place. Understanding these dynamics may make preventing war—not preventive war—a central tenet of U.S. national security policy. It is too late to halt the march to Baghdad, but we can move beyond the false and facile observations that dominate the conventional discourse. Arriving at sound judgments about the unintended consequences of the Iraq War is the first step toward reversing the conflict’s unfortunate terrorism legacy.

7 Hafez, “Jihad After Iraq,”
8 Sciolino, “Fears of Iraq Becoming a Terrorist Incubator Seem Overblown.”
9 For the comment on Pakistan, see Greg Miller, “Influx of Al Qaeda, Money into Pakistan Is Seen,” Los Angeles Times (May 20, 2007). For the comment on Afghanistan, see Hekmat Karzai and Seth Jones, “How to Curb Rising Suicide Terrorism in Afghanistan,” Christian Science Monitor (July 18, 2006). And for the comment on Algeria, see Michaels, “Foreign Fighters Getting Out of Iraq.”
10 Bergen and Cruickshank, “The Iraq Effect.”
CIS’s Latest Asia-Pacific Crisis Simulation

The Center hosted its fifth Asia-Pacific Crisis Simulation in May 2008. The two-day event was organized by CIS director and Ford International Professor of Political Science Richard Samuels as part of his graduate seminar, “Japan and East Asia Security.” Participating were students, scholars, policymakers, and business executives from MIT and beyond.

The year is 2014 and Asia is fractious: China and India have risen; Japan, worried about abandonment by its powerful U.S. ally, has become more muscular, and the Korean peninsula remains a dangerously unstable place. The players of the game—in their assigned roles as global leaders, the voting public, media, and members of a control group—steer the course of world politics through the next decade.

Samuels, working with his advanced graduate students, has developed these pedagogical exercises since 1993. Current events shape the themes—this year’s being a spin-off of the long-standing Middle East debacle, only worse. The simulations attract world-class participants, including Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Ambassador Stapleton Roy, Flynt Leverett, and Takashi Oka to name a few. Samuels’ students, as a result, get to spend sustained time with such experts, experiencing the pressures, learning from their calculations, and hearing the final analysis.

Several hypothetical outcomes from past simulations have played out in the real world. For example, the 1993 simulation modeled the costs of a US-Japan trade war, and anticipated very closely the maneuvers of Tokyo and Washington as they occurred two years later. Another simulation looked at how the Japanese government might respond to a hostage crisis just one year before their embassy was captured by revolutionaries in Peru. In 2004, China’s peaceful rise was assessed, anticipating its shift toward behavior as a “responsible stakeholder.” Also anticipated in the 2004 simulation was the return of Russia to the world stage.

Who were the political winners and losers in this year’s game? The results will be posted on the CIS website at http://web.mit.edu/cis/sim.html. Time will tell whether it proves to be a crystal-ball look at things to come.

Summer 2008 Offerings

The Security Studies Program is offering two courses during the 2008 summer session for professional studies. “From Technology to Innovation: Putting Ideas to Work,” offered July 14-17, explores innovations in both public and private organizations in an effort to identify best practices. “Combating Bioterrorism/Pandemics: Implementing Policies for Biosecurity,” offered July 28-30, looks at the challenges public health, law enforcement, and national security agencies face in ensuring biosecurity. See MIT’s Professional Education Programs website for registration requirements: http://web.mit.edu/mitpep/index.html
On March 14, Marc Sageman, an expert on Al-Qaeda and related terrorist organizations, came to MIT for a CIS Starr Forum that focused on the research he conducted for his earlier book, Understanding Terror Networks, and his recent publication, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. Sageman, who holds an M.D. and Ph.D. in sociology, has worked for the CIA and the U.S. Navy and is currently a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Sageman opened his talk by remarking that there is no great secret to studying terrorism. As he teaches in his own classroom, it is all about methodology, specifically the application of the scientific method. He argued that most of the terrorism databases that existed when he was researching Understanding Terror Networks were incident-focused, which he considers of little value. Instead, he wanted to build a database focused on the actual terrorists, rather than their attacks, in order to draw lessons about their background and motivations. He started building his database with the 9/11 hijackers, built it out to include those terrorists who had a relationship with them, and continued to grow his database as he followed the network of individuals that were affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Today, the database includes information on more than 500 individuals, which he suggests yields a great deal of insight on the past, present, and future trends of terrorism.

Interestingly enough, Sageman said that his findings since the publication of Understanding Terror Networks are nearly the opposite of those from that book. This spurred him to start thinking of modern terrorism, especially that linked to Al-Qaeda, in three waves. The first wave was comprised of the so-called “Afghan Arabs” from the 1980s, about two dozen of whom remain, mostly in Waziristan on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. These individuals, including Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, still comprise the leadership of Al-Qaeda and the global jihad (to the extent that one exists), and their organizing purpose was a violent born-again social movement that targeted the “far enemy,” or non-Muslim Western governments. The second wave of terrorists were comprised largely of students and expatriates in the West who went to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s for training during Al-Qaeda’s so-called “golden age,” when the group had significant cash flow and a sanctuary where it could operate with little interference. After a transition phase from 9/11 to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, during which time the sanctuary in Afghanistan was eliminated and communication began to be monitored on a massive scale, the third and current wave of terrorism began. Sageman noted that the form of this third wave was born out of necessity, specifically due to the hostile habitat for terrorism in most countries post-9/11. Government crackdowns and monitoring of mosques and other institutions have pushed jihadists to the Internet, where anonymity is more assured. This has led to a flattening of the movement due to the inherently egalitarian nature of the Internet, which has helped produce the “leaderless jihad” Sageman sees today.

The individuals in each wave have disparate backgrounds and motivations, which is the realization Sageman made when he started to discover results in recent years that did not correspond with his earlier findings. Rather than the well-educated, comparatively affluent members of the first and second waves of terrorism from Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the third wave was marked by poorly educated individuals, often with no formal initiation, attracted to a “jihadi cool” youth culture that appeals especially to those who...
have been unable to assimilate into foreign societies. Individuals in the third wave are often driven by anger and a sense of moral outrage, but Sageman claims that they are anti-intellectual and react against a war against Islam that they believe is being waged by America, Israel, and their allies. Sageman believes that it is social networks based on friendship or kinship that bridge the gap between individual outrage and terrorist acts. European countries that have not done a good job assimilating their immigrant populations (unlike the U.S.) are particularly vulnerable to a wave of potential terrorists that he compares to the anarchists of a century ago in terms of their structure and methods.

Fortunately for the U.S., Sageman argues that Al-Qaeda is a self-limiting threat. The group has few friends and no potential state sanctuary. The end-state favored by Al-Qaeda—a strict Islamist state like Afghanistan under the Taliban—is not attractive to most Muslims, including many would-be jihadists. The nature of the third wave makes it difficult to impose discipline and work collectively towards any sort of long-term goal or strategy. Furthermore, one makes a name for oneself by committing worse and worse atrocities, but history has shown that those actions can be counterproductive for an organization, as they were with the bombing of a wedding in Jordan in 2005.

To combat Al-Qaeda, Sageman claims that the U.S. and its allies must eliminate the first two waves of terrorists that still exist and deny them sanctuary. However, he claims that the third wave must be contained by preventing the radicalization of a new generation. The glory must be taken out of terrorism in youth culture, which can be accomplished via a focus on victims of attacks rather than perpetrators. He further suggests a smaller U.S. footprint in Iraq, challenges to the frame of a larger “War on Islam,” and preaching the benefits of immigration and assimilation to skeptical publics as the best way to ensure that terrorism will not become an even larger problem on their own shores. Ultimately, Sageman does not believe that Al-Qaeda can achieve its lofty goals of removal of American influence in the Middle East and the reestablishment of the caliphate, but he does argue that the U.S. can make things much harder for itself and its citizens if it does not act on the lessons learned from a systematic study of individuals who have chosen terrorism in the past, and others who may do so in the future.

Those who missed the Center’s Starr Forum event “Leaderless Jihad: Radicalization in the West,” may view it online at http://web.mit.edu/cis/starr.html.

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CIS Audits Conventional Wisdom

Among the topics addressed in the Center's Audit of the Conventional Wisdom publication series in the winter and spring were Russia’s status as an energy superpower, Iraq’s three civil wars, the relationship between the United States and Iran amidst the nuclear standoff, progress (and a lack thereof) in global development, what “Wilsonianism” and “liberal foreign policy” really mean, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. All audits are available at: http://web.mit.edu/cis/acw_h.html.

Recently published:

“Pakistan’s Governance Imperative” (Paula R. Newberg); “Much Ado About Nothing: the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process” (Anat Biletzki); “Wilson’s Radical Vision for Global Governance” (Erez Manela); “Good and Bad News on Global Development” (Dani Rodrik); “Wilson, Bush, and the Evolution of Liberal Foreign Policy” (Tony Smith); “Wilson and the Founders: The Roots of Liberal Foreign Policy” (Ted Widmer); “A Solution for the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Standoff” (William Luers, Thomas Pickering, and Jim Walsh); “Iraq’s Three Civil Wars” (Juan Cole); “The U.S. and Iran After the NIE” (Farideh Farkhi); “Russia: An Energy Superpower?” (Carol Saivetz).
précis: What are the greatest strengths of the Seminar XXI program? What is your assessment of the relationship between academics and policymakers of international relations and American foreign policy?

RA: The two clear strengths of the program are the fellows and the faculty, and it’s usually an excellent mix of both. The philosophy of Seminar XXI is to attract people that are in high positions of responsibility or are judged to be in the next five years. If you look at the alumni, it’s almost a who’s who of the top performers in those respective agencies and services. As a program, we try to provide points of view and frameworks from social science that the fellows are not used to having. We try to give them new ways of stepping back and thinking about the problems they have to deal with. The interaction between the faculty and the fellows is one of mutual respect. It’s a society of mutual admiration—the faculty want to be invited back and the fellows are very sorry to see the year end.

The interaction between academia and policymakers is a complex one. Very few of us are fortunate to have a direct pipeline into the National Security Advisor of the U.S. Most of our influence is more indirect; we’re responsible for providing outside critiques and outside frameworks. Our influence is indirect but it’s important. We’re part of the “foreign policy attentive public” and we can affect the climate of opinion by what we say and write. If you can influence how people view a subject then you are having influence, and this is how I look at this program. We have more than 1,200 alumni now, this is our twenty-second year, and that’s the way you measure influence.

précis: You’re affiliated with several research institutions in the greater Boston area. Is there significant cross-pollination among them?

RA: Both Harvard and MIT are very good in the way that they reach out to and invite the faculty from other institutions. We all know one another, there’s a lot of interaction. Both are very good at bringing in people from the outside, as is Tufts; they are larger institutions that have more resources. Do we get to see one another as much as we would like or should? The obvious answer is no, because we all have duties at our respective institutions and there is only so much time in the day. But I think Boston is one of best areas in the United States for the field of international relations and security studies and that is due to the large number of high quality institutions and the openness with which they treat faculty from other institutions. I can’t speak for the students and whether they take advantage of this or not, but they should if they don’t.

précis: Is the debate over grand strategy alive and well in U.S. political discourse?

RA: In academia there is certainly a vigorous debate—and the center has shifted. Too many people have now gone over to the “dark side” with offshore balancing. Of course, there are two variants: the Steve Walt/Barry Posen variant, and the Chris Layne variant, which is a much more extreme version of offshore balancing. I told Steve Walt after reading his manuscript for his book, Taming American Power, that his “offshore balancing” is a bit of a misnomer because while he wants us to get out of Europe and over the horizon in the Gulf he’s still talking about a healthy military presence in East Asia, and as best as I can figure so is Barry Posen. I wouldn’t call that offshore balancing unless you’re arguing...
that we’re mainly afloat in East Asia and that is therefore offshore, but I think that stretches the term a bit.

That said, I think that you see a younger generation of people coming up questioning the inherited wisdom about the importance of the United States projecting military power abroad, including two graduates of this program, Daryl Press and Eugene Gholz. I think that the debate is alive and healthy, but I also think that you don’t see the same type of debate in the political world these days. Nobody, at least in the campaigns, is advocating the kind of positions that are represented by Posen, Walt, and Layne on the one hand and people like me on the other, who call themselves selective engagers but are criticized for not being as selective as they should be. But I think this will continue to go on because what the U.S. does and does not do in the world is very important not only for the U.S. but for the rest of the world. This debate is very healthy and nobody has a monopoly on wisdom here.

**précis: What are the main lessons that emerged from your studies on democracy and counterterrorism?**

**RA:** When we get a new president, let us hope that we’ll have a better counterterrorism policy. I don’t think that we have discovered yet the right mix for a political counterterrorism strategy. The lessons we learned from looking at past counterterrorism campaigns by democracies and quasi-democracies are pretty clear. One is that force has to be used discriminatingly. If it is used indiscriminately, you end up looking like the opponent that you are trying to defeat; so discrimination in the use of force is extremely important. A second lesson is obvious: good intelligence and international cooperation are key ingredients. A third is becoming increasingly apparent with regard to Al-Qaeda if you look at opinion polls concerning the tactics of Al-Qaeda (as opposed to the goals): they are not respected, and Bin Laden’s standing has gone down in the Arab and Muslim worlds. This is explained by the third lesson, namely, that terrorists tend to do themselves in and overreact with their use of extreme measures. This has a tendency to turn off populations from which they draw support and claim to represent. The fourth lesson is the importance of political strategy. Counterterrorism is more akin to police work and intelligence work rather than sending your military forces off to invade countries. To the extent that you use your military forces, they’re more akin to special operations, discreet uses of force. If you come down with a heavy hand, and governments usually do that initially, this proves counterproductive and governments do learn, albeit slowly, that they are making big mistakes. A fifth lesson we learned is the importance of coordination among the various security agencies. Too often they worked at cross-purposes and as a consequence stumbled over one another.

The lessons are not rocket science, they are pretty clear, and to the extent that those past campaigns are relevant for a larger one they can be of some use. The clear message that I come away with in thinking about the Cold War is to not make the central mistake of the Cold War, when we had a view of communism as monolithic and the Soviets as in control of all communist movements, which was absurd. And here I think we have an organization called Al-Qaeda which is also a movement, so there’s a certain buy-in to a universal ideology that is very anti-West and anti-corrupt-Muslim-regimes and very fundamentalist in its outlook, but we shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that this is not a global network directed by Al-Qaeda. Most of these organizations are loosely affiliated, if at all, and have their own local agenda, and they’re not going to allow themselves to be hijacked by Al-Qaeda; they’re going to use Al-Qaeda for their own purposes. This idea of a global jihadi threat that is centrally directed, to the extent that people buy into that vision, is absurd and bad for policy.

**précis: You’ve written a great deal on coercive diplomacy. Are the rules of the game different for dealing with nuclear-armed states vs. states armed with only conventional forces vs. non-state actors?**

**RA:** Well I think coercive diplomacy is difficult, period, because there is usually an asymmetry between how strongly the U.S. cares on the one hand and how much the target state or group cares on the other. In many of the cases we looked at, while the U.S. succeeded, that is to say coercion succeeded, coercive diplomacy failed. That is not a contradiction; you can succeed at coercion if you’re prepared to wage war but coercive diplomacy tries to do these things short of war.

We did have one chapter by Martha Crenshaw, in _The United States and Coercive Diplomacy_, with regards to terrorists and her conclusion was that it was difficult. Coercing non-state actors is not impossible, but I think it is more difficult than trying to coerce states. And coercion against nuclear-armed states should, in theory, be more difficult than coercion against non-nuclear armed states, if no other reason than nuclear-armed states have the ultimate defense of nuclear weapons.

**précis:** As a co-editor of Cornell University Press’ Series in Security Studies, do you like the direction that the field of international relations and specifically Security Studies is headed?

**RA:** The field of security studies is prospering, and this is due largely to the excellent young people that the field has attracted over the last ten to fifteen years. What we have seen is both older and younger scholars, but especially the younger ones, moving very quickly to develop our knowledge base about the new security issues that have arisen with the end of the Cold War. I am quite pleased with what the Cornell Series has published, and a good many of those contributions have come from MIT Ph.D.s—a testament to the quality of the MIT students and the Security Studies Program here. I applaud the pluralism in approaches to the field, and hope that the field will continue to be open to many approaches and not become dogmatic about the nature of inquiry in security studies. This will enable the field to prosper and continue to be both theoretically strong and policy relevant.
“Among the refusals to apologize, perhaps the most notorious is the Turkish government’s refusal to apologize for the Armenian genocide of 1915. Armenians have long demanded that Turkey acknowledge the massacre as genocide and apologize for it.”

Toward a Membership Theory of Apologies

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commemorations of the war. Religious institutions, and principally the Catholic Church, have offered a significant number of apologies covering a range of issues. Two apologies refer to the Catholic Church’s silence and inaction toward the slaughter of European Jews during World War II.

As important, although I do not discuss them, are the large—indeed incalculable—number of apologies neither asked for nor given and refusals to apologize. The former group might well include, for example, an apology from the Dominican Republic for the week-long massacre in October 1937 of approximately eight thousand Haitians by the Rafael Trujillo government. Under pressure from the United States and Haiti, Trujillo agreed in December 1937 to arbitration and an international commission to investigate the massacre. However, before the investigation began, Trujillo offered to pay $750,000 to the Haitian government to end the matter immediately. In the end, Trujillo paid only a fraction of the promised amount and offered no apology. As Eric Roorda writes, “One element missing from Trujillo’s effort to repair the damage of the Haitian massacre was any expression of remorse.” The Haitian government, for its part, accepted the money, along with a personal payment to the president, and did not demand an apology.

Among the refusals to apologize, perhaps the most notorious is the Turkish government’s refusal to apologize for the Armenian genocide of 1915. Armenians have long demanded that Turkey acknowledge the massacre as genocide and apologize for it. Turkey claims that there was no genocide, that the numbers dead are wildly exaggerated, and that the Armenians rose up against the Ottoman Empire and fought with the Russian army. This refusal to acknowledge, let alone apologize, persists, even with Turkey’s entry into the European Union partly hanging in the balance and in the wake of historical reexaminations undertaken by a small, and growing, number of Turkish historians.

In this book, I focus on the apologies offered by and requested of governments, as opposed to heads of state. This distinction is an important one that requires explanation. Apologies by heads of state are verbal utterances made by an executive and, in a few cases, a government official. These utterances bear official weight, of course, by virtue of the speaker’s prominence and position. But they do not carry the weight of government apologies, which are (or so far have been) the results of deliberative processes and have frequently been accompanied by monetary compensation. There are exceptions, however. The establishment of a national center of medical bioethics at Tuskegee University, for example, followed President Bill Clinton’s 1997 apology to the eight survivors of the Tuskegee syphilis study.

In keeping with this distinction between heads of state and governments, all but two of the government apologies have been directed toward domestic populations, whereas the majority of apologies offered by heads of state have concerned international matters. Moreover, certain of the head-of-state apologies possess an unexpected quality not present in government apologies. A leader may or may not have consulted with advisors and other politicians before offering it. For example, during his 1970 visit to the site of Poland’s Warsaw ghetto, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt fell to his knees, expressing German guilt, sorrow, and responsibility for the Holocaust. In contrast, government apologies most often have been highly scripted affairs, the products of consultations and official government bodies.

Governments have apologized or have been forced or asked to apologize for historical and catastrophic wrongs—wrongs committed during World War II, at the end of colonial rule, or over the course of national founding and settlement. Of the eight that I count in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, three resulted from actions committed during World War II: Germany’s apology and payments (now totaling an estimated 100 billion DM) to Israel, to surviving Jews for the Holocaust, and to other victims; the United States’ apology and payments of $20,000 to surviving Japanese Americans
for their internment; and Canada’s apology and payments of CAN$21,000 to surviving Japanese Canadians for their internment. There was one for the decisions undertaken by a former European colonizer. In February 2002, the Belgian government apologized for its role in the 1961 assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the first prime minister of Congo, Belgium’s former colony. The Belgian government also “announced the creation of a $3.5 million fund in Lumumba’s name to promote democracy in Congo...” The remaining four apologies have been for national founding and historical treatment of indigenous populations in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States: In addition, in 2000 the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs apologized for its treatment of American Indians, and in 2005 the U.S. Senate apologized for its historical failure to pass antilynching laws. Finally, there is a pending congressional apology resolution to Native Americans, and there has been widespread discussion about and demands for an apology and reparations to African Americans for slavery and Jim Crow segregation.

We now have a sense of the wider set of public apologies and the comparatively smaller set of government apologies, and of where the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and U.S. apologies and nonapologies that I will examine fit within both. They are few in number, but most often broader in scope, addressing national founding, settlement, and historical mistreatment.

This essay is an excerpt from chapter one of The Politics of Official Apologies by Melissa Nobles. Cambridge University Press. Copyright © Melissa Nobles 2008.


7 The two exceptions are the German government’s apology to Jews who survived the Holocaust and to the state of Israel, and the Belgian government’s apology to the Congolese for Belgium’s role in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba.

8 The figure of 100 billion DM is based on German government estimates up to the year 2000. It includes all reparations claims to all those persecuted by the Nazis, including non-Jews. Pross, Christian. 1998. Paying for the Past: The Struggle over Reparations for Surviving of the Nazi Terror. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.


12 The U.S. case refers to the 1993 Joint Congressional Resolution to the people of Hawaii.
Conference on Liberal Tradition in Foreign Policy

The Center convened a conference at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on Thursday, January 10, to dissect the liberal tradition in U.S. foreign policy. Cosponsored with the History and Democracy Project and the U.S. Division of the Wilson Center, the invitation-only meeting of 60 scholars, journalists, and congressional aides featured presentations by leading historians on several enduring themes, such as human rights, democracy, and economic justice. The historians included Elizabeth Borgwardt, Edward Widmer, Erez Manela, Tony Smith, Charles Maier, and Amy Staples. Several of the talks were published in the Center’s “Audits” publication, found online at http://web.mit.edu/cis/acw.html. More details, including a webcast of the conference, are available online: http://web.mit.edu/cis/act_ffpt.html.

CIS Showcased in Tokyo

Members of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan attended a luncheon at the Roppongi Hills Club, featuring CIS director and Ford International Professor of Political Science Richard J. Samuels, two MIT graduates, and MIT-Japan Program alumni based in Japan. Also, a symposium entitled “Meeting a Rising China,” was jointly held by the Center’s MIT-Japan Program and Keizai Koho Center at Keidanren Kaikan. Speakers from MIT included Security Studies Program member and assistant professor of political science Taylor Fravel, CIS affiliate and associate professor of political science Edward Steinfeld, George Gilboy, China country manager for Woodside Energy Australia and senior fellow at CIS, and Robert Madsen, CIS senior research fellow. Final remarks were made by Samuels and Akihiko Tanaka, professor of international politics at the University of Tokyo.

Williams on Homeland Security Funding

SSP principal research scientist Cindy Williams delivered a presentation on the promises and the reality of homeland security funding amidst the Department’s five-year anniversary, as part of the SSP Wednesday Seminar Series. Williams noted that despite consolidating budget authority under a single cabinet secretary, a comparison of key strategy documents to actual budgets reveals significant disconnects. Williams argued that DHS does not do a great job of identifying risks and allocating funding accordingly, and the promise of unity of effort across the various organizations that comprise DHS remains unrealized. Williams’ recommendations for improvement include mandating a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and improving the quality and quantity of the Homeland Security Council staff, which is currently dwarfed by that of the National Security Council.

CIS Hosts Conference on U.S.-Japan Relations

CIS organized a two-day retreat entitled “US-Japan Relations and a Changing Asia.” The event was held on Feb. 29 and March 1, 2008, at the Endicott House at MIT. Moderating the discussions was Richard Samuels, Ford International
Professor of Political Science and director of CIS. Participants included assistant professor Taylor Fravel, SSP alum Daryl Press, and Ph.D. candidate Llewelyn Hughes. The conference report, compiled by Hughes, can be found on the CIS website.

The Corporate Media and the Iraq War

Greg Mitchell came to MIT for a Starr Forum in May to talk about his latest book, So Wrong for So Long, which chronicles the failings of the corporate media coverage of the war in Iraq. He is the editor of Editor & Publisher where he writes the column “Pressing Issues,” and is the author of eight books. So Wrong for So Long, published February 2008, has received a tremendous response, ranging from appearances on Jim Lehrer NewsHour, NPR and Democracy Now! to reviews in the L.A. Times and Vanity Fair online.

Richardson on What Terrorists Want

Louise Richardson, executive dean at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, delivered a talk on the causes and effects of terrorism as part of SSP’s Wednesday Seminar Series. Richardson claimed that although there is no single cause of terrorism, a lethal cocktail of a disaffected individual, an enabling community, and a legitimizing ideology often leads to terrorist acts, defined as the deliberate targeting of noncombatants for a political purpose. Richardson claims that terrorist groups have been much more effective at achieving the three Rs—revenge, renown, and reaction—than their primary political motives. Richardson argued that declaring a war on terrorism plays directly into the terrorists’ hands, and instead suggested that the U.S. readjust its goals to contain the threat from terrorism rather than making a war on it, since overreaction and the use of indiscriminate force are the quickest ways to lose a struggle with a terrorist organization. According to Richardson, being “tough” on terrorism is not the same as being effective, and the U.S. and its citizens need to adjust their mindset accordingly.

CIS Sponsors Two New Working Groups

The Middle East Security Politics Working Group seeks to provide graduate students, faculty, and outside researchers with a forum to present their ongoing Middle East security work and receive feedback from interested researchers. The group is run by student coordinators Josh Shifrinson and Keren Fraiman and sponsored by Ford International Professor of Political Science Stephen Van Evera and CIS visiting scholar Carol Saivetz. The China Politics Working Group brings together faculty and graduate students from a variety of disciplines united in a common interest in understanding change in contemporary China. The group is chaired by associate professor of political science Edward Steinfeld.

Middle East Film Series Presented by CIS

CIS presented three films from the Middle East, based in Algeria/France (“Inch’Allah Dimanche”), Israel/The Golan Heights (“The Syrian Bride”) and Iraq before, during and after the US war and invasion in 2003 (“My Home—Your War”). The films focus on the lives of three women, linked together by their Middle Eastern identity and a variety of challenging issues. They are portrayed while following their life paths amidst the political and social trials common to the region. Meriam Belli, Anat Biletzki and Ban Al-Mahfodh from MIT discussed some background aspects to the three films. Each examined the socio-political context that Middle Eastern women are facing in the region. Both the films and speakers threw light on their roles as women within the context of trying circumstances of isolation, tribulation and modern warfare, while holding on to freedom of spirit.
People


Professor of political science Nazli Choucri has been re-elected chair of the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Management of Social Transformations, the flagship UNESCO program on knowledge-based policy for development. Choucri is the lead editor of Mapping Sustainability: Knowledge e-Networking and the Value Chain, a volume of the Alliance for Global Sustainability Book series (2007). Co-editors include MIT alum Dinsha Mistree and MIT political science undergraduate Carlos Ortiz. Chapter authors include Ph.D. candidate Anne-Katrin Wickboldt and MIT alum Craig Hart.

SSP associate director Owen Cote hosted a conference in February on experimentation to support new submarine missions. It was attended by much of the senior submarine leadership in the U.S. Navy. The conference is part of an ongoing SSP conference series on the future of the Navy. Cote gave a talk on the future of nuclear non-proliferation to the Department of Defense's National Security Studies Program, in partnership with the Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University, on April 22.

Assistant professor of political science M. Taylor Fravel gave a talk at the 2008 annual convention of the International Studies Association in San Francisco entitled, “China’s Territorial Future: Will Conquest Pay?” Fravel also delivered the talk at Princeton University’s International Relations Colloquium in March.

In January, Ph.D. candidate Benjamin Friedman became a research fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies at the Cato Institute.

Ph.D. candidate Brendan Green will be attending the West Point Summer Seminar on Military History this June.

Ph.D. candidate Peter Krause was selected as a fellow of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) for the 2008-09 academic year. Krause also received the Kathryn Davis Fellowship for Peace to attend the Middlebury College Arabic School this summer.

Bruce Mazlish, professor emeritus of history, delivered an invited lecture at Duke University in September 2007 on “Humanity in a Global Epoch.”

National Defense Fellow Todd Piergrossi was promoted to the rank of Colonel in the United States Air Force in April 2008 and will be assigned to the National Security Agency (NSA) this summer.

Karen Polenske, professor of regional political economy and planning in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning, received the Sloan Industry Studies Best Book Award at the Sloan Industry Studies Annual Meetings on May 1 for her book The
Technology, Energy, Environmental-Health (TEEH) Chain in China: A Case Study of Cokemaking. Polenske has also received a one-year seed funding grant from Beyond Petroleum (BP) to conduct research on regional energy-intensity trends in China.

**Vibha Pingle** is a new associate director at MISTI who will be developing the new global seed fund collaborations and student research opportunities. **David Dolev**, the founder and co-director of the Center for Jewish-Muslim Relations in Boston, is the new program coordinator for MIT-Israel. **Erin Schenck**, previously from the MIT Media Lab, is the new assistant for both the MIT-Germany Program and MISTI. **Erin Baumgartner** is the new program assistant for the MIT-France Program.

Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the Security Studies Program **Barry Posen** was on NPR’s “On Point” Tuesday, April 1, 2008, as one of several guest commentators on the topic “Basra: Defining Moment?” **Juan Cole**, an SSP fellow, was also on this show.

**Richard Samuels**, Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for International Studies, was among five finalists for the Lionel Gelber Prize, one of the world’s leading awards for books on international affairs. Samuels was nominated for *Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*, published last September by Cornell University Press.

**Joli Divon Saraf** became the new Security Studies Program assistant director in April. Saraf previously worked as the publicity and outreach coordinator of the Literature section at MIT. She has maintained an interest in international studies, due in part to her family’s diplomatic background, which entailed her living and traveling all over the world. Saraf received her M.A. in international business and management in London.

Assistant professor of political science **David Singer**’s paper, “Financial Regulation, Monetary Institutions, and Inflation in the Industrialized World” (with Mark Copeland-vitch), won the Kellogg Award for best paper presented at the 2007 Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting. Singer has been named a visiting scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences for the 2008-09 academic year.

Ph.D. candidate **Paul Staniland** gave a talk entitled “Explaining Armed Group Cohesion and Fragmentation in Kashmir and Northern Ireland (and Sri Lanka?)” at the Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo, Sri Lanka, on April 3, 2008. Staniland was awarded a 2008-09 predoctoral fellowship from the Belfer Center at Harvard in the Intrastate Conflict and International Security Programs.

Senior research scholar **Sharon Stanton Russell** and her fellow research team members (Principal investigator Jennifer Leaning, M.D. and Professor Kenneth Hill of Harvard School of Public Health, William Seltzer, senior research fellow at Fordham University, and Saira Malik of Cambridge Health Alliance) have been working on “India, Pakistan, Bangladesh: The Historical Demography of Partition” since 2002. Their project has been funded by Harvard University’s Weatherhead Initiative under the umbrella of Harvard’s South Asia Initiative.

In March, DUSP department head Larry Vale gave a keynote talk at an invited conference in Abu Dhabi held to help plan a new capital city for the United Arab Emirates, intended to house 350,000 people. This happily coincided with publication of a new and updated second edition of Vale’s book, Architecture, Power, and National Identity, a study of the relationship between politics and design in capital cities around the world.

Ford International Professor of Political Science Stephen Van Evera was on Minnesota Public Radio’s “Midday,” Tuesday, April 1, 2008. The show was titled “Calm Returns to Iraq?” Van Evera also served as a discussant for “The ‘War on Terrorism’: Where Do We Stand?” a conference held by the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies at Tufts University in January.

Ashutosh Varshney, a visiting scholar at CIS and MIT alum, was named both a Guggenheim Fellow and a Carnegie Scholar for 2008. Guggenheim fellows are appointed on the basis of outstanding achievement and exceptional promise for continued accomplishment. As a Carnegie scholar, Varshney is among 20 recipients selected for “their compelling ideas and commitment to enriching the quality of the public dialogue on Islam.” The Carnegie scholars receive two-year grants of up to $100,000 each.

SSP research associate Jim Walsh testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on April 24, 2008. Walsh addressed the status of Iran’s nuclear activities and current U.S. policy.


**Published**

Boaz Atzili, Recent Ph.D. Recipient

Nazli Choucri, Professor of Political Science
M. Taylor Fravel, Assistant Professor of Political Science
“Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes,”

Benjamin Friedman, Ph.D. Candidate


Bruce Mazlish, Professor Emeritus of History

Melissa Nobles, Associate Professor of Political Science

Richard Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of CIS

Paul Staniland, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science and Kelly Greenhill, MIT alum
and Assistant Professor at Tufts University

John Tirman, Executive Director and Principal Research Scientist at CIS


Lily Tsai, Assistant Professor of Political Science

Jim Walsh, SSP Research Associate


Cindy Williams, SSP Principal Research Scientist


Jerusalem 2050 Announces Competition Winners

The Jerusalem 2050 Program, a joint initiative sponsored by the Department of Urban Studies and Planning and the Center for International Studies at MIT, announced on March 21 the winners of its global Just Jerusalem competition. The open contest sought proposals that addressed different aspects of urban life in a futurist Jerusalem. Participants were asked to look beyond the current nation-state conflict and, instead, focus on ‘just’ the city as a place where, by mid-century, its citizenries co-exist in peace.

Four winning entries and seven honorable mentions were selected by an A-list jury. Students, professionals, practitioners and others who care about Jerusalem were among the winners. The selected proposals, or the authors, hail from all over the world: Malaysia, Austria, the United States, India, Israel, Palestine, China, England, Australia, Cyprus, and Greece.

The top winners will be at MIT during fall 2008 where they will engage in interdisciplinary discussions about the implementation of their ideas. To learn more about the project and future plans, visit http://web.mit.edu/cis/jerusalem2050/.

Photo from a winning proposal entitled “Envisioning Jerusalem through Media Barriers and Performance Space.” For more details on the competition winners and their proposals, visit the competition web site at http://web.mit.edu/cis/jerusalem2050/just_jerusalem/winners.html.