Level 4 Biosafety Laboratories: Public Information and Risk Analysis

Introduction

The BSL4 Controversy

The purpose of this web site is to educate the public at large about the arguments surrounding the new BSL4 facilities and their research goals. This site provides basic information about biological weapons, as well as links to a variety of government, civic, academic, and other important sources.

As the most current case of controversy, the planned BSL4 facility at Boston University Medical Center in Boston, Massachusetts, is an important focus of this web site. Visitors to this web site are encouraged to familiarize themselves with the location of the proposed BSL4 and its demographic characteristics, as well the arguments for and against this particular laboratory.

Starting in the early 1990s, the US government turned its attention to the threat of biological weapons as they might be acquired by hostile small states or terrorists. Secretary of Defense William Cohen expressed this position in 1999:

As the new millennium approaches, the United States faces a heightened prospect that regional aggressors, third-rate armies, terrorist cells, and even religious cults will wield disproportionate power by using—or threatening to use—biological weapons against our troops in the field or our citizens at home. (in Joshua Lederberg, ed. Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat, MIT Press, 1999, xii)

In reaction to this perceived threat, the idea of funding research arose to protect American troops and civilians against possible attacks. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and the 2001 anthrax letters, the federal government took strong measures to defend the nation against possible bioterrorist attacks.

A specific government initiative has been to increase basic research on disease-causing agents (mostly bacteria and viruses) that have been or could be developed as agents for biological weapons. Along with anthrax and smallpox, dozens of other diseases fit this category. The goal of this research would be to discover more and better medical defenses, for example, vaccines, antibiotics, and antiviral medicines. For most, no easy or completely effective or safe prevention or cure exists. At the same time, the actual threat of terrorists using biological weapons has been difficult to assess. The word “bioterrorism” has been in use for a decade to describe large-scale lethal attacks on civilians, but to date no such attacks have taken place in the United States or elsewhere.

In addition to increased funding for defensive research against biological agents, the government also authorized the building of new laboratories where the most dangerous of these “select agents” could be researched under special safety conditions. These laboratories are categorized as Biosafety Level 4 (BSL4), in contrast to laboratories at Level 3 and 2 levels of safety and containment. Such BSL4 facilities already existed in 2001, most notably at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia, and at the US Army’s Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland.

While those in favor of new BSL4 facilities argue that they serve national security, those opposed argue that the laboratories pose serious risks of harm to civilians.

The Council for Responsible Genetics (http://www.gene-watch.org/) summarized the criticisms:

In September of 2003, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) awarded a $1.6 billion federal biodefense laboratory to Boston University Medical Center (BU). The project will include lab space designated for research on pathogens for which there is no known cure. While supporters applaud the potential for new jobs and vaccines, community groups have opposed the project.

Among their chief complaints is BU's aversion to transparency and accountability. Unlike other applicants for the lab, Boston University did not provide outlines of proposed research to community members. They circumvented the the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) by not completing an environmental impact review. The very site of the lab was chosen without consulting surrounding communities. Furthermore, conditions stipulated by NIAID—and only reluctantly acknowledged by the university—make it possible that BU will not control the content of research conducted at the lab. Boston University's unwillingness to share details about a facility that will handle some of the most dangerous pathogens known to science, and their reluctance to openly engage the public, have created a climate of suspicion and distrust.

Both sides of the debate were summarized in the May 20, 2004, issue of The New England Journal of Medicine (350; 21: 2119-2123, http://www.nejm.org/)

The building of new BSL4 facilities has caused concern for the potential risk they pose to local populations, if the safety features surrounding research ever failed. Critics have pointed out that laboratory accidents might cause dangerous epidemics or public panic. Other concerns have been for national security in general, as with increased risks of sabotage or black market sales of dangerous agents. The training of a new generation of scientists so that they become familiar with the development and production of biological weapons agents, even for defense purposes, has also raised concern. Critics have also have pointed to secret US research as a possible incentive to an international arms race among less powerful nations.

Visitors to this site are encouraged to learn about the general context for BSL4 controversies. The newest federal legislation for protecting the nation against bioterrorism is the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which is available on-line (http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/analysis/). This legislation outlines the duties of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the mission of the department, which was created in 2003. Especially relevant in this legislation is Title III, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures. Under Title III, see the following:

Section 303, Conduct of certain public health-related activities. This section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to carry out his civilian human health-related biological, biomedical, and infectious disease defense research and development responsibilities through agreements with the Department of Health and Human Services unless the President otherwise directs, and gives the Secretary specific transfer authority to fund such agreements. In carrying out these responsibilities, however, the Secretary retains full authority to establish the research and development program, including the setting of priorities. The section also gives the Secretary specific authority to fund other research and development projects that he elects to carry out through the Department of Health and Human Services or other federal agencies.

Jeanne Guillemin
Security Studies Program
Technical Working Group

Copyright © 2004-2006: Jeanne Guillemin, guillemin@mit.edu
This site's content was designed and laid out by Damien Croteau-Chonka, dws@andsoitbegins.com.
Original contributors to its content include Martin Buisman, Sara Berkeljon, Catherine O’Connell, Alexandra Tillson, James Kenney, Darrel Swann, and Nathanael Hasselbeck.