

THE WAR ON TERROR: FORGOTTEN LESSONS FROM WORLD WAR II

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President George W. Bush has likened the war on terror to the struggles Americans faced in World War II, explaining that today's terrorist enemies are "successors to Fascists, to Nazis ... and other totalitarians of the 20th century."¹ Yet the Bush administration has left the lessons of World War II largely unheeded. Its conduct of the war on terror departs from the policies that brought the United States victory in World War II and success in the postwar years.² The administration will have more success against the terrorists if it learns and applies the methods that won the Second World War.

SETTING PRIORITIES

During World War II, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration believed that Nazi Germany was its most dangerous opponent. Administration officials reasoned that only Germany could possibly conquer Great Britain, and Britain's demise would open the whole Atlantic region to German dominion and leave the United States dangerously exposed. The Roosevelt administration therefore adopted a "Ger-

many First" strategy, under which it focused first on defeating Germany while checking Japan in Asia, and then turned to defeat Japan once Germany was beaten.³

In contrast, the Bush administration has not put top priority on defeating America's most dangerous current enemy, al-Qaeda. Instead, it focused only briefly on al-Qaeda and then diverted itself toward other projects. The administration launched the war on terror in October 2001 by invading Afghanistan and ousting the Taliban regime, which had sheltered al-Qaeda. This was clearly the right move. But soon the administration took a left turn into Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein, although Saddam was not involved in the 9/11 attack, was not cooperating with al-Qaeda in other ways, and was otherwise contained. The administration also pursued hostile policies toward Iran and Syria, talking of ousting both regimes, in another left turn away from combating al-Qaeda. Iran and Syria have nasty rulers, but they are not in league with al-Qaeda. Conflict with all three states — Iraq, Iran and Syria — is a diversion from fighting al-Qaeda, the main threat.

One Bush administration official, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, even argued soon after the 9/11 attack that the United States should respond by attacking Iraq instead of Afghanistan.⁴ This would have left al-Qaeda free to launch more attacks on the United States from its safe haven in Afghanistan — hardly a good result. The administration rejected Wolfowitz's suggestion, but it did transfer resources away from Afghanistan and toward Iraq in early 2002, before it finished destroying the al-Qaeda leadership then hiding in Afghanistan, and before it finished consolidating the new Afghan government. This allowed important al-Qaeda elements to escape to Pakistan and fight another day.⁵ They have now reconstituted a dangerous al-Qaeda command in Pakistan.⁶ It also allowed the Taliban to survive and later recover strength in Afghanistan. Today the Taliban poses a serious threat to the new Afghan government of Hamid Karzai.⁷

Despite these misadventures and al-Qaeda's continued strength, the Bush administration still fails to focus on al-Qaeda. The administration's latest *National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism*, issued in September 2006, never mentions Osama bin Laden. It frames all terrorist movements as American enemies, including those that have no evident intention of attacking the United States. States that sponsor terror but do not sponsor it against the United States and are not in league with al-Qaeda are also defined as American targets.⁸ As such, the report is a warrant for a wide American rampage in the Mideast and elsewhere that would not focus on the al-Qaeda threat and would actually benefit al-Qaeda by diverting American focus onto other terror

groups. This seems unwise while al-Qaeda is coming for our throats, as it surely is.

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice mentioned Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas, but not al-Qaeda, when she defined America's adversaries in the Mideast in Congressional testimony in early 2007.⁹ Something is wrong with this picture. Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas are hardly benign, but they have never attacked the U.S. homeland or inflicted mass casualties on U.S. civilians. Nor do they indicate an intention to conduct such attacks. In contrast, al-Qaeda has mass-murdered American civilians and will do so again when it can. A former al-Qaeda press spokesman, Suleiman Abu Ghaith, has claimed that al-Qaeda had a right to kill four million Americans, including two million children.¹⁰ Al-Qaeda operatives have tried to acquire ingredients for nuclear weapons so they can bring this horror to pass. Far from passing unmentioned, al-Qaeda should be defined as the prime global threat to the United States. It is by far the most dangerous enemy facing the United States in the Mideast or elsewhere.

MOBILIZING RESOURCES

President Franklin Roosevelt fully mobilized the American public and the U.S. economy to fight World War II. He asked for and was granted great sacrifices from the American people. He increased defense spending from 2 percent of national income in 1939 to 54 percent in 1944.¹¹ He raised taxes and imposed rationing. In 1940, he reinstated the draft, over strong opposition. Once war began, he called to arms all able-bodied men.¹²

In contrast, the Bush administration mobilized few resources for the wars in

Afghanistan and Iraq and against al-Qaeda. It waged the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq on the cheap, skimping on postwar security and economic assistance for Afghanistan and putting an undersized force in Iraq despite warnings from U.S. military leaders that more U.S. troops were needed. It has not asked the American people to support moves to end Western dependence on Persian Gulf oil, although this dependence makes vast wealth available to Muslim extremists and limits U.S. options against them. Nor has the Bush administration called for other sacrifices from the American people. Instead, it has cut taxes for the very wealthy, while also urging Americans to support the war effort by going shopping, in order to pep up the economy. The only Americans asked to sacrifice are those in our armed forces, especially in the reserves and National Guard units, who pay for the Iraq War with their sweat and blood.

FORGING ALLIANCES AND CUTTING DEALS

The Roosevelt administration forged a vast alliance to wage World War II. It won the war with only modest U.S. losses because its allies had vast resources (by themselves, America's allies had more industrial power than the Axis states; combined with the United States, they had more than tripled it)¹³ and because these U.S. allies did most of the hard fighting and took most of the casualties that victory required.

Some of America's World War II allies and associates were odious. They included the mass-murdering Josef Stalin in the Soviet Union, the brutal Josip Broz Tito in Yugoslavia, the corrupt and autocratic Chiang Kai Shek in China, and elements of

the Vichy government in France. Yet these unsavory associates vastly eased the American road to victory against the Axis. Without their help, the United States would have paid a huge blood price for victory — if it won at all.

After World War II was won, President Harry Truman stabilized the postwar world by forging the broad and powerful NATO alliance in 1949. It kept the Soviet Union at bay for four decades and won the Cold War.

In contrast, the Bush administration made little effort to win others' support for its Mideast policies. It held traditional U.S. allies at arm's length and refused even to talk with more roguish Mideast players. Regarding the war on Iraq, the administration gained major international backing only from Britain. Once in Iraq, it failed to move fast to cut a deal with the Iraqi Sunnis, to gain their acquiescence to the U.S. program in Iraq. This left the Sunnis assuming they had no place in a U.S.-crafted Iraq, fueling their decision to rebel. And the administration failed to reach understandings with Syria and Iran to gain their cooperation with Iraq's reconstruction. Postwar reconstruction usually fails if neighboring states do not want it to succeed, yet the Bush administration did little to win their assent.

Why is the United States failing in Iraq? Partly because the Bush administration invaded Iraq without bringing enough friends to share the burden, and then sought no *modus vivendi* with Iraq's Sunnis or its neighbors. The Bush team failed to follow FDR in practicing the art of the deal.

The Bush team has also failed to practice the art of the deal in the broader war on al-Qaeda. It offered little induce-

ment to Iran to end its nuclear programs, recklessly talking about regime change instead, even though Iran repeatedly signaled its willingness to cut a deal on nuclear weapons with the United States.¹⁴ It refused serious talks with North Korea on its nuclear program until late 2006, despite North Korean signals of interest in cutting a deal.¹⁵ By then, the North Korean situation had gravely worsened: the North had expanded its atomic arsenal from one to two bombs in 2001, when the Bush administration took office, to seven to nine bombs in 2007, with more on the way. It will now be far harder to disarm North Korea than if Bush had pursued a deal in 2001. The nuclear weapons built as a result could wind up in the hands of terrorists, with fateful consequences.

And the Bush team pushed U.S. relations with Syria to rupture despite valuable Syrian help against al-Qaeda after 9/11. Syrian intelligence cooperation after 9/11 allowed the United States to thwart al-Qaeda attacks on the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain and the U.S. embassy in Ottawa.¹⁶ Many American lives were likely saved by averting these attacks. But Bush administration hostility toward Syria has ended Syria's cooperation. This raises the risk that al-Qaeda's next strike on the United States will succeed.

WAGING A WAR OF IDEAS

The Roosevelt administration waged an intense war of ideas to bring the world to its side in World War II. Even Hollywood was mobilized, producing Frank Capra's effective seven-part series "Why We Fight" and many other films.¹⁷ (This Hollywood campaign reached a vast international audience, as Hollywood movies already were widely watched

across the world.) The Truman and Eisenhower administrations continued this effort into the Cold War, waging a strong war of ideas through the U.S. Information Agency and other forums.¹⁸

In contrast, the Bush administration has left the war of ideas unfought¹⁹ and left al-Qaeda's propaganda largely unanswered. As a result, that propaganda is widely believed in the Arab and wider Muslim world. Many Muslims believe al-Qaeda claims that the West seeks to destroy Islam. Large public majorities in Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia still do not even believe that groups of Arabs carried out the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States.²⁰ U.S. efforts to destroy al-Qaeda cannot succeed while such attitudes endure.

The United States is losing the war of ideas partly because U.S. public-diplomacy efforts have been poorly funded and poorly led. The State Department Office of Public Diplomacy, which should lead in waging the war of ideas, received only \$1.36 billion in funding for FY 2006.²¹ Only a fraction of the funds were devoted to efforts directed at the Muslim world. This effort is far too small for the task at hand.

Some might say that waging a war of ideas against monsters like Hitler, Tojo, Mussolini and Stalin was like shooting fish in a barrel. These leaders were easy to discredit because they were grotesque. But the same is true of Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and Mullah Omar. They preach hate against most of the world, including the vast share of the Muslim world that rejects their view of Islam. They have murdered many Muslims and other innocents. Their Islamist political model has already been tried and shown to fail, with disastrous results, in Afghanistan, Sudan

and Iran. They are hiding in caves, with no state apparatus to amplify their message. That the United States is losing a public relations contest to such primitive thugs is an appalling failure and a disgrace on those U.S. officials responsible.

SOFT LANDING FOR THE DEFEATED

After winning World War II, President Truman invested vast amounts of money and brainpower in guiding Germany, Japan and Italy toward democracy, prosperity and political moderation. The United States occupied Germany for four years and Japan for six, staffing these occupations with highly competent people.

In contrast, the Bush administration invested little in programs to resuscitate post-war Iraq and Afghanistan. As noted above, it sent too few military forces into Iraq and staffed the occupation with amateurs. It under-resourced the rebuilding of Afghanistan, denying urgent requests from President Karzai for more security and economic assistance. As a result, both Iraq and Afghanistan now qualify as failed states. Iraq has descended into civil war. Afghanistan is the world's largest opium producer and is again breeding terrorists friendly to al-Qaeda. Large portions of Afghanistan have reverted to the control of the Taliban, who are allied with al-Qaeda.

The Roosevelt administration began planning for the postwar peace as a first order of wartime business, in December 1941. In contrast, the Bush administration made no serious plan for managing the postwar situation in Iraq and made no use of government research that was done toward making such a plan.²² Vice President Dick Cheney even prevented General Jay Garner, the first head of the American

postwar mission in Iraq, from bringing onto his staff the State Department official who had organized research in the State Department to support postwar planning, apparently out of fear of tainting U.S. Iraq policy with State Department thinking. As a result, the U.S. entered Iraq with no scheme for the postwar period.²³

CREATING A PEACEFUL ORDER

President Roosevelt recognized that U.S. interests would be injured if a new war followed World War II. Accordingly, he worked to create international institutions that would bolster peace. Specifically, he established the United Nations, which he modeled on the 1815 Concert of Europe, an institution created by the European powers to preserve peace after the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars.²⁴ Roosevelt also worked to create institutions that would promote free trade, in part because he believed, with Imanuel Kant and others, that a liberal trade regime would bolster peace.

More recent U.S. presidents have also played the peacemaker. Jimmy Carter crafted a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, and Bill Clinton engineered peace in Bosnia, helped bring peace to Northern Ireland, and tried, although without success, to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In contrast, the Bush administration has declined to play peacemaker. It walked away from managing the Israel-Palestinian conflict, dropping efforts to bring peace and failing even to work to prevent the conflict from escalating. It has made little effort to defuse other conflicts, including those in Somalia, Kashmir and Chechnya. It has proven inept in its efforts to control Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq.

Al-Qaeda feeds on war. In its recruiting message, it exploits all conflicts involving Muslims, painting Muslims as victims in these conflicts, whether or not they are. This gives the United States a large interest in promoting peace. It should work to dampen conflict throughout the region.²⁵ But the Bush administration declines to play this role.

THE BEST PEOPLE

Roosevelt appointed an outstanding leader and strategist, General George C. Marshall, as his Army chief of staff.²⁶ Together Roosevelt and Marshall, in turn, appointed as war commanders the best group of officers ever to lead America's armed forces in wartime. These officers included such standouts as Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, Matthew Ridgway, George Gavin, George Patton, Joseph Lawton Collins, Pete Quesada, Raymond Spruance, Chester Nimitz, and William (Bull) Halsey.

In contrast, President Bush has appointed mediocre leaders and left them in place despite poor performance. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld committed epic errors in his handling of Iraq but remained in office until November 2006, long after these errors were evident to all serious observers.²⁷ Rumsfeld in turn promoted to top policy posts and military commands individuals known more for their obedience than their competence.²⁸

Ignoring clear evidence that al-Qaeda posed a grave danger, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz belittled the al-Qaeda threat before the 9/11 attack and urged the removal of another official, Ambassador Robert Gelbard, who rightly recognized the danger al-Qaeda posed.²⁹ Despite Wolfowitz's grave misjudgments,

President Bush rewarded him with appointment to the presidency of the World Bank.

The story was repeated elsewhere. Bush appointed the hapless Michael Brown to head FEMA and the blundering L. Paul Bremer to head Iraqi reconstruction.³⁰ A group of inexperienced and unqualified lesser officials, selected for their conservative politics rather than their competence, filled out the Iraq reconstruction team.³¹ An extreme ideologue, David Wurmser, has played a key role in making Bush administration policy toward the Middle East from his position as chief Middle East adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney.³²

Why has Iraq gone so badly? Partly because a leader like George Marshall was not in charge. Marshall's insistence on competence was not applied when the Bush team selected officials responsible for conducting its policy toward Iraq. Instead, lesser standards were applied, incompetents were appointed, and inferior results were achieved.

UNITING AMERICANS

FDR sought bipartisan support for his war policy during World War II. As the war began, he announced that he would put his divisive New Deal policies on the back burner, declaring that "Dr. Win the War" had replaced "Dr. New Deal." He did not exploit the war to gain partisan advantage. FDR also appointed two distinguished Republicans to his war cabinet: Henry L. Stimson became his secretary of war, and Frank Knox, the Republican candidate for vice-president in 1936, became his secretary of the navy. As a result, Republicans as well as Democrats widely supported the U.S. war effort.

In contrast, the Bush administration has not consulted the Democrats nor

included them in counterterror and Iraq policy making. The administration has also used the Iraq and al-Qaeda wars as occasions for scoring partisan points against the Democrats. For example, Vice President Cheney declared during the 2004 election campaign that “we must make the right choice” on election day, “because if we make the wrong choice, then the danger is that we’ll get hit again ... in a way that will be devastating.”³³ A Republican TV ad used the smoking rubble of the World Trade Center as a prop during the same campaign.³⁴ The Bush administration's use of the Iraq and al-Qaeda wars for its partisan political advantage helped divide the country along party lines on U.S. Mideast policy.

The administration has also made grave mistakes in Iraq that it might have avoided had it consulted Clinton administration officials who learned valuable lessons relevant to Iraq from the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Somalia and elsewhere. Gaining this expertise cost the United States dearly, but the Bush team has declined to use it.

LESSONS NOT HEEDED

Under Roosevelt’s leadership, the United States won World War II in three years and nine months. In contrast, President Bush has now been leading us against al-Qaeda for nearly six years with no end in sight. Al-Qaeda’s top leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, remain at large in Pakistan, plotting more mayhem against us. Taliban leader Mullah Omar remains at large. Al-Qaeda lost its secure base in Afghanistan in 2002 but it adapted by morphing into a decentralized organization that remains capable of great destruction. Estimates of the number of al-

Qaeda members worldwide have grown from 20,000 to 50,000 during 2001-06.³⁵ The number of al-Qaeda attacks worldwide has grown from three during the five years before September 11, 2001, to 30 in the five years following that day.³⁶ These are ominous trends.

The conditions for the continued existence of al-Qaeda — extremist ideologies, inflammatory civil and international wars, failed states, and deep anger at the Bush administration among Muslim elites and publics — remain in place in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda will not be defeated until these conditions are addressed. But the Bush administration has no coherent plan to address them.³⁷ Instead it misdirects its efforts toward the pipedream of ending terror by ousting regimes and spreading democracy in the Middle East.

Why has the administration failed to apply best practices from the past to the current war against al-Qaeda? Why does it not learn from the experience, gained at great cost, of World War II and other wars? Historian Andrew Bacevich notes the “contempt for the accumulated wisdom of the military profession” among Bush-administration civilian officials in the Defense Department.³⁸ Commentator Fareed Zakaria has noted the contempt with which the administration has treated foreign leaders and officials, writing in 2003: “Having traveled the world and met with senior government officials in dozens of countries over the past year, I can report that with the exception of Britain and Israel, every country the administration has dealt with feels humiliated by it.”³⁹ Zakaria reports that Jorge Castañeda, Mexico's reformist foreign minister until January 2003, said of Latin American officials: “We like and understand America.

But we find it extremely irritating to be treated with utter contempt" by Bush administration personnel.⁴⁰ A senior U.S. Army general who worked in the Bush administration notes that "the people who worked around the president were ... intellectually arrogant."⁴¹ Another Army officer has noted the "towering hubris" that mars former Secretary Rumsfeld's character and "the grace and humility which he so sorely lacks."⁴² The Bush administration's view of past U.S. administrations is likewise tainted with arrogance and disrespect. Many Bush officials think most past U.S. national-security managers were weak of will and weak of mind. They

believe that wimps made U.S. foreign policy before they arrived on the scene. Bush administration officials learn little from the past because they think past American policy makers, including those in FDR's administration, have little to teach them.

The American people have paid a high price for the Bush administration's mistakes in the war on terror. They suffered on 9/11 and have suffered since in Iraq. The price will likely keep rising until new U.S. leadership appears that is willing to learn from other past and present American policy makers and to apply wisdom gained from America's past wartime experience.

¹ The White House, "President Bush Addresses American Legion National Convention," August 31, 2006, p. 3, retrieved on 9/1/06 from www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/print/20060831-1.html.

² Valuable introductions to U.S. policy in World War II include Kent Roberts Greenfield, *American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963); Warren F. Kimball, "Franklin Roosevelt: 'Dr. Win-the-War,'" in Joseph G. Dawson, *Commanders in Chief: Presidential Leadership in Modern Wars* (University of Kansas Press, 1993), pp. 87-105; Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., *Command Decisions: 20 Crucial Command Decisions That Decided the Outcome of World War II* (Methuen, 1960); Mark Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000); and Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (Oxford University Press, 1979).

³ Louis Morton, "Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II," in Greenfield, *Command Decisions*, pp. 3-38; and Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, pp. 20-21, 29-40.

⁴ Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (Penguin Press, 2006), pp. 30-31. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld echoed Wolfowitz's Iraq-first idea. Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (Free Press, 2004), pp. 30-31.

⁵ The Bush administration had an opportunity to capture al-Qaeda leaders during Operation Anaconda in March 2002 but failed partly because it diverted needed U.S. forces to Iraq. Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda* (Berkley Books, 2005), pp. 85-86.

⁶ Noting al-Qaeda's continued strength are Steven Fidler, "Al-Qaeda Seeks to Expand Its Operations," *Financial Times*, April 21/22, 2007, p. 1; "Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate on Global Terrorism," *The New York Times*, September 27, 2006, p. A6; and David Sanger, "Waging the War on Terror: Report Belies Optimistic View," *The New York Times*, September 27, 2006, p. A6.

⁷ Administration policy toward Afghanistan during 2001-2003 is outlined in Clarke, *Against All Enemies*, pp. 274-79. Discussing deterioration in Afghanistan is David Rohde, "Afghan Symbol for Change Becomes a Symbol for Failure," *The New York Times*, September 5, 2006, p. 1.

⁸ *National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism* (September, 2006), retrieved from www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsc/2006 on 9/6/06), pp. 5, 15.

⁹ Jim Lobe, "Democracy Languishes, But Neocon Strategy Lives," *Antiwar.com*, January 19, 2007, retrieved from <http://antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=10356>.

¹⁰ In 2002, Abu Ghaith announced on an al-Qaeda-affiliated web site, www.alneda.com: "We have a right to kill 4 million Americans — 2 million of them children — and to ... wound and cripple hundreds of thousands"

(quoted in Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (Times Books, 2004), p. 12). A portrait of the jihadis' worldview and violent intentions is provided by Mary Habeck in *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* (Yale University Press, 2006).

¹¹ Peter Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies* (Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 33, Table 2-2.

¹² The sacrifice Americans made in past wars is discussed by Robert D. Hormats in *The Price of Liberty: Paying for America's Wars* (Times Books, 2007). Hormats writes that "in every major war that we have fought, with the exception of Vietnam, there was an effort prior to the war or just after the inception to re-evaluate tax and spending policies and to shift resources from the less vital national pursuits to the strategic objectives of fighting the war." He quotes FDR's statement to the American people in his 1942 State of the Union address: "War costs money. ... That means taxes and bonds and bonds and taxes. It means cutting luxuries and other non-essentials. In a word, it means an 'all-out' war by individual effort and family effort in a united country." Quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, "Don't Ask, Don't Know, Don't Get," *The New York Times*, March 7, 2007.

¹³ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (Random House, 1987), p. 332.

¹⁴ Iran's signals of its willingness to agree to curb its nuclear program are summarized in Flynt Leverett, "Dealing with Tehran" (Century Foundation, December 12, 2006, retrieved from www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=PB&pubid=595 on 1/23/07): 12-13; Flynt Leverett, "Iran: The Gulf Between Us," *The New York Times*, January 24, 2006; and in "Leverett: Bush Administration 'Not Serious' About Dealing With Iran," interview by Bernard Gwertzman with Flynt Leverett, March 31, 2006, Council on Foreign Relations, retrieved from www.cfr.org/publication/10326/ on 9/6/06. The texts of Iran's proposals are posted on line by the Arms Control Association at www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals.asp?print.

¹⁵ North Korea's signals are discussed in Jim Walsh, "Trip Report: DPRK, PRC, ROK, June 25-July 4, 2005" (Managing the Atom Project, BCSIA, Harvard University, n.d.): 4-5, 7-9, 11-13 and *passim*. An account of recent U.S.-North Korean negotiations is Leon V. Sigal, "North Korea: Negotiations Work," (MIT Center for International Studies Audit of the Conventional Wisdom, 07-03, February 2007).

¹⁶ Seymour Hersh, "The Syrian Bet," *The New Yorker*, July 28, 2003; and William James Martin, "Clean Break with the Road Map," *Counterpunch*, February 14/15, 2004, pp. 12-14.

¹⁷ Accounts of FDR's propaganda efforts in World War II include Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II Movies* (Free Press, 1987); Thomas Doherty, *Projections of War: Hollywood, American Culture, and World War II* (Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Fyne, *The Hollywood Propaganda of World War II* (The Scarecrow Press, 1994); Christof Mauch, "Chapter 5: Media War and Black Propaganda," in *The Shadow War Against Hitler* (Columbia University Press, 1999); and Richard Steele, *Propaganda in an Open Society: The Roosevelt Administration and the Media 1933-1941* (Greenwood Press, 1985).

¹⁸ Recent works on the efforts to win the war of ideas during the Cold War both in the "free world" and behind the Iron Curtain include Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union* (New York University Press, 1999); Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956* (Cornell University Press, 2000); Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (University Press of Kansas, 2006); and Gary D. Rawnsley, ed., *Cold-War Propaganda in the 1950s* (St. Martin's, 1999).

¹⁹ A good agenda for waging the war of ideas against al-Qaeda was laid out by Antony Blinken shortly after 9/11 but the Bush administration largely ignored his recommendations. Blinken's advice is in Kurt M. Campbell and Michèle A. Flournoy, *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism* (CSIS Press, 2001): 141-151; and Antony J. Blinken, "Winning the War of Ideas," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 101-114.

²⁰ "The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other," *Pew Global Attitudes Project*, June 12, 2006, question 38; retrieved from <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=253>. Disbelievers that Arabs performed the 9/11 attack outnumbered believers by 59 to 32 percent in Egypt, 59 to 16 percent in Turkey, 65 to 16 percent in Indonesia, and 41 to 16 percent in Pakistan. Ibid.

²¹ Susan B. Epstein, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background and the 9/11 Commission Recommendations* (U.S. Congressional Research Service RL32607; May 1, 2006), p. 5, estimated from Figure 1. Accessed on 5/30/06

at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/66505.pdf>.

²² Ricks, *Fiasco*, pp. 76-81, 101-4.

²³ Ricks, *Fiasco*, pp. 101-4; Michael Isikoff and David Corn, *Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the War in Iraq* (Crown, 2006), pp. 199-200; and Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III* (Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp. 126-29.

²⁴ A summary of FDR's strategy for postwar peace appears in Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft* (Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 101-113.

²⁵ My argument is from Stephanie Kaplan, who maintains in a forthcoming MIT political science Ph.D. dissertation that war is a tonic for terrorist propaganda-making, recruiting, network-building, and training, and thus serves as a general breeding ground for terrorists.

²⁶ On Marshall, see Mark A. Stoler, George C. Marshall: *Soldier-Statesman of the American Century* (Twayne, 1989).

²⁷ The best surveys of Bush administration policy in Iraq are Ricks, *Fiasco*; Isikoff and Corn, *Hubris*; Woodward, *State of Denial*; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone* (Knopf, 2006); and George Packer, *The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).

²⁸ Ricks, *Fiasco*, pp. 33, 80-81, 89, 103-6, 127-8.

²⁹ Clarke, *Against All Enemies*, pp. 231-33. Other misjudgments by Wolfowitz are discussed in Isikoff and Corn, *Hubris*, pp. 52, 66-77, 80-82, 104-5, 110-11, 193-96, 304-5.

³⁰ On Bremer's errors see Ricks, *Fiasco*, pp. 158-66; and Woodward, *State of Denial*, pp. 188-89, 191, 193-200, 205-7, 219-20, 234, 249, 252, 294.

³¹ Ricks, *Fiasco*, pp. 111, 203, 208-212; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Ties to GOP Trumped Know-How Among Staff Sent to Rebuild Iraq," *The Washington Post*, September 17, 2006; and Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City*, pp. 85, 91-94, 211-12.

³² On Wurmser, see James Bamford, *A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies* (Anchor, 2005): 261-65, 268-69, 281, 287-90, 293, 304, 315. In early 2001, Wurmser published a paper advising that the United States and Israel should together destroy the regimes in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and the Palestinian authority. *Ibid.*, p. 268. In 1996, Wurmser also advised incoming Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel should attack Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. Netanyahu wisely declined the advice. *Ibid.*, pp. 262-3.

³³ Woodward, *State of Denial*, pp. 353-54. President Bush declared during the 2002 Congressional campaign that Senate Democrats were "not interested in the security of the American people." Isikoff and Corn, *Hubris*, p. 117n.

³⁴ "The 'Willie Horton' Ad of 2004?", FactCheck.org, 9/28/04, downloaded from <http://www.factcheck.org/article268.html>, 11/27/06.

³⁵ Sharon Burke and Harlan Geer, *The Neo Con: The Bush Defense Record by the Numbers* (Third Way National Security Project, September 2006, retrieved from http://third-way.com/data/product/file/58/The_Neo_Con_9.5.06_final_electronic_version.pdf, on 9/6/06), p. 9.

³⁶ *Ibid.* Also painting a worrying portrait of U.S. performance against al-Qaeda is Carl Conetta, "Pyrrhus on the Potomac: How America's post-9/11 wars have undermined US national security" (Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report #18, September 5, 2006, retrieved from www.comw.org/pda/).

³⁷ I assess the Bush administration's counterterror strategy in Stephen Van Evera, "Bush Administration, Weak on Terror," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter 2006), pp. 28-38.

³⁸ Ricks, *Fiasco*, p. 75.

³⁹ Fareed Zakaria, "The Arrogant Empire," *Newsweek*, March 24, 2003.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* Zakaria reports that a retired senior Turkish diplomat, Ozdem Sanberk, remarked that U.S. abrasiveness helped prevent Turkish support for the 2003 U.S. attack on Iraq: "The way the U.S. has been conducting the negotiations has been, in general, humiliating."

⁴¹ Ricks, *Fiasco*, p. 99.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 169.