Laura Holgate
Vice President for Russia and Newly Independent States Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative

October 15, 2003

Thanks to Harvey and Heidi.

Harvey asked me to talk about US programs to address "loose nukes" and why they are so hard, especially politically. This is a question I ask myself every day, because it would seem like a real no-brainer to lock up and get rid of any material that could be used to make a nuclear bomb. Reality shows us it's a lot harder than that.

Let me present my remarks in three parts:

1. What would a serious loose nukes policy and program look like?
2. How close are current programs to this ideal?
3. Why is it so hard?

Caveat: By focusing on the weapons and materials, we implicitly define proliferation as a supply-side problem. It makes sense to do this because the supply of nuclear materials is easier to control than the demand for nuclear weapons, whether from states or non-state actors. We should still be pursuing parallel policies to improve global security writ large, in ways that reduce the chances that states will pursue nuclear weapons to increase their own security, and to "dry up the swamps" of misery, chaos, violence and disaffection that spawn and nurture terrorists. These will take much longer, however, and we don't have time to wait.

A Real Loose Nukes Approach

• Policy: It will be the policy of the US that all nuclear material (by which I mean material that can be used in a nuclear weapon), wherever located in whatever form, shall transparently be secured and accounted for by its owners--with assistance from others, if necessary--and removed or destroyed if it cannot be secured or if it has no legitimate purpose.
• Objectives, more or less in priority order:
  • Secure all nuclear weapons to highest standards
  • Secure all nuclear materials to highest standards
    
    • Military/Civilian
    • Processing/storage/transport
      
  • Detect clandestine weapons programs
  • End production of additional nuclear weapons or materials
    
    • Weapons facilities
    • Fuel cycle facilities
      
  • Destroy all unnecessary/illegitimate nuclear weapons
  • Destroy all unnecessary/illegitimate nuclear materials
    
    • Military
    • Civilian
      
  • Detect/prevent nuclear smuggling
    
    • Out of host country
    • Into target country
      
  • Prevent access to nuclear materials or weapon-relevant information
    
    • People
    • Documents/data
      
  • Destroy unnecessary/illegitimate delivery systems
    
• US programs to achieve these goals must be
  
  • Cooperative with other like-minded nations, and prepared to be coercive with recalcitrants
    
  • Balance comprehensiveness with priorities
    
  • Flexible and responsive
    
  • Integrated and coordinated
    
    • Domestically
      
    • Internationally (see above)
      
  • Enjoy attention and support at highest levels of government
    
  • Adequately funded
    
  • Adequately staffed
    
    • Quantity
      
    • Expertise

Are we there yet? Rating Progress Toward this Ideal

• Policy: Bush has articulated a policy of keeping the bad stuff out of the hands of the bad guys, not a bad first start, and he has elevated preemption from a technique to a tenet, which could be problematic. Other long-standing US policies of support for the NPT and the IAEA; specific regional policies on North Korea, Iran, and South Asia; support for a ban on fissile material production; and other specific approaches, none of which add up to a comprehensive statement like the one I mentioned.
  
• Objectives: most are consistent with current US and international approaches, but programmatic gaps remain. Let's run through them and see what the holes are.
  
  • Secure all nuclear weapons to highest standards
    
    • Doing OK on US weapons
      
    • Working with Russia on some of their weapons (why not all?)
      
    • Not worrying about UK or French weapons, and probably not Israel's either
      
    • Should be worrying about Indian, Pakistani, probably North Korean, and possibly Chinese weapons-no programs
      
  • Secure all nuclear materials to highest standards
    
    • Doing OK with US military materials, room for improvement on US civilian materials (e.g., MIT reactor)
      
    • Some US oversight of US-origin materials exported elsewhere
      
    • Working with Russia on some military and civilian materials (why not all?)
      
    • Working with non-Russian FSU on military and civilian materials
      
    • Limited steps with China, Pakistan, and maybe India
      
    • No cooperation on civilian Pu accumulating in Europe and Japan
      
    • No programs with South Africa's indigenously produced HEU
      
    • IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service available to any who ask, but not binding
      
  • Detect clandestine weapons programs
    
    • IAEA safeguards system-limited to NPT signatories, doesn't prevent "line dancing" à la Iran
      
  • End production of additional nuclear weapons or materials
    
    • All US weapons materials production reactors shutdown since 1980s
      
    • Russian Pu production reactor shutdown in place but rocky
      
    • Russian assembly-disassembly facilities have gone from 4 to 3 under Nuclear Cities Initiative
      
    • No constraints on Israeli, Indian or Pakistani production
      
    • Ineffective attempts to halt North Korean production
      
    • FisBan stalled in UN
      
    • US anti-reprocessing policy ineffective in halting accumulation of civilian Pu in Europe and Japan
      
    • Israeli attack on Osirak
      
  • Destroy all unnecessary/illegitimate nuclear warheads
    
    • US warhead destruction slowed by problems at Pantex
      
    • No programs to assist in Russian warhead destruction
      
    • UK, France and China not pursuing warhead destruction
      
    • Prepared for warhead destruction in Iraq but none found
      
    • No openings for cooperation with India, Israel, North Korea or Pakistan
      
  • Destroy all unnecessary/illegitimate nuclear materials
    
    • US destroying 175 tonnes of HEU unilaterally
      
    • Russia destroying 500 tonnes of HEU with US
      
    • US-Russian disposition of 34 tonnes of Pu in troubled negotiation (why not more?)
      
    • Some programs to reduce HEU stocks at civil facilities in Russia, Soviet republics and clients, US clients (why not globally?)
      
    • Commercial MOX not reducing stocks of separated civil Pu in Europe or Japan
      
  • Detect/prevent nuclear smuggling
    
    • Second Line of Defense cooperation with Russia and other FSU (not comprehensive)
      
    • Proliferation Security Initiative
      
    • US Homeland Security Agency efforts very limited
      
    • IAEA nuclear smuggling cooperation
      
  • Prevent access to nuclear materials or weapon-relevant information
    
    • US personnel probably not a large concern
      
    • Employment stabilization programs for Russia and other FSU focus on scientists (why not others?)
      
    • Export control cooperation in Russia, FSU, many others
      
  • Destroy unnecessary/illegitimate delivery systems
    
    • INF treaty eliminated entire class of delivery systems
      
    • US START/SORT-mandated destruction on course
      
    • CTR support to Russia keeping START/SORT-mandated destructions on course
      
    • CTR support to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine eliminating their strategic systems
      
    • No arms-control requirements for UK, France or China (yet?)
      
    • Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund-one-off projects
      
    • SCUD destruction in Iraq
      
    • No hope of destruction in India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan
      
  • US programs to achieve these goals must be
    
    • Cooperative with other like-minded nations, and prepared to be coercive with recalcitrants: G-8 GP a great step, needs more action; preemption in Iraq probably lost more ground that it gained
      
    • Balance comprehensiveness with priorities: missed chance in 2001 Non-Pro Review, currently neither comprehensive nor prioritized, opportunity-limited
      
    • Flexible and responsive: CTR a particular problem-more legislative barnacles every year, DOE more flexible but bureaucratically weak and timid
      
    • Integrated and coordinated
      
      • Domestically: poor though possibly better than 3 years ago, but NSC unable to hold agencies accountable to executing Presidential vision
        
      • Internationally: some ad-hoc structures, but little detailed interaction at program level
        
    • Enjoy attention and support at highest levels of government: rhetoric not reflected in reality-opportunity limited
      
    • Adequately funded: $1B/year is not enough, GP is admission of that, Baker-Cutler says $3B/year for nukes alone
      
    • Adequately staffed
      
      • Quantity: small and circular cadre
        
      • Expertise: often not adequate on technical or economic grounds

Why is it so hard?

• Outdated norms: NPT's grand bargain legitimizes "peaceful" nuclear development that comes right up to the line of dangerous behavior, whether Iran's fuel cycle facilities or Belarus's research reactor. Need to rethink in light of technology advances and increased awareness of terrorist threat.
  
• Nuclear non-members: NPT's limitations on cooperation with non-members complicates cooperation with India, Israel, Pakistan on nuclear materials security and weapons safety. Need to figure out how to interact with them without legitimizing their weapons programs.
  
• Weak standards: Physical Protection Convention binding but limited, and INFCIRC 225 rev 4 limited and not binding, no consensus on higher standards. Need to focus on best practices in near term, perhaps building towards improved standards.
  
• Sovereign sensitivities: Weapons programs and facilities are crown jewels of national security, even when oversized. Natural that cooperation is hard, but also used as an excuse to avoid cooperation. Need to find a way to balance international interests in transparency with legitimate national security secrecy.
  
• Differing threat perceptions: Most nations outside the US think WMD proliferation is mostly the US's problem, and that we'll solve it for us which will solve it for them. Russia humors us in cooperative programs but expends no serious political capital to address internal or external threats, despite Putin's statements echoing Bush's. G-8 GP's slow start shows this on both sides (donor and recipient).
  
• Attitudes towards US: Perceptions that US is not living up to Article 6 commitments devalue our voice on nonproliferation. Recent policies on testing, mini-nukes and preemption reinforce these attitudes, and need to be reconsidered in terms of their impact on current or future proliferants. We need to be better at "selling" our progress on Article 6, but also at recruiting other, more appealing, voices, such as Kazakhstan, Canada, Sweden.
  
• US approach to cooperative programs: Our system of parliamentary oversight, public accountability and competitive procurement often meshes poorly with partners' practices and limits areas of cooperation owing to access disputes, funding unpredictability, contracting disputes, and other legal/political/cultural restrictions.
  
• Inconsistent US policy toward Russia: SORT approach means Russia no longer threatens us, but refusal to help secure tacnukes implies we still see them as a threat.
  
• Shallow US support for cooperative programs: Only a few people actually oppose threat reduction cooperation, but even fewer actively support it. Most legislators don't even know what threat reduction means or how it fits with our national security policies. Most that do know about it will go along with it but not take tough stands in its defense. Many hear "assistance" and think "foreign aid," but personal experience indicates that citizens, when exposed to the arguments and the successes, can tell the difference and are supportive. Congressional opponents take advantage of Pentagon apathy on threat reduction.
  
• US bureaucratic obstacles: interagency rivalries, stovepiped programs, poor management and high personnel turnover combine with a lack of vision, unclear priorities and vague goals to hobble progress. Many of these obstacles can be found in partner bureaucracies as well.

Bottom line: loose nukes are not really anyone's top priority. When push comes to shove, no one pushes or shoves for threat reduction. Other priorities win out: contracting orthodoxy, flat budgets, turf protection, etc.

The real miracle is how much has gotten done despite these immense challenges. The key is dedicated, motivated staff with activist leadership who refuse to accept business as usual, matched by the same in a partner country who sees such cooperation to be in their interest. Our challenge is to try to create these conditions wherever we can.

Laura Holgate joined NTI after serving in a number of senior positions in the federal government. She managed the Cooperative Threat Reduction program at the U.S. Department of Defense, which provides assistance to Russia and the new independent states in securing and destroying excess nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and materials. She also served as director of the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition at the U.S. Department of Energy.

Back to seminar schedule, Fall 2003