Security Studies Program

Islamist Wars of Ideas

Marc Lynch
Williams College

March 7, 2007

• Lynch wants to refocus the “war of ideas”
  • U.S. is not major player in war of ideas in Middle East as we often assume
    
• Al-Qaeda is a constructivist political actor seeking to shift the identity of the region; should be measured in this way, not by the number of attacks
• Al-Qaeda
  • Defines them as a constructivist actor
    • They are obviously engaged in terrorism and military actions, but these acts are in the service of a larger political project
    • Al-Qaeda has clearly shifted from centrally directed organization to more dispersed group (Al-Qaeda 2.0)
      • This new group is ideally adapted to being an effective constructivist actor: relies on networks, more tape releases, fewer attacks
      • This was forced upon Al-Qaeda by OEF, not a strategic choice, but the ongoing polemic between Zawahiri and the Muslim Brotherhood over involvement of Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in elections reveals a great deal
        • The network as currently constructed transcends international boundaries
      • Long-term strategy of AQ is apparent
        • Has individual and collective component, but different approach than other Islamists
          • AQ wants to frighten or inspire Muslims to accept their identity of “Muslim” over others, but it is not enough to wage internal jihad or join Muslim Brotherhood, instead one must prioritize jihad as defined in their narrow, aggressive way
            • The breaking point in the war of ideas is identity of what it means to be a Muslim, which is raging within Islam
              • Western efforts to fight for liberalism and/or secularism are largely irrelevant to this struggle
• Media environment and war of ideas
  • Television, internet, and face to face are major battlefields
    • Both AQ and U.S. are focusing on waging media campaigns and examples from above, which are ineffective compared to long-term, social network building of Muslim Brotherhood
  • Al-Jazeera
    • Originally important to AQ's strategy, piggybacked on political discourse of Al-Jazeera until a few years ago
      • “Al-Jazeera moment” from 1997-2003 was unique and won't happen again, had news field in Arab world to itself, now faces many competitors
      • Al-Jazeera became the “common knowledge” of Arab society in 2001
      • Al-Jazeera covered Palestine, Iraq, reform issues, and responsibility of U.S. for problems with each (Lynch did content analysis on this)
      • Negative agenda of Al-Jazeera was similar to AQ, but positive agenda was different (AJ supported democracy, women's rights, etc.)
      • Arab television market is now dense, cannot be monopolized anymore by Al-Jazeera or AQ
• Lynch supported Bush democracy promotion agenda to crowd out AQ's message, focus debate on positive agenda, although he didn't agree with much of the strategy
• Internet
  • Strengths
    • In link between identity and actions, it self-selects well-motivated recruits and carries them that last mile
  • Weaknesses
    • Average person will not put in effort to click through jihadist websites most of the time
  • AQ has increasingly turned to the internet, Zarqawi put beheading videos online, drew those interested
  • Zawahiri videos now released on internet with English subtitles
  • Laura Mansfield has AQ postings almost immediately
• Face-to-face
  • Most neglected part of U.S. efforts
  • Exchange programs reach too few people, harder to get visa now
  • Embassy officials often trapped in embassy
  • AQ face-to-face is now in self-starting cells (like London )
    
• Egypt
  • Muslim Brotherhood is most successful group at war of ideas in 20^th century
    • Pragmatic adjustment to opportunities
    • Provision of schools, health clinics, etc. are key parts of this strategy
    • “All politics is local,” Egyptians respond to local problems, examples
      
• Danish cartoons
  • Should be taken very seriously in terms of what it represents for wars of ideas, potential for grassroots action
    
• Iraq
  • Biggest issue in Arab world now, may have even surpassed discussion of Palestinian issue right now
  • Iraq has been source for providing attacks, videos, support for parts of their narrative
  • U.S. has maneuvered itself into a position where AQ will claim victory no matter what happens
    
• Anti-Americanism
  • AQ has won on this front, negative ideas about America are deeply entrenched and widely held
    
• Democracy
  • AQ has clearly lost, demands for such political reforms is deeply entrenched, although not liberal, western style democracy
  • Democracy increasingly supported as anti-American issue due to U.S. treatment of Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood election successes
    
• Targeting civilians
  • AQ losing this fight, U.S. winning it, but mainly because of terrorist attacks on Muslims (Jordan, etc.), not due to U.S. efforts
    
• Takfir debate
  • Rejection of is most important marker of moderation, acceptance of is most important marker of extremism
    
• U.S. needs to pick which war of ideas it wants to win
  • Muslim Brotherhood makes good partner in push for democracy and not targeting civilians, but will create more Islamic society, may have other goals U.S. does not support
  • U.S. does not have infrastructure to succeed at local level
    
• Al-Qaeda does not want to capture Iraq, would prefer smaller communities of “true” Muslims in a place like Anbar
  • AQ does not want nation-state system, but increasingly operating regionally within it
    
• Sunni-Shia
  • Caught a lot of political actors in region by surprise, none have effectively dealt with it yet
    • Good evidence this is top down directed hatred, violence
      • Possibly preparing for war with Iran, having to deal with events like Hizballah war, Saddam's hanging, etc.

Rapporteur: Peter Krause

back to Wednesday Seminar Series, Spring 2007