Security Studies Program Seminar

What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat

Louise Richardson
Executive Dean, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study

February 20, 2008

How is Terrorism Defined?

• Richardson defines terrorism as the deliberate targeting of noncombatants for a political purpose
  • Her research focus is on non-state terrorism, although that does not mean she considers so-called “state terrorism” somehow morally superior, she just chooses to focus on non-state terrorism
  • “Terrorism” should not be a normative definition; the focus should be on means and not ends
• Key characteristics of terrorism
  • The act is politically inspired
  • The act involves violence (she does not think cyberterrorism qualifies)
  • Terrorism is symbolic; the perpetrators want to have an impact that extends beyond the act itself
  • The goal is to communicate a political message, not defeat the enemy
  • The victim(s) of an attacks and the audience are not the same
  • Deliberate targeting of noncombatants is an essential part of any terrorist act
  • Terrorists are invariably weaker than their opponents

Four Common Myths About Terrorism

• Myth #1: Terrorism is new, especially the mixing of religion and politics
  • No, terrorism has existed for thousands of years and before the French Revolution religiously inspired terrorism was more the rule than the exception
• Myth #2: Terrorism stems only from Islam
  • No, there are terrorists from all major religions and walks of life, Islam has no monopoly on terrorism
• Myth #3: Terrorists are not normal, rational beings
  • Most studies of terrorism demonstrate that terrorists are generally quite sane
  • The tactic of suicide bombing maximizes minimal capabilities, and terrorist leaders often talk in cold cost-benefit terms
• Myth #4: Terrorists are amoral
  • All terrorists Richardson has met believe passionately in the morality of their cause, immorality of their enemy's cause

What are the Causes of Terrorism?

• There is no single explanation for terrorism
  • There are too many types of terrorists for one explanation to work, yet…
  • There are so few terrorists that terrorism is a microphenomenon that further defies monocausal explanations
• Lethal cocktail that leads to the emergence of terrorist acts
  • Disaffected individual
  • Enabling community
    • Recent change is that online communities can now serve that role in some capacity
  • Legitimizing ideology

Does Terrorism Work?

• It is impossible to answer the question of whether terrorism works unless you can find out what terrorists want to achieve
  • Terrorists have primary and secondary motives
    • Primary motives include the achievement of autonomy or secession by nationalist groups or the replacement of secular law with religious law by religious groups
      • Primary motives are generally not common across all groups
    • Secondary motives are common across all kinds of groups
      • The three R's
        • Revenge
          • Sometimes personal, more often revenge for community with which terrorist identifies
          • Terrorists see themselves as playing David to the state's Goliath; see state as the aggressor
        • Renown
          • Publicity is a central objective, but also glory for the individual and the cause
          • Committing a terrorist act can enhance social status for individual attackers, whereas for a terrorist leader it can lead to national and global renown
        • Reaction
          • Terrorist attacks demonstrate the existence of a resistance and its strength
            • State reaction does the same; the scale of the state reaction may be more important than the details
      • Terrorists have been much more successful at achieving the three R's than their primary motives
      • Motivations that have motivated soldiers are not that different than the motivations of terrorists

The U.S. and Terrorism

• Declaring a war on terrorism plays directly into terrorists' hands
  • This makes it easier for terrorists to commit revenge with our troops there and it creates more actions for which revenge is desired
  • The U.S. gives them renown and reaction, we elevate their stature by our actions
  • The goal of defensive warfare is to deny an adversary the objectives he seeks, by declaring war on terror the U.S. is making the achievement of the terrorists' objectives more possible
  • Unfortunately, the U.S. has insisted on learning from its own mistakes, rather than those of others from the past
    • Mistakes of the U.S. “War on Terror”
      • Declaration of war on terrorism will be seen as major mistake, one cannot (and should not) declare a war on a tactic
      • Conflating U.S. enmity with Saddam and Osama led to disastrous policy choices
      • Failing to mobilize the international community effectively after 9/11 was a major mistake
      • Failing to educate the American populace about terrorism and the assessment of risk was a major missed opportunity
• The U.S. should readjust its goals to contain the threat from terrorism rather than making a war on it
  • This policy should be guided by 6 principles
    • Have a defensible and achievable goal (cannot eliminate terrorism, can contain it)
    • Live by your principles (the example of George Washington during the Revolutionary War and the treatment of POWs)
    • Know your enemy (intelligence assets are key)
    • Separate terrorists from their communities (since they are dependent on that support)
    • Engage others with you in this campaign (both international community and moderates in key countries)
    • Have patience and keep perspective (the U.S. is not more endangered now than during the Cold War)
  • Being tough on terrorism is not the same as being effective, the worry is being labeled “soft” on terrorism
    • The U.S. should focus on what is effective instead of what looks tough

Observations from Recent Project on Democracies and Counterterrorism

• Three general observations
  • Governments' counterterrorist practices improve with time
    • There is no silver bullet (military, intelligence, or otherwise)
    • Governments that combined carrots and sticks were most successful
  • Discriminate use of force was/is key to effectiveness
  • Conciliatory measures: the mobilization of moderates was essential to success
• Of the three parts of the lethal cocktail of terrorism, states (and the U.S.) have the most potential influence on communities, not disaffected individuals or ideologies, and should plan accordingly

Rapporteur: Peter Krause

Back to Wednesday Seminar Series, Spring 2008