Unite or Die: Balance of Power and the Construction of the European Community

Security Studies Program Seminar

Unite or Die: Balance of Power and the Construction of the European Community

Sebastian Rosato
University of Notre Dame

September 16, 2009

Rosato’s presentation focused on a simple but theoretically and empirically weighty question, namely: what accounts for the construction of the European Community (EC, later the European Union, or EU) out of a group of sovereign states?

The issue has both practical implications – EC formation suggests the nation-state system has moved towards supranational union and dampened the risk of war – and theoretical significance – the EC is the most significant example of cooperation in modern times central to the liberal and constructivist paradigms

Analysts need to explain three phases of EC/EU history: its 1) construction, 2) maintenance, and 3) stagnation

Integration is defined as a form of centralized cooperation whereby states agree to joint control over their militaries or economies, or to cede authority over military or economic affairs to a supranational organization

Unlike other forms of cooperation, integration entails centralization

Each period sees certain key policy decision in the areas of politics, military affairs, and money/trade that must be accounted for in any theoretical framework

During the formation of the European Community in 1945-1957, the major integration initiatives are the Euro Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European Defense Community (EDC), and European Economic Community (EEC), Bretton Woods system
This led to a period of maintenance (1958-1999) during which trade further integrates, monetary integration changes forms but not function as the Bretton Woods system collapses, while military integration fails to occur
And continues today in a period of stagnation and unraveling (1989-present) witness to stasis in political and military integration and the gradual unraveling of economic integration

Rosato offers a balance of power explanation for EC/EU formation, maintenance, and stagnation

A balance of power explanation contends integration is best understood as a consequence of the prevailing distribution of power

Here, state goals and power competition condition state behaviors

Security is a state’s first priority, followed by sovereignty and the competition for power and wealth.
In order to ensure security states seek power (quantitative and qualitative aspects)

In an anarchic world, a state has three options to confront a security threat: 1) buck-passing, 2) balancing (quantitative and qualitative) 3) bandwagoning
The logic of cooperation emerges based on whether one faces a superior or vastly superior competitor

With a superior competitor, one can either buck-pass or balance
With a vastly superior competitor, one faces the choice of balancing or bandwagoning

To balance under this condition, one is forced to centralize and develop the means of balancing, likely with a balancing coalition
This requires both the means of balancing and opportunity to organize

Yet even after the decision to balance is made and the opportunity emerges, there is still the issue of control over the integrated coalition

With a symmetric distribution of power in the integrating coalition, states will integrate (i.e. share control) because none can seize control
With an asymmetric coalition, states will unify since the most powerful member will seize control

Rosato tests the balance of power explanation against two competing theories of EU formation from the liberal and constructivist paradigm

The liberal paradigm is represented by Moravcsik’s theory that the EC/EU formed due to the political efforts of particular groups within European nations who would derive economic benefits from integration
Parsons’s contention that the EC/EU represents a particular (i.e. non-generalizable) outcome of the ideas evolving in Europe after the experiences of World War II

How do the competing explanations fare?

At the systemic level, the distribution of power is vastly in the Soviet Union’s favor even as the European states show a marked proclivity to balance against it

Yet only the presence of the United States provides Europe a window of opportunity in which to balance

Balance of power calculations – particularly the rivalry between France and Germany – encourage the trend towards some sort of coalition

The temporary weakness of Germany, integration rather than simple unification

When one looks at the record of elite debates there is little evidence in EEC or EDC calculations of the desire for economic gains or of any ideational/normative influence
The logic of the argument suggests the elimination of the USSR will eliminate the integration incentive and therefore curtail the trend

This is exactly what happens: economic integration comes to a standstill – albeit with continuation of the trends extant at the end of the Cold War - while military integration is still-borne

Prosperity can keep the status quo from unraveling, but integration is unlikely to move forward
Overall, the evidence is strongly weighted in favor of the suggestion that the EC/EU was a European effort at better competing against the USSR during the Cold War

This balance of power account of EC/EU formation explains the uniqueness of EC/EU and further illuminates why one does not find similarly extensive instances of integration elsewhere

Simply put, other coalitions in, e.g., Asia, Africa, and so on lack either the means or opportunity to integrate when faced with an external incentive

In terms of competing explanations, it is interesting that economic interdependence is actually greater in other coalitions/alliances, yet no integration occurs
The constructivist argument is explicitly non-generalizable, so the non-finding is less of a surprise. The problem here, though, is its inability to explain attempts at integration that fail

back to Wednesday Seminar Series, Fall 2009