Security Studies Program Seminar

Gulliver’s Troubles: America, Obama and the Middle East

Aaron David Miller
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

May 6, 2009

There is still not much hope for the prospect of a negotiated settlement in Palestine, for the following reasons:

• America is a modern-day Gulliver, tied up by small powers. When they are not tying us up, we are tying ourselves up with illusions. We are neither feared, respected nor admired in an increasingly critical region. These failures began 16 years ago under Bill Clinton and persisted through George W. Bush’s terms. If we cannot succeed in peacemaking and in war-making, then maybe our great power in this region of the world is not so great. Being a great power means we cannot be said “no” to without consequence, and that does not appear to be the case.
• The reasons for our failure have nothing to do with any illusory decline. Instead, we are simply dealing with a dysfunctional part of the world that eludes resolution. In the Middle East, we are in an investment trap — we cannot fix it and cannot run away from it. So we need to define cruelly and unforgivingly what our interests in the region actually are.
• A Pax Americana in this region is not borne out empirically. At best we have had moments of success (1973, 1979, 1991), punctuated by drift, near-success and abject failure. We cannot build an empire if no one is actually doing our bidding; more often, we are the ones being manipulated.
• We allow our domestic politics to inhibit the options available to us. Our special relationship with Israel exists independently of any of our hard interests, but it has little to do with foreign lobbies — instead, the relationship is based on value affinity. Over the last 16 years, the special relationship with Israel morphed into an exclusive relationship — without reciprocity, to the detriment of American (and likely Israeli) interests.
• We do not call the Israelis out on behaviors that complicate our policy (i.e., settlements).
• We are far too ready and willing to uncritically respond to Israeli ideas (i.e., Camp David).
• We use Israel’s needs and requirements as the point of departure for what our interests are.
• Some have convinced themselves that we cannot be Israel’s friend and an effective mediator at the same time. This is not true. We can never be an honest broker, but the Sadat-Begin deal was nevertheless struck. Sadat understood the paradox of America as a partial mediator.
• If we did not have our relationship with Israel, the phone probably would not ring at all. We just need to learn how to use that relationship wisely, without allowing it to become exclusive.

Advice to Obama:

• Do not see the world the way you want it to be, or as a set of possibilities; see it the way it is. For instance, the 2000 Camp David summit never should have taken place. Neither the Israelis, nor the Palestinians, nor Bill Clinton were prepared; the possibility of a conflict-ending agreement was slim to none.
• We have a split-the-difference view of the world, driven by our geography and attendant physical security. This explains our optimism — our belief that every problem has a solution, and that everybody is more or less like us.
• It also explains our arrogance. On eighth day of Camp David, we discussed the worst possible issue: Jerusalem. Americans tried to navigate this issue with all kinds of clever fixes (such as giving the Israelis below-ground rights to the sacred spaces and the Palestinians above-ground rights). All these solutions failed because Jerusalem is not meant to be shared.
• Look to the past, not as a prison but as a source of information. History is rarely used to make arguments in a policy setting, yet it teaches prudence and guards against great-power perceptions of omniscience and omnipotence.
• Between 1945 and 1952, no Americans were killed by Japanese during the occupation of that country. We should have looked to the lessons from Japan before jumping into Iraq.
• Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan are long ordeals with ambiguous measures of success. Obama needs a Middle East policy initiative for which success is both possible and measurable. The Arab-Israeli conflict could provide a suitable arena — it is familiar and has tangible measures of success. But there are two competing realities here: (1) The Israeli-Palestinian issue is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. (2) The prospect of a conflict-ending agreement which resolves conclusively the four major issues (borders, security, refugees and Jerusalem) is unimaginable now.
• Until there is a unified Palestinian government, there is no way forward.
• In Israel, there is a more organized form of dysfunction — a new generation of prime ministers (1996 onward) who may not have the moral authority and historical legitimacy to make the required decisions.
• A 100% territorial exchange will be required, as was the case in 1979. If Obama does not understand that, there is no point in getting involved.
• There is an unprecedented degree of external intrusion into the peace process (Hezbollah, Hamas). These players have put new issues on the table (i.e., Iran), and a once hermetically sealed peace process has now become regionalized.
• An Israeli-Syrian agreement would be doable, but it is not clear how to deal with that issue independently from the Palestinian and Iranian tracks.

Q&A

Q. You say the U.S. needs to focus down on its interests in the region — so what are they?
A. With respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, nation-building is not in our interest. With respect to Iran, no one knows how the story will end. Sanctions do not work; we have not yet tried diplomacy, but it is not clear the Iranians are interested in meeting us in the middle anyway. We need and do not have a Secretary of State who has the deviousness, toughness and relationship with the President to make a run at an approach in the region that offers a chance of success. There is no indication we have a clear understanding of what our interests are and how best to protect them.

Q. A more optimistic view of the Arab-Israeli conflict is that many pieces are in place for a comprehensive settlement, and that we are better off now than we were 20 years ago. There is no more radical rejection; now majorities of the publics on both sides want the same terms. The most important element missing is an American-defined peace plan, which would deal with the extremists on both sides by applying both carrots and sticks.
A. It is hard to get anything done on this issue. A comprehensive American plan such as the one you proposed would go beyond anything we have ever done; for instance, the administration is probably not prepared for what it is going to be like to deal with Jerusalem and the Golan Heights simultaneously.

Q. Your analysis of the past highlights how many factors were weighted toward success, and yet there was failure. Now many of these factors are gone (i.e., a coherent Palestinian government). So what are the most important obstacles to progress now?
A. First, an absence of leaders who are masters rather than prisoners of their politics. Secondly, there does not appear to be a way to bridge the gaps on the two identity issues (Jerusalem and refugees). The second constraint could be alleviated with an American plan, but Obama should first work internally with Israelis and Palestinians to see whether the gaps can be bridged.

Q. You say the U.S. is not really an honest broker but that we could still be an effective broker. Is it possible that we need another party operating on behalf of the agreement in this process, such as Russia?
A. Negotiations survive because they are based on a balance of interests. When we understand how to use the Israeli relationship, which is to be reassuring but equally tough-minded, we can be successful. Other countries can add value with respect to several off-the-table benefits; they can provide money, technical expertise, etc. But on the core issue, you need a lawyer whose client is the agreement.

Q. You note a lack of unity on Palestinian side; what should be the U.S. role in trying to foster that unity? Should we prop up Abbas, establish a security force in the West Bank, or keep our hands off?
A. Our capacity to play an active role is probably limited. This is an internal affair — perhaps we could find a way to help repair it but not by intruding. For instance, if we opened a dialogue with Hamas, the government of Israel would have a justifiable and ready-made issue on which to distract, divert and derail any American initiative.

Q. What is the best solution to the refugee issue?
A. It is hard to look at these issues in isolation because there are tradeoffs between them. In addition, it is not known how many Palestinians are actually left who, between 1947 and 1949, found themselves outside of their homes.

Q. Earlier you offered the Japanese occupation as a missed history lesson. Had we not already paid the price for Japanese occupation during World War II?
A. The broader point is that prior to the invasion of Iraq, we did not look at the nature of the situations in which we had been involved on the one hand and were about to be involved on the other. Germany was also successfully occupied. In a war of discretion like Iraq, a greater premium is placed on competency, and we just did not think this through.

Q. Someone might say George W. Bush initially had the same hands-off attitude toward the Israeli-Palestine conflict as Obama — due, analogously, to Bill Clinton’s failure — but that eventually, in 2008, he had to rush to put an agreement together that also failed. Maybe there will be something not of our choosing that is going to happen, and we will need a plan.
A. I am only arguing that if this administration goes forward with a more comprehensive approach, they need to keep in mind some of the lessons of the past. Every administration emerges throwing out the advice of its predecessors. In this case Obama ought to throw out the past 16 years, but should still look back to an earlier time.

Q. Surely U.S. domestic politics will have a lot to do with the outcome.
A. Governing is about choosing, and you only care about what you own. Obama has to find a way to set his priorities, and the Arab-Israeli conflict is a slow-moving one. He has bigger campaign commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention Iran. But, given the hopelessness of these other situations, the “100-year headache” of the Arab-Israeli conflict might be a fruitful issue area for him.

Rapporteur: Nathan Black

back to Wednesday Seminar Series, Spring 2009