Does Levine (in "Materialism and Qualia") hold that:
(1) partly in response to the inverted spectrum argument, some functionalists gave up the
idea that all mental states are functional states?
(2) some identity statements do not leave an explanatory gap?
(3) pain is identical to c-fiber firing?
(4) if pain is a functional state, science will probably discover that it is?
(5) even if pain is in fact identical to the opening of D-valves,
God could have created pain without creating D-valves?
Does Stoljar (in "Two Conceptions...") hold that:
(6) a priori o-physicalism is false?
(7) qualia supervene with metaphysical necessity on physical properties (understood on the theory-based conception)?
(8) God created triangles and pieces of pie?
(9) consciousness willl always remain a mystery?
(10) we have reason to believe that qualia are sometimes causally efficacious with respect to physical events?
url=http://mit.edu/abyrne/www/2409S06PS10.html