24.09 Minds and Machines

(1) Let 'A' and 'B' be names (e.g. 'Jessica Simpson', 'Mercury', 'Igor Ivanovich Sikorsky'), or descriptions with the definite article (e.g. 'the inventor of the helicopter', 'the closest planet to the Sun', 'the soon-to-be-ex wife of Nick Lachey'). If 'A' and 'B' are rigid, then 'A = B' is noncontingent (necessarily true or necessarily false).
Is the converse true? That is, if 'A = B' is noncontingent, are 'A' and 'B' rigid?

(2) According to Armstrong, was Brentano a Materialist?

(3) Does Armstrong think the mind-body problem can be solved without conceptual analysis?

(4) Does Armstrong think a Materialist should analyse the property of being red as "[that property] of a physical surface, whatever [it is], that characteristically produces red sensations in us"?

(5) According to Putnam, is the functional-state hypothesis incompatible with dualism?

(6) According to Putnam, is the main problem with the behavior disposition theory that there is no species-independent kind of pain behavior?

(7) According to Lewis, is it necessary that pain = c-fiber firing?

(8) Does Lewis think that enough physics lessons would tell him what it's like to taste Vegemite?

(9) Does Lewis think that someone who doesn't know what it's like to taste vegemite is lacking some information?

(10) Consider the following three claims:
a. There are no nomological danglers.
b. If functionalism is true, physicalism (in the sense of Block, p. 95) is false.
c. Functionalism is true.
Could these three claims be true together? Or must at least one of them be false? In other words: are these claims jointly consistent or inconsistent?