24.09 Minds and Machines

Does Putnam (in "The meaning of 'meaning'") accept that
(1) it is (metaphysically) possible that water isn't H2O?
(2) there is a possible world in which pencils are organisms?
(3) if two speakers are in exactly the same psychological state ("in the narrow sense"), then their words apply to the same things?
(4) cats, for all we know, might be robots controlled from Mars?
(5) frying pans could be made out of molybdenum?
(6) meanings are not in the head?
(7) a molybdenum knife could cut the pie any way you like?
(8) if word W1 in my vocabulary means the same as (is synonymous with) word W2 in my vocabulary, then I will know that W1 and W2 are synonymous?
(9) terms for furniture exhibit the "division of linguistic labor"?

Does Burge (in "Individualism and the Mental") accept that
(10) 'Bertrand thinks that water is not fit to drink' is an intensional context?
(11) there is a possible world in which overstuffed single-seat armchairs are sofas?
(12) a sentence provides the content of someone's belief?
(13) only butchers can fully understand the word 'brisket'?
(14) the "arthritis" thought-experiment involves imagining that there is a planet far from Earth on which the word 'arthritis' applies not only to arthritis but to various other rheumatoid ailments?
(15) partial understanding of a word is a quite rare phenomenon?
(16) the sort of argument in "The meaning of 'meaning'" applies to more words than a Burge-style argument?