Does Dretske (in "A Recipe for Thought") hold that:
(1) Fodor's disjunction problem is easier than the problem of misrepresentation?
(2) the relevant functions in his recipe for thought are acquired phylogentically?
(3) no additional theory is needed to account for the way beliefs rationalize behavior?
Does McKinsey (in "Anti-Individualism...") hold that:
(4) Davidson defends the traditional version of privileged access?
(5) it is knowable only a posteriori that Paris Hilton exists only if Kathy Hilton exists?
(6) externalism should be formulated in terms of metaphysical entailment?
(7) externalism is true?
(8) one cannot be mistaken about whether one is in pain?
(9) if (2b) and (3) are true, (1) is false?
(10) Does Brueckner (speaking on behalf of the externalist or "anti-individualist"), claim that the proposition that Oscar is thinking that water is wet fails to conceptually imply that Oscar inhabits an environment containing H2O but not XYZ?
url=http://mit.edu/abyrne/www/2409S06PS7.html