24.09 Minds and Machines

Does Tye (in "Visual Qualia...") hold that:
(1) visual experiences have no intrinsic, non-intentional or non-representational features?
(2) the property blue is both a property of the ocean and a property of one's visual experience when one sees the ocean?
(3) in order to have a visual experience of the determinate hue red₁₉, one must possess the concept red₁₉?
(4) it is possible to express in words the complete content of one's visual experiences?
(5) if Oscar and Twoscar are molecule-for-molecule duplicates, they must be in the same phenomenal states?
(6) the Necker cube (see below) shows that there are Qualia?

Does Nagel (in "What is...") hold that:
(7) it makes no sense to suppose that there are facts we could never know?
(8) Argument D, as reinforced by Kripke, has true premises?
(9) Martians would not be able completely to master our physics?
(10) the identity theory is false?