Does Chalmers (in "Consciousness and...") hold that:
(1) type-C materialism is plausible?
(2) on any interpretation of quantum mechanics the wavefunction sometimes evolves nonlinearly?
(3) epiphenomenalism should be taken seriously?
(4) panprotopsychism is nuts?
(5) the two-dimensional argument against materialism is closely related to
Argument D, as repaired by Kripke?
Does Jackson (in "Epiphenomenal Qualia") hold that:
(6) Nagel's batty argument shows that physicalism is false?
(7) the heavy coat of the polar bear is epiphenomenal?
(8) it is completely mysterious how epiphenomenal qualia fit into the world as described by science?
(9) physicalists are analogous to tough-minded sea slug philosophers?
(10) a premise of the Knowledge argument is that imprisoned Mary does not know what
it's like to be a normal person living in a multicolored environment?
url=http://mit.edu/abyrne/www/2409S06PS9.html