1. Nagel, Jackson, and McGinn all think that consciousness poses a problem for physicalism, on somewhat similar grounds. Critically compare and contrast their views. Is it true that "with consciousness, [the mind-body problem] seems hopeless"?
2. In "Consciousness and its place in nature", Chalmers distinguishes Type-A Materialism, Type-B Materialism, Type-C Materialism, Type-D Dualism, Type-E Dualism, and Type-F Monism. Pick one that you think is false. Explain what this theory is, and why you think it's false. Now take the theory that you think is true (or, at any rate, is the least implausible of the lot). Explain what this theory is, and defend it against objections.
3. Could a suitably fancy robot think? More specifically, could a robot believe that it's raining in Cambridge? (Take the robot to be constructed from the usual materials: microprocessors, cables, servomotors, etc., with a variety of external sensors like cameras and microphones.) Could a suitably fancy robot have conscious experiences? More specifically, could a robot feel pain, or have a yellowy-orange afterimage? Approach these questions by considering how they might be answered by various philosophers we have encountered, for instance Descartes, Smart, Block, Lewis, Putnam, Dennett, and Chalmers.
url=http://mit.edu/abyrne/www/2409S06finalexamquestions.html