



Rules:

1. During each turn, the team gets to select from 3 categories of questions (Quotes, Views, Tools).
2. Pick a question at random from the chosen category.
3. All the teams get 1 minute to write down the answer on the sheet provided.
4. If the team whose turn it is gets the question right, they get a point.
5. If the team gets the question wrong, the other teams share their answers; if they're right, they each get a point.
6. *Sketch that argument bonus round*—each team gets a different argument that they have to (roughly) sketch in 3 minutes. If the argument sketched (a) correctly identifies the conclusion of the assigned argument and (b) is valid as written, the team gets 3 points.
7. Award fantastic prizes to the team with the most points. Hooray!

Any rule can be overridden by your TA. Your TA's decision is final, and no correspondence will be entered into.

Who said that? What do they mean? (no point without explanation)

1. "...the rejection of visual Qualia is not tantamount to a rejection of the view that there is something it is like for the subjects of visual experiences"

Tye (pg. 447-8) distinguishes between qualia, which are introspectible properties of experiences that characterize what it is like to have them, and Qualia, which are introspectible, intrinsic, and nonrepresentational properties of experiences that characterize what it is like to have them. Tye's point is that in denying the existence of Qualia, he is not denying that there is something it is like to undergo an experience, because that can be characterized in terms of qualia.

2. If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity—that is, less attachment to a specific viewpoint—does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: It takes us farther away from it".

According to Nagel (pg.223), the scientific reduction of a phenomenon to a physical phenomenon is a move in the direction of greater objectivity; that is, it is to give a characterization of the phenomenon that isn't (or at least, is less) tied to particular points of view. So to reduce the subjective character of experience to the physical is to give an account of the former that isn't tied to particular points of view. But that's to take us further away from understanding the subjective character of experience, for that is essentially tied to a particular point of view.

3. "...I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it."

Descartes (pg.16). Every state of affairs of which I can form a clear and distinct conception (every proposition which I can clearly and distinctly conceive of being true) is possible.

4. "Rather as traditional theologians found themselves conceding cognitive closure with respect to certain of the properties of God, so we should look seriously at the idea that the mind-body problem brings us bang up against the limits of our capacity to understand the world"

McGinn (pg. 397) is arguing that human minds are cognitively closed with respect to a certain property, i.e., that they are constitutionally incapable of forming a concept of this property. Moreover, he is proposing that this property explains the connection between the brain and consciousness. So the mind-body problem is, in a sense, insoluble.

5. "The all but universally accepted view that an assertion of identity between consciousness and brain processes can be ruled out on logical grounds alone derives, I suspect, from a failure to distinguish between the "is" of definition and the "is" of composition."

Place (pg.56) He is saying that identity statements like "consciousness is brain process x" contain the "is" of composition – that consciousness, in this case, is nothing over and above brain process x, but this is not to say that "consciousness" means "brain process x" (if this were the case, it would be the "is" of definition).

6. "The major factor in stopping people from admitting qualia is the belief that they would have to be given a causal role with respect to the physical world and especially the brain, and it is hard to do this without sounding like someone who believes in fairies. I seek...to turn this objection by arguing that the view that qualia are epiphenomenal is a perfectly possible one"

Jackson (pg.273) is arguing that many people deny that there are qualia (which, on his usage of the term, are nonphysical), just because they think that admitting qualia is tantamount to admitting that the nonphysical can causally affect the physical. Jackson seems to agree that such a claim is crazy pants. However, he argues that admitting qualia doesn't entail admitting that they affect the physical; he thinks the view that qualia are epiphenomenal (i.e., that they don't causally affect the physical world) is defensible.

7. "We may say that X is in pain simpliciter if and only if X is in the state that occupies the causal role of pain for the appropriate population"

Lewis. For Lewis the concept of pain is the concept of a state that occupies a certain causal role, and this state can be specific to a population, eg. humans, or Martians. In humans, the state which occupies the causal role of pain might be C-fibers firing, for example. In Martians, it might be D-valves opening. The human would then be in pain if he has firing C-fibers, and the Martian if he has opening D-valves.

8. "there is division of linguistic labor"

Putnam. Not everyone who uses certain words is an expert in recognising what the words refer to. For example, I might not be very good at distinguishing elms from beech trees, but I do not need to be able to in order to acquire the word 'elm'. One can rely on experts for this purpose, so this divides the 'linguistic labor' of knowing and employing the various parts of the meaning of 'elm'.

9. "If you want to know what intelligence is, you need a recipe for creating it out of parts you already understand"

Dretske is explaining what his overall project is. His aim is to provide a naturalistic account of thought, intelligence, and intentionality. He wants to avoid employing elements in the explanation which make appeal to parts that already possess the capacity or feature which is to be explained. He thinks that it is only acceptable to use intentional ingredients in the explanation if we know how they work.

10. "The upshot of these reflections is that the patient's mental contents differ while his entire physical and nonintentional mental histories, considered in isolation from their social context, remain the same"

Burge. The 'reflections' refer to the thought experiment regarding Alfred who mistakenly believes he has arthritis in his thigh, and Alfred in a counterfactual scenario where the linguistic community actually uses the word 'arthritis' to apply not just to inflammations of the joints, but to all rheumatoid ailments. Burge argues that the content of Alfred's thoughts differs in these two cases, simply because the usage of the linguistic community differs. In order to ensure that the social environment is all that matters, Burge stipulated in the thought experiment that the physical and nonintentional mental histories were the same in the two cases.

11. "The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false". [Just explain why these four claims are jointly inconsistent; don't bother to motivate the claims or to explain how "the debate over physicalism...can be seen as concerning" it.]

Stoljar (pg.311) argues that these claims are jointly inconsistent because (1) and (2) entail that physicalism is false and (3) and (4) entail that physicalism is true.

12. "Let me first try to state more accurately the thesis that sensations are brain processes. It is not the thesis that, for example, "after-image" or "ache" means the same as "brain process of sort "X" (where "X" is replaced by a description of a certain sort of brain process)."

Smart (pg.62) The claim that sensations are identical to brain processes is not a claim about the meanings of our terms concerning our mental states; the identity theory can be true even if the corresponding psychophysical identities are not a priori.

13. "Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality"

Searle (Minds, Brains and Programs). If something can think, it must be in virtue of more than just running a particular program; running a particular program is not enough for a system to exhibit underived intentionality (that is, "aboutness" – representing, referring to – something, but not in virtue of some other distinct system's ability to represent).

14. "What it is to be a true believer is to be an *intentional system*, a system whose behavior is reliably and voluminously predictable via the intentional strategy"

Dennett. The intentional strategy is one of the strategies that Dennett says we use for making predictions about the future. It consists of treating the object whose behaviour you want to predict as a rational agent with beliefs, desires and other intentional states. Dennett is saying that if such a strategy is very successful, the object in question has beliefs. There is no need to look inside the object's head (if it has one) to find its beliefs.

What's that view? (one point per view)

1. What is Type-type identity theory?
That any type of mental state is identical to some type of physical state; e.g. that pain is c-fibres firing.
2. What is Token-token identity theory?
That any particular mental state is identical to some particular physical state; e.g. my pain at 10am is identical to some c-fibres firing at 10am.
3. What is Weak AI?
The principle value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool—e.g. it enables us to simulate various kinds of mental processes (c.f. Strong AI: that an appropriately programmed computer literally has mental states)
4. What is Behaviorism?
Mental states are behavioral dispositions (dispositions to behave in a certain way); e.g. to be in pain is to be disposed to wince, or groan, or cry out, etc.
5. What is type-B materialism?
It is the view that while there is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths, there is no ontological gap (i.e., the phenomenal is still reducible to the physical). For example, the type-B materialist holds that zombies are conceivable but not possible. [see Chalmers 253]
6. What is type-C materialism?
It is the view that while there is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths, it is in principle closable (i.e., once we learn more neuroscience, complete knowledge of the physical will a priori imply complete knowledge of the phenomenal). For example, the type-C materialist holds that zombies are prima facie conceivable but not ideally conceivable. [see Chalmers 257]
7. What is type-D dualism?
It is the view that phenomenal truths are not reducible to physical truths, and moreover that phenomenal states can causally affect physical states (and vice versa). [see Chalmers 261]
8. What is epiphenomenalism?
It is the view that phenomenal truths are not reducible to physical truths, and moreover that phenomenal states cannot causally affect the physical world. [see Chalmers 261, Jackson 276]
9. What is panprotopsyism?
It is the view that phenomenal properties are constituted by the categorical properties that are the bases of physical properties, which are characterized in terms of dispositions (i.e., to be a quark is just to have certain dispositions). [see Chalmers 265, Stoljar 320]
10. What is functionalism?
Functionalism is the view that mental states are functional states, consisting of inputs, outputs, internal states, and their causal relations.
11. What is psychofunctionalism?
Psychofunctionalism is the view that the functions that constitute mental states are to be discovered by empirical, scientific investigation.
12. What is representationalism?
It is the view that mental states require inner representations: a subject is in such-and-such mental state with representational content that p only if a proper part of the subject has the representational content that p.

13. What is active externalism?

It is the view that features that fall outside the head may in some circumstances play an active role in our cognitive processes and thoughts. For example, Otto's notebook plays an active role in his cognitive life, akin to his biology memory.

14. What is privileged access?

Privileged access is the allegedly special, or privileged, way in which we know our own thoughts. It need not be infallible, but it is not available to others.

15. What is derived intentionality? Give an example of something which has derived intentionality.

Something has derived intentionality just in case its intentionality can be explained in terms of the intentionality of something else. Words in a book might be thought to have only derived intentionality, since they derive their power to represent from the uses to which human intentional agents put them.

What's in the toolbox? (one point per philosophical tool)

1. Give an example of a property and a particular.

Being red; my drink-bottle. Or: being my drink-bottle, that red chair

2. What is an intensional context?

An intensional context is a sentence S containing a referring expression N such that a sentence in which we have replaced N with a coreferring expression M may have a different truth value to S. Beliefs are an example of an intensional context.

3. What is the difference between metaphysical possibility and epistemic possibility?

If something is metaphysically possible it is possible relative to what there is and what it is like. If something is epistemically possible, then it is possible relative to what we know (what we know a priori/ what we can conceive of).

4. What are dispositions?

Properties like fragility or solubility which are powers or tendencies to do x given some particular conditions y; i.e. the tendency to dissolve if put in water

5. Give an example of a type and related token.

The general word, "cat"; a particular instance of the word "cat" which is written on the board. Pain; my pain at 10am.

6. What is it for X to supervene on Y?

X supervenes on Y if any possible world just like ours with respect to Y is just like ours with respect to X...alternatively, there is no change in X without a change in Y

7. What are categorical properties?

Categorical properties are the kind of property the possession of which explains the possession of a dispositional property (e.g., the properties whose instantiation makes it the case that the vase is fragile)

8. What does it mean for a proposition to be knowable a priori? A posteriori?

A proposition p is knowable a priori iff p can be known independently of experience. Otherwise it is knowable (only) a posteriori.

9. What does it mean for a property to be extrinsic? Give an example of an extrinsic property.

A property is extrinsic iff it is not necessarily shared between perfect duplicates. Eg. having weight 1kg, being 5 meters from Harvard Square.

10. What is the extension of a term? What is the intension?

The extension of a term is the set of things the term refers to. The intension is its 'meaning', in the intuitive sense.

Round Two

What's the argument? (three points per argument)

1. What's Kripke's argument for the necessity of identity? (that in every possible world, an object *o* is identical to itself)

- 1) For any object *o*, *o* is identical to itself
- 2) *o* couldn't possibly have been identical to something else.
- 3) Therefore, necessarily, *o* is self-identical

*(i.e. in every possible world, *o* is identical to itself)*

[see slides for lecture 9]

I'd personally also be fine if they gave the distinct, but more obviously valid argument:

- 1) For any object *o*, *o* is identical to itself
- 2) For any object *o**, if it is possible that *o* is distinct from *o**, then *o* is distinct from *o**
- 3) Therefore, necessarily, *o* is self-identical

I'd also give credit, but not quite full credit (maybe 4 out of 5?), if they came up with an argument using rigid designators.

2. The explanatory argument (concerning consciousness)...

- 1) Physical accounts explain at most structure and function. (e.g., a physical account explains what an entity is made of, how its constituents are arranged, what its causal role is, etc.)
- 2) Explaining structure and function does not suffice to explain consciousness. (e.g., the proposition that pain is functional state *F*, or that pain is C-fibers firing, doesn't explain why pain feels the way it does (rather than some other way), i.e., such an account doesn't explain why it is like what it is in fact like to be in pain—see Levine 356. By contrast, there is no analogous explanatory gap with the proposition that water is H₂O, at least given extensive knowledge of physics and chemistry.)
- 3) No physical account can explain consciousness. (from 1, 2)
- 4) Anything that can't be explained in physical terms is not itself physical.*
- 5) Consciousness is nonphysical. (from 3, 4)

**note that Levine doesn't endorse this premise; it was suggested by Chalmers*

[see Chalmers 248, Levine]

3. Outline Block's argument about the homunculi-headed system and explain what it is designed to show.

Block's homunculi-head example is supposed to show that functionalism is too "liberal" -- that it counts some things as having minds that do not in fact have them. We are to imagine a body which is internally different from our own. The 'brain' in this body is a group of little men (homunculi) who each perform a very simple task. Even though each little man need have next to no intelligence, the overall system has a complex functional organisation, which could be the same as the functional organisation of our own thinking, at least for some period of time. Block's claim is that the homunculi-headed system is a counterexample to functionalism, since it is doubtful whether it has mental states. The reason is that there is nothing it is like to be the homunculi-headed system. It lacks 'qualitative states', 'raw feels' or 'immediate phenomenological qualities'. According to functionalism then, the homunculi-headed system would have a mind, since it has the same functional organisation as we do. Yet Block argues it does not, since it lacks qualia.

Round Three

Questions about the essay questions?

This quiz show was brought to you by
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