

Curriculum Vitae

Alex Byrne

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
32-D808, Cambridge MA 02139-4307, USA
+1 617.258.6106 (ph); +1 617.253.5017 (fax)
abyrne@mit.edu; url: web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/

Employment

2006- Professor of Philosophy, MIT
2002-2006 Associate Professor of Philosophy, MIT (tenured)
1999-2002 Associate Professor of Philosophy, MIT (untentured)
1995-1999 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, MIT
1994-1995 Instructor in Philosophy, MIT
1993-1994 Mellon Postdoctoral Instructor in Philosophy, Caltech

Education

1994 Ph.D., Princeton University
1989 M.A., King's College London
1988 B.A., Birkbeck College London

Areas of Specialization and Interest

AOS: philosophy of mind; metaphysics and epistemology
AOC: philosophy of language; twentieth century analytic philosophy;
philosophical logic; ethics

Publications

Papers and Commentaries

Forthcoming "Skepticism about the Internal World," *Norton Introduction to Philosophy*.
Forthcoming "Perception and Evidence," *Philosophical Studies*.
Forthcoming "McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism, etc.," *Scepticism and Perceptual Justification*, ed. E. Zardini, Oxford.
2012 "Hmm... Hill on the Paradox of Pain," *Philosophical Studies* 161:489-96.
2012 "Knowing What I See," *Introspection and Consciousness*, ed. D. Smithies and D. Stoljar, Oxford.
2011 "Transparency, Belief, Intention," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*.

- 2011 "Knowing What I Want," *Consciousness and the Self: New Essays*, ed. J. Liu and J. Perry, Cambridge.
- 2011 "Urban Light and Color," (with David Hilbert), *New Geographies 3, Urbanisms of Color*: 64-71.
- 2011 "Knowing That I Am Thinking," *Self-Knowledge*, ed. A. Hatzimoysis, Oxford.
- 2011 "Are Colors Secondary Qualities?," (with David Hilbert), *Primary and Secondary Qualities*, ed. L. Nolan, Oxford.
- 2010 "How Do Things Look to the Color-Blind?" (with David Hilbert), *Color Ontology and Color Science*, eds. J. Cohen and M. Matthen, MIT Press.
- 2010 "Perception, Recollection, Imagination," *Philosophical Studies* 148: 15-26.
- 2009 "God," *Boston Review* January/February (a 'notable essay' in *Best American Essays 2010*)
- 2008 "Basic Sensible Qualities and the Structure of Appearance" (with David Hilbert), *Philosophical Issues* 18: 385-405.
- 2007 "Do We See More Than We Can Access?" (with David Hilbert and Susanna Siegel), *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 30: 501-2. (Comment on Block, "Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.")
- 2007 "Possibility and Imagination," *Philosophical Perspectives* 21: 125-44.
- 2008 "Either/Or: Disjunctivism for Dummies" (with Heather Logue), *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, eds. A. Haddock and F. Macpherson, Oxford.
- 2007 "Soames on Quine and Davidson," *Philosophical Studies* 135: 439-49.
- 2007 "Knowing Right and Wrong: Is Morality a Natural Phenomenon?," *Boston Review* March/April: 27-30.
- 2007 "Truest Blue" (with David Hilbert), *Analysis* 67: 87-92.
- 2007 "Color Primitivism" (with David Hilbert), *Erkenntnis* 66: 73-105.
- 2006 "Comments" (on Cohen, Mizrahi, Maund, and Levine), *Dialectica* 60: 337-40.
- 2006 "Color and the Mind-Body Problem," *Dialectica* 60: 223-44.
- 2006 "Hoffman's "Proof" of the Logical Possibility of Spectrum Inversion" (with David Hilbert), *Consciousness and Cognition* 15: 48-50.
- 2006 "Qualia ain't in the Head" (with Michael Tye), *Noûs* 40: 241-55.
- 2006 "What Mind-Body Problem?," *Boston Review* May/June: 27-30.
- 2006 "Bad Intensions" (with James Pryor), *Two-Dimensional Semantics*, eds. M. García-Carpintero and J. Macià, Oxford.
- 2005 "Introspection," *Philosophical Topics* 33: 79-104.
- 2005 "Knowing Our Minds", *Boston Review* November/December: 21-4.
- 2005 "Is Snow White?", *Boston Review* April/May: 33-5.

- 2005 "Perception and Conceptual Content," *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, ed. E. Sosa and M. Steup, Blackwell.
- 2004 "What Phenomenal Consciousness is Like," *Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness*, ed. R. Gennaro, John Benjamins.
- 2004 "Hardin, Tye, and Color Physicalism" (with David Hilbert), *Journal of Philosophy* 101: 37-43.
- 2004 "How Hard are the Sceptical Paradoxes?," *Noûs* 38: 299-325.
- 2003 "Color Realism Revisited" (with David Hilbert), *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 26: 791-4.
- 2003 "Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content," *Philosophical Studies* 113: 261-74. (Symposium on Tye, *Consciousness, Color, and Content*.)
- 2003 "Color Realism and Color Science" (with David Hilbert), *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 26: 3-21. Reprinted as "Réalité des Couleurs et Science des Couleurs," trans. F. Perrodin, *Pratiques* 18: 9-75 (2007).
- 2003 "Color Realism Redux" (with David Hilbert), *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 26: 52-63.
- 2003 "Color and Similarity," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 66: 641-65.
- 2002 "DON'T PANIC: Tye's intentionalist theory of consciousness," *A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind* symposium on Tye's *Consciousness, Color, and Content*, <http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/tyesymp_byrne.htm>.
- 2002 "Something About Mary," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 63: 123-40 (special issue: the philosophy of Terry Horgan).
- 2002 "Yes, Virginia, Lemons are Yellow," *Philosophical Studies* 108: 213-22 (special issue: Pacific APA 2001).
- 2002 "Semantic Values?," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65: 201-7. (Symposium on Lance and Hawthorne, *The Grammar of Meaning*.)
- 2001 "Intentionalism Defended," *Philosophical Review* 110: 199-240. Reprinted in *Representationalism*, eds. Macpherson and Platchias, MIT Press.
- 2001 "Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam and others," *Philosophical Quarterly* 51: 238-45.
- 2000 "Chalmers' Two-Dimensional Argument Against Physicalism," *MIT Working Papers in Linguistics and Philosophy* 1: 1-20.
- 1999 "Cosmic Hermeneutics," *Philosophical Perspectives* 13: 347-83.
- 1999 "Chalmers on Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics" (with Ned Hall), *Philosophy of Science* 66: 370-90.
- 1999 "Subjectivity is No Barrier," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 22: 949-50. (Comment on Palmer, "Color, Consciousness, and the Isomorphism Constraint.")
- 1999 "Two Radical Neuron Doctrines" (with David Hilbert), *Behavioral and*

- Brain Sciences* 22: 833. (Comment on Gold and Stoljar, "A Neuron Doctrine in Philosophy of Neuroscience.")
- 1998 "Interpretivism," *European Review of Philosophy* 3: 199-223.
- 1998 "Against the PCA-analysis" (with Ned Hall), *Analysis* 58: 38-44.
- 1998 "Dennett versus Gibson," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 21: 751-2. (Comment on Pessoa et al., "Finding Out About Filling-In.")
- 1997 "Unique Hues" (with David Hilbert), *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 20: 184-5. (Comment on Saunders and van Brakel, "Are there Nontrivial Constraints on Colour Categorization?")
- 1997 "Colors and Reflectances" (with David Hilbert), in *Readings on Color volume 1*, eds. A. Byrne and D. R. Hilbert, MIT Press: 263-88.
- 1997 "David Hume, David Lewis, and Decision Theory" (with Alan Hájek), *Mind* 106: 411-28.
- 1997 "Some Like It HOT: consciousness and higher-order thoughts," *Philosophical Studies* 86: 103-29.
- 1996 "On Misinterpreting Kripke's Wittgenstein," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 61: 339-43.
- 1996 "Spin Control: comment on McDowell's *Mind and World*," *Philosophical Issues* 7: 261-73.
- 1996 "In Defence of the Hybrid View" (with Michael Thau), *Mind* 105: 139-49.
- 1995 "Perception and Causation" (with David Hilbert), *Journal of Philosophy* 92: 323-9.
- 1993 "Truth in Fiction: the story continued," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 71: 24-35.

Encyclopedia Articles

- 2009 "Robert Stalnaker," "Judith Jarvis Thomson," "Sydney Shoemaker," *A Companion to Metaphysics* (second edition), eds. J. Kim, E. Sosa, G. Rosenkrantz, Wiley.
- 2009 "Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities," *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*, eds. B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann, S. Walter, Oxford.
- 2007 "Colour Vision, Philosophical Issues About" (with David Hilbert), *Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science*, Macmillan.
- 2006 "Intentionality," *The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia*, eds. S. Sarkar and J. Pfeifer, Routledge.
- 2005 "Private Language Problem (addendum)," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (second edition), Macmillan.
- 2004 "Inverted Qualia," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-inverted/>>

- 1994 "Behaviourism," *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. S. D. Guttenplan, Blackwell: 132-40.

Reviews

- Forthcoming Review of *Perception and its Objects*, by Bill Brewer, *Mind*.
- 2013 Review of *Phenomenal Intentionality*, ed. Uriah Kriegel, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* forthcoming.
- 2012 Review of *The Opacity of Mind*, by Peter Carruthers, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* 2012.05.11.
- 2011 Review Essay of *Speaking My Mind*, by Dorit Bar-On, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 83: 705-17.
- 2010 Review of *Seeing, Doing and Knowing*, by Mohan Matthen, *Mind* 119: 1206-10.
- 2006 Review of *There's Something About Mary*, eds. P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, and D. Stoljar, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* 2006.01.20.
- 2004 "Necessary Truths: Scott Soames's *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century*" (with Ned Hall), *Boston Review* October/November: 34-6.
- 2004 Review of *Purple Haze*, by Joseph Levine, *Philosophical Review* 111: 594-7.
- 2004 Critical notice of *Consciousness, Color, and Content*, by Michael Tye, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 68: 245-7.
- 2001 Review of *Phenomenal Consciousness*, by Peter Carruthers, *Mind* 110: 1057-62.
- 2001 Review of *The Quest for Reality*, by Barry Stroud, *Philosophical Quarterly* 51: 395-8.
- 1999 Review of *Problems of Vision*, by Gerald Vision, *Philosophical Review* 108: 415-8.
- 1998 Review of *Philosophy of Mind*, by Jaegwon Kim, *Philosophical Review* 107: 113-5.
- 1994 Review of *Belief and Meaning*, by Akeel Bilgrami, *Philosophical Review* 103: 356-8.
- 1993 Review of *The Nature of Fiction*, by Gregory Currie, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 71: 503-5.
- 1993 Review of *Matters of Metaphysics*, by D. H. Mellor, *Philosophical Review* 102: 285-7.

Books

Philosophy of Mind, in preparation for Princeton University Press.

Transparency and Self-Knowledge, in preparation for Oxford University Press.

Edited Books

- Forthcoming *Norton Introduction to Philosophy*, edited with Gideon Rosen, Joshua Cohen, and Seana Shiffrin, W. W. Norton.
- 2009 *Disjunctivism*, edited with Heather Logue, MIT Readers in Contemporary Philosophy, MIT Press.
- 2006 *Content and Modality: themes from the philosophy of Robert Stalnaker*, edited with Judith Thomson, Oxford University Press.
- 2001 *Fact and Value: essays on ethics and metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson*, edited with Robert Stalnaker and Ralph Wedgwood, MIT Press.
- 1997 *Readings on Color, volume 1: the Philosophy of Color*, edited with David Hilbert, MIT Press.
- 1997 *Readings on Color, volume 2: the Science of Color*, edited with David Hilbert, MIT Press.

Fellowships and Honors

- 2013 NEH Summer Stipend
- 1998-2001 Class of 1947 Career Development Professorship (MIT)
- 1990 Charlotte Elizabeth Proctor Honorific Fellowship (Princeton University)
- 1990 Annual Essay Contest Winner, Leibniz Society of North America
- 1989 Fulbright Award to study in the United States

Talks, Colloquia, etc.

- 2013:
- September "Knowing that I am in Pain," Johns Hopkins University.
- September "Guerrero on Dharmakīrti's Theory of Perception," Workshop on Mind and Attention in Indian Philosophy, Harvard University.
- August "Chen on Transparency," Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop & Network on Transparency, Syracuse University.
- May "Troubleshooting the Cosmoscope," University of Bonn.
- May Roundtable Discussant, Network for Sensory Research Workshop on Temporal Experience, University of Toronto.
- April "The Epistemic Significance of Experience," UC Berkeley.
- March "Color," University of Texas at Austin (Tye & Sainsbury seminar on color).
- January "The Epistemic Significance of Experience," Birkbeck College, University of London.
- "David Hamlyn on Knowledge and Perception," David Hamlyn Memorial Meeting, University of London.
- 2012:

- November “The Epistemic Significance of Experience,” University of Missouri, Columbia.
- May “Schellenberg on the Epistemic Role of Experience,” Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy, Oberlin College.
- April: Carruthers’ *The Opacity of Mind*, Pacific APA, Seattle.
- March: “Color Relationalism and Color Relativism” (with David Hilbert), Auburn University.
- 2011:
- November “On Molyneux’s Question” (with Pawan Sinha), Conference on the Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration, Brown University.
“The Epistemic Significance of Experience,” Rice University.
- October “Perception and Belief,” Conference on Conceptual Content, Cambridge University.
- July “Transparency, Belief, Intention,” Joint Session, University of Sussex.
- August “Philosophical Problems of Colour,” Conference on Varieties of Human Cortical Colour Vision, Simon Fraser University.
- June “Personal Identity and Conceptual Analysis,” Conference on Conceptual Analysis and Two-Dimensionalism, University of Cologne.
“Imagery and Possibility,” Conference on the Epistemology of Philosophy, University of Cologne.
- April “McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism etc.,” Oberlin College.
“McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism etc.,” University of Texas at Austin.
“Hmm... Hill on the Paradox of Pain,” Pacific APA, San Diego.
“Skepticism about the Internal World,” Brown University
Panelist, 2011 Veritas Forum, MIT
- February “McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism etc.,” Brandeis University.
- January “Thoughts on Surviving Death,” Princeton University symposium on Mark Johnston’s *Saving God* and *Surviving Death*.
- 2010:
- December “Hallucination and Imagery,” List Visual Arts Center, MIT.
- October Macpherson on Phenomenal “Presence as Absence,” SNNP Workshop on Emotion and Perception, University of Glasgow.
- May “Imagery and Possibility,” Imagination and Modality Workshop, University of St. Andrews.
- April “Silent Soliloquy and Thought Insertion,” Harvard Workshop on Cognitive Phenomenology & Inner Speech.
- March “Knowing What I See,” IJN/MIT conference on self-locating belief, Paris.
- 2009:
- December Comment on Genone, “How to be a Direct Realist,” Eastern APA, New York.

- November “Silent Soliloquy and Thought Insertion,” Ohio State University.
 “Recollection, Perception, Imagination,” Cognitive Theory and the Arts Seminar, Harvard.
- August “Silent Soliquy and Thought Insertion,” European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Budapest.
- April “Knowing What I Want,” Cal State Fullerton Philosophy Symposium.
 “Recollection, Perception, Imagination,” Pacific APA, Vancouver.
- March “On Molyneux’s Question” (with Pawan Sinha), Neuphi, Boston University.
- January “Knowing What I Want,” University of Oxford.
 “Seeing is Believing,” Philosophy of Mind/Psychology Workshop, University of Oxford.
- 2008:
- December Comment on Soteriou, Workshop on the Role of Consciousness in Thought, Harvard University.
- October Comment on Hill, Conference in Honor of Ruth Millikan, University of Connecticut.
- September “Hallucination and Imagery,” Interdisciplinary Philosophy/Psychology Conference on Hallucination, University of Crete (co-organized with University of Glasgow).
- August Comment on Hellie, Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop & Network on Consciousness, Syracuse University.
- July “Knowing What I See,” Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
 “Knowing What I See,” Workshop on the Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual Experience, Australian National University.
- April Comment on Briscoe, “Visual Shape Perception and Bodily Action,” Central APA, Chicago.
 “McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism etc.,” Basic Knowledge Workshop, University of St. Andrews.
- March “Mary and Episodic Memory,” Pacific APA, Pasadena.
 “Basic Sensible Qualities and the Structure of Appearance,” Georgia State University.
 “Skepticism about the Internal World,” Georgia State University.
- 2007:
- September “How Do We Know Our Own Minds?,” the 2007 Burman Lectures in Philosophy, Umeå University.
 “Skepticism about the Internal World,” Philosophical Society, Umeå University.
 “Perception and Introspection,” Workshop on Perception and Content, Stockholm University.
- June “Knowing That I am Thinking,” Institute of Philosophy, University of

- London.
- “Privileged and Peculiar Access,” Bled Epistemology Conference, Slovenia.
- April “How do Things Look to the Color-Blind?” (with David Hilbert), Conference on Color, Florida State University.
- “Possibility and Imagination,” Pacific APA, San Francisco.
- March “Experience and Content,” Conference on the Admissible Contents of Experience, University of Glasgow.
- 2006:
- December Comment on Clark, Perception Symposium, Harvard University.
- November “Knowing That I am Thinking,” UMass Amherst.
- “Color and Philosophy,” Hill and Tarr seminar on perception, Brown University.
- September “A Lesson from the Chinese Room,” Harvard University MBB Junior Symposium.
- August “Knowing That I am Thinking,” University of Melbourne.
- “Knowing That I am Thinking,” Monash University.
- “Experience and Content,” ANU.
- “There are No Experiences,” Consciousness at the Beach, ANU.
- July Discussant, Time and Consciousness conference, Sydney University.
- May “Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem,” Temple University Philosophy Society.
- March “Experience and Content,” Nonconceptual Representation Workshop, University of Tübingen.
- February “Either/Or: Disjunctivism for Dummies”, University of Connecticut.
- 2005:
- December “Introspection,” University of Alberta.
- “Introspection,” University of Calgary.
- July Discussant, Syracuse Philosophy Annual Workshop & Network on Consciousness, Syracuse University.
- June “Either/Or: Disjunctivism for Dummies” (with Heather Logue), Conference on Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, University of Glasgow.
- “Matthen on Vision and Objects,” Conference on Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, University of Glasgow.
- May “Either/Or: Disjunctivism for Dummies,” Metaphysics and Epistemology conference, Dubrovnik, Croatia.
- “Is Snow White?,” Bowdoin College.
- March “Fodor and Heck on the Given, the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, etc.,” APA Pacific Division meeting, San Francisco.

- February "Transparency and Self-Knowledge," Stanford University.
 "The Puzzle of Transparency," Block and Nagel seminar on language and mind, NYU.
- January "Transparency and Self-Knowledge," University of Southern California.
- 2004:
- December "Gert on the Shifted Spectrum," APA Eastern Division meeting, Boston.
- September "Transparency and Self-Knowledge," Union College.
- June "Martin's Theory of Alienation," NYU conference, Florence.
 "Color Misperception," Nijmegen University/Tilburg University Workshop.
- May "Transparency and Self-Knowledge," Western Washington University.
- April "Perception and Conceptual Content," APA Central Division meeting, Chicago.
 "Color and the Mind-Body Problem," Auburn University.
- March "Zawidzki on Epistemic Content," APA Pacific Division meeting, Pasadena.
 "Transparency and Self-Knowledge," University of Vermont.
- 2003:
- December "Brown on Two Kinds of Color," APA Eastern Division meeting, Washington D.C.
 "Transparency and Self-Knowledge," University of Texas at Austin.
- November "Color and the Mind-Body Problem," University of Fribourg.
- October "Color Misperception," Color Perception: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives, UBC.
- August "Transparency and Self-Knowledge," Metaphysics and Epistemology conference, Dubrovnik, Croatia.
- June "Color Perception and Misperception," Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Pasadena.
 "Consciousness and the Self," ASU.
- 2002:
- Dec "Polger against Color Objectivism," APA Eastern Division meeting, Philadelphia.
- Oct "Some Philosophical Applications of Variation in Color Vision," Color Perception: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives, UCSD.
- June "Shoemaker on Phenomenal Character," NEH Summer Institute: Consciousness and Intentionality, UCSC.
- April "Colors and Dispositions," APA Central Division meeting, Chicago.
- Mar "Tye on Color and Consciousness," APA Pacific Division meeting, Seattle.
- 2001:

- Dec "Chalmers on Epistemic Content," SOFIA XIV, Veracruz, Mexico.
- Nov "Disgust and Reality," Rutgers University.
- June "Bad Intensions," (with James Pryor), II Barcelona Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Reference.
- May "Peil on Causation as Influence," APA Central Division meeting, Minneapolis.
- Mar "Yes, Virginia, Lemons Are Yellow," APA Pacific Division meeting, San Francisco.
- 2000:
- Oct "Johnston on Hallucination," UNC Chapel Hill Colloquium.
- Aug "Something About Mary," Austrian-Slovene Philosophical Euroconference, Slovenia.
- May "What is the 'Hard Problem' of Consciousness?," Sigma Xi seminar, Hanscom Airforce Base.
- Apr "Rueger on Supervenience and Emergence," APA Pacific Division meeting, Albuquerque.
- Mar "Intentionalism Defended," Block and Nagel seminar on consciousness, NYU.
- 1999:
- Dec "Colors and Dispositions," Brandeis University.
- Nov Roundtable discussant, conference on normativity, Brown University.
- Nov "Colors and Dispositions," University of Edinburgh.
- Nov "Color and Similarity," University of Stirling.
- July "The Hard Problem of Perception," Australian National University.
- June "The Hard Problem of Perception," University College London.
- 1998:
- May "Block and Kim on the Explanatory Gap," APA Central Division meeting, Chicago.
- Apr "Chalmers on Consciousness and Cosmic Hermeneutics," 3rd Brazilian International Conference on Cognitive Science, Campinas, Brazil.
- 1997:
- Dec Comment on Vinuesa, APA Eastern Division meeting, Philadelphia.
- Oct "Colors and Dispositions," 4th Brazilian Conference on Analytic Philosophy, Florianópolis, Brazil.
- 1996:
- Nov "Red is *Really* More Similar to Orange than to Green—and Other Objections to Physicalism About Color," Cognitive Science table, Harvard University.
- Nov "Red is *Really* More Similar to Orange than to Green—and Other Objections to Physicalism About Color," Birkbeck College.

- Sept “On (Yet More) Criticisms of a Physicalist Theory of Colors,” Princeton University.
- 1995:
June “Spin Control: comment on John McDowell’s *Mind and World*,” SOFIA VIII, Cancun.
- 1994 :
Apr “Emergentism” and “Some Like It HOT: consciousness and higher-order thoughts,” Cornell University.
- Apr “Some Like It HOT: consciousness and higher-order thoughts,” Caltech.
- 1991:
July “Truth in Fiction: the story continued,” Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, Melbourne.
- Apr “Leibniz on Personal Identity,” Leibniz Society of North America, APA Central Division meeting, Chicago.

Ph.D. Thesis

The Emergent Mind, Princeton University, 1994

Committee: David Lewis (Chair), Mark Johnston

MIT Activities and Committees

Section Head, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2013-

Associate Chair, Committee on Discipline, MIT, 2012-

Member, COD Rules Committee, Fall 1012

Acting Head, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Spring 2012

Committee on Discipline, MIT, 2010-11

Burchard Faculty Fellow, MIT, 2010-11

Committee on Discipline, MIT, 2005-8

Chair, Committee on Graduate Students, Dept. Linguistics and Philosophy, 2004-13

Philosophy Section Webmaster, Dept. Linguistics and Philosophy, 2001-

HASS-D Overview Committee, MIT, 1995-7, 2002-3

MIT Press Cognitive Science Advisory Board, 1996-2003

Committee on the Undergraduate Program, Dept. Linguistics and Philosophy, 1995-6

Referee Work, Etc.

For: Oxford University Press, MIT Press, Routledge, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, *Noûs*, *Mind*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Linguistics and Philosophy*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Experimental Psychology*, *Mind and Language*, *Analytic Philosophy*, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *Thought*

Co-investigator, Network for Sensory Research, 2011-
Scientific Advisory Board, Institute of Philosophy Centre for the Study of the Senses,
2010-
Editor, PhilPapers, 2009-
Editorial Board, Philosophy Compass (Blackwell), 2005-
Editorial Board, MIT Readers in Contemporary Philosophy, 2004-
Philosophical Gourmet Report Advisory Board, 2003-
Editorial Board, *Philosophical Studies*, 2002-