

The Aftermath of 9/11: Implications for Airline Industry Structure & Competition

by

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What has changed since 9/11?

- Demand = down
- Supply = down less than demand
- Costs (security, delays, labor) = up significantly
- Revenues and profits = down precipitously
- Control over “product” quality and customer satisfaction

Will situation “snap back” to the pre 9/11 *status quo ante*?

■ Unlikely to happen soon

- Most new costs will be hard to reduce
 - New security directives
 - Increased time/delays → reduced utilization
 - Labor (e.g., UAL, DL)
 - Fuel prices = likely to increase

Will situation “snap back” to the pre 9/11 *status quo ante*? (cont.)

■ Unlikely to happen soon (cont.)

- Demand may also be slow to rebound
 - Increased travel times → reduced demand, particularly for business and short haul travel
 - Increased “hassle” → increased customer ill will & reduced demand, particularly for business travel
 - Business travel & purchasing patterns may also be changing
 - Increased price sensitivity/resistance by business travelers disproportionately affects network carriers...
 - And benefits LCCs
 - As a result, revenues & profits will be slow to recover, particularly for network carriers

Will situation “snap back” to the pre 9/11 *status quo ante*? (cont.)

- LCCs have been less affected by— and have recovered more quickly from -- the events of 9/11 than have the large network carriers
 - But LCCs need dense markets
 - Most dense short haul markets = already served
 - Greatest LCC opportunities = longer haul routes
 - But weakness in demand should increase the value/importance of surviving hub networks

What are the implications for airline competition and industry structure?

- Network carriers will continue to lose market share to LCCs
 - Prior to 9/11, there was already substantial evidence of excess network carrier capacity (chronic sub-par returns for even the most profitable)
 - Increasing costs and declining business revenues since 9/11
 - Have exacerbated an existing problem and
 - Portend further shrinkage in the market share of large network carriers vs. LCCs

What are the implications for airline competition and industry structure? (cont.)

- Network carriers will continue to lose market share to LCCs (cont.)
 - This reduction in network carrier market share should – and probably will -- occur more by subtraction (i.e., shrinkage and/or bankruptcies) than by merger or acquisition.
 - Most majors cannot presently afford the financial or organizational costs of a large acquisition/merger
 - Any capacity reductions following a merger would benefit all competitors but the costs of acquisition/merger would be borne predominantly by the acquirer (assuming no anti-competitive effects)

What are the implications for airline competition and industry structure? (cont.)

■ Continued growth in RJ flying is likely

- Lower labor costs permit profitable operations at lower levels of demand
- Pax are willing to pay higher fares for non-stop service
- But lower labor costs = key to continued growth of RJs
- More independence for regional airlines ???

Can Network carriers remain competitive enough with LCCs to sustain service to small points that can only be served profitably via hubs?

- Highly unlikely that hub networks will disappear
- But further shrinkage in the number of networks seems inevitable
- How much shrinkage will depend on:
 - Cost differentials between network carriers and LCCs – where productivity differences will be crucial
 - Majors could increase productivity with less restrictive work rules
 - Standardized aircraft configuration could also be productivity plus
 - Adequacy of infrastructure = big unknown
 - ATC capacity
 - Airports/runways
 - But can government deliver???

What are the characteristics of the carriers that are likely to survive the coming “squeeze”?

■ For network carriers, keys include:

- Strong balance sheet
- Low unit costs relative to competition
- Structure of their route networks
 - Competitive scope domestically and internationally
 - Least exposure to LCCs, particularly domestic
 - Less may be better
 - Ultimately, 4 large US networks plus a handful of LCCs seem likely to be viable

What are the characteristics of the carriers that are likely to survive the coming “squeeze”? (cont.)

■ For LCCs, keys will include:

- Strong balance sheet → deterrence
- Low unit costs → offset lower unit revenues
- Competitive scope → why coverage and connections count
- Credible brand identity → WN and who else?