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Managing Evolution in a Prominent African NGO: Lessons from Enda Tiers Monde in Dakar, Senegal

Research Focus

On November 21st, 2007, street vendors rioted in downtown Dakar, Senegal's capital city. They burned cars and tires, threw stones at storefronts, and pillaged the mayor's office and national electric company until they were eventually dispersed by the city's police force. The riots were a spontaneous response to the forced removal of vendors and beggars from Dakar's streets that began a week before, following a decree issued by President Abdoulaye Wade aimed at bringing order to the crowded city center.¹ Overwhelmed by the spontaneity and widely dispersed nature of the riots, the government withdrew the removal decree temporarily. All sources say Dakar returned quickly to life-as-usual. Yet the day's events were a shock for Senegal, widely regarded as the most stable, democratic nation in an otherwise volatile region. They brought the issues of urban informality, marginalization, and public decision-making to the forefront of Senegal's political landscape.

The vendor riots led me to a number of initial questions that would guide my research: 1) How are Dakar's institutions coping with its rapid, and largely informal, growth? 2) What policy strategies are being developed to deal with slum settlements and street vendors and how are these strategies being developed? 3) Under what circumstances is civic and institutional capacity being built in the city to reduce poverty and inequality in the face of this informal growth? 4) Are there exemplary initiatives/projects that have been successful at uniting government, business, and civil society institutions in co-production of mutually beneficial solutions for slum upgrading, capital creation for informal-sector businesses, etc.? 5) Are marginalized groups developing civic capacity to participate effectively in decision-making and, if so, how?

In order to approach these questions, I decided to work with Enda Tiers Monde, an international environment and development NGO based in Dakar with satellite offices throughout the developing world. I planned to look at some of the organization's initiatives relating to informality in attempts to identify best practices for civic and institutional capacity building and poverty reduction. I anticipated that Enda would have been involved in the events surrounding the vendor riots given that the riots were one of Dakar's most striking civil society moments in some time and Enda is Senegal's oldest, largest and most influential NGO and the champion of Dakar's "popular economy." Yet when I began my research in Senegal, I realized that Enda was entirely absent from events surrounding the riots. Where was Enda? Why were they absent? These questions were being asked by many people around Dakar who felt that Enda should have been involved. At the same time, during the latter months of 2007 and into 2008, these were among the questions being asked by staff at the organization's headquarters in Dakar as part of an internal reflection and strategic planning process.

Thus, my research came to focus more narrowly on the evolution of Enda—the historical development of Enda's approaches, organizational structure, and institutional relationships, particularly around issues of urban informality. In its thirty years of operation, Enda has made some significant contributions to urban development in Dakar. However, as demonstrated by their lack of involvement and influence in events surrounding Dakar's recent civil society mobilizations,

¹ "Senegal vendors clash with police." The Associated Press, November 21, 2007.

Enda's role and relationship with both grassroots actors and national policy-makers has changed. My Master's thesis, developed out of this research, will attempt to explain this evolution and its implications for the organization's current comparative advantage in addressing issues of urban informality in Dakar.

Methodology

To conduct my research, I spent two months during the summer of 2008 and an additional two weeks in January, 2009, at Enda's headquarters in Dakar, working under the supervision of Cheikh Gueye, the Urban Policy Advisor to the Executive Secretary and head of Coordination and Planning for the organization. While there, I reviewed internal documents and conducted interviews with 19 Enda staff, both at headquarters and in program offices. I also interviewed 12 community beneficiaries, 4 social science researchers, 10 government officials, 4 representatives from partner organizations, and 6 donor representatives. In addition, I spent 3-5 days in each of three Enda entities that focus on urban development—Enda RUP (Relay for Participatory Urban Development), Enda Ecopop (Popular Economy), and Enda Ecopole (Training and Organizing Center)—observing their activities and conducting field visits to project sites. I chose to focus on these three entities and one other, Enda Diapol (Political Dialogue), to assess the evolution of Enda's impacts on urban issues in Dakar.

Overview of Senegal and Dakar²

Senegal is a French-speaking country located on the westernmost tip of Africa, bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the east, Mauritania to the north, Mali to the West, Guinea to the southeast, Guinea-Bissau to the south, and the Gambia, which is surrounded by Senegal along the River Gambia. In 2008, the country's population was estimated at around 12 million people, with a population growth rate of 2.3% annually. The same year, Senegal's GDP was estimated at \$9.1 billion US. With few natural resources, Senegal's economy is dominated by a few sectors, including peanuts, chemical industry (i.e. phosphates), tourism, fisheries, and services (i.e. telecommunications and construction). In 2007, the country was experiencing real GDP growth of 4.8% annually.

Though economic performance has been strong in recent years, the majority of Senegal's population is quite impoverished. As estimated by the United Nations Development Program, Senegal's GDP per capita in 2005 was \$1,792 PPP US³, with 56.2% of the population living below \$2 per day and 33.4% of the population below the national poverty line. The adult literacy rate was 39.3%, and life expectancy at birth 61.6 years. With a UNDP Human Development Index value of 0.499, Senegal ranks 156th out of 177 countries with data.

Senegal has one of the highest rates of urbanization—defined as the urban population as a percentage of total population—in West Africa, which at 48% is higher than the average rates for all of sub-Saharan Africa (around 29%).⁴ Dakar, the capital city, is Senegal's largest city and is located on the Cape Verde Peninsula on the Atlantic coast. Its position on the western edge of Africa is advantageous for trade, so Dakar has grown rapidly into a major regional port. The population of the Dakar metropolitan area in 2005, according to official estimates, was 2.45 million people, or roughly 21% of Senegal's total population. Thus, one-fifth of Senegal's population lives in an area that makes up 0.28% of the national territory.

² The information in this section comes primarily from two sources: Wikipedia and the *Dakar Horizon 2025 Urban Master Plan* prepared by the Senegalese Ministry of Urbanism and Land Management in January, 2003.

³ Purchasing Power Parity

⁴ "Republic of Senegal, Humanitarian Country Profile." IRIN News. Online.

<http://www.irinnews.org/country.aspx?CountryCode=SN&RegionCode=WA>. January 7, 2007.

This high population density is due to the fact that Dakar is the major administrative center, housing the National Assembly and the Presidential Palace, while at the same time the industrial commercial and financial hub of the country. Despite land management, regional development, and decentralization policies, the Dakar region contains more than 46% of the Senegalese civil service, 97% of commerce and transportation salaries, 96% of bank employees, 95% of industrial and commercial enterprises, and 87% of permanent jobs, according to the Dakar Horizon 2025 Master Plan created by the Ministry of Urbanism and Land Management.

During the French colonial period, which lasted until 1960, Dakar served as the point of contact between France and its territories in Africa. The city of Dakar is one of 67 *communes* in Senegal, created by the French colonial administration in 1887. The *commune* of Dakar was preserved by the Senegalese state after independence in 1960, though its limits have changed over time. The current limits of the Dakar were established in 1983. The *commune* of Dakar is at the same time a *département*, of which there are 34 in Senegal. *Départements* have no political power and function as administrative structures of the central government, responsible for some administrative services and overseeing the activities of the *communes* within their boundaries. The *département* of Dakar is composed of four *arrondissements*: Almadies, Grand Dakar, Parcelles-Assainies, and Plateau/Gorée (downtown Dakar). Like the *départements*, *arrondissements* are local administrative structures of the central state. The Dakar region, one of the 13 regions in the country, contains 4 *départements* composed of 9 *arrondissements* containing 47 *communes d'arrondissement*. The *département* of Pikine is the most populated, with 36.8% of the region's population, followed by Dakar, with 33.5%, Guediawaye, with 17.6%, and Rufisque, with 12.08%.

For 40 years following independence, Senegalese politics were dominated by the Socialist Party of Senegal, or PS. Leopold Sedar Senghor, Senegal's first president after independence, established the Senegal Progressive Union party, or UPS. In 1976, he changed the name of the party to PS, the Socialist Party. When Senghor stepped down in 1980, elections were held and Abdou Diouf, also from PS, was elected the second president of Senegal. In 2000, Abdoulaye Wade, leader of the opposition Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), defeated Abdou Diouf to become the third and current president of the country. Two years later, in May of 2002, Wade also ran and was elected president of the Dakar regional council, while another PDS leader, Pape Diop, was elected mayor of Dakar. Thus from 2002 until recent local elections held in March, 2009 in which a coalition of opposition parties won, Dakar has been controlled by the ruling PDS party.

The Vendor Riots In Context

Wade announced his decision to enforce the removal decree at the closure of his annual Presidential Investment Conference on November 12th, arguing that uncontrolled street vending had cost the country around 185 million dollars due to traffic jams that discourage investment.⁵ He stated, "What is happening in Senegal is inadmissible because anyone can plant themselves anywhere...The state will take full responsibility for putting an end to this anarchic occupation...No one will benefit from protection because we have the will to make Dakar a modern city."⁶ In response to the decree, the Governor of Dakar ordered the police to clear the streets of vendors, sparking the riots.

On the same day as the riots, members of Senegal's 18 unions took to the streets in a previously planned and authorized march protesting the high cost of living and demanding increases

⁵ Tillinac, F. and M. Ba. "Senegal police fire tear gas at trade unions, rioting vendors." Agence France Press, November 21, 2007.

⁶ "Encombrement de la voie publique: Wade promet de sévir." *Sud Quotidien (Senegal)*, November 13, 2007.

in salaries and support for struggling businesses.⁷ After the street vendor's morning riots, the government withdrew the permit for the unions' planned protest at the last minute, but more than 600 people marched anyway.⁸ In addition to the street vendors, the day's protests included teachers, public servants, and average citizens struggling to feed their families as cost of living and unemployment rise. They were all met by police using tear gas, warning shots, and rubber truncheons.

The underlying frustrations demonstrated by the vendor riots suggest that Senegal's economic growth, at an annual rate of over 5%, is not being felt by the country's urban poor. According to UNHabitat data in 2007, out of Senegal's approximately 5.5 million urban dwellers, 76%, or roughly 4.2 million people, live in informal settlements. A 2006 World Bank study of employment in Senegal found that 95% of people actively employed work in the informal sector. In the face of rising inflation and rapidly increasing costs of oil and food, basic commodities like cooking gas, rice, and bread are becoming unaffordable for many Senegalese. At the same time, people are frustrated with a political regime in which power and wealth appear increasingly concentrated.

As one of the only countries in West Africa never to have had a coup d'état, Senegal is relatively unaccustomed to mobilization of the poor, particularly of a violent nature. Yet the vendor riots and policy actions that prompted them suggest a breakdown in communication between the government and the city's poor on key urban development concerns related to investment, employment, and citizen participation in decision-making. Because of the role Enda Tiers Monde has historically played, both as defender of the urban poor's rights and as intermediary between these populations and the state, everyone from union representatives to elected representatives to Enda employees themselves thought Enda should have been involved in events surrounding the riots. Their absence is explained through a detailed look at the natural evolution of this organization and its environment.

Background on Enda Tiers Monde

Enda is a unique NGO in that it was founded and is based in Senegal, but with international satellite offices in Africa, South America, Asia, and Europe. Environnement et Developpement du Tiers Monde (Enda TM) was created in 1972 as a joint program of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the African Institute of Economic Development and Planning (IDEP), and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) following the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. Jacques Bugnicourt headed the program. He was a French national trained in economic development, political science, and geography who had served since 1961 as Director of Land Management in the Senegalese government and as a professor in Dakar's National School of Applied Economics (ENEA). In 1978, Bugnicourt decided to make Enda a separate, independent international environment and development NGO, retaining its base in Dakar. From its inception, Enda had strong ties with the Senegalese government, due in large part to Bugnicourt's personal relationships with high-level governing officials, including the President. Enda and the Senegalese national government signed a contract granting Enda international diplomatic status and rent-free government-owned office space for the organization's headquarters.

Bugnicourt's vision was for Enda to be an organization at the frontier of alternative approaches to development. Enda's early mission, as described in its contract with the government, was "promotion of research activities, grassroots community development training and support, environmental management, and diffusion of appropriate technologies in third-world countries, in

⁷ "Senegal: Poverty at the root of violent protests." IRIN News, November 22, 2007.

⁸ "Senegal vendors clash with police." The Associated Press, November 21, 2007.

close cooperation with groups, associations, and institutions of these countries with similar ambitions and with organizations affiliated with the United Nations.”⁹

Starting with a staff of ten, Enda was run by an Executive Secretariat housed at the headquarters in Dakar, with oversight from an international Board of Directors. Over time, semi-autonomous, thematic “entities” were founded in Senegal, their creation driven organically by emerging development challenges or interests of the Executive. At the same time, “antennas” were established in other developing countries by nationals of those countries who sought affiliation with Enda. There are now 18 entities in Senegal including Enda Health, Enda Energy, Ecopop (popular economy), and Enda Diapol (political dialogue), to name a few. International antennas exist in 11 countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Dominican Republic, India, Vietnam, France, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Mali, and Madagascar. The antennas are entirely financially autonomous from the Executive Secretariat, as are the entities, except for the salary of each entity head, which is paid with central operating funds. The majority of Enda’s funding comes in the form of project grants from bilateral and multilateral donors, which amounted to 13,925,356 Euros in 2007. Enda also receives institutional funds from the governments of Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in the amount of 2,345,963 Euros in 2007.

With over 300 staff in Senegal and 500 globally, administration of Enda is complex. There is a General Assembly of delegates from all entities/antennas who are responsible for many of the decisions related to internal operations of the organization. The Board of Directors has some of the same responsibilities as the General Assembly, but is also charged with mobilizing financial resources, arbitrating conflicts within the organization, and naming the Executive Secretary. Representatives from the entities, the Executive Secretariat, the General Assembly, and the Board of Directors are expected to come together for an Inter-Entity Meeting every 18 months, though these meetings have historically happened less frequently. According to long-term staff of Enda, management under Bugnicourt was somewhat arbitrary and improvisational, without standard operating procedures or strategic plans.

When Bugnicourt died in 2002, Enda began a difficult period of internal evaluation, reorganization, and redefinition. After five transitional years, a new Executive Secretary, Josephine Ouedraogo of Burkina Faso, took office in September, 2007, marking what many see as a new era for Enda. The organization is currently working to understand its comparative advantage and reposition itself, both in Senegal and internationally.

Findings

Three different types of analyses help explain where Enda is today and why they weren’t involved in the vendor riots, as many felt they should have been. These three analyses are: 1) historical, 2) external/institutional, and 3) internal/organizational.

Historical: Urban development issues, particularly the informal sector and irregular settlements, have been “at the heart” of Enda’s activities since its inception. In an era when most NGOs were concerned about rural development and agricultural production, Bugnicourt was determined to make the urban poor the focus of Enda’s interventions. According to one long-standing member of Enda’s Board of Directors, Bugnicourt, with his background in land management and political science, was particularly attuned to land rights struggles in the cities of the developing world. As a resident of Dakar, he witnessed how the rural exodus was causing the capital to become crowded with people looking for work and places to live. And he was sensitive to the lack of security, both social and economic, that dominated these people’s lives. At that time,

⁹ “Accord de Siege,” contract between Environnement et Developpement du Tiers-Monde (ENDA) and the Government of the Republic of Senegal.

the Senegalese government was investing in planned housing developments like HLM and SICAP that attempted to control the growth of the city. Yet there were populations already living in the development sites, and their settlements were taken down with force. One long-standing member of Enda Ecopop states, “Enda was one of the first organizations to talk to the public sector about the right to the city, getting government to speak to and listen to slum dwellers.” According to a Professor of Sociology at the University Cheikh Anta Diop, Enda got the state to focus on urban marginalization and entrepreneurship. At a time when many development concepts were coming from the international arena, Enda put the focus on internal marginalization. Bugnicourt became deeply involved in the struggle to protect informal settlements like Ex-Rail and Baraka and more broadly in defending the rights of marginalized urban populations in questions of urban development.

The Enda entities that have historically focused their activities on urban development, namely RUP, Ecopop, Ecopole, and Diapol, were all able to respond creatively to the authentic challenges of Dakar’s urban poor in their earlier years. RUP, founded in 1983, facilitated participatory land management processes and developed innovative sanitation technologies for neighborhoods not served by public sanitation systems. Ecopop was created in 1990 to support actors in the “popular economy” through organizing and training. Out of the work of RUP and Ecopop came Ecopole, opened in 1996 as a training, research, and meeting space for the poorest thirty percent of Dakar’s population, namely slum dwellers and actors in the “popular economy.” Diapol, for “political dialogue,” was established as an entity in 2001. Diapol’s focus is “political poverty;” their goal is to build capacity of impoverished populations to “engage with the power structures that affect their lives.” Diapol’s first project was around issues of environment and gender in Thiaroye, a poor neighborhood on the outskirts of Dakar.

Over the years, the activities of each of these entities have changed significantly, their focuses shifting away from the populations they were initially engaged with. RUP has continued with their sanitation work, expanding their projects to other countries and broadening to issues of waste water management, urban agriculture, and even urban governance. Ecopop is now known for its work on decentralization and training of local governments. Many of Ecopole’s original activities have slowed down as a result of lack of funding, and they now are involved in projects related to nutrition, waste management, and local development planning. Finally, Diapol has moved away from action research on urban issues, focusing instead on agricultural production, fisheries, transborder cooperation, and migration.

External/institutional: The events surrounding the vendor riots are evidence of a lack of dialogue between the state and street vendors, a significant set of economic actors, around issues of livelihood and spatial access in the city of Dakar. Because of the role Enda has historically played both defending the rights of informal actors and mediating between these actors and the state, observers all over the city expected that they would have played a role in this conflict. The fact that they didn’t can be explained in part by the evolution and dynamism of the organization’s relationships with external actors, particularly the populations with whom they work and the state.

There is a pervasive sentiment, both within and outside the organization, that their entities are less close to marginalized urban populations like slum dwellers and informal vendors than they once were. There are a variety of other theories about why Enda’s relationship with its populations has shifted. Someone at the SE attributed this to a change in approach. “Enda went from a defender of rights to a facilitator of dialogue. We are more in the middle now.” Others argue that Enda’s focus has shifted from the domestic grassroots to the international arena. In some ways, the organization is now more focused on international policies, engaging more in international lobbying for a just world, i.e. on issues of climate change and strengthening South-South collaborations in problems of the global economy. Other people feel that the distancing is related to the increasing

“technocratization” of the organization. One social science researcher argued that in its earlier phases, “Enda had militant engagement along with technical expertise.” Someone else stated that “before they were more focused on vulnerable populations, but now they are working on high level applied research that is grounded in the field.”

For others, Enda’s distancing from marginalized populations is a natural extension of their growth and need for expanded resources. One researcher argued that when Enda was smaller and more focused, they were very close to vulnerable groups. With the growth of their sphere of activities, it is more difficult to identify Enda with these groups. He stated, “These groups used to go to Enda to have their voices heard. Now there are NGOs focused on specific issues who people prefer to go to. Enda has become too big for people to know who to go to there to be their interlocutor.” Someone at Ecopole argued that the problem was related to resources. “Before, we were closer to populations because we had the resources. Now we don’t have the resources.” A former employee corroborated that the search for financing has changed Enda’s relationships with their populations. “Enda wants to privatize themselves and they can become seen as a consulting firm. Look for money, do the work, and get the profit. They used to be more militant, more closely aligned with populations.” While marginalized people still have a considerable amount of trust in Enda and contacts have been maintained, the perception of the relationship, and perhaps the relationship itself, has changed.

Enda’s relationship with the Senegalese state has also changed over time. Enda’s founder, Bugnicourt, had strong personal relationships with Senegal’s first and second presidential administrations, from 1960 to 2000. The quality of Enda’s work was appreciated by the government and while they were not always in agreement, Enda was able to dialogue with high-ranking officials around issues of development and the environment in Dakar and in Senegal. When the current president, Wade, from the opposition party, came to power in 2000, Enda lost most of its ties to the national government. Thus, Enda also lost the ability to influence important policy, particularly related to urban development decisions in Dakar.

Yet at the same time, Enda entities have deepened relationships with local governments, who have been given greater responsibility for development planning following massive decentralization reforms in 1996. From the point of view of local governments, working with Enda adds value, both technically and politically. For Enda, one important explanation for the organization’s increased distance from the national government is that decisions over urban planning and development are increasingly localized. It has been strategically necessary for Enda to become more involved with local authorities. Though entities like Ecopop and Ecopole might be increasingly focused on municipal governance “because the national state is too far from citizens,” their influence may reach more broadly, though perhaps more indirectly.

Internal/organizational: In addition to the historical evolution of Enda’s urban activities and the organizations’ changing relationships with external actors like populations and the state, the internal dynamics of the organization also have significant implications for where they are today. Over time, the organization has grown, and management has changed. With growth came formalization, though not to the degree one might expect. For the majority of the life of the organization, management has granted the entities as much autonomy and flexibility as possible, believing this would make them more responsive and innovative in their work. In some ways, this has served the entities and their populations, who operate primarily in informal networks, well. However, because systems of internal evaluation and accountability have not been created, the organization has missed opportunities for learning and proactive engagement with issues like informal street vending in Dakar.

One of Enda’s greatest challenges is to figure out how to balance the flexibility and autonomy of the entities while encouraging strategic collaboration, learning, and adaptation. In

some ways, Enda's decentralized structure has been an asset to the organization. As stated by one academic observer, "Each entity has their own expertise so they need a level of autonomy." Each entity has been able to develop its own capacities and respond selectively to issues of their choosing. Some people within the organization, primarily at the level of the entities, believe that their autonomy allows them to be more innovative in their work.

Yet many would argue that the entities have become too independent, with their actions and approaches too widely dispersed. People both inside and outside the organization agree that greater synergy between the entities would help the organization have more weight in local, national, and international debates. Someone at IAGU argued, "the decentralization of the entities creates a tension between specificity and greater weight in bigger change." It is also doubtful that the autonomy of the entities allows them to be more creative or innovative. This may be true for some entities, but for others, the independence has made them more vulnerable. As stated by one researcher, "Because entities are looking for funding, they end up being donor-driven." Additionally, many people argue that the lack of collaboration between entities causes "duplication, competition, and conflicts of interest," as one project partner suggested. Lack of collaboration, "mission drift," and redundancy of experience may diffuse Enda's impacts and confuse outside partners about Enda's operations and areas of expertise.

A more important explanatory issue affecting Enda's ability to respond to emerging challenges relates to entities' ability to be strategic and selective about the work they do. Most people attribute the growing opportunism among Enda's entities to the structure and functioning of the organization. Another important factor that has affected the entities' ability to dictate their own agendas is funding. Under the leadership of Bugnicourt, Enda had large amounts of "strategic," or operational funds that weren't linked to specific projects. Since the death of Bugnicourt, the amount of strategic funds has shrunk, while project funding has increased significantly. Many people argue that Enda, in part as a result of this increased opportunism, has shifted from being a political organization to being an implementing agency. In its earlier years, Enda was known for undertaking experimental pilot projects designed to test their alternative development vision. They linked this quest to a larger political project, pushing the national and international community to recognize the value of this alternative vision. However, there is the general perception that this changed over the course of time. People within the organization generally agree that Enda must now define its political identity more clearly.

Enda's ability to be strategic in its activities is closely related to how the organization approaches evaluation and accountability. Most people understand accountability in financial terms, as a way of monitoring how funds are used in organizations, particularly public and non-profit organizations. Yet accountability mechanisms can also be an important managerial tool for assessing the impacts of an organization and making adjustments to improve performance. For much of its existence, Enda has operated with this ad-hoc system of evaluation and internal accountability with no pressure to change. While in recent years they have been attempting to do more evaluation, it is typically for the purposes for external accountability, rather than internal learning.

Though Enda possesses significant internal research and knowledge-production capacities, the evolution of its structures and the absence of internal, strategic evaluation and accountability mechanisms have affected the organization's ability to use its experience and capacities for the purposes of learning and adaptation. Enda has a rich history of action research that it uses to guide its activities and influence national and international decision-makers. Yet as Enda has grown, attempted to scale up its impacts, and sought new sources of funding, the ability of entities to interrogate their actions and change course has been constrained. They are less experimental; many recognize that in the domain of urban development issues, Enda has not been as innovative in recent years.

Enda's ability to learn and adapt its interventions depends on its ability to use grounded knowledge production for the purposes of internal evaluation and learning. The autonomy of its entities may allow them to develop small-scale, innovative ideas, yet this may also constrain their ability to put these ideas into practice and achieve larger impacts. The challenge for Enda is to figure out how to develop a system that will grant entities the flexibility to experiment while supporting them with evaluation for learning and adaptation.

Conclusions

I am still in the process of developing my final conclusions and recommendations for Enda, so my ideas are not fully concretized. What is certain, though, is that if Enda is to be at the cutting edge of development issues in Dakar, Senegal, and beyond, it will have to think critically about the impacts it is trying to influence and how its activities and relationships can further those goals. It will also have to develop mechanisms for tracking change and changing course, when necessary, to be able to respond proactively to emerging challenges, like that of informality in Dakar. If it is able to do these things, it is less likely to miss major events like the vendor riots and instead be the important player it seeks to be.