

M/W 10:30 – 12:00
E51-361

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Reading List

^ = on reserve at Dewey Library

* = required reading; in reading packet

** = required reading; not in reading packet; will be handed out

General References

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6. Multiagent Moral Hazard and Common Agency (Holmstrom)

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D. Collective Decision Making and Advocacy

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