

GROUP ATTACHMENTS AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR WAR

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In a democratic country, no course of action can be sustained without the support of the mass public. This constraint is especially significant in matters of war and peace. As Reiter and Stam (2002) have recently argued, echoing Kant (1795), democracies must have the tacit consent of their citizens in order to wage war.¹

Though government cannot go to battle with the support of its people, whether the mass public should guide and determine foreign policy has remained the subject of great debate throughout U.S. history. For a number of years, political scientists believed that the public was ill informed about foreign policy issues. Furthermore, in those few instances where citizens did pay attention to foreign affairs, scholars argued that citizens' preferences were volatile and guided by irrational impulses (for statements of these views, see Almond 1960; Converse 1964; Lippman 1922). In recent years, a more charitable view of the capabilities of the mass public has emerged. There is a growing consensus that citizens, on the whole, hold foreign policy preferences that are sensible and adjust to changes in world events that reflect on American interests (Holsti 1992, 1996; Jentleson 1992; Nincic 1988, 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992; though see Bartels 2003). On matters of war, many political scientists and policymakers therefore argue that unmediated events – the successes and failures on the battlefield – determine whether the mass public will support military excursions.

I, however, advance a simpler story. In this paper, I argue that public opinion concerning war follows a simple structure. Opinions over foreign policy, just like opinions about domestic politics, are structured by politically relevant predispositions – attachments and enmities to political and social grouping in American society. In a companion piece (Berinsky 2006), I consider the effect

¹ Reiter and Stam's book is but one work in the vast literature in International Relations on "the democratic peace" – the question of whether democratic governments are less prone to international conflict than states with other forms of government (Doyle 1983, 1986; Gowa 1999; Huth and Allee 2003; Maoz 1998; Morrow 2002; Russett 1993; Small and Singer 1982).

of political predispositions on opinion. In this paper, I consider the role that groups play in public opinion on matters of war.

Recent research in the field of public opinion has demonstrated the continuing power of stereotypes and other group-centered attitudes or heuristics in shaping political understanding and behavior (Berinsky and Mendelberg 2005; Gilens 1999; Hurwitz and Peffley 1998; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 2001; Sears et al. 2000; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Valentino et al. 2002). This literature stems from Converse's insight, worked out in the seminal work on belief systems, that the public's beliefs are mostly structured by the social groupings of society (Converse 1964). Most of this work concerns the tendency of attitudes towards domestic political groups to structure domestic policy opinion. But the scope of group attachments may extend past the domestic arena. In this paper, I argue that beliefs about the groups to which individuals feel attachment or enmity also structure their attitudes in the foreign policy realm. I draw primarily on data from World War II – a time when internal ethnic divisions were a highly visible part of the social sphere. But to demonstrate the generality of the group-based perspective, I look to two recent controversies involving foreign trade, where domestic groups were particularly salient.

Groups and Political Thinking

Converse's (1964) landmark work on belief systems is primarily remembered for its fairly dismal conclusions regarding the possibility of ideological thinking among members of the mass public. But Converse did not merely document the shortcoming of the citizenry; he also considered the ways that individuals could come to reasoned political decisions, even in the absence of an overarching guiding ideology. Converse concluded that two factors might provide structure to public opinion. The first was the existence of narrow issue publics – groups of citizens with relatively crystallized opinions in given issue areas (see Hutchings 2003 for an elaboration of this insight). The second – and the one most relevant for present purposes – is the power of groups.

Drawing of contemporary theories of “reference groups”, Converse claimed that visible groups in a society provide structure to individual political judgments. Specifically, he argued that citizens could “evaluate parties and candidates in terms of their expected favorable or unfavorable treatment of different social groupings in society,” (1964, 216) and mentioned race, religion, and nationality as clear referents on the political scene of the 1950s (see also Campbell et al. 1960). According to Converse, ordinary individuals could situate themselves on the stage of the mass politics through the use of these group reference points, thereby coming to meaningful political decisions.

Converse placed a great deal of weight on the power of groups because they were relatively simple concepts, requiring a lower threshold of sophistication than was needed to employ abstract concepts, such as ideology. As Converse argued, to employ group-based reasoning, citizens need only “be endowed with some cognitions of the group and with some interstitial ‘linking’ information indicating why a given party or policy is relevant to the group” (p. 236-237).² Such information allows even casual observers of the political science to understand complex political events. Presaging later work on cues and heuristics (Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991), Converse noted that reference group cues could serve as the foundation of “ideology by proxy” creating meaningful patterns in the attitudes and behaviors of ordinary citizens (Converse 1975).

Evidence from open-ended questions on likes and dislikes of the parties demonstrated the centrality of group thinking in the belief systems of the mass public. Coding the statements in these

² The first part of this equation is fairly straightforward. Groups that are prominent within a society are more likely to be recognized by individual members of the mass public. The second part – the linking information cannot be taken as a given. However, as Converse notes, in some situations, “the cues presented to citizens concerning links between the group and party or policy are so gross that they penetrate rapidly even to the less informed” (1964, 238). As discussed below, high profile foreign policy issues – such as war – involving foreign nations may be a class of situations where these links are clear.

questions, Converse assigned respondents to one of five “levels of conceptualization.” While few respondents thought about politics in ideological terms, the large plurality of respondents (42%) were classified in the “group interest” category.³ These were respondents who had a clear image of politics as an arena of group concerns and used this understanding of group relations to come to political judgments.⁴ For example, one respondent disliked the Democratic Party because “it’s trying to help the Negroes too much.” Similarly, another respondent said that she did not favor the Democrats because, “they were hard on the farmers ... [Truman] said he was going to do things for the farmers and he backed out.” (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960).

The reference group theories Converse and his colleagues drew upon have largely fallen by the wayside in favor of other group-based theories, such as Social Identity Theory, and Realistic Group Conflict theory. As Weisberg and Green (2003) note, from a modern perspective, reference-group theory may even be considered quaint. However, Converse’s central insight remains important; groups as cognitive constructs can play a significant role in structuring public opinion.

In fact, much work done since Converse underscores the cognitive power of groups in influencing political behavior. Kinder, Adams, and Gronke (1989) find that individuals come to

³ The next largest group, “nature of the times” comprised 24 percent of the sample. These respondents made simple associations between the condition of the economy or the state of international affairs on the one hand and the incumbent administration on the other. These statements largely consisted of uniformed references to controversies over public policy. For instance, of the Republican Party, one respondent said, “Seems a lot like they helped to stop the [Korean] war.”

⁴ Converse himself did not make mention of the large proportions of respondents who fell in the “group interest” level of conceptualization when he discussed the role of groups and opinion. Kinder (2003) speculates that Converse may have overlooked this evidence because, by relying on reference group theory, Converse focused primarily on groups in society apart from one’s own. Much of the rhetoric concerning likes and dislikes of candidates and the parties, however, concerned the group to which the respondent belonged. I argue that both references to ones own group and references to other groups are consistent with Converse’s general approach – in both cases, relying on groups allows one to arrive at decisions on complex political issues.

understand the national economy through the prism of groups to which they belong. Specifically, the largest predictor of judgments of change in national economic well being was change in their own group's economic well-being. Other work has found that liked or disliked population groups can anchor political reasoning, Brady and Sniderman (1985) found that individuals come to political understanding – “an impressively accurate map of politics” (p. 94) – by referencing their political affect towards politically strategic groups. Similarly, Mutz (1998) argues that group influence is sociotropic. When coming to political decisions, citizens rely primarily on their perceptions of large-scale collectives – including groups – that exist beyond the realm of personal experience. For instance, Mutz and Mondak (1997) found that group-based economic perceptions affected presidential vote in 1984. This influence was not a function of group membership, group identification, or traditional forms of group comparison such as relative deprivation. Instead, citizens used groups as cognitive reference points.

Thus, setting aside a strict adherence to reference-group theory, the central finding relevant here is that both groups to which an individual belongs – the collection of individuals of which a citizen is a part – and groups to which she does not belong – those groups towards which an individual feels enmity or affection – can be important reference points in political understanding and choice. Put simply, citizens can use their affect toward groups to comprehend and guide complex political decisions.⁵

When Do Groups Matter?

To argue that “groups matter,” however, is not sufficient; we also need to know which groups matter. Certainly membership in or hostility toward politically salient groups can provide a

⁵ Individuals do not have to be aware of their affect toward various groups in order for those groups to play a role in political decision-making. Recent work has found that groups can play a role outside of consciousness (Berinsky and Mendelberg 2005, Mendelberg 2001).

reference point for political choice, but given the broad constellation of groups in American society, what factors determines which groups guide political cognition and decision-making?

First, consider the effects of group membership. As Kinder, Adams, and Gronke (1989) note, people may use groups as prisms of understanding that may, in turn, influence political choice. Sometimes group identity is a more powerful force than other times. As Conover (1988) notes, the framing of an issue by media and political leaders may invoke “group cues” that heighten the influence of groups in political thinking.

When considering affect towards other groups, variation exists in the nature and power of affect towards other groups, as well. One line of work suggests that it is not the particular group that matters for political decisionmaking as much as it is feelings towards groups in general. Kinder (2003) has explicated the concept of ethnocentrism – a coherent ideology concerning group relations in which one’s own ethnic identity is regarded as superior to all others. Kinder has shown that ethnocentrism – measured as subscription to stereotypes concerning a wide range of groups – affects opinion in a variety of domains, from immigration to attitudes concerning 9/11 (Kam and Kinder 2005, Kinder 2003). Moreover, he has shown that the power of ethnocentrism extends to the realm of foreign policy. Kinder and D’Ambrosio, for instance, demonstrate that opinions about the first Gulf War were influenced by ethnocentrism (Kinder 2003).⁶

Beyond generalized sentiment concerning other groups, affect toward specific groups can also be important. Conover’s (1988) notion of group cues applies not just to group membership but also to cognition concerning other groups. After all, when issues cue particular groups, they can

⁶ Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) find that the core value of “ethnocentrism” structures foreign policy beliefs. But Hurwitz and Peffley’s definition of ethnocentrism is a different definition of ethnocentrism than the one I employ here. Hurwitz and Peffley measure ethnocentrism at the national level, defining the concept as “the belief that one’s country is superior to all other” (1987, 1108). Thus, Hurwitz and Peffley’s use of the term bears little relation to the concept of domestic ethnocentrism used by Kinder and myself.

activate not just relevant group memberships, but attachments and enmities to those groups.

Conover's argument builds upon Converse's discussion of the importance of "linking" information.

Some groups are more prominent than others in political discourse on particular issues; attitudes toward these groups can play a key role in the individual decision-making process.

Groups and Foreign Policy

Though much research on domestic public opinion has examined the role of groups, there has been little work on this subject in the realm of foreign affairs. In the immediate post-World War II years, scholars looked for a link between group affiliations and attitudes toward international involvement (Rieslbach 1960; Russett 1960). These authors examined the effects of relationship between ethnic affiliation and isolationism using both aggregate Congressional voting records and individual-level public opinion data, but found little evidence for such a relationship. These studies may have closed the door to work on the role of groups in foreign policy prematurely. Kinder's work on ethnocentrism finds that groups – considered broadly – matter in the development of public opinion concerning foreign policy. It is a small step to argue that in the realm of foreign relations, beliefs concerning specific groups should play a powerful role as well.⁷

Public Opinion and World War II

The World War II era seems an especially fruitful area for research. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, different European ethnic groups maintained distinct identities and links to old country. Furthermore – as we shall see in a moment – a great deal of ethnic hostility existed in the United States. The immigration experiences of the late 19th and early 20th century solidified opinions of

⁷ There has been some limited work done on the relationship between attitudes towards domestic groups and foreign policy. Though he does not explicitly argue from a group-based theoretic position Hill (1993) finds that opinion concerning domestic race relations structured attitudes towards sanction against South Africa (see below).

particular ethnic groups – most notably Jews and Italians – independent of wartime opinion. Little work, however, has been done on the relationship between groups and opinion toward the war.⁸

To the extent that such work exists, prevailing wisdom seems to be that ethnic identity shaped opinion prior to U.S. entry in the conflict, but dissipated as a factor after Pearl Harbor. Tracing out the tension between group ethnic identities and a unified national identity, Gleason finds that ethnic groups retained salient nationalistic identities throughout the 1930s and into 1940. For instance, during this time the German-American Bund was politically active and the Italian-American press maintained a pro-Fascist orientation. Indeed “Until the summer of 1940, there was no question that Italian-Americans in general were solidly behind Mussolini (p. 349) Gleason, however, argues that the act of going to war altered the link between ethnic identity and attitudes towards the war. As he writes, “the practical effect of wartime experience was assimilative in the sense that it enhanced national unity and a common sense of national belongingness. (p. 516).” Similarly, Perlmutter argues, “Wars, revolutions, and national liberation movements abroad always galvanize American ethnic and racial groups ... during World War II [but before U.S. entry], more than 200 organizations, not including small local or state societies, engaged in a wide variety of activities on behalf of their ancestral homelands.” (p. 64-5). However, once the U.S. entered the conflict, Perlmutter claims that domestic ethnics repudiated their homeland and, essentially, pledged their full allegiance to America. These speculations, however, remain that; mere speculations. The

⁸ Rieslback (1960) examined the effect of Congressional district composition on the voting records of members of Congress during the 1938 to 1941. He theorized that Congressional districts with high concentrations of Irish and German immigrants would be represented by Congressmen with anti-war voting records. The data did not support this hypothesis. However, given the multiple sources of isolationist voting behavior and the problems of ecological inference, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from this study.

role of group identity and ethnic enmity in structuring opinion concerning World War II deserves closer examination.

Group Attitudes and Public Opinion Concerning World War II

To assess the strength of beliefs towards ethnic groups in structuring opinion, it is necessary to both collect reactions toward other groups in society and to membership in particular ethnic groups. Information concerning feelings toward relevant domestic groups was only sporadically collected during the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, while we have good measures of feelings toward particular groups in society, these measures were rarely included on the surveys. On the question of group membership, we have the opposite set of problems. Both the Office of Public Opinion Research (OPOR) and National Opinion Research Center (NORC) measured information concerning the respondent's parents' place of birth. Thus we can identify those respondents who are first-generation immigrants, though we cannot measure how close those respondents felt to their own groups. However, even with these indirect measures it is possible to learn a great deal about how ethnic loyalties and dislikes structured opinion concerning the war.⁹

Attitudes toward Domestic Groups: The Structure of War Support

One survey particularly well suited to the examination of the role of attitudes towards other groups in society is a poll conducted by Roper for Fortune Magazine in August 1939, on the eve of World War II. Roper asked respondents their opinions concerning a variety of courses of action the U.S. might take toward the conflict in Europe. Respondents were also asked a series of questions about their feelings toward particular domestic ethnic groups. Specifically, Roper asked "Of the people now in the U.S. who were born in foreign countries, which nationality would you say has made the best citizens? Which the worst?" A total of 43 percent of the sample identified at least one

⁹ It should be noted that much work on race and gender adopts a similar "mere membership" approach to analysis.

nationality that made the worst citizens, while 50 percent named at least one group who constituted the best citizens. These numbers are especially high given that the item was phrased as an open-ended question; respondents were required to produce their own ethnic labels for the interviewer. Table 1 presents the distribution of answers to these questions.

Somewhat surprisingly, given the persecution of German nationals during World War I, a plurality of respondents said that Germans made the best citizens, followed closely by the English. On the question of which nationality made the worst citizens, a large proportion of respondents – 22 percent – identified Italians (with another 3 percent identifying Sicilians). No other ethnic group approaches this figure. In fact, respondents named Italians as the worst citizens almost four times as often as any other group. This pattern of aversion can be found in every geographic region and among every subgroup of the population.¹⁰ Even respondents with relatively little contact with Italian immigrants expressed dislike for Italians. For instance, 17 percent of rural Midwesterners said that Italaians made the worst citizens. These results are especially striking in light of the fact that the Roper sample is certainly an over-educated sample relative to the population.¹¹ Given the strong relationship between tolerance and education levels, we might expect that the true levels of ethnic dislike would run even higher in the population at large.¹² The high levels of hostility toward Italians

¹⁰ For instance, while anti-Italian sentiment ran highest in New England, as we might expect from patterns of immigrant migration (26 percent of respondents named them the worst group), a plurality of respondents named Italians the “worst” group in each census region. The same patterns of dislike can be found in divisions along gender, age, urbanicity and racial lines.

¹¹ While Roper did not measure the education levels of the respondents, polls from this era consistently drew samples that had higher mean levels of educational attainment than the Census estimates (see Berinsky 2005 for details).

¹² It might also be the case that highly educated respondents disliked distinct groups of immigrants. If this was the case, then perhaps in the full sample, there would appear a different distribution of ethnic dislikes altogether. Without a measure of education on this survey, it is impossible to tell which scenario properly captures the sentiments of the mass public.

should not, however, obscure the relatively high levels of dislike of other groups. Non-trivial portions of the population also mentioned Jews and Germans as the “worst” groups. Clearly in the late 1930s, enmity toward ethnic groups ran high in the American population.

What is especially important about these results is the fact that these enmities were almost certainly forged on the domestic stage, independent of the international events of the mid-to-late 1930s. Certainly, I cannot rule out the possibility that attitudes concerning war shaped feelings toward domestic groups; the existing data does not allow me to empirically sort out the direction of causality. Indeed the fairly low prevalence of anti-Japanese sentiment in 1939 indicates that the World War II experience influenced affect toward and treatment of Japanese-Americans in the 1940s. However, I can establish the exogeneity of attitudes toward two key groups – Italians and Jews – by relying on historical accounts of their immigrant experience. Anti-Italian sentiment had a long history prior to the beginning of World War II.¹³ During the 1880’s, the supply of European immigration to America shifted from the traditional sources of Northern and Western Europe to the less familiar Southern and Eastern Europe. While immigrants from almost every region in Europe saw discrimination at one point or another, Italians were a prominent victim of such sentiment (Alba 1985; Higham, 1969). Stereotypes for Italians ranged from the physical – references to their “low foreheads” and “dark skin” – to the psychological – references to their “dangerous social tendencies” and their “proclivity for crime.” (Alba 1985; Higham 1969). I.W. Howerth (1894) expressed a common perception, writing, “Of our immigrants the most refractory are undoubtedly the Italians... the opinion has become current that individually and collectively they are a very dangerous people. And thus it is that the adjectives lazy, filthy, cruel,

¹³ Furthermore, the large gap in the dislike of immigrants from the two European Axis countries – Italians were mentioned as the most disliked group by 20 percent more respondents than were Germans – indicates that it is not attitudes toward the impending war alone that determines the patterns of likes and dislikes.

ferocious, bloodthirsty, and the like, are supposed to be particularly applicable to this class of immigrants. No epithet is too insulting to apply to the ‘Dago.’” This portrayal of Italians continued through the 1930s. Life Magazine, for example, intending to compliment baseball star Joe DiMaggio, wrote, “Although he learned Italian first, Joe, now 24, speaks English without an accent, and is otherwise well adapted to most U.S. mores. Instead of olive oil or smelly bear grease he keeps his hair slick with water. He never reeks of garlic and prefers chicken chow mein to spaghetti” (New York Times, March 8, 1939). Similarly, dislike of Jews had a long history in America. Jews were widely seen as “avaricious social climbers who pushed themselves where they were not wanted” (Alba 1985). During the 1890’s, it was widely feared that Jews would wreak havoc on the American economy in their attempts to rule the world; by the 1900’s this fear had subsided but the anti-Semitic notions of the Jew as a greedy and vulgar race continued to persist throughout WWII (Higham 1969). In sum, dislike of these groups emerged independently of the War.

For present purposes, more important than the absolute levels of fondness or enmity towards foreign groups is the political power of these feelings. Conover argues that groups “will enter into political thinking most strongly on issues where the group cues are explicit and salient” (1988, 61). Given the salience of the impending war, we would expect that citizens could easily map their feeling toward ethnic groups onto the international scene. That is, the interstitial linking information that lies at the heart of group-based cognition was widely available. This was not only the case for Germans – the primary aggressors in the brewing conflict – but among Italians as well. Casey (2001) performed a quantitative content analysis of FDR’s speeches from 1937 to 1941 to determine whom FDR labeled “the enemy.” By 1941, the target of U.S. alarm was clearly Hitler and Nazism. In the second half of 1941, 110 of the 145 references FDR made to an “enemy” made

mention of the Nazi regime. But FDR had not always focused on the Nazis. In the second half of 1939, two of the eight references made by FDR to “the enemy” were aimed at Mussolini and the fascist government of Italy. Additionally, during the first half of 1940, there were no specific references made to Hitler, while 9 out of 25 references were made to Mussolini and/or the Fascist Italian government.¹⁴ Thus, not only the German government but the Italian government featured prominently as enemies of the United States in the political rhetoric of this time. Theory would therefore lead us to expect that feelings toward German and Italian domestic groups would structure opinion on the conflict at hand.

To assess the effect of these likes and dislikes of particular groups on opinion toward the war, I ran a series of analyses using six dependent variables from the Roper Study. The first three of these questions concern possible support for England and France in the event of war with Germany. Respondents were asked:

If England and France go to war against the dictator nations, should we:

1. Sell them food for cash, credit, or not at all?
2. Sell them war supplies for cash, credit, or not at all
3. Send our army and navy abroad to help them immediately, or only if it is clear they are losing, or not at all?

The final three items tapped more general sentiment concerning U.S. involvement in war. Respondents were first asked, “Should we tend strictly to our business and go to war only to defend our own country from attack?” They were then asked, “Do you think there are any international questions affecting the U.S. so important to us in the long run that our government should take a stand on them now, even at the risk of our getting into war?” Finally, they were asked if the U.S. should “remain completely neutral and sell to anyone on a cash and carry basis.”¹⁵

¹⁴ The other 16 references were to unnamed aggressors or dictatorships

¹⁵ The response categories for these questions were “Yes,” “No,” and “It Depends.”

In predicting the answers to these items, I included measures for whether respondents expressed support for Germans, Italians, and English as the “best” citizens, and whether they considered Germans and Italians the “worst” citizens. I expected that expressing sympathy for the English and antipathy towards Italians and Germans would increase support for the war, while voicing sympathy for Germans and Italians would decrease support for aggressive U.S. action. I also included a measure to tap feeling towards Jews.¹⁶ Given the clear anti-Semitic rhetoric of the Nazis, my expectation was that expressing dislike of Jews would elicit a different reaction than expressing dislike of Italians or Germans; the expression of anti-Jewish sentiment should lead to the manifestation of an isolationist, rather than an internationalist position. The measure I used specifically taps feeling toward American Jews.¹⁷ Respondents scored high on this variable if they expressed a non-tolerant position.¹⁸

¹⁶ It appears that anti-Axis citizen sentiment is not a reflection of general hostility toward ethnic minorities in the United States. Given that only two percent of the sample expressed dislike of more than one group – almost certainly as a result of the design of the question – it is impractical to correlate the different dislike measures. It is, however, possible to correlate the dislike measures with the anti-Semitism item. Support for the proposition that there should be a policy to deport Jews from this country to some new homeland “as fast as it can be done without inhumanity” is not correlated with dislike of Italians and Germans. The correlation between the Anti-Semitism item and the dislike of Italians is -0.01 , while the correlation with dislike of Germans is 0.02 . These results indicate that anti-Axis immigrant sentiment is distinct from dislike of other ethnic groups.

¹⁷ I used the question which specifically asked about Jews in America so that I could directly tap anti-Semitism rather than use the indirect ethnic dislike question. In addition, because only two percent of the sample expressed dislike for more than one ethnic group, using this measure also allows me to tap overall dislike of Jews with a less discriminating probe. I reran my analysis using the ethnic dislike question in place of the anti-Semitism measure and obtained similar, though somewhat weaker, results. However, I do find stronger results in the expected direction if I use a measure that combines the two items concerning Jews.

¹⁸ The precise wording of the questions was:

Which of the following statements most nearly represents your general opinion on the Jewish question:

I ran the analysis using each of the six dependent variables. Because respondents were allowed to give answers that followed no particular ordering, I used an unordered multinomial logit (MNL) model to derive coefficient estimates of the effect of the group like and dislike variables. I then generated estimates of the effects of these variables on the probability of choosing various response categories. Following the analytic strategy outlined in Berinsky (2005), I included controls for the quota categories of gender, region, urbanicity, and class. These results are available in Appendix A.¹⁹ To ease the interpretation of these results, in Table 2, I present the first differences – the increase or decrease in the predicted probability of giving an anti-intervention response –

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1. In the United States the Jews have the same standing as any other people, and they should be treated in all ways exactly as any other Americans
 2. Jews are in some ways distinct from other Americans but they make respected and useful citizens so long as they don't try to mingle socially where they are not wanted
 3. Jews have somewhat different business methods and therefore some measures should be taken to prevent Jews from getting too much power in the business world
 4. We should make it a policy to deport Jews from this country to some new homeland as fast as it can be done without inhumanity

Respondents who chose any answer except the first were given a “non-tolerant” score; those choosing the first answer were assigned a tolerant score. Additional analysis where the different response categories were entered as a series of dummy variables yield similar results; the higher numbered (less tolerant) answers exhibited stronger effects, but all the effects were in the same direction.

¹⁹ While the MNL analysis uncovered some interesting results – for example, the ethnic like and dislike variables had the effect in some cases of mobilizing respondents from the “don't know” category to a pro-intervention or anti-intervention position – in general the tenor of the results does not change if I collapse the response categories and use probit analysis instead. A word about MNL analysis is in order here. There has been a recent interest in the proper econometric specification of unordered choice models. In particular, Alvarez and Nagler (1995) argue that models that relax the IIA restrictions, such as the Multinomial Probit (MNP) model, may be more appropriate than the MNL model for examining unordered choices. Because MNP requires additional assumptions that are as problematic for my purposes as IIA, I used MNL analysis.

resulting from labeling a particular group the “best” or the “worst.”²⁰ As the table demonstrates, the respondents’ reaction to particular ethnic groups structures opinions toward the war in important ways. Though the size of the effects vary somewhat, the effect of judgments of groups on attitudes toward the war is largely consistent across the different measures. Respondents who prefer immigrants from England are more likely to support action on the part of the U.S. vis-à-vis the Axis countries. In all six cases, these respondents give more interventionist responses and the difference is large in four of the cases. Conversely, expressing warmth toward ethnic Italians increases the probability of expressing support for anti-interventionist policies. This effect is moderately large on several of the items and has the correct sign in five of the six cases. The effect of liking Germans has a somewhat inconsistent effect. Sometimes expressing attachment to citizens from Germany

²⁰ I present the probability of giving an anti-interventionist response rather than a pro-intervention answer because it is easiest to distinguish the isolationist responses from the set of possible question responses. For instance, it is difficult to determine if selling arms for “credit” is a strictly pro-intervention response, but the “not at all” response is a clear anti-intervention response. In addition, I do not report significance tests here or for other analyses in this paper. The World War II data was collected using quota-sampling methods. While it is possible to draw inferences about the U.S. population from this data through methods that account for bias in the sampling procedures (see Berinsky 2005 for a discussion) compiling accurate measures of uncertainty is a complicated process. Standard tests of statistical significance assume that the data are drawn through probability sampling. Quota samples, however, rely on interviewer discretion for respondent selection, thereby diverging from strict random sampling. Thus, as Gschwend notes, “it is neither clear according to statistical theory how to compute a standard deviation, nor how to estimate standard errors.” (2005, 89). In the analyses that follow, I follow the convention of other scholars who have analyzed the data (Baum and Kernell 2001; Schlozman and Verba 1979; Verba and Schlozman 1977; Weatherford and Sereyev 2000) and present standard errors for the estimated coefficients. In effect, I analyze the data as though it was generated through probability sampling. However, when computing quantities of interest to ease interpretation of these results – such as first differences and predicted probabilities – I do not present standard errors. It should be noted that my confidence in the validity of the results does not rely on the statistical tests alone. The convergence of the results across different polls taken at roughly the same time speaks to the robustness of my results.

significantly increases the probability of giving an anti-interventionist response, sometimes it decreases the likelihood of such an answer, and other times it has no effect. Turning to the “dislike” questions, claiming that immigrants from Axis nations make the worst citizens predisposes respondents to support interventionist policies. The effect of the “German worst” variable is in the pro-intervention direction in all six cases and is very large on the question of sending the U.S. armed forces abroad and the question of remaining neutral. Moreover, expressing dislike for Italians decreases anti-interventionist sentiment on all the items.²¹ But it is not the simple dislike of groups that are “different” that drives this result. Respondents who express non-tolerant attitudes towards Jews are more likely to express anti-interventionist sentiment on five of the six questions. Thus, here it is not general resentment toward immigrant groups that drives the group attachment result. Rather, specific attachments and (especially) resentments toward particular groups structures opinion towards the war in sensible ways. To use the terminology of Campbell and LeVine (1961), opinion is not determined simply by universal ethnocentrism; instead, it is ordered by specific stereotypes. As expected, it appears that *domestic* loyalties and animosities determine, in part, where individuals stand on foreign policy issues.

Group Membership and Foreign Policy

²¹ It could be that the results concerning ethnic dislikes are even stronger than the analysis in Table 2 indicates, because there might be omitted variable bias in these analyses. The respondent’s education was not measured on this survey. However, we know that the well educated tend to be more tolerant of racial and ethnic groups and, therefore, should report fewer ethnic dislikes than the less educated respondents. These highly educated respondents also tend to be interventionist in outlook. Thus, in this case, the omitted variable of education is negatively correlated with the dependent variable and negatively correlated with the ethnic hatred variable. In such a case, the coefficient on the ethnic dislike variable would be attenuated toward zero.

Having established the power of sentiment towards other groups in structuring public opinion, I turn next to questions concerning the effect of membership in particular ethnic groups.²² Several surveys from the war period asked respondents to identify where their parents were born. On the basis of this information, we can isolate the ethnic lineage of the survey respondent to see if both parents were born in the U.S. or if at least one of their parents was born in an Axis country, an Allied country, or another foreign country.²³ These groupings can then be used to examine the effect of the respondents' ethnic background on attitudes towards the war. These questions, of course, are not ideal measures of group attachment. First, they only allow us to identify and measure first

²² I do not mean to draw a stark distinction between these two sets of analyses. It is not possible to identify the ethnic identity of the respondents to the Roper survey discussed above. Thus, it could be that the respondents who say that a particular group makes the “best” citizens are members of that group. What distinguishes the analysis in this section from the results presented above is that here I am able to identify precise ethnic attachments. Put another way, the Roper survey allows us to tap likes and dislikes of particular groups, though we do not know the particular ethnic identity of the respondent. On the surveys examined here, we might not be able to measure closeness to particular groups, but we can measure the ethnic identity of the respondents.

²³ To be specific, I created a four-fold typology: (1) Respondents whose parents were both born in the United States (on average about 65-70% of respondents); (2) respondents who had one or both parents born in an Axis country (approximately 6-8% of the sample); (3) respondents who had one or both parents born in an Allied Country (approximately 8-10% of the sample) and (4) A residual category for those respondents who did not fit into any of the first three categories – including respondents who had foreign born parents who did not come from an Axis or an Allied country. The residual category also included respondents who might be subject to crosscutting cleavages, namely those respondents who had one parent born in an Axis country and one parent born in an Allied country. In practice, however, almost no respondents met such a standard. For instance in a January 1941 survey, only 3 of 3168 respondents traced their lineage to both Axis and Allied countries. In general, the 1930s and 1940s were simply a different time, when ethnic groups tended not to intermarry. A majority of individuals with parents from one foreign country tended to marry others from that country, with the rest mostly marrying U.S. born partners. To test the robustness of my results, I ran another set of analyses where I separated people with one foreign-born parent from those with two foreign born parents. Given the relatively small number of individuals in these groups, it is not surprising that these estimates are quite noisy, but I generally find that these analyses replicated the results reported here.

generation effects.²⁴ We cannot trace the precise ethnic lineages of the respondents. Second, the measures do not assess how close the respondent felt toward their own group. But while these measures might not be perfect, they are the only information we have to work with. Analyses using these measures can illuminate important issues of public support for war. In fact, given the same information, the U.S. government performed similar analysis using opinion polls collected by the Survey Division of the Office of War Information.²⁵

I first examined the effect of ethnic identity on opinion before the U.S. became involved in the war using a series of polls conducted by OPOR in the first quarter of 1941. I broke the items concerning war into three groups. First, I identified questions relating to political comprehension. These questions are especially important because they allow us to determine how group attachments affected how individuals understood developments related to the war. The second set is questions

²⁴ Sometimes, however, surveys asked respondents where they themselves were born. Using these measures in place of the parental variables yields results that are similar in magnitude to the first generation results presented below. It appears, then, that native born and first-generation ethnics exhibited similar patterns of political behavior.

²⁵ After the U.S. entered the War, the Office of War Information (OWI) established a Surveys Division, whose assigned task was to monitor civilian morale and collect data on public attitudes and behavior concerning the war. Though OWI, like other wartime government agencies employed social scientists, the Office did not have a national field staff or people experienced in survey operations. The NORC organization was therefore awarded a contract to run surveys for OWI. Several OWI reports presented the relationship between a respondent's parental heritage and opinion concerning the war. One report, "How the People of the United States Would Fight This War." (January 12, 1942) presented breakdowns of prospective war opinion by the same Allied/Axis distinction used here. Another report – "How the populace regards the government's handling of war news" (Jan 22, 1942) "examined ethnic breakdowns on opinion concerning the way the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor was handled. Other contemporary observers were interested in the role of ethnicity as well. Cantril, for instance, traced group influence by examining the Catholic/Protestant split on the question of whether we should help England and concluded, "When Catholics looked toward Europe, they tended to look on the European scene as both Americans and Catholics, whereas when they looked toward the East, their religious frames of reference did not apply and they held essentially the same nationalistic opinion as did Europeans" (19XX, 183).

that directly ask about the war in Europe. Finally, I examined questions concerning war extending beyond the European theater.

I again ran my analyses using unordered MNL.²⁶ Because I can trace trends over time through multiple surveys, rather than presenting first differences, I present the predicted probability of holding an interventionist attitude for an “average” respondent who differs only in their ethnic background. Specifically, I compute the predicted opinion for three groups: (1) the respondent whose parents were both born in the U.S. (2) the respondent with at least one parent from an Allied country, (3) the respondent with at least one parent from an Axis country.

In Table 3, I present the effect of ethnic identity on the three classes of variables (the full model results are presented in Appendix B).²⁷ Turning first to the political understanding questions,

²⁶ These runs control for the region of residence, size of town, occupation, gender, race, and education of the respondent, following the strategy outlined by Berinsky (2005).

²⁷ The precise wordings of these questions are (in the order in which they appear in Table 3): (1) “Which side do you think is winning the war now – Germany and Italy or England?” (2) “Which side do you think will win the war if no other countries go into it – Germany and Italy or England?” (3) “If Germany and Italy defeat England in the present war, do you think that Germany and Italy will start a war with the United States within the next 10 years?” (4) “If Germany defeats England in the present war, do you think you will be as free to do what you want to as you are now?” (5) “Do you think that, if England falls, Germany will soon be in control of all of our trade and foreign markets?” (6) “Which side do you think will win the war – Germany and Italy, or England?” (7) “If Germany and Italy should defeat England in the present war, do you think Germany and Italy would start a war against the United States within the next 10 years?” (8) “Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the United States to try to do? To keep out of war ourselves or to help England win, even at the risk of getting into the war?” (9) “Which of these two things do you think is the more important? That this country keeps out of war, or that Germany be defeated, even at the risk of our getting into the war?” (10) “Would you be willing to fight or have any man of military age in your family fight overseas if the United States gets involved in the war in Europe?” (11) “If American merchant ship with American crews are used to carry war materials to Britain, and some of them are sunk by the Germans on the way over, would you be in favor of going to war against Germany?” (12) “Do you think the United States should go to war only after it has actually been invaded, or do you think that there are times when we should

individuals with ethnic ties to the Axis countries are less likely than other groups think that England will win the war, and tend to attribute less sinister motives to Germany and Italy. Conversely, individuals from Allied countries are more likely to take a positive view of the Allied war effort and are slightly more likely to take a dismal view of the prospect of a world under Axis rule. In some cases, these differences are extremely large. For instance, the gap between Allied and Axis ethnics on questions of whether Italy and Germany will start a war was 33 percent on the March 12, 1941 survey and 28 percent on the March 28, 1941 survey.

Turning next to questions concerning actions in Europe, Table 3 demonstrates that the effect of ethnic identity extends beyond the realm of political understanding into the domain of political choice, especially for those respondents who descend from parents born in Axis countries. The “European Theater” questions concern the tradeoff between helping England and staying out of the war, the tradeoff between defeating Germany and staying out of the war, and the question of whether the respondent would be willing to fight in Europe if the U.S. became involved.

The “help England” question is especially significant because it essentially serves as a referendum on FDR’s war policy. Contrary to conventional wisdom, while isolationism may have died at Pearl Harbor, it began its death throws almost a year earlier. Aggregate support for helping England had increased over the course of 1940, and by January 1941 more respondents wanted to help England than wanted to take a course of action ensuring that the US would stay out of the war. Clearly, the American public on the whole was mobilizing for U.S. involvement in the European theater. But not all Americans felt the same way; important variation existed on the basis of ethnic identity.

fight before we are invaded?” (13) “Should the United States take steps now to keep Japan from becoming more powerful, even if this means risking a war with Japan?” (14) “If Brazil, Argentina, Chile or any other Central or South American country is actually attacked by any European power, do you think the United States should fight to keep that European power out?”

All three times that the question concerning whether it was more important to help England was asked, respondents whose parents were born in Axis countries were far less likely to support helping England. The average difference between respondents with native-born parents and those with at least one parent born in an Axis country is 28 percent. With regards to questions concerning involvement in the war in Europe that do not directly ask about England, the gap between respondents descending from Axis countries and those whose parents were born in the US was smaller, but still sizable.

The effect of having parents born in Allied countries was considerably smaller across the board on the “help England” questions. On average, having an Allied parent increased interventionist sentiment by ten points, less than half the size of the Axis parent effect. In addition, the substantive effect of Allied heritage also shrank over time. The diminishing effect of allied heritage, however, is not the result of diminished support among those of Allied heritage. Rather, during this time support among native-born Americans increased greatly. On the other questions concerning the European theater, the effect of the Allied parent variable is smaller still.²⁸

Turning finally to the proximate questions – whether the U.S. should fight preemptive wars, whether the U.S. should risk war to contain Japan, and whether the U.S. should defend Latin America if it were attacked by European powers – the effects of the ethnic background variables are in the same direction as before, but the effects are diminished in size. The Allied parent variable effect is rather small. In the Axis parent case, however, the effects remain powerful, and influences

²⁸ The pattern of results also suggests that it is not the mere mention of a particular country that triggers affect. When Germany is specifically mentioned (in the split-sample experiment in the January 28, 1941 OPOR survey) the effect of Axis country parentage is smaller than in the “help England” form of the question. It appears, therefore, that the mention of England is a trigger for both positive affect among those from Allied countries and negative affect for those respondents from Axis countries.

even attitudes toward war with Japan. Furthermore, significant differences remain between the Allied and Axis ethnic groups.

Clearly, the power of some ethnic ties are stronger than others. Attachments to Axis countries through one's parents structure a variety of war-related attitudes. The Allied parenting variable on the other hand is less powerful, more limited in scope, and appears to diminish in strength with time. It appears that, over the course of the first quarter of 1941, the children of parents born in the Allied countries came to think more like decedents of American citizens, while the children of parents born in Axis countries retained a distinct opinion on the war.

It is also interesting to note that the effects of ethnic identity are not conditioned by the respondent's attention to politics. Unlike the effects of partisan attachment (Berinsky 2006), the effect of ethnic identity is the same at all levels of political sophistication. This result suggests that group membership is indeed a gut instinct that structures opinion on the war, independent of political attentiveness. Even among political sophisticates, groups play an important role in political cognition and choice.

Post-U.S. Entry.

I next examined data collected after the U.S. became involved in the Second World War. The data here is plentiful. OPOP regularly asked the ethnic heritage question from 1942 through the end of the war. As a result, it is possible to extend the pre-war analysis and trace trends over long periods of time.

To demonstrate patterns of opinion along ethnic lines, I followed the same analytic strategy as I did with the pre-war data. However, because more data exists in the 1942-1945 era, I present time-trend graphs of the predicted views of the different ethnic groups (the full model results are

presented in Appendix C).²⁹ This analysis indicates that the conventional wisdom that viewed Pearl Harbor as a grand unifying event is incorrect. The pre-war differences on questions of understanding and choice persisted even after the U.S. became directly involved in World War II.

I first take up the questions relating to understanding. I examined three questions. The first asks, “Do you think Russia can be trusted to cooperate with us after the war is over?” The second asks, “Can England be depended upon to cooperate with us after the war?” The final question was, “Which of these two statements do you think is closer to the truth? (1) England is now fighting mainly to keep her power and wealth. (2) England is now fighting mainly to preserve democracy against the spread of dictatorship.”

Large differences exist between those of Axis and Allied heritage on questions of trust.³⁰ There is some over-time movement in sentiment toward Russia among all ethnic groups, indicating that factors other than ethnic identity provide structure to opinion (Figure 1). But even so, the differences between the different ethnic groups endure. Those respondents descending from Axis countries are always less trusting of Russia and England (Figure 2) and are less sanguine about England’s motives (Figure 3). Citizens descended from Allied countries, on the other hand, take a more positive view of the Allies than do respondents with two native-born parents.

²⁹ I use a loess smoothing algorithm (Cleveland 1979) to trace opinion trends over time because fewer respondents were interviewed in the surveys in the post war period (approximately 1000 per survey as opposed to the 3500-case surveys analyzed above). As a result, the estimates of the effects of ethnic background are based on fewer cases than was the case for the pre-war data.

³⁰ These differences remain even if we strip out those ethnic groups referred to in the question. That is, the same results obtain on the “trust Russia” question after removing those respondents of Russian heritage from the analysis.

On the question of opinion toward the war, the central item of interests whether the respondent would be willing to make peace with the German Army.³¹ This question serves as a referendum on support for the stated U.S. policy of unconditional surrender. As Figure 4 demonstrates, fairly consistent trends emerge across the war years. Though there is some movement in opinion over time, sentiment on this question largely remains stable from 1942 to 1945. What is most distinctive is the behavior of the Axis group. In the first year of American involvement, respondents descended from Axis countries were about 20 points less supportive of war than native-born respondents. This gap closed over time, but remained on the order of 10 to 15 percentage points through the end of the war. Respondents descended from Allied countries, on the other hand, were slightly more supportive of the policy of unconditional surrender through 1945, mirroring the general shape of opinion that crystallized in early 1941. As was true before the U.S. entered the war, Allied ethnics took a consistently more hawkish posture than native-born Americans, but this difference was fairly small, never growing more than five percentage points in size.³²

These differences among ethnic groups extend to the question of how severe a peace treaty should be relative to the Treaty of Versailles. Throughout the war years, Allied ethnics and native U.S. respondents both recommended a punitive resolution to the war. As Figure 5 demonstrates, by

³¹ Specifically, the question asks, “If the German Army overthrew Hitler and then offered to stop the war and discuss peace terms, with the allies, would you favor or oppose the offer of the German army?”

³² OPOR also asked respondents, “If Hitler offered peace now to all countries on the basis of not going farther, but of leaving matters as they are now, would you favor or oppose such a peace?” The differences between the ethnic groups are largely the same as those presented here. It should be noted that at a couple points on the Figure 4, opposition to making peace with the German army is relatively low. In these two cases, respondents were first asked if they would be willing to make peace with Hitler. A question-wording experiment performed early in the war demonstrates that the net effect of asking the “Hitler” variant of the question before the “German army” form of the question is to drop opposition to making peace with the German army by about 10 percent, thereby explaining the divergent findings.

the end of 1943, a ten-point gap opened up between these groups and those respondents who descended from Axis countries.

Further evidence for the distinctive opinion of ethnic groups can be found on questions measuring the respondent's desired level of international cooperation. Several times from 1942 to 1945, OPOR asked respondents if the U.S. should embrace the dominant orthodoxy in foreign policy that emerged after Pearl Harbor (Legro 2000) and take an active role in world affairs after the war.³³ Figure 6 demonstrates that Allied ethnics adopted this view early in the war, while respondents descended from Axis countries were less supportive of such a position. However, these gaps shrank over the course of the war, coinciding with a general rise in internationalist sentiment. By end of the war, all three groups held roughly the same view.

The Modern Era: Attitude Towards Trade and Groups

The argument in this paper is that ordinary individuals come to understand complex foreign policies, in part by using the lens of group attachments and dislikes forged upon the domestic political scene. This phenomenon should not be particular to World War II. I next demonstrate the power of groups to determine opinion concerning foreign policy in a modern political context, by examining attitudes concerning sanctions against South Africa in the mid-1980s and Japan/U.S. trade relations in the early 1990s. Though issues of trade are unlike issues of war in many ways, both involve complicated subjects removed from the everyday lives of ordinary Americans. As expected, I find that in issues of foreign economic policy, as in issues of war, individuals understand complex events in part by relying on domestic political attachments and dislikes.

South African Sanctions

³³ Specifically, the question asked, "Which of these two things do you think the United States should do after the war is over: (1) stay out of world affairs as much as we can, or (2) take an active part in world affairs?"

The first example I draw upon is one with clear linkages between the domestic and political spheres; sanctions against South Africa in the mid-1980s.³⁴ From the early 1960s through the early 1980s, U.S. policy toward South Africa was driven largely by economic concerns. The resources and markets of South Africa made it an attractive trading partner for the U.S. At the same time the policy of apartheid enacted in 1948 – where blacks in South Africa were separated from whites and denied voting rights – created a tension between economic interests and moral considerations. Beginning in the 1960s, the General Assembly of the United Nations began passing motions condemning South Africa and, in the mid-1970s, passed the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. This convention provided a legal framework within which nations could apply sanctions to press the South African government to change its racial politics.

By the mid-1980s, the tension between economic and moral concerns began to tip towards morality. Concern about South Africa among political actors had spread into a series of mass protests in the United States. However, the Regan administration was especially hostile to the notion of enacting sanctions, referring to the incumbent South Africa Botha Administration as “an ally and a friend,” leading to a series of conflict between Reagan and the Democratic Congress. Spurred by the Congressional Black Caucus, in 1985 the House passed a bill calling for sanctions on South Africa, including broad restrictions on trade and the divestment of economic interests of U.S. companies. The Senate followed shortly thereafter. This effort was preempted by an Executive Order imposing more limited economic sanctions. At the time he signed the order, Reagan stated that he opposed sanctions, but issued the order to forestall the harsher sanctions envisioned by

³⁴ The material for this section is drawn from <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/saessayx.htm> (Accessed March 6, 2006).

Congress. But the next year, over Reagan's veto, Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which prohibited U.S. trade and other economic relations with South Africa.

The South Africa sanctions issue meets Converse's conditions facilitating group-based cognition. Given the clear racial component of the South Africa issues, and the obvious parallels to the U.S. experience with slavery, the links between the relevant domestic group – blacks – and the international issue are relatively apparent. Moreover the centrality of race in the contemporary political scene (Kinder and Sanders 1996, Carmines and Stimson 1990) ensured that attitudes about Blacks as a domestic group were well developed at this time. The South Africa case is especially advantageous for present purposes, because it avoids completely the questions of endogeneity raised by the World War II-era analyses. It is simply not plausible to argue that feeling towards Blacks in the U.S. arose from attitudes toward the government in South Africa; the flow of the causal arrow from domestic groups to foreign policies is indisputable.

Previous research supports the prevalence of group-based thinking on the South Africa question. Hill (1993) examined data from the 1988 National Elections Study and found that Americans used their general racial posture – measured by the racial resentment scale (Kinder and Sanders 1996) – to come to judgments concerning sanctions.³⁵ Here I turn to a similar dataset – the 1986 National Elections Study to assess the impact of groups.

To measure attitudes on the desirability of sanction, I draw upon the same NES question about South Africa used by Hill (1993).³⁶ This question was asked in a fully filtered form:

³⁵ Kinder and Sanders (1996) also find that racial resentment is a significant predictor of opinions on sanctions in 1986.

³⁶ Hill uses the 1988 NES for his analysis. I use the 1986 data for two reasons. First, I wish to confirm that Hill's findings replicate in an independent dataset. Second, I wish to create a more difficult test by situating the controversy in a more explicitly partisan context. In 1986, the battle lines over the sanctions issue were clear; the Democratic Congress and the Republican president were at odds. To the extent that group

Respondents were first asked if they had an opinion on U.S. policy toward South Africa. Almost half of those asked said that they did not have an opinion. The remaining respondents were then asked their opinion regarding sanctions.³⁷ Given the structure of the question-answering decision and the large portion of respondents who did not answer the question, I estimated jointly the decision to offer a response and the direction of response using a bivariate probit selection model (Dubin and Rivers 1990; Greene 1997; for a similar application, see Berinsky 1999, 2002a, 2004).

To measure group membership, I use the respondent's race, scored as a dummy variable for Black respondents. To measure attitudes toward the relevant out-group, African-Americans, I use the racial resentment scale, which is designed to measure racial animosity through the use of subtle questions (Kinder and Sanders 1996). While this measure is widely used to tap attitudes towards blacks, it remains controversial. Some researchers claim that racial resentment is essentially just a measure of opposition to government assistance (Schuman 2000; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986). Others find that the racial resentment scale measures different concepts for liberals and conservatives (Feldman and Huddy 2005). For my purposes, this controversy is not directly relevant, because I am interested in measuring affect towards Blacks in the domestic setting. Since each of the items in the racial resentment scale battery mentions "Blacks" and taps feelings toward that group, the racial resentment scale is appropriate and, most importantly, exogenous to my issue of interest – sanctions towards South Africa. Still, I recognize that some scholars might be skeptical of the use of this measure; I therefore replicated my analysis with two additional measures of affect toward blacks

membership and attitudes structure opinion in this heavily partisan context, we can have greater confidence of their independent predictive power.

³⁷ The precise wording of the question was, "Lately, South Africa has been in the news a lot. Have you read or heard enough about what's going on there to have an opinion about what U.S. policy toward South Africa should be? [if yes] some people think that the U.S... should apply economic pressure to get the South African government to change its racial laws. Others think that the U.S. should not do this. What do you think-- should the U.S. apply economic pressure or not?"

– feeling thermometer scores for “Blacks” and support for spending on Blacks. Analyses that use these alternative measures replicate the findings obtained using racial resentment.³⁸ I also included a series of demographic and attitudinal control variables in my analysis, though the tenor of the results does not change if the controls are removed.³⁹

The full model results are presented in Appendix D.⁴⁰ The important point for the present purposes is that both in-group membership and feeling toward the relevant domestic group are both highly significant in both a statistical and substantive sense.⁴¹ To explicate the substantive effects of these variables, I present first differences for the variables of interest in Table 4. The first row gives the effect of race for the modal respondent on the probability that he would support sanctions, given that he has offered an opinion to the question. The next row presents the effect of a move from the minimum (observed) value to the maximum value of racial resentment. Finally, for purposes of comparison, the third row presents the effect of moving from a being a strong

³⁸ I adjusted the Black feeling thermometer score to control for interpersonal differences in the use of the feeling thermometer scale by including the mean of the feeling thermometer rating given to four balanced groups, namely liberals, conservatives, Democrats, and Republicans (Winter and Berinsky 1999).

³⁹ The bivariate probit selection model requires an exclusion restriction to identify the model. Specifically, at least one variable must be included in the selection equation, but excluded from the outcome equation. Here I follow the strategy employed in my previous work on racial questions and social welfare policy (Berinsky 1999, 2002a, 2002b, 2004) and use measures of political information and political discussion to identify the model. As with my earlier work, I also included measures indicating how difficult it was to contact the respondents, on the assumption that those who are difficult to reach would also be less likely to answer specific survey questions (Brehm 1993).

⁴⁰ It should be noted that a likelihood-ratio test on ρ indicates that selection bias exists in the question answering process. The estimates presented here correct for that bias.

⁴¹ I measure statistical significance here with a likelihood ratio test across the two-equation system. Thus, though the race variable fails to reach conventional levels of significance in the outcome equation, the effect of race is significant across the selection and outcome equations. Overall, then, the effect of race on the question-answering process is significant.

Republican to a strong Democrat. Given the strong partisan component of the South Africa issue, party identification should have a large effect on opinion.

Table 4 demonstrates that, as expected, both group-based variables have strong effects. I find that Blacks were 18 percent more likely than whites to support sanctions. The effect of attitudes toward Blacks is even stronger. The most racial resentful respondents are 45 percent less likely to support sanctions than the least resentful respondents, an effect even larger than that of party identification.

Japan/U.S. Trade Relations

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, economic relations between the U.S. and Japan were a prominent political issue. Japanese businesses made major gains in the U.S. market and the future of the competitiveness of U.S. business was in doubt. Perhaps the most emblematic image of this era was the picture of George H.W. Bush vomiting on the Prime Minister of Japan while on a trip in January 1992 to negotiate greater market access for American businesses in Japan.

On this issue, as with the question of sanctions and South Africa, I expect that domestic and international opinions will be linked through affect toward relevant groups. Specifically I predict that feelings towards Asian-Americans – as a domestic ethnic group – should structure opinions about policy toward Japan.⁴²

To tap beliefs toward economic policy, I draw upon a question, asked by the National Elections Study in 1992: “Which of the following statements comes closer to your opinion one, Japanese companies are competing unfairly with American companies; or two, the United States is blaming Japan for its own economic problems.”⁴³ To test this hypothesis, I modeled responses to

⁴² I do not examine the effect of the relevant group membership here, because only 18 Asian Americans were included in the 1992 NES sample, a figure that represents about one percent of the total sample.

⁴³ A number of respondents also volunteered that “both” parties were to blame.

this question using, as my primary independent variable, the feeling thermometer toward “Asian American.” However, generalized sentiment toward minority groups could also affect opinion.⁴⁴ I therefore included a measure of ethnocentrism, modeled on Kinder’s work, to assess the relative role of beliefs towards group relations in general.⁴⁵ In my runs, I included both of the group-based measures, along with a series of control variables.⁴⁶

The full MNL analysis is presented in Appendix D. To ease interpretation of my analysis, I first ran a series on likelihood ratio tests to assess whether a given variable had an effect on the structure of choice. I found that ethnocentrism and feelings toward Asian Americans both had significant effects. To further ease the interpretation of these results, in Table 5, I present the effect of a move from the minimum (observed) value to the maximum value of a variable on the probability that the modal respondent would blame Japan for the economic problems. As Kinder predicts, I find that ethnocentrism has a powerful effect on the probability that an individual attributes economic problems to Japan. The most ethnocentric individuals are 29 percent more likely than the least ethnocentric to blame Japan for the economic problems. However, as predicted, it is not simply general affect that matters; feelings toward Asian-Americans have an almost equally large

⁴⁴ To make sure that it is not general hostility towards particular groups that drives my results, I included a measure of sentiment toward “fundamentalists.” As expected I found that this measure had no effect on opinion, indicating that it is opinion about a particular group that drives the result.

⁴⁵ To employ the ethnocentrism variable, I restricted the sample to whites only. Kinder measures ethnocentrism by assessing a respondent’s willingness to subscribe to particular stereotypes about particular groups. Specifically he measures the respondent’s belief that “lazy” “unintelligent” and “violent” describe Blacks, Hispanics, and Asian-Americans. Here I use a modified version of this measure, using only serotypes of Blacks and Hispanics (for obvious reasons).

⁴⁶ This analysis also included a series of control variables: gender, education, political ideology, partisanship, subscription to principles of equality, trust in government, census region, and – as in the South Africa sanctions analysis – the mean feeling thermometer rating given to 6 balanced groups to control for interpersonal differences in the use of feeling thermometers (Winter and Berinsky 1999).

effect – those most cool toward Asian Americans are 27 percent more likely to blame Japan than individuals most warm to Asian Americans.

Certainly, these results are not definitive. The types of endogeneity concerns raised in the discussion of ethnic groups during World War II almost certainly plague this analysis. Perhaps individuals who blame Japan for the U.S.'s economic problems came to dislike Asian Americans in the years before the NES was conducted. Indeed the World War II experience suggests that such a process is plausible. In 1939, a relatively small percentage of Americans said that the Japanese were the worst immigrant groups. But after the U.S. entered the war against Japan, Japanese-Americans were forced into internment camps.

That said, the evidence for the power of groups in the modern era is strong. The findings concerning the distinctiveness of the effects of feelings towards Asian-American as a group together with the South Africa findings suggest that the phenomenon identified in the context of World War II provides a more general structure for public opinion about foreign policy.

Conclusion

TABLE 1:
THE DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC GROUP ATTACHMENTS AND HOSTILITY

ROPER AUGUST 1939

Of the people now in the U.S. who were born in foreign countries, which nationality would you say has made the best citizens? Which the worst?

Best:

1. Germans:	13%
2. English:	10%
3. Irish:	6%
4. Scandinavians:	5%
5. Swedes:	4%

Worst:

1. Italians:	22%
2. Jews:	6%
3. Germans:	4%
4. Sicilians:	3%
5. Japanese:	2% (6% on the pacific coast)

TABLE 2:
THE POWER OF ETHNIC ATTACHMENTS AND ANIMOSITIES: GROUP
ATTACHMENT AND ENMITY EFFECTS

Roper, August 1939

	Tend to Own Business	No question so important that US should risk war	Don't allow England/France buy Food
English Best	-.07	-.05	-.02
Germans Best	.00	-.03	.00
Italians Best	.02	-.02	.02
Germans Worst	-.01	-.02	-.02
Italians Worst	-.01	-.02	-.02
Restrict Rights of Jews in America [†]	.01	.05	.03

	Don't allow England/France buy war supplies	Don't send Army and Navy Abroad to Help	Remain Neutral
English Best	-.05	-.13	-.03
Germans Best	.02	.06	.04
Italians Best	.05	.06	.07
Germans Worst	-.03	-.11	-.11
Italians Worst	-.06	-.05	-.01
Restrict Rights of Jews in America [†]	.03	.03	-.01

†=Rejecting the statement "In the United States the Jews have the same standing as any other people, and they should be treated in all ways exactly as any other Americans"

Cell entries are the Effect of giving a particular response to the likes/dislikes question on the probability of choosing an isolationist response

Note: The model respondent is a female lower-middle class resident of New England on a rural farm who is a housewife, a student, or retired who expresses tolerance for Jews and states no like or dislike of any particular ethnic group. The results do not change significantly if other model respondent profiles are used.

**TABLE 3:
THE POWER OF ETHNIC ATTACHMENTS, PRE-AMERICAN ENTRY INTO WWII**

POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING

Date	U.S. Born Parents	Allied Parents	Axis Parent
England is Winning the War			
January 28, 1941	.30	.38	.21
England will Win the War if No Other Countries Enter			
March 12, 1941	.58	.68	.42
If England Looses, Germany and Italy Will Start a War			
March 12, 1941	.61	.70	.37
If Germany Wins, I Will Be As Free As I Am Now			
March 12, 1941	.36	.38	.53
If Germany Wins, They Will Control Trade			
March 12, 1941	.17	.20	.12
England Will Win The War			
March 28, 1941	.83	.91	.68
Italy and Germany Will Start a War within 10 Years			
March 28, 1941	.67	.71	.43

Note: The model respondent is a rural resident of the Midwest a housewife, a student, or retired, who is of “average” class and has some high school education. The results do not change significantly if other model respondent profiles are used.

TABLE 3 (CONTINUED):**EUROPEAN THEATER**

Date	U.S. Born Parents	Allied Parents	Axis Parent
Help England vs. Stay Out			
January 28, 1941	.56	.74	.30
March 12, 1941	.62	.70	.30
March 28, 1941	.74	.79	.47
Defeat Germany vs. Stay Out			
January 28, 1941	.52	.61	.36
Willing to Fight in Europe if U.S. Gets Involved?			
March 12, 1941	.46	.53	.32
Vote to Go to War?			
January 28, 1941	.10	.14	.05
Favor War if Convoy is Sunk?			
January 28, 1941	.17	.20	.12

Note: The model respondent is a rural resident of the Midwest a housewife, a student, or retired, who is of “average” class and has some high school education. The results do not change significantly if other model respondent profiles are used.

TABLE 3 (CONTINUED)

PROXIMATE QUESTIONS

Date	U.S. Born Parents	Allied Parents	Axis Parent
The U.S. should fight Preemptive Wars?			
March 12, 1941	.51	.58	.33
U.S. Should Risk War to Keep Japan Down			
March 28, 1941	.56	.63	.50
Defend Latin America if Attacked by European Power?			
March 28, 1941	.75	.77	.69

Note: The model respondent is a rural resident of the Midwest a housewife, a student, or retired, who is of “average” class and has some high school education. The results do not change significantly if other model respondent profiles are used.

TABLE 4:
NES 1986: DETERMINANTS OF SUPPORT FOR SANCTIONS

Effect of moving from minimum value to maximum value on probability of supporting sanctions
(conditioning on answering the sanctions question)

Variable	Minimum Value	Maximum Value	Effect
Racial Resentment	0.70	0.24	-0.47
Black	0.45	0.63	0.18
Party Identification	0.27	0.59	0.32

All values have been set to the mean except for categorical variables, which have been set to their mode.

TABLE 5:
NES 1992: DETERMINANTS OF ATTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Effect of moving from minimum value to maximum value on probability of Attributing U.S.
economic problems to Japan

Variable	Minimum Value	Maximum Value	Effect
Asian-American FT	0.51	0.24	0.27
Ethnocentrism	0.47	0.18	0.29

All values have been set to the mean except for categorical variables, which have been set to their mode.

Figure 1:
Trust Russia After War?




Figure 2:
Trust England After War?




Figure 3:
England is Fighting Only to Preserve Democracy




Figure 4:
Oppose Peace with The German Army




Figure 5:
Make Treaty More Severe than Last War





Figure 6:
Take an Internationalist Posture After War



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**APPENDIX A: THE POWER OF ETHNIC ATTACHMENTS AND ANIMOSITIES: GROUP
ATTACHMENT AND ENMITY EFFECTS**

Roper, August 1939

Tk

**APPENDIX B: THE POWER OF ETHNIC ATTACHMENTS, PRE-AMERICAN ENTRY
INTO WWII**

**APPENDIX C: THE POWER OF ETHNIC ATTACHMENTS, POST-AMERICAN ENTRY
INTO WWII**

APPENDIX D: ECONOMIC POLICY ANALYSIS

NES 1986: SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA

TK

NES 1992: ATTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Variable	Japanese to Blame vs. U.S. is to blame		Both to Blame vs. U.S. is to blame		DK vs. U.S. is to blame	
	Coefficient	(SE)	Coefficient	(SE)	Coefficient	(SE)
Constant	0.11	(0.47)	-0.61	(0.72)	-1.78	(1.28)
Asian-American FT	-1.36	(0.48)**	0.44	(0.80)	0.88	(1.29)
Fundamentalist FT	0.17	(0.30)	-0.44	(0.81)	-0.88	(1.28)
Immigrant FT	-0.38	(0.39)	0.84	(0.47)*	0.29	(0.86)
Mean FT Score	1.84	(0.72)**	0.15	(0.67)	-0.20	(1.02)
Ethnocentrism	0.50	(0.35)	-1.75	(0.63)**	0.29	(0.93)
Male	0.17	(0.12)	-0.07	(0.18)	-0.46	(0.35)
Education Level	-0.66	(0.28)**	-0.48	(0.42)	-0.97	(0.79)
Liberal	-0.34	(0.18)*	-0.55	(0.29)*	-0.24	(0.59)
Conservative	0.14	(0.16)	0.03	(0.24)	-0.08	(0.48)
No Ideology	-0.34	(0.18)*	-0.46	(0.29)	0.53	(0.45)
Party Identification	0.17	(0.10)*	-0.14	(0.17)	-0.17	(0.28)
Equality	-0.25	(0.34)	0.30	(0.53)	-1.23	(0.98)
Trust in Government	-0.75	(0.29)**	-1.08	(0.47)**	0.57	(0.74)
Northwest	-0.19	(0.19)	0.05	(0.28)	-0.91	(0.70)
Midwest	-0.04	(0.17)	-0.00	(0.26)	0.31	(0.47)
South	-0.23	(0.17)	-0.18	(0.27)	-0.02	(0.49)

N = 1469

LL= = -1467.77

**=p<.05 *=p<.10 (2-Tailed Test)

Note: "U.S. is to blame" is the base category.