Devise a paper topic of your own. (If you chose this option you must clear your topic with me by sending me a description of your topic by email.)

Critically evaluate Schlesinger's interpretation of McTaggart's argument that it is impossible that there be an A-series. Do you think Schlesinger's interpretation is correct? Do you agree that on Schlesinger's interpretation, McTaggart's argument is a good one?

(If you choose this topic you will need to clearly explain Schlesinger's interpretation; state your reasons, drawing on Mctaggart's paper, for thinking it is or is not a good interpretation; and evaluate the argument.)

Schlesinger claims that the Doctrine of the Similarity of Space and Time is false. But he has a theory about which necessarily true "temporal" sentences have necessarily true "spatial" counterparts, and vice-versa. Is Schlesinger's theory correct?

(If you choose this topic you will need to state the Doctrine, clearly state Schlesinger's theory (be sure to explain all technical terms that occur in these explanations), consider some potential counterexamples to Schlesinger's theory, and evaluate whether they are indeed counterexamples.)

In "Bringing About the Past" Dummett discusses an argument for (a view he calls) fatalism. (Beware: his definition of "fatalism" appears to differ from van Inwagen's.) Critically evaluate his discussion. Just what argument is Dummett discussing? What does Dummett think is wrong with the argument? Do you agree with him about its flaws?

Is time travel possible? Critically evaluate an argument (or some arguments) that time travel is impossible. (You can choose from the arguments we discussed in class, or that Lewis discusses in his paper; or some argument of your own devising.)

Warning: This is a dangerous topic. As with discussions of the passage of time, it is very easy when discussing time travel to say things that make no sense. (Remember assignment 2?) If you choose this topic, be very careful to be clear.

This topic draws on our discussion of whether there can be time without change and our discussion of the reality of the passage of time.

Shoemaker claims, at the beginning of his paper, that "McTaggartian" changes are not "genuine changes." But near the end of his paper he admits that in the possible world he imagines (a world in which there are changeless intervals of time), we may have to accept that Mctaggartian changes are genuine changes after all. What argument for this conclusion does he have in mind? Is this argument a good one? If this conclusion is true, does it follow that in Shoemaker's imagined world time's passage is a real phenomenon?

(If you choose this topic you will need to give clear definitions, with examples, of "genuine change" and "McTaggartian change," construct an argument for or against the claim that McTaggartian changes are not genuine changes, and evaluate that argument.)

Some philosophers think that welfare is "additive": they think that the welfare-value of someone's entire life is simply the sum of that person's momentary welfare levels. Is this true? If not, then what relationship does the welfare-value of someone's entire life bear to that person's momentary welfare levels?

(You will need to explain and evaluate some argument(s) we have discussed against "additivity." "Welfare-value of someone's entire life" and "momentary welfare level" are technical terms: you'll need to define them; your definition should enable someone who did not take this class to grasp these concepts.)